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Abstract. 
This thesis attempts to determine the extent of the ideological commitment and opposition to 
the purging of Parliament and the subsequent execution of King Charles. It analYses the role 
of one individual and four groups involved in the politics of the English Revolution. The first 
chapter will focus upon the activities of Oliver Cromwell. Chapter two will ana, lyse the levels 
of commitment to the revolution amongst the Members of Parliament that survived the 
purges. The third chapter will consider the role of House of Lords. The last two chapters will 
consider the influence of a political group traditionally called the Presbyterians with the final 
chapter focussing on the contemporary press. 
The argument presented will suggest that one of the reasons for the failure of the Republican 
Government to implement reform rests with the activities of groups outside of Westminster. It 
will also argue that there was an attachment to the principle of political change amongst men 
who withdrew from politics before the signing of Charles's death warrant but returned in 
February 1649 to engage in politics. The commitment demonstrated by this group who were 
supported but not led by Oliver Cromwell, contrasts with the opponents of revolution who 
failed to unite and lacked a sufficient ideological commitment to launch a challenge to the 
new Government. All of these decisions were taken at a time when the press was relatively 
free and developing their own political agenda. 
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Aspects of the English Revolution 
December 1648 - Mqy 1649 
This thesis will focus upon the events between Pride's Purge and the formal establishment of 
a Commonwealth in May 16491. May has been used as a boundary for two reasons; first it 
marks the collapse of the Leveller or army mutinies which had seriously threatened the new 
regime. Second, May was an important month symbolically since Monarchy was formally 
replaced with a new style of Government. 
Samuel Gardiner's work upon this period remains the most detailed narrative of the events 
which led to the regicide and the subsequent establishment of the Commonwealth. He saw the 
revolution as the triumph of the radical Independent Party over the more moderate 
Presbyterians; although the latter had a larger parliamentary majority, the Independent's 
victory was due to the unequivocal support they received from the New Model Army. The 
radical rump of Independent MPs then governed the nation for more than three years. 
According to Gardiner, this novel Parliament failed to implement reforms because they 
became a corrupt government characterised by power seeking and self-indulgence. Finally, 
Cromwell's patience was exhausted when the Rump initiated proposals to perpetuate their 
own power. In April 1653 the Long Parliament was dissolved by the New Model Army. 2 
1 C. H Firth and R. S Rait The Acts and Ordinances of the Interregnum 1642-1660 3 vols 
(London 1911), vol ii p. 120. 
2 S. R. Gardiner, A Histojy of The Commonwealth to the Protectorate 1649-1656 4 vols 
(1893). This is the overriding argument in his work. It was centrally challenged by Blair 
Worden cited below n. 6,7 and 8 below. 
I 
The publication of David Underdown's Pride's Purge fatally undermined Gardiner's dualist 
portrayal of Parliamentary politics. Developing upon the work of Jack Hexter and Valerie 
Pearl3' Professor Underdown demonstrated that, throughout the 1640s the majority of MPs 
could not be consistently identified with either the Presbyterians or the Independents. But 
most importantly for the purposes of this thesis, Professor. Underdown argues that 
membership of the Rump was not synonymous with support for the events which brought the 
Republic into existence. He suggests that the crucial decision which explains the Rump 
Parliament's moderation was taken upon the 1" February 1649. MPs who had failed to 
register their dissent to the 5 th December vote were permitted to resume membership upon the 
condition that they acknowledged the error of their ways and subscribed to the dissent, albeit 
belatedly. These "conformist"4 MPs returned (over one hundred in number) during February 
and their numerical advantage 5 'over the revolutionaries (defined as those men who had taken 
the dissent prior to 30th January and/or were regicides) explains the Rump's failure to extend 
the revolution beyond the execution of the King. In addition to this valuable argument, 
Professor Underdown's narrative of the events between the purge and regicide raises a 
number of issues which were not considered by Samuel Gardiner. First, he argues that 
Westminster politics cannot be isolated from the events in the localities. Second, he provides 
useful information upon the opposition to the new regime from the Levellers and the 
Presbyterians. Finally, Pride's Purge includes a sustained portrayal of Oliver Cromell, 
suggesting that the contradictions of the Commonwealth are partially explained by the 
ambiguities and complexities found in the personality of the future Lord Protector. 
3 J. H. Hexter Reign of King Pyrn (Cambridge. Mass 1941). Valerie Pearl "Oliver St John and 
the Middle Group" EHR ixxxi 490-520; David Underdown Pride's Purge: Politics in the 
Puritan Revolution (Oxford 197 1) p. 45-75. 
4 Underdown Pride's Puree . 210,215-17,224-53. 
Lbid. p. 220. 
2 
Professor Underdown's narrative of the events leading up to the regicide was soon followed 
by Blair Worden's detailed examination of politics during the Rump Parliament. 6 For the 
purposes of this thesis it is important to note two differences which exist in their 
interpretations. Professor Worden questioned Professor Underdown's use of the term 
'revolutionary' for the early dissenters and regicides. Professor Worden rejects notions of 
radicalism suggesting that many of these revolutionaries objected to the person of the King 
7 
rather than the institution of Monarchy . Second, Professor Underdown's suggestion that the 
conformists returned to Westminster because they joined a revolutionary bandwagon was 
questioned in Professor Worden's thesis. The latter suggests that these MPs had more positive 
8 
reasons for returning than Professor Underdown's bandwagon theory allows. 
Despite these peripheral differences, upon major issues these two historians agree. Both argue 
that membership of the Rump was not synonymous with social radicalism. Both works appear 
to have replaced Samuel Gardiner's account which saw the Rump as an initially radical body 
which then became dilatory and corrupt. And both historians agree that Cromwell was 
influential in both establishing the new Republic and then moulding it in a conservative 
fashion 
6 Blair Worden, The Rump Parliament (Cambridge 1974) 
Ibid. p. 33-60. 
8 Ibid. p. 63; Worden argues that MPs resumed membership for a variety of reasons including 
a desire to curb radical tendencies by influencing events from within Parliament. 
3 
The chorus of praise which greeted these two publication? has not reduced over time. Both 
accounts remain the most significant analysis of politics during the Revolution and in the first 
months of Republican rule. However, two other historians deserve a mention. 
John Adamson has attempted to demonstrate the importance of the House of Lords during the 
1640s. As is well known, his arguments resulted in a bitter debatelo. But despite this interest 
in Dr Adamson's published work, little use has been made of the final chapter of his doctoral 
thesis". At present we have two entirely different interpretations. Dr Adamson portrays the 
Lords as a small but important chamber still fulfilling an important legislative function. 
Moreover, he has revived the radical credentials of a number of the peers. First, he argues that 
the Lords had the respect and, for a month at least, the support of many in the Anny. Sec6nd, 
Dr Adamson suggests that the peers who sat in Parliament in the weeks between 6 th December 
and 3 rd January accepted or even supported Pride's Purge. Finally Dr Adamson claims that 
five or six peers would have countenanced the trial of the King provided the result was 
deposition rather than regicide 12 . This exciting re-interpretation challenges the views 
presented by David Underdown and Veronica Wedgwood. The former presents the House of 
Lords as a pathetic handful of insignificant aristocrats eclipsed by an omnipotent Lower 
9 Reviews of their work can be found in the following journals Derek Hirst HJ. 1972, p. 812 - 
815; Austin Woolrych EHR (1972), p. 1972; Robert Ashton HJ (1975) p. 184; B. S. Capp EHR 
1975 p. 1975. 
10 John Adamson, "The Baronial Context of the English Civil War" TRHS 40, p. 93 - 1320; 
Adamson, " The English Nobility and the Projected Settlement of 1647" HJ 30 (1987) p. 567- 
602; Adamson "Politics and the Nobility in Civil War England" HJ 34 (1990) p. 231-255. 
Mark Kishlansky "Saye What" HJ 33 (1990) p. 917-37, Kishlansky "Saye No More"JBS 
(199 1) p. 3 99-448. 
11 John Adamson, 'The Peerage in Politics 1645-9. ' (PhD thesis, Cambridge, 1986), p. 257 - 
279. 
12 c lbid' p. 272. 
4 
Chamber. 13 Dame Veronica provides a useful narrative of the debate which resulted in the 
Lords rejection of the proposals to erect a High Court of Justice. However, the absence of any 
discussion of the House of Lords prior to the 4 th January vote tacitly demonstrates her belief 
that the peers failed to play a significant role. 14 
The most significant re-appraisal of the Rump Parliament can be found in the work of Sean 
Kelsey. In his book Inventing a Republic, he makes it clear from the start that his aim was to 
"take issue with a conventional wisdom which depicts the Rump Parliament as a feckless, 
shallow and unconvincing expedient. "15 Dr Kelsey did not concern himself with political 
divisions within the rump, allowing the Parliament to speak for itself by looking at the 
spectacle which accompanied the parliament's proceedings. He also re-examines the political 
background to the eventual dissolution. 16 Although he remains an admirer of Blair Worden's 
work he challenges the view that the Rump always regarded itself as a temporary expedient. 17 
His assessment at the Parliament is the most significant work to appear since the publication 
of Blair Worden's The Rump Parliament. 18 
13 Underdown, Pride's Purge, p. 181-202. 
14 C. V. Wedgwood, The Trial of Charles 1 (1964), p. 84-5. 
15 Sean Kelsey, Inventing a Republic. The Political culture of the English Commonwealth 
(Manchester 1997) 
16 Ibid p. 151-199. 
17 lbid, p. 200-227. 
18 This refers to politics during 1649 - 5,3 within parliament. Ian Gentles' The New Model 
Army in England, Ireland and Scotland, 1645-53 (Oxford 1992), has plenty of detail upon the 
actiyities of the Army p. 266-442. 
5 
Two other books deserve a mention at this stage. 19 Dame Veronica Wedgwood's account of 
the trial of Charles I remains the most detailed account of the days proceeding the regicide. 
The book brilliantly captures the mood of the occasion. However, the account is concerned 
with how rather than why and the motivations which prompted the major protagonists remain 
obscure. 20 Ian Gentles has also written an important book upon the New Model Army. 21 His 
account investigates the background to the Armies Remonstrance and the New Model's 
attitude towards the remaining MPs and it also includes a comprehensive account of the trial 
of the King from the Arrny's perspective. Apart from providing a wealth of new information 
upon the activities of the Army, Professor Gentles departs from Professor Underdown's 
argument in two areas. First, he regards Cromwell as a committed radical, who from the first 
day of the purge, was willing to support the regicide. Also, Professor Gentles rejects the view 
that during the Whitehall debates Ireton deliberately kept the Levellers talking, to allow the 
more moderate officers the opportunity to pursue their own, more limited revolution. 22 His 
argument suggests that there was a closer relationship between the Army and Parliament than 
the works of Professor Underdown and Professor Worden allow. 23 
All the historians cited above have retained the tenn 'revolution' as a description of the events 
covered in this thesis. My title, 'Aspects of the English Revolution' will not result in a 
theoretical discussion of the term. As Dr Aylmer notes, many of these discussions have 
19 In the chapters which follow I will make reference to certain important articles. These 
include Ian Gentles "The Struggle for London during the Second Civil War" HJ 26 (1983) 
p. 280-300; Barbara Taft "The Council of Officers", Agreement of the People 1648-9", HJ 28 
(1985) p. 169-85; Barbara Taft "Voting Lists of the Council of Officers", BIHR LI 1 (1979) 
p. 138-54. 
20 C. V. Wedgwood, The Trial of Charles 1, passim. 
21 Ian Gentles, The New Model Anny ited in n. 18 above. 
22 This argument is also found in the works of Barbara Taft cited in n. 19 above. 
23 Gentles, New Model Army, p. 276 - 314. 
6 
24 
resulted in rather sterile arguments. Whilst I accept that many MPs who sat in the Rump 
Parliament were not social radicals, England did witness a Revolution. A simple chronology 
of political events including Pride's Purge, the formal and public execution of Charles 1, the 
abolition of Monarchy and the House of Lords and the establishment of a Commonwealth do, 
in Professor Hutton's words, "amply deserve" the title Revolution. 25 
Even if we strictly adhere to one of the definitions of the tenn Revolution, "a sudden or far 
reaching change", the term, despite the Restoration in 1660, still has its merits. In many 
respects the Interregnurn did result in fundamental long-term change. England became the 
dominant nation within the British Isles. 26 The interregnum also ensured that there would be a 
greater acceptance of those wishing to worship outside the established church. In a 
provocative article, Derek Hirst has questioned the tendency of revisionist historians to under- 
estimate the amount of change in social and economic affairs. 27 The second definition, 
fundamental political change, certainly arose during the period covered by this thesis. The 
abolition of Monarchy, with the institution replaced by a single chambered legislature with 
special executive responsibilities given to an elected Council of State, does, by any yardstick, 
amount to a fundamental, political change. Since this thesis is principally concerned with 
politics the term 'Revolution' appears to be the only satisfactory description. Moreover, Sean 
Kelsey's work upon the Rump has shown that this was a period of profound change in 
politics; although historians differ upon the motives of the leading protagonists, revisionists 
24 G. E. Aylmer, Rebellion or Revolution, (Oxford 1986), p. 204. A roll-call of the most 
famous Stuart Historians have used the term revolution. The list includes S. R. Gardincr, 
Christopher Hill Blair Worden, John Morrill, Sean Kelsey and Ian Gentles. 
25 Ronald Hutton, The British Republic, 1649-60 (1990), p. 4 
26 Ibid p. 135 
27 Derek Hirst, "Locating the 1650s in England's Seventeenth Century", History, vol 8 1, July 
1996, p. 359-383. 
7 
and counter revisionists appear to accept that England witnessed a revolution in the period 
covered by this thesis. 28 
This thesis began its life as a study of the English Presbyterians during the Rump 
Parliament. 29 After four months of study upon the primary material, it became clear that my 
interpretations would upon a number of issues, be very different to the arguments found in the 
works of Professor Underdown and Professor Worden. A seminar paper was delivered 30 
which tested a number of my arguments, and it became clear that I had enough material to 
focus my study upon the Revolution. 
The first chapter of this thesis will focus upon Oliver Cromwell. This will include a re- 
examination of his attitude to the Armies Remonstrance, the reasons for his late arrival in 
Westminster, his role as an MP and his involvement in last minute negotiations with the King. 
By devoting a chapter to Cromwell I intend to look at the man in great detail, assessing his 
attitude to the Army, his political and religious vision, his influence within the parliamentary 
arena and his views upon Levellers, Presbyterians and Royalists. The most important aim of 
the chapter is to determine whether Cromwell provided the Revolution with its momentum or 
if he was one leader amongst many. Dr Kelsey's findings, which portrayed the members of 
the Rump as more determined Republicans suggests that Cromwell was not as influential as 
28 See note 24 above. Although these historians differ upon the nature of the English 
Revolution, they accept the term - even the most revisionist. 
29 The Rump remains the orthodox description of the Parliament which sat from 1649 - 53. 
For an alternative tenn see Ronald Hutton, The British Republic p. 136. 
30 1 am grateful to have been afforded the opportunity to present a paper upon Oliver 
Cromwell to the University of Cambridge. 
8 
once thought. 
31 This thesis will attempt to establish his role during the Revolution and in the 
first months of Republican rule. 
The second chapter of this thesis will focus upon the MPs who sat in Parliament between 
Pride's Purge and the I 9th May. It will re-examine the Purge itself and analyse the reasons for 
Parliament's delay in commencing the proceedings against the King. It will also investigate 
the roles performed by the regicide MPs, attempting to answer two questions. First, were the 
regicides subjected to intense pressure to sign the death warrant? Second, the chapter will 
scrutinise their participation in parliamentary committees and their attendance in the Painted 
Chamber. This section will also consider the MPs who sat in Parliament between the purge 
and regicide but refused to sign the death warrant. This will result in an examination of 
alternative solutions which may have been proposed, which did not necessarily sanction 
regicide. The chapter will also comment upon the appropriateness of the labels 'conformist' 
and 'revolutionary', and in the process it will comment upon the political conviction of these 
so called Rumpers. 
As mentioned above, Professor Underdown and Professor Worden have explained the limited 
nature of the Revolution by focusing upon the conservative backgrounds of the majority of 
MPs. In my chapter upon the MPs, I will examine the possible influence exerted by groups 
outside of Westminster. John Lilburne encouraged army revolts at a time when the new 
regime's survival was seriously threatened. This thesis will attempt to determine whether the 
Rump's draconian response to the Leveller threats was based upon pragmatic issues of 
survival or an ideological aversion to demands for reform. Pressure upon the regime did not 
solely come from the Levellers. The secluded MPs and the Presbyterian clergy bitterly 
complained about the moves against the King. Mark Kishlansky has shown how pressure 
31 This view is clear throughout Dr Kelsey's book Inventing a Republic especially p. 4 
9 
groups influenced MPs in the 1640s. This chapter will consider the possible connection with 
demands for moderation outside of Westminster with the legislation enacted by the Rump 
Parliament. 32 
My third chapter will focus upon the House of Lords, assessing the two different arguments 
we have at our disposal. The chapter will test a number of Dr Adamson's contentions 
including the Peers' attitude towards the Purge, the events leading up to their abolition, their 
importance in the Parliamentary process and their involvement in the last minute negotiations 
with the King. The section will also consider contemporary opinions of the Lords. The 
chapter will also examine three prominent Peers, the Earls of Warwick, Denbigh and 
Pembroke. After Pride's Purge, Warwick declared his loyalty to the new regime but he failed 
to become a regic ide. Soon after Charles lost his head, Warwick was dismissed from his 
position as Lord Admiral. Apart from this, little is known about Warwick's attitude and 
actions during the Revolution . 
33 The same dearth of secondary source material applies to the 
Earls of Denbigh and Pembroke. Both men sat in the Lords during December 1648, and 
according to Professor Underdown, both Peers were key participants in negotiations to spare 
the King's life. 34 Neither man became a regicide, but both agreed to serve the new regime. 
This chapter will consider their involvement in the events before and after the execution. By 
analysing their role in politics an assessment will be made of their motives forjoining the new 
regime and their influence within the unfamiliar world of parliamentary government. 
i2 Mark Kishlansky, The Rise of the New Model Arm (Cambridge 1979) p. 76-102. 
33 The most useftil account can be found in B. S. Capp, Cromwell's Nayy: the fleet and the 
English Revolution 1648-1660 (Oxford 1989) p. 44-45. 
34 Underdown, Pride's Purge p. 148-50. 
10 
The chapters upon Cromwell and upon the two Houses of Parliament will, to varying degrees, 
focus upon groups of men who supported the new regime. My fourth chapter will focus upon 
a group traditionally regarded as opponents of the new regime - the English Presbyterians. 
35 
The chapter will comment upon the controversy surrounding the term Presbyterian 36 with 
special reference to the divide between secular and clerical Presbyterianism, other issues 
including the scale of the Presbyterian opposition and the relationship between Presbyterians 
and Royalists will be discussed in the course of this chapter. This section will also examine 
the possibility that certain Presbyterians attempted to influence Parliament by deliberately 
acting as a political pressure group. It is interesting to note that in Blair Worden's study of the 
Rump Parliament, petitions from Presbyterians were only mentioned upon three occasions. 37 
But most importantly this chapter will attempt to determine the nature of Presbyterians 
ideology; even if they do not belong to a coherent political, party, dramatic events can unite 
disaffected individuals. The chapter will also include a section upon William Prynne, 
assessing his influence upon the new regime and his motives for making so many criticisms 
of the new regime. 
The final chapter of this thesis will focus upon the press during this revolutionary period. It 
will consider every title and assess various journalists' attitude towards Presbyterians, 
35 L. H. Carlson, "A History of the Presbyterian Party from Pride's Purge to the dissolution of 
the Long Parliament" Church History xi 1942; G. Abernathy The English Presbyterians and 
the Stuart Restoration 1648 - 1663, Transactions of the American Philosophical Society. P. 
Crawford, Denzil Holles, 1598-1660, (1979). These appear to be the most significant works 
upon the Presbyterians, although useful information is contained in Worden and Underdown 
cited above. 
36 S. Foster, "The Presbyterian Independents Exorcised" P&P 44, (1969), p. 52 -75; David 
Underdown, "The Independents Reconsidered", JBS 3 (1964) p. 57-84; Underdown "The 
Independents Again", JBS 8 (1968) p. 94-118. J. H Hexter, "Presbyterians, Independents and 
Puritans, A Voice from the Past" P& P 47 (1970), p. 134-6; Underdown Pride's Purge p. 45- I 
75; Wordcn 9 "m p. 4-1 1. 
37 Blair Worden did accept that there were outside pressures, Rump163-169. 
II 
Levellers, MPs, the House of Lords and their rivals from other newspapers. It is intended that 
the finished product will demonstrate the kind of information the people had access to. The 
chapter will also test the accuracy of the newspapers and comment upon their value as a 
source. The thesis will also consider the possibility that even amongst licensed newspapers, 
journalists were willing to promote a defined political view. The chapter will attempt to 
discover which journalists acted in isolation and which editors were working in close co- 
operation with factions either within or outside Parliament. FinallY, the chapter will consider 
the attachment to the principle of a republic from this important element in English society. 
This thesis will consider all these groups within a very short tifile-span. Historians are 
habitually aware of the dangers of using hindsight to present a picture of simplicity and 
inevitability. Most people know that Cromwell was a regicide whose name appeared third on 
the regicide document. But when did the King's death become inevitable and when did 
Cromwell decide that the King must die? Many historians believe that Charles's death only 
became certain when Cromwell finally bequeathed his support to the idea of regicide. The 
crux of this argument rests with the assumption that the purging of Parliament did not 
inevitably lead to regicide. Historians have been correct to highlight the source material which 
supports this case. But the acknowledgement of the dangers of hindsight as a means of 
explaining history within straightforward notions of consistency, persistence and orderly 
sequence should not make the historian oblivious to source material which suggests that the 
purge was designed for, and inevitably led to regicide. By pursuing this approach, I hope to 
demonstrate more clearly than before the level of ideological commitment amongst the 
supporters and opponents of the English Revolution. 
12 
Oliver Cromwell and the English Revolution. 
This thesis will analyse Oliver Cromwell's role in the events between Pride's purge and the 
regicide and then assess his influence in the early months of the republic. The conclusions 
will suggest that Cromwell arrived in London satisfied with the decision to purge Parliament. 
The chapter will also indicate the problems with the view that Cromwell favoured a last 
minute settlement with the King. This perspective is similar to conclusions found in the 
works of other historians. ' Moreover, Ian Gentles and Veronica Wedgwood have produced 
accounts which have claimed that Cromwell's views were from the first day qf the purge, at 
one with his more radical colleagues. 2 However, there remain a number of reasons for 
pursuing this fresh investigation. 
Veronica Wedgwood's argument was successfully challenged by David Underdown, with the 
latter citing fresh evidence to support the view that Cromwell, initially at least, attempted to 
influence events in a more moderate direction. Miss Wedgwood had attempted to challenge 
the view propounded by Samuel Gardiner, which had placed Cromwell at the forefront of the 
alleged moves to spare the King. 3 As so many historians have found, challenging Samuel 
Gardiner is not an easy task. 4 For Miss Wedgwood the problem was compounded when 
1 John Morrill (ed. ), The Nature of the English Revolution, (1994) p. 18-29. W. C Abbott, 
Writings and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell 4 vols, (Harvard Press 1937-47), vol. i, p. 750. 
2 Ian Gentles, The New Model Army (Oxford 1992), p. 283-314; CN Wedgwood, The Trial of 
Charles 1 (1964), p. 76-82. 
3 S. R Gardiner, Histo[ý of the Great Civil War (1893), vol. iv p. 281-90; CN Wedgwood, The 
Trial of Charles 1, p. 77 and p. 233 n. 30. 
4 This point was made by John Morrill during a seminar at Bristol University. Also, as will be 
shown, Professor Underdown developed Gardiner's case rather than offering an alternative 
explanation. 
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Professor Underdown accepted, and then developed upon, Gardiner's argument. By 1972 her 
views upon Cromwell appear to have collapsed within academia. 5 
More recently, Professor Gentles has challenged aspects of Professor Underdown's argument. 
He has suggested that Cromwell's arrival after Pride's Purge was not a deliberate ploy, 
illustrating Cromwell's reluctance to see force used against a constitutional body. 6 This part 
of Professor Gentles' argument will be supported in this thesis. Also Professor Gentles' claim 
that, throughout December 1648, Cromwell was convinced that the king must be executed 
will be developed in the course of my discussion. 7 However, his argument fails to provide us 
with a consistent picture of Cromwell during this critical December month. In addition to 
portraying Cromwell as the committed radical resolved on regicide, Professor Gentles 
contradicts this argument by linking Cromwell with plans for the preservation of monarchy 
with Charles remaining as the titular Head of State. 8 Also, at one point during his account, 
Professor Gentles suggests that Cromwell may have favoured a scheme which would have 
resulted in Charles' abdication. 9 
5 With the exception of Ian Gentles, historians have followed Professor Underdown's account. 
A. B Worden, The Rump Parliament, (Cambridge 1975) p. 67-68. B. Coward, Oliver 
Cromwell (1991) p. 64-68; Charles Carlton, Charles 1: The Personal Monarch (1983), p. 338. 
Austin Woolrych 'Cromwell the Soldier' in John Morrill (ed), Oliver Cromwell and the 
English Revolution, (1990) p. I 10. J. S. A Adamson 'The Peerage in Politics 1645-49' 
(Cambridge PhD thesis 1986) p. 263; B. Coward, The Stuart Age (2 nd edition, 1994), p. 20 1. 
D. Hirst, England in Conflict (Oxford 1999), p. 253-4. Robert Ashton, The English Civil War: 
Conservatism and Revolution (2 nd ed. 1989) p. 346-7. Peter Gaunt, Oliver Cromwell (Oxford 
1997), p102-3. For Professor Underdown's account see Pride's Purge: Politics in the Puritan 
Revolution (Oxford 1971), p. 150-168. My views are very close to John Morrill and Philip 
Baker, 'Oliver Cromwell, the Regicide and the Sons of Zeruiah', paper given to the Institute 
of Historical Research, December 1999. 
6 Ian Gentles The New Model AM p. 284, Underdown Pride's Purge p. 119, p. 148-50. 
7 Both Ian Gentles and Veronica Wedgwood dismissed the royalist accounts as "mere wishful 
thinking". My version fully discusses these royalist sources. 
8 Ian Gentles The New Model Anny p. 298. 
9 lbid p. 299. The argument countering Professor Gentles' claim is found later in this chapter. 
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Professor Underdown's portrayal of Cromwell remains the most consistent and detailed 
account available. Prior to the publication of 'Pride's Purge' historians had failed to explain 
Cromwell's activities in the middle of December. Most accounts claimed that Cromwell 
deliberately delayed his arrival to London, and historians made use of the evidence which 
suggests that Cromwell favoured a last-minute settlement with the King. 10 However, 
Cromwell's part in events between the 7 th of December and the 18 th December remained 
obscure. 11 
Professor Underdown provided a cohesion to Cromwell's activities during December 1648. 
He suggested that Cromwell was never a wholehearted supporter of Pride's purge, and after 
his belated return to London, he pursued a conciliatory policy consisting of three components. 
First, Cromwell was behind moves to secure the release of all but the most irreconcilable 
MPs. Second, Cromwell wished to undo the purge by securing the return of a number of 
secluded M. Ps. Third, through the Earl of Denbigh, Cromwell attempted to reach a 
compromise with the King. 12 This thesis will challenge Professor Underdown's interpretation 
and, in so doing, it will question an orthodoxy established in the works of Samuel Gardiner, 
Charles Firth, Christopher Hill, Blair Worden, Barry Coward and most recently by Peter 
Gaunt. 13 
10 Prior to Professor Underdown's work, the most extensive use of these sources was made by 
Samuel Gardiner cited n. 3 above. For a discussion of these sources see below. 
11 The 18 th was the date, according to Underdown's account, that the Earl of Denbigh began 
to discuss the formulation of a scheme to allow Charles to remain as King. 
12 Underdown Pride's Purge p. 150-168. 
13 See Footnote 5 above; for Gardiner's account see n. 3; C. Hill, God's Englishman 
(Harmondsworth 1970), p. 102-3; C. H Firth Oliver Cromwell and the Rule of Puritans (1961), 
p. 215-16. Peter Gaunt Oliver Cromwell p. 102-3. 
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professor Underdown illustrated his argument that Cromwell was not an enthusiastic 
supporter of Pride's purge with four pieces of evidence. First, he suggested that Cromwell 
indulged in a period of self-imposed exile during November 1648. Second, he pointed to a 
quotation made by Cromwell which revealed a preference for delaying the Army's 
Remonstrance. Third, Cromwell was deliberately dilatory when travelling from Pontefract to 
London. And finally, Professor Underdown pointed out that intelligent contemporaries were 
quick to note that Cromwell had stayed away from London until after the purge. 14 
Professor Gentles' argues that Cromwell stayed in the north, not to indulge in the luxury of 
indecision, but to direct military operations in the last ma or theatre of war 15 . This is supported 
by an analysis of Cromwell's writings during the second Civil War. 16 In a letter to Derby 
House, written on the 15 th of November, Cromwell illustrated his own view of the difficulties 
surrounding the siege of Pontefract Castle: 
"The men within are resolved to endure to the utmost extremity, expecting no mercy, as 
indeed they deserve none. The place is very well known to be one of the strongest inland 
garrisons in the kingdom, well watered situated upon a rock in every part of it, and difficult to 
mine. The walls very thick and high with strong towers, and it baltered, very difficult to 
access by reason at the depth and steepness of the graft. " 17 Apart from revealing Cromwell's 
own opinions of the difficulties involved with the siege of Pontefract, the reference to the 
14 Underdown Pride's Purge p. 148-150; Peter Gaunt Cromwell p. 96-102. 
15 Ian Gentles The New Model Anny p. 284 
16 Abbott The Writings and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell vol i, p. 602-750. 
17 Cromwell to the Committee of Lords and Commons at Derby House (15 November 1648) 
Abbott i p. 683-4; Thomas Carlyle The Letters and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell 2 vols 
(1845), vol i, p. 384 -. See also A Declaration Collected Out at the Journals of Both Houses 
T. T E. 475 (17) (Wednesday November 29 - Wednesday 6 December) p. 6; The Moderate 
T. T E. 475 (8)_(Tuesday November 28 - Tuesday 6 December. ) 
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Royalists wishing to endure to the "utmost extremity" is of importance. Upon the 28 th June, 
Cromwell had commented upon the royalists claiming that they were gentlemen of quality 
and "men thoroughly resolved. "18 Cromwell clearly respected the Royalists determination He 
was not issued with a direct order to leave the north until the 29th of November. 19 As he has 
previously reminded Derby House, his brief was to "prosecute the remaining party in the 
north and not leave any of them to be a beginning of a new Anny, nor cease to pursue the 
victory till [I] finish and fully complete it. 112o Cromwell's desire to "finish and complete" the 
destruction of the royalist cause is evident in numerous letters he wrote during the Second 
Civil War. 21 In November 1648, this remained his principle aspiration. 
John Adamson has shown how service in the field occupied the majority of Cromwell's time - 
from August 1642 to January 1644; from February to November 1644; from March 1645 to 
July 1646. Although the First Civil War ended in 1646, Cromwell was with the Army again 
for much of the period from April to December 1647. The outbreak of the Second Civil War 
meant that he was with the Army again from April 1648 until the end of November. 22 We are 
18 Cromwell to Fairfax, une 28 1648, Abbott i p. 618-19 and Carlyle i p. 319-22. For further 
examples see Cromwell to Fairfax May 9 1648 Abbott i p. 606-7; Cromwell to Lenthall 20 
August 1648 Abbott i p. 634-638 esp p. 637 also Carlyle p. 341. Cromwell to Derby House 
Committee 23 August 1648 Abbott i p. 641-42. 
19 Underdown's Pride's Purge p. 150; Gentles The New Model AMy p. 284; Woolrych 
"Cromwell the Soldier" in Morrill ed Oliver Cromwell and the English Revolution p. 110 
Wedgwood Trial of Charles I p. 32. 
20 Cromwell to Derby House 20 September 1648 Abbott i p. 656-658. 
21 Cromwell to John Poye July 10 1648 Abbott i p. 620, Cromwell to the Committee of 
Lancashire August 17 Abbott i p. 632-633 also Carlyle i p. 329-30ý Cromwell to Maio 
Thomas Saunders June 17 Abbott i p. 615-16; letter to the Lord Grey Groby 20 August 1648 
Abbott i p. 640; letter to the Committee of York 23 August Abbott i p. 640 also Carlyle i 
p. 346-347, Declaration of the 8h September Abbott i p. 647-648 also Carlyle i p. 355-356. 
22 J. S. A Adamson "Oliver Cromwell and the Long Parliament" in Morrill (ed) Oliver 
Cromwell and the English Revolution p. 55. See John Morrill's Introduction to this collection 
of essays p. 4. 
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therefore looking at a relatively inexperienced parliamentary politician. The bulk of 
Cromwell's energy throughout the Civil War had been channelled against the Royalists. Until 
their defeat was achieved, it was natural that he remained in the north in his more accustomed 
role as Military Commander, rather than return to the unfamiliar world of Westminster. 
Cromwell's decision to remain in the north, rather than being a refuge was consistent with his 
actions throughout the Civil War. 
In addition to the issues raised above, it is possible that Cromwell remained in the north to 
continue his role as spokesman for his soldiers. Throughout the two Civil Wars, Cromwell 
showed a consistent concern about the physical plight of his men. 23 Cromwell fcared that, 
unless the Derby House furnished his regiments with the money owed to them, there was a 
real danger of mutiny. The concerns voiced by Cromwell continued during the month in 
which Underdown claimed that Cromwell was indulging in a period of self-imposed exile. 
On the I Oth November Cromwell wrote to Colonel Charles Fairfax, promising that he would 
"do what lies in me to get you supplied". Recognising the seriousness of the situation, he 
offered Fairfax an immediate loan of E100.24 Five days later Cromwell wrote to Derby House 
asking for funds to be provided for three complete regiments of foot and two of horse. 25 just 
three days before leaving Pontefract, Cromwell almost begged the Treasurer of the County 
Committee of West Riding to furnish his soldiers with pay. The seriousness of this demand is 
illustrated by Cromwell's warning that the soldiers are ready to mutiny, the justifiable reason 
23 Cromwell to Fairfax 9 May Abbott i p. 606-7; Cromwell to the Committee at Carmathen 9 
June 1648 Abbott i p. 611-612; Cromwell to Fairfax 28 June 1648 Abbott i p. 618-19 also 
Carlyle i p. 319-23. Cromwell to Lenthall 20 August 1648 Abbott i p. 634-38; Cromwell to 
Derby House Committee 23 August Abbott i p. 641-41, Cromwell to Sir Hen! Y Cholmley and 
Sir Edward Rhodes 20 August 1648 Abbott i p. 639 also Carlyle i p. 345-6. 
24 Cromwell to Charles Fairfax, 10 November Abbott i p. 681-2. 
25 Cromwell to Derby House 15 November 1648 Abbott i p. 683-4. 
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being that they did not have enough money to buy bread. 26 There can be little doubt that 
during this November month, Cromwell believed that a failure to supply his soldiers with 
their arrears of pay was potentially fatal; as he remarked to Charles Fairfax on the I Oth 
November "nothing else will keep the men together. "27 
it would be entirely wrong to assume that Cromwell's concern for his soldiers simply 
reflected his desire to prevent them from indulging in refractory behaviour. Cromwell 
frequently commented upon the valour of his officers and soldiers, 28 and how their success 
had been achieved against overwhelming odds. 29 He suffered with them, alanned that the 
poor "Godly people should still be made the object of wrath and anger"30 As Commander of 
the Northern Forces, it was his duty to represent the plight of his soldiers to Parliament, to act 
as their mouthpiece. Cromwell continued to write to the Derby House in November 1648. 
This should not be dismissed as a smokescreen which hid a form of personal political 
paralysis. Cromwell remained in the north to complete the siege of Pontefract and to continue 
his role as spokesman for his troops, his arguments given greater credence by the simple fact 
that he witnessed the condition_s which his men were forced to endure. During this November 
month, Cromwell was the military man determined to oversee the demise of the Royalist 
cause. The evidence presented also reveals a man showing a genuine concern for the plight 
facing his soldiers. 
26 Cromwell to Thomas St. Nicholas 25 November 1648 Abbott i p. 643-694 also Carlyle i 
p. 392. 
27 Cromwell to Charles Fairfax 10 November 1648 Abbott i p. 681-82. 
28 Cromwell to Lenthall 20 August 1648 Abbott i p. 634-638 Carlyle i p. 336-344; Cromwell to 
Derby House 23 August 1648 Abbott i p. 641-42. 
29 Cromwell to Lenthall 20 August 1648 Abbott i p. 634-638; Carlyle i p. 336-344. 
30 Cromwell to Fairfax 28 June 1648 Abbott i p. 613-619 also Carlyle i p. 319-322. 
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Professor Underdown's suggestion that Cromwell's preference to delay the Army's 
Remonstrance was another indication of his reluctance to endorse the purging of Parliament, 
is also open to question. 31 His argument is derived from a letter written by Cromwell to his 
cousin Robert Hammond. Commenting upon the Remonstrance, Cromwell stated that "we 
could perhaps have wished the stay of it till after the treaty". However, Professor Underdown 
failed to finish the quotation; immediately succeeding these words came the important 
statement "yet seeing it come out, we trust to rejoice in the will of the lord. ý732 It appears, 
therefore, that Cromwell objected to the timing rather than the content of the document. The 
content was radical enough, calling for an instant end to the Newport negotiations. Even 
more significantly it demanded that the "King be brought to justice as the capital cause of all 
the late wars. 33 Hammond provided Cromwell with the ideal opportunity to reveal his 
moderate stance. Apart from being a close relation, for whom Cromwell had a great deal of 
attraction, Hammond held grave reservations about the Army's moves against the King. 34 Had 
Cromwell been opposed to the Army's Remonstrance, he could have written to his cousin to 
re-assure him, by promising that steps would be taken to moderate some of the Army's 
demands. Instead, the only advice Cromwell afforded was to place trust in God's providences. 
Far from revealing a moderate disposition, Cromwell referred to the Newport negotiations as 
a "ruining hypocritical agreement", suggesting that a number of MPs had been occasioned to 
overlook what was "just and honest". The King was also described as "that man against 
whom God hath witnessed" . 
35 
31 Underdown Pride's Purgep. 119,121 150. 
32 Cromwell to Hammond 25 November 1648 Abbott i p. 696-699 esp p. 698; Carlyle i p. 393- 
400. 
33 The Remonstrance or Declaration of the Army T. T E. 473 (3) 20th November 1648. 
34 Old Parliamentary History XVII p. 240 quoted in C. V. Wedgwood Trial p. 30-3 1. 
35 Cromwell to Hammond 25 November 1648 Abbott i p. 696-699; Carlyle i p. 393-400. 
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Cromwell revealed his tacit support for the Army's Remonstrance by promoting a number of 
petitions from his own regiments. These petitions were similar to the Remonstrance, 
demanding that a diligent inquisition be held for the innocent blood shed in this late war. As 
in the Remonstrance, Charles Stuart was not spared. The petitions included a clause stating 
that "neither king, lords or any such persons [should] be exempted from being proceeded 
against"36 . In a letter to Fairfax, Cromwell endorsed the petitions with the unequivocal 
statement, "I do in all my heart concur with them". 37 
Cromwell's attitude towards the Army's Remonstrance and the petitions from his own 
regiments, reveal a man who was following rather than initiating political events. He found a 
"very great sense" in the petitions from his regiments, but there is no evidence that he 
participated in the framing of these proposals. Although sceptical about the timing of the 
Army's Remonstrance, "seeing it come out" he was prepared to endorse it. This reluctance to 
initiate a political programme is, however, very different from being in a state of indecision. 
Cromwell remained a conviction politician. His opposition to the Newport negotiations was 
clear. He sent a message to Sir Henry Vane encouraging him not to "shift and shirk", in 
favour of Charles Stuart. As mentioned above, Cromwell used apocalyptic language when he 
described Charles Stuart as "that man against whom God hath witnessed. "38 In a letter to 
Hammond, Cromwell wrote that "peace is only good when we receive it" warning that it was 
36 The Declarations and Humble Representatives of the Officers and Soldiers in Colonel 
Scroop's Saunders and Waulton's regiments T. T. E. 475(13) 5 th Dec 1648 p. 2-4. Also, The 
Humble Representation of your Officers and Soldiers in Nottingham T. T E. 475 (24) 7 th 
December; A new Remonstrance from the Northem Army T. T E 475 (4) 4th December p. 3 
(clausel2) 
37 Cromwell to Fairfax 20 November 1648 Abbott i p. 690-91; Carlyle i p. 390-1. 
38 Cromwell to Hammond 6 November 1648 Abbott i p. 676-678. 
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dangerous to go against the will of God to attain it. "39 Cromwell appreciated that the Newport 
negotiations needed to be disrupted. The Anny only had two options, a purge or a 
dissolution. It appears unlikely that Cromwell would have favoured a dissolution. On the 6th 
January 1649, Cromwell disagreed publicly with Ireton over the date at which Parliament 
should be dissolved. Ireton believed that Parliament should be compelled to dissolve on the 
last day of April, whereas, Cromwell argued that it would be more honourable to let 
Parliament set the date for its own dissolution. 
40 Considering Cromwell believed that the 
41 Newport negotiations were dangerous and hypocritical, there is no reason to doubt Ludlow's 
remark that Cromwell was glad about the purge and would endeavour to maintain it. 42 
Professor Underdown's argument that Cromwell was deliberately dilatory in his journey was 
questioned by Ian Gentles. 43 Professor Gentles argues that Cromwell bad to ensure that his 
responsibilities in the north would be taken care of during his absence; his account also points 
out that in light of the numerous attacks on parliamentary leaders in the autumn of 1648, and 
with the death of Rainborowe fresh in his mind, the journey from the north was always going 
to be a slow one. 44 In addition to Ian Gentles' observations, it can be argued that Cromwell's 
late arrival was not particularly significant. It is true that Cromwell missed Pride's purge, but 
45 he was in the parliament receiving the House's hearty thanks, at the very time a second and 
39 Ibid; also Cromwell to Hammond 25 November Abbott i p. 696-699. 
40 Ian Gentles The New Model Arm -5. gy p. 284 
41 Cromwell to Hammond 25 November 1648 Abbott i p. 696-699. 
42 C. H Firth (ed) Memoirs of Edmund Ludlow (2 vols, 1894) i p. 211-12. For a discussion of 
Ludlow's account see below. 
43 Underdown's Pride's Purge p. 149-50; Ian Gentles The New Model Army p. 284-5; Peter 
Gaunt Oliver Cromwell p. 102. 
44 Ian Gentles The New Model ýLrmy cited n. 43 above. 
45 Cj vi p. 94. 
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equally important purge was taking place. The significance of this purge should not be 
underestimated. On the 6 th , it was widely reported that there was "Little hope of an accord" 
between Parliament and the Army. 46 Also, on the 6 th Parliament refused to proceed with the 
Army's requests, spending most of the day complaining about the plight of the secluded 
members. 47 It was only after the second purge upon the 7 th that Parliament agreed to debate 
48 
the Army's proposals. Cromwell did not arrive after the dirty work; he was in the thick of it. 
Professor Underdown also noted that "intelligent contemporaries" appreciated that Cromwell 
had deliberately remained away from London until after Pride's purge. 49 The two intelligent 
contemporaries were Edmund Ludlow and Marchamount Nedham. Nedham was the editor 
of the royalist Mercurius Pragmaticus. In his editorial covering the political events from 
Tuesday December 12'h, until Tuesday December the 19'h, he noted that "Oliver forbore 
coming to London until after the force acted upon the House. "50 There are two problems with 
Professor Underdown's use of this source. First, as editor of a royalist newspaper, it was in 
Ncdham's interest to reveal divisions amongst the Army leaders. Second, his comments arc 
at variance with those he wrote in the previous week's edition. In that paper Cromwell was 
46 This is a quote from The Moderate Intelligence T. T E. 475 (26) Thursday 30th November 
- Thursday 7th December 1648; see also The Perfect Weekly Account T. T E. 476 (15) 1648 
p. 306; The Moderate T. T E. 476 (5) Tuesday 5 th December-Tuesday 12 th December 1648; A 
Declaration Collected out of the Journals of Both Houses T. T E. 476 (17) Wednesday 6 th 
December -Wednesday 13 th December 1648 p. 11, A True Relation of the Army's Seizure 
of Eminent Members T. T E. 476 (14) ; Mercurius Pragmaticus E. 476 (2) Tuesday 5th 
December- Tuesday 12th December 1648; C. J vi, p. 93-4. 
47 Sources listed n. 46 above. Also Whitelock and Lucy Hutchinson reveal the unpopularity of 
the purge. Bulstrode Whitelock Memorials of English Affairs 4 vols (Oxford 1853), vol ii, 
p-471 
48 C. J vi p. 94-95 
49 Underdown Pride's Purge p. 150. 
So Mercurius Pragmaticus T. T E. 476 (35) Tuesday 12 - Tuesday 19 December 1648. 
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not depicted as a man who either disagreed with the purging of Parliament, or an individual 
attempting to undo the purge. Nedharn admitted that Cromwell arrived after the purge, but he 
included the sarcastic comment, "Nol Cromwell arrived, as if he poor man had no hand in the 
business. " Nedham's obvious irony at this juncture is re-enforced by his account of 
Cromwell's entry into the House. "In came that pure holy Goblin Nol Cromwell, who brought 
,, 51 in along his fellow saint Henry Marten, who looks thin, as if he had "gotten a Scottish clap. 
Ludlow, writing a long time after the purges, wrote that Cromwell had not been acquainted 
with the design, "yet since it was done, he was glad of and would endeavour to maintain it. si52 
Far from implying that Cromwell deliberately remained away from London because he had 
reservations about the purging of Parliament, this statement supports the argument above; 
Cromwell was a supporter of the purge, but he was following rather than initiating events. 
Moreover, Ludlow categorically states that Cromwell supported the purge. He wrote his 
account after the dissolution of the long Parliament, an action he viewed as "trecherous and 
impious". 53 It is likely that had Cromwell objected to the purge, Ludlow would have 
mentioned it to highlight the future Lord Protectors hypocrisy. Whatever our opinions of 
Cromwell, it cannot be denied that both the purges and regicide gave him more political 
power than he had previously enjoyed. Had he been opposed to the very act which brought 
him this power, it is inconceivable that Ludlow would have failed to highlight this dupliCity. 54 
51 Mercurius Pragmaticus T. T E. 476 (2) Tuesday 5- Tuesday 12 December 1648. For a 
detailed discussion of all of Nedham's newspapers see below in this chapter and in chapter 5 
52 Ludlow Memoirs i p. 211-12 
53 Ibid p. 347-355 quoted from p. 355; A. B Worden (ed) A Voyce From the Watch Tower Part 
Five 1660-1662, (Camden Fourth Series, 1978), p. 68-69. 
54 The best available account dealing with Cromwell and his contempories is found in John 
Morrill's "Cromwell and his Contempories" p. 259-81 in Oliver Cromwell and the English 
Revolution. No mention of Cromwell's duplicity is mentioned in this account. 
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Cromwell's arrival after Pride's purge was not a deliberate ploy which indicated his 
reservations about using force against a constitutional body. Although he did not play a part 
55 in the planning of the purge, he objected to the Newport negotiations, believing that the 
parliamentary majority had "by their passive principle overlooked what was just and 
,, 56 honest. Cromwell, at this stage, was not directing events, but his own comments and 
actions suggest that he supported the Army's dramatic purges. Moreover, nearly all those 
contemporaries who commented upon the purge, whether Royalist, Presbyterian or radical, 
saw no hint of Cromwell being at odds with those who planned and carried out the purges. 
Professor Underdown argued that from Cromwell's return to London, until the end of 
December, he attempted to undo the purge and prevent the trial of the King. The next part of 
this chapter will consider aspects of this argument. This section considers Cromwell's role in 
plans to re-admit a number of secluded members and his involvement in the release of the 
57 imprisoned members. 
Professor Underdown argued that Cromwell's return to London was followed by several hints 
of moderation. He provides three examples. First, Hugh Peters delivered a restrained sermon 
on the 8th of December. Second, "rumours were being spread" suggesting that these would be 
a settlement with the king. Third, upon the 12 Ih of December a few imprisoned MPs were 
55 We cannot know for sure who actually planned the purge. From Ludlow's account we 
know that six men were involved. These probably included Ireton, Ludlow, Harrison. Sir 
William Constable, Lord Grey of Groby and Cornelius Holland. It is possible that Colonel 
Pride and Sir Hardress Waller took part. Ludlow Memoirs ip 209-10; Ian Gentles The New 
Model Army p. 281-2; David Underdown Pride's Purge p. 141-2. 
56 Cromwell to Hammond 25 November 1648 Abbott p. 696-699. 
57 Underdown Pride's Purge p. 150-172. Professor Underdown's account is supported by Ian 
Gentles New Model Arm p. 297-298. 
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released. Although Professor Underdown rightly cited the source, Mercurius Pragmaticus, 
which mentioned Peters' sermon, 58 there is no evidence suggesting that Cromwell was 
influential. Furthermore, Professor Underdown needed to explain another sen-non delivered 
by Peters on the 22 nd December. In this sermon Peters suggested that the Army should "root 
up monarchy, not only here but in France and other kingdoms. " Peters also added that 
precedent should be ignored since this was an age to make examples. 59 This second sen-non 
was spoken at the very time Professor Underdown suggested that Cromwell was working for 
a compromise which included the release of the remaining imprisoned members and the 
restitution of the secluded members. 60 If Underdown's view that Cromwell was behind 
Peters' first sermon is accepted, Cromwell's influence did not last very long. It is more likely 
that Peters' sermon on the 8h was independent, designed to re-assure wavering MPs who had 
survived the two purges. 61 
The second example Professor Underdown cited to suggest that Cromwell's arrival coincided 
with hints of moderation rests with the evidence he acquired from Mercurius Pragmaticus. 
Marchamout Nedharn claimed that these were moves afoot to save the king, coupled with 
overtures and offers to the imprisoned members. At this stage, Nedharn did not link these 
signs of moderation with Cromwell; he implicitly stated that these conciliatory moves were a 
reaction to the "general outcries" and distaste caused by the Remonstrance and the late force 
58 Mercurius Pragmaticus T. T E. 476 (2) Tuesday 5-Tuesday 12 December 1648; Mercurius 
PraRmaticus T. T E. 477 (30) Tuesday 19 December-Tuesday 26 December 1648 
59 Mercurius Pragmaticus T. T E. 477 (30) Tuesday 19 - Tuesday 26 December 1648; H. R 
Trevor-Roper Religion, the Reformation and Social Change (1972) p. 332-3; Clement Walker 
A Complete Histo! y of Independency 4 vols (1661), part ii, p. 49-50 
60 See below in this chapter. A new study of the purge is made in chapter 4. 
61 As Professor Underdown points out, a number of MPs survived the purges of the 6 th and 7 th 
but still had reservations about the Army's actions, Pride's Purge p. 143-172. 
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upon the House. 62 Also, not one contemporary account made reference to Cromwell being 
party to any moves towards a compromise. It is significant to note that Whitelock, apart from 
reporting Cromwell's arrival, does not mention him until he was apparently involved in a 
compromise scheme on the 18th of December. 63 
Professor Underdown's final example linking Cromwell's arrival with hints of moderation, 
was the release of four MPs on the 12 th of December. It is again difficult to associate 
Cromwell with this decision. It appears that Thomas Lane and Henry Pelham were released 
after a request from Thomas Widdrington, 64 but no other individual M. P. is linked with 
making a direct appeal for the discharge of any imprisoned member. The most significant 
objection which can be raised against Professor Underdown's argument, is the supposition 
that the Army altered their policy because of pressure from the moderates. From the first day 
of the purge the Army's policy towards the imprisoned members was chaotic. Upon the Oh, 
Nathaniel Fiennes and Benjamin Rudyard were released with six other members offered their 
paroles. 65 Two other events on the Oh illustrate that the Army was not following a careftilly 
planned and fastidiously executed policy. First, the officer guarding the prisoners had no idea 
what was to be done with them. 66 Second, it appears that Fairfax was not familiar with the 
names of those imprisoned; a Presbyterian account of the purge stated that by order of the 
62 Mercurius Pragmaticus T. T E. 476 (2) Tuesday December 5- Tuesday December 12 1648. 
63 Whitelock Memorials ii p. 471-477. 
64 Mercurius Elencticus T. T. E. 476 (4) Tuesday 5- Tuesday 12 December 1648 p. 532. 
65 Parliament Under the Power of the Sword T. T 669 f. 13 (54), 7 th December1648; The 
Moderate Intelligencer, T. T. E. 475 (26), Thursday 3 Oth November -Thursday 7 th December 
1648; The Perfect Weekly Account T. T E. 476 (15), Wednesday 6 th December 6- 
Wednesday 13 th December 1648 p. 305. 
66 A True and Full Relation cited in n. 46 above. 
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general, Hugh Peters visited the imprisoned members " to take a list of their names. 9,67 
Colonel Pride was also unsure what was to be done with the members under restraint. When 
he was asked, he could only state that he had no other employment for the present and could 
not wait upon them. , 68 At one stage later on, Fairfax was not aware that William Prynne, the 
Anny's most vocal opponent, was a prisoner. 69 Also, despite Parliament's requests for a 
charge to be brought in against the imprisoned members, it took the Army until the 4 th of 
January to respond. 70 
Throughout December the Army's primary concern was to Provide a more tractable 
Parliament. It is clear that the Army wished to bring the eleven MPs impeached in 1647 plus 
71 Major General Browne and Lionel Copley to justice. With the exception of Sir Robert 
Harley who had close connections with Fairfax 72 and Edward Massey who escaped, 73 the MPs 
amongst this group who were present in London between the 6 th and 12 th of December 
remained in confinement until 1651. In December 1648, the future of the other imprisoned 
67 A True and Full Relation, T. T E. 476 (14), 13 th December 1648, p. 4 
68 Ibid p. 5 
69 Underdown Pride's Purge p. 192 and sources listed in footnote 49. 
70 CJ vi p. 93,95,97,101 and I 11. 
7 th 1 The Humble Proposals and Desires of His Excellency the Lord Fairfax. T. T. E. 475 (25) 17 
December 1648 Whitelock Memorials ii p. 469; D Brown (ed) The Historical Collections of 
John Rushworth 8 vols, (1721-22), vol vii, p. 13 54 - from now on all references to Rushworth 
relate to vol vii, unless otherwise specified. 
72 Historical Manuscripts Commision Report, 14th Report appendix, part II Portland 
Manuscript- Col E. Harley to Lord Fairfax p. 166. (1894) 
73 Underdown Pride's Purge p. 195 
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members took a very secondary place. This explains why these members were both treated 
and released in such an ad-hoc fashion. 74 
Professor Underdown's whole argument linking Cromwell's arrival with hints of moderation 
is open to question. If anything his arrival coincided with policy moving in a more radical 
direction. As noted earlier, the 7 th saw a continuation of the purge and Parliament deciding to 
proceed with the Army's requests. 75 Another purge took place on the I Vh, a clear indication 
that the Army, far from desiring a compromise, wanted Parliament to move with haste. 76 
There is no evidence suggesting that Cromwell was behind these moves, and this, coupled 
with the absence of evidence linking Cromwell with a more moderate policy indicates that, 
certainly until the 18'h of December, Cromwell was not taking an active interest in the future 
of the legislature. 
Whitelock's memorials reveal that between the I 8'h and the 23 rd of December, Cromwell was 
involved in discussions concerning the ftiture of the secluded and imprisoned MPs. 77 On the 
18 th December Whitelock, Widdrington, Cromwell and Coloner Deane held a meeting and 
discussed how the settlement of the kingdom might be best effected. 78 Whitelock saw 
Cromwell the following day but no record of their conversation survives. Two days later, 
74 Of the eleven MPs: Clockworthy, Waller, Sir William Lewis along with Browne and 
Copley remained confinement. The other MPs amongst the eleven did not arrive at 
Westminster during the purge with the exception of the aforesaid Maney and Harley, these 
five remained in prison until 165 1. All the other MPs taken into custody had been released by 
April 1649. This is discussed in greater detail in chapter 2 below. 
75 See above. The significance of this second purge is discussed in greater detail in chapter 2. 
76 Mercurius Pragmaticus E. 476 (35) December 12-19 1648; Second Part of the Narrative p. 4; 
Underdown's Pride's Purge p. 159. 
77 Whitelock Memorials ii p. 477-485. 





another meeeting took place involving Cromwell, Whitelock, Widdrington and Speaker 
Lenthall. Cromwell and Lenthall asked the two lawyers to "draw up some heads upon 
discourse, to be considered by the same company. The lawyers were also asked to "frame 
somewhat in order to the restitution of the secluded members. "79 From this account Professor 
Underdown claimed that Cromwell appeared to be working for the return of the secluded 
members and the release of the imprisoned MPs. There are a number of problems with this 
view. 
First, although it is clear from Whitelock's account that Cromwell was involving the two 
lawyers in discussions, it would be wrong to assume from this account, that Cromwell was 
behind, or favoured plans to overturn the Army's work during the purges. Whitelock never 
stated Cromwell's position on these issues. More importantly, this reference to the 
'Presbyterian'80 Ws was not a new scheme drawn up by either Whitelock or Cromwell. On 
the 6 th 7 th, 14 th and 20th of December Parliament had sent a committee to Fairfax enquiring 
about the future of the members under restraint. 81 Far from being a new compromise scheme, 
Whitelock was merely reflecting moderate parliamentary opinion. 
Professor Gentles argues that Cromwell invited Whitelock to draw up these proposals because 
82 he recognised the importance of having as many M. P. s as possible backing the King's trial. 
This is a more plausible explanation; if the Army was to secure the support of the moderates, 
to keep them in Parliament, thus providing a hint of legitimacy to the actions against the king, 
the views of the moderates would, at the very least, have to be listened to. It is significant that 
79 Ibid p. 479. 
80 By Presbyterian I mean secluded and imprisoned MPs. The term is discussed in chapter 4. 
81 C. J vi p. 93,95,97,101 and 111. 
82 Ian Gentles The New Model Army p. 298. 
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Whitelock and Widdrington survived the purge, but both men held serious reservations about 
the Army's actions. Both men were appointed to a parliamentary committee to "consider how 
, 83 best to proceed against the King. By including Whitelock in these discussions Cromwell 
was pursuing a not totally unrealistic hope, that the two lawyers would support the Anny's 
actions. 
Professor Underdown's view that the meetings with Whitelock were a serious attempt to 
provide a settlement for the secluded members is not supported by the evidence in the 
memorials. Upon the 23 rd , in keeping with their previous agreement, Whitelock was able to 
put forward his case for moderation. However, Whitelock's account reveals that this 
discussion concerned the future of monarchy, rather than the restitution of the secluded 
members. 84 Had Cromwell been behind, or even supported the restitution of the secluded 
members, it is likely Whitelock would have mentioned it. Moreover, it is highly probable that 
Cromwellian support for the scheme would have ensured that the issues were discussed. 
Instead of supporting Whitelock, on the 29th Cromwell wrote to Harrison asking him to come 
to London. 85 Had Cromwell favoured proposals to undo the purge, Harrison was the last 
person he would have wanted in London. 
Although it was resolved on the 23 rd to re-convene the discussions, the meeting never took 
place. 86 This was not the result of a sudden change of policy upon the part of Cromwell. On 
83 C. J vi p. 103. 
84 Whitelock Memorials ii p. 481. 
85 Cromwell to Harrison, 22 nd December 1648, Abbott i p. 714-15. 
86 Whitelock Memorials ii p. 481-82. 
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the 26h, Cromwell's attempts of flattery were put to the test; Whitelock was asked to join the 
"king killing" committee. Both he and Widdrington refused. 87 
There is not enough evidence to suggest that Cromwell was taking an initiative by asking 
Whitelock and Widdrington to draft some proposals. Although Whitelock implied that his 
proposals were of great significance, no other contemporary made reference to them. Indeed, 
the Presbyterians did not mention any attempt by Cromwell to assist the cause of the secluded 
and imprisoned members. Nathaniel Stephens and other MPs were praised for voicing their 
objections to the purge88 but Cromwell was not mentioned. (We must conclude that these 
were not particularly serious discussions. ) 
If there is not sufficient evidence to support Professor Underdown's view that Cromwell 
wished to secure the return of the secluded members, it remains possible that Cromwell 
participated in moves to prevent the trial of the King. Historians who subscribe to this view, 89 
accept the evidence left by Royalists, and in particular the views and writing of Marchamount 
Nedham. 
Between the I 9th and 291h of December Nedham claimed that the radical cause was dividing 
and this would culminate in the return of Charles as King. A close examination of Nedham's 
87 Whitelock Memorials ii p. 484. 
88 The Second Part of the Narrative T. T E. 477 (19) p. 4. A True and Full Relation T. T E. 476 
(14). 
89 The best two accounts dealing with this royalist evidence are found in the works of 
Professor Underdown and Samuel Gardiner. Underdown's Pride's Purge P. 168-172; S. R 
Gardiner Histo! y of the Great Civil War vol. iv p. 284-7. 
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newspapers will cast doubt upon this assertion. It will also develop upon the works of both 
Veronica Wedgwood and Ian Gentles. 90 
Before considering the contents of Nedham's papers 91 two important points must be 
remembered. First, Nedham's reports indicating a split between the Grandees and the 
Levellers vindicated his own editorials. He went to great lengths to explain why the political 
system would not survive without a King. At the core of Nedham's argument rested the 
assumption that without a king, the radicals would split. He warned that instead of peaceable 
government under hereditary kings, the land would groan under the burden of successive 
tyrannies. 92 His claims that the Grandees wished to rid themselves of the Levellers, did justice 
to all the exaggerated dangers Nedham warned his readers about. Second, Nedham was a very 
able journalist. At this stage of his career he was writing for the Royalists and he therefore 
attempted to please his readers and promote the Royalist cause. But, as Nedharn admitted 93 , 
defeat in two civil wars had left the Royalist party in a state of dejection. Royalists yearned 
for glimmers of hope and Nedham proved adept at providing these. 94 
90 Both Veronica Wedgwood Trial of Charles I p. 77 and note 30 p. 232 and Ian Gentles New 
Model Army p. 298 believe that the royalist accounts were the product of wishful thinking. 
Although I agree with this view, my account provides new information upon Nedham's 
journalistic style. 
91 Nedham was responsible for four newspapers during this period. Mercurius Pragmaticus E. 
476 (2), E. 476 (35), E. 477 (30), E. 537 (20). They are all found in the Thomason Tracts. 
From now on all references with E refer to the aformentioned collection. They are all listed in 
the notes on the Press, chapter 5 below. 
92 Mercurius. Pragmaticus E. 476 (2) Tuesday 5 December - Tuesday 12 December. 
93 Mercurius Pragmaticus E. 537 (20) Tuesday 26 December - Tuesday 9 January. From now 
I have abbreviated this title to Merc Prag. 
94 Nedharn was the most effective of all the royalist journalists. For more information on the 
royalist press see chapter 5 below. 
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Nedham was the editor of four editions of Mercurius Pragmaticus during the period between 
the purge and Regicide. In each issue he provided his royalist readers with optimistic 
forecasts. In the first edition, Nedharn made two references to the Grandees, both suggesting 
that they would not be too extreme. However, he did not develop upon this theme preferring 
to place royalist hopes upon the "general outcries and distaste caused by the Anny's 
Remonstrance. "95 He triumphantly reported that Colonel Ashton was preparing to launch a 
counter-revolution. These factors, coupled with the Prince of Wales' strength in Ireland, 
"opened a door of hope for Charles' deliverance. , 96 
in his second paper, Nedharn continued to make optimistic forecasts. The issues raised above 
were mentioned again, but Nedharn had a new story to illustrate how the radical cause was 
dividing. He confidently asserted that the Earl of Warwick had reftised to side with the Army, 
preferring to support the Newport compromise. For good measure Nedham claimed that 
Warwick believed that the Newport agreement bad placed too many restrictions upon 
Charles. 97 
Before considering Nedham's final two papers, it is worth assessing the accuracy of his 
version. He was correct when he stated that there were general outcries against the Army's 
Remonstrance. But this verbal hostility, which mainly came from Presbyterian MPs - the 
people who the purge was directed against, did not represent a threat to the Anny. Moreover, 
as mentioned above, the Army took no notice of protests, illustrated by the additional purges 
of Parliament. 98 The reports concerning Ashton were again an exaggeration; whilst it is true 
95 Merc. Prag E. 476 (2) Tuesday 5 December - Tuesday 12 December 1648. 
96 Ibid 
97 Merc. Prag E. 476 (35) Tuesday 12 December - Tuesday 19 December1648. 
98 See above. For more detail on this second purge see chapter 2 below. 
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that the Lancashire man disagreed with the purge, there is no evidence to support Nedham's 
view that Ashton was prepared to lead a counter-revolution. 
99 The reports from Ireland again 
over-stated the immediacy of the threat. Although Parliament and the Anny recognised a 
potential threat, the notion that there was an immediate danger did not exist. 100 Such a report 
outlines a potential threat, but it does not suggest that the Army had any immediate cause to 
panic. 
Nedham's account concerning the Earl of Wanvick proved to be fallacious. It is clear that he 
had attempted to take advantage of certain confiision which existed over Warwick's attitude 
towards the Parliament. 101 But Warwick soon clarified his position by publicly declaring that 
it "never entered into his thoughts to stand against the Army. 102 Nedham had attempted to 
manipulate a conftised situation to suit his royalist readers. The attempt failed and in his next 
99 The evidence concerning Ashton is very conflicting. Cromwell had a high regard for him 
(Cromwell to Lenthall 20 August 1648 Abbott p. 634-638) which perhaps makes it unlikely 
that Ashton would have launched a counter-revolution. Mercurius Elencticus E. 476 (4) 
Tuesday 5 December 1648, mentions Ashton's hostility but George Wharton did not believe 
that a counter revolution would be the result. The Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencier E. 476 
(39) Tuesday 12 -Tuesday 19 December 1648 p. 1191 printed a letter from colonel Ashton 
claiming that he and the Lancashire forces "were resolved to submit to the orders of the 
General. " The Moderate E. 536 (2) Tuesday 19 - Tuesday 26 December 1648, produced an 
identical report to the one found in the Weekly Intelligencier. From these accounts, coupled 
with the absence of panic amongst those in power, it is clear Nedharn vastly exaggerated the 
danger. 
100 See footnote above 99. 
101 Rushworth Historical Collections vii p. 1366. 
102 As with Ashton's activities, these are conflicting reports concerning War-wick. The 
Kingdome's Weekly Intelligencer T. T E. 476 (39) Tuesday 12 -19 December 1648 p. 1190 
claimed that War-wick had returned home due to poor weather. The same report was made in 
The Moderate E. 477 (4). A Declaration from both Houses T. T E. 477 (7) claimed Warwick 
returned because he was unwell. Merc Elencticus T. T E 476 (4) p. 532 had "great hopes" that 
Warwick bad returned to join the royalists. The situation was resolved when Warwick came 
out in favour of the new regime. Declaration of the Earl of Warwick T. T E. 476 (21) 14 Ih Dec 
1648.1649; Adamson "The Peerage in Politics" p. 262. Rushworth vii Historical Collections 
p-1366. 
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edition, Nedham was forced to concede that Warwick had sided with the Anny. 103 However, 
this was not a problem, Nedham. had a new story to reveal how the radical cause would 
collapse. 
104 
Before we consider Nedham's final two newspapers it is worth glancing at the political 
situation. By the edition of Mercurius Pragmaticus, covering the events between the 19th and 
26'h of December, Ncdham. was running out of stories. Warwick and the Lancashire forces 
had issued declarations of loyalty to the new regime. 105 Upon the 13 th of December, 
Parliament had revoked the former votes which annulled the vote of No Addresses. On the 
same day the Treaty of Newport was voted dishonourable. 106 On the 20th of December, further 
restrictions upon Parliamentary membership were established; all MPs were expected to 
declare that they had, or would have dissented to the 5 th of December vote. 107 And most 
significantly on the 23d of December, the House considered how to proceed in a way of 
justice against the king and other capital offenders. ' 08 
Against this background Nedharn attempted to supply his readers with hope. He no longer 
suggested that there would be an insurrection by discontented Presbyterians. Nedham now 
argued that Cromwell and the Grandees would allow Charles to remain as titular Head of 
State. To add gloss to his argument, Nedham pointed out that the views of the levellers and 
103 Declaration of the Earl of Warwick T. T E. 476 (21), 14 Ih December 1648, and note 102 
above. 
104 Mere. Prag E. 477 (30) Tuesday 19-26 December 1648. 
105 See Warwick's Declaration above notes 102 and 103 
106 Cj vi, p. 97. 
107 Worden The Rump Parliament p. 33-55. 
108 CJ vi p. 102-103. 
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the Grandees were as different as "fire and water". 109 As with Nedham's earlier editions, it is 
difficult to accept his account. 
Considering it was no longer credible to suggest that deliverance would come from either 
War%vick or discontented Presbyterians, Nedham needed a new story. It is plausible to 
assume that he seized upon Cromwell's relatively low profile' 10 and manufactured an account 
to suit his Royalist readers. In addition to this argument there are specific issues which 
undermine his account. 
On the 23 rd of December, Parliament established a committee to consider "how best to 
proceed against the King". "' Nedham believed that this was not significant because only a 
small minority of MPs were 'mad enough' to countenance the trial of an anointed 
sovereign. 112 In Whitelock's memorials, far from implying that the majority of MPs favoured 
moderation, the lawyer stated that the "fierce party prosecuted their design with all 
eagerness. "' 13 Whitelock's account proves to be the more authentic, thirty-eight MPs were 
invited to sit upon this committee. Moderates, including Whitelock himself, were nominated 
but the majority were future regicides. Sixteen members had already shown their radicalism 
by taking the test of dissent. ' 14 
109 Mere. Prag T. T E 477 (30) Tuesday 19 - 26 December 1648. 
110 See below for a survey of Cromwell's role during this period. 
111 CJ vi p. 102. 
112 Mere. Prag T. T E. 477 (30) Tuesday 19 - 26 Decembe 1648. 
113 Whitelock's Memorials ii p. 480. 
114 Ibid; C-J vi p. 101-3; Underdown Pride's Purge p. 366-99. Worden The Rump Parliament 
p-33-55. 
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Nedham continued to argue that Cromwell wished to spare the king, even after Cromwell had 
spoken in favour of the trial. Upon the 26 th , Nedham suggested that the Grandees "would be 
nimble in preventing Parliament from moving against the King. "' 15 Instead of making a 
dramatic intervention on the king's behalf, on the 29th of December, Cromwell joined the 
"king-killing committee". From this point onwards, Nedharn accepted that the King would 
forfeit his crown, though his life would be spared. "' 16 
Nedham never explained how the Grandees would prevent the trial of the King. At the end of 
his account concerning the events between the 19'h and 26 th of December, he promised his 
readers that the next edition would show "the way whereby (the Grandees) intend to comply 
and remove all objections", ' 17 to their projected settlement. But this information was never 
provided. In its place we have been left with unsubstantiated accounts. 
The accounts in Nedham's Mercurius Pragmaticus provide the majority of information 
concerning the alleged attempts to save the King. In addition to writing his newspapers 
Nedharn was sending letters to Nicholas which were almost identical to his editorials. 118 
Although Nedham made no reference to the Denbigh mission, Professor Underdown used his 
account to indicate the terms that were offered to Charles. 119 Apart from the Royalist 
Mercurius Melancholicus, no other newspaper substantiates Nedham's version of events. 
115 Mere. PraR T. T E 537 (20) Tuesday 26 December - Tuesday 9 January 1648. 
116 Ibid By the end of this edition Nedharn appears to have accepted that the Grandees would 
not secure a settlement with the king, however, Nedham still believed they would preserve his 
life. 
117 Mere. Prag T. T E. 477 (30) Tuesday 19 - 26 December 1648. 
118 Bodl Lib, The Clarendon Manuscripts, 34 f. 12,16,17,19; Underdown Pride's Purge 
p-366-99; S. R. Gardiner History of the Great Civil War vol iv p. 284. 
119 Underdown Pride's Purge p. 168. 
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Mercurius Melancholicus has been described as the "most unreliable newspaper, characterised 
by scurrility, wild rumours and breast beating. " On the 25 th December this paper reported that 
Cromwell had agreed that "there was no policy in taking away the King's life. " This edition 
also reported that 7,000 men in Lancashire and 20,000 men in Wales were on the brink of 
launching a counter-revolution. Apart from having the same motivation as Nedham, the 
exaggerations in this account render the paper a most unreliable source. 120 
Finally, how much significance should we attach to the Denbigh mission? The French 
Ambassador Grignon heard a rumour that Cromwell had asked Denbigh to make a final offer 
to the King, the terms of which would have allowed Charles to remain as titular Head of 
State. 12 1 This account was quite possibly the product of rumours circulated by the Royalist 
press. As late as the 28 th of January, some royalists still claimed that the Grandees would 
spare the King. These accounts are rightly dismissed by historians as the product of wishful 
thinking. The same could be said about this account. Moreover, Gringnon had no detailed 
knowledge of the mission, which suggests that his account may have been the product of an 
unsubstantiated whisper. 
If we accept that the mission did take place, John Morrill has provided the most sensible 
explanation. Professor Morrill argues that many officers and soldiers were convinced that 
God was responsible for their victories in battle. Therefore, the King's decision to precipitate 
the Second Civil War was a direct challenge to God's authority. Professor Morrill suggests 
120 J. Frank, The Beginnings of the English Newspaper 1620-1660 (Camridge. Mass 1961), 
p. 162. Mere. Melancholicus E. 536 (27), Monday 25 th December - Monday I" January 1648, 
p. 3 for Cromwell's alleged desire to spare the King, p. 8 for the information concerning 
Ashton's forces and those in Wales. 
121 S. R Gardiner HistoKy of the Great Civil War vol iv p. 285-6. 
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that the point of the Denbigh mission was to demonstrate that God had hardened the King's 
heart; even at this stage, the King was incapable of reason and was being driven to destruction 
by his own o y. 
122 
The dearth of evidence surrounding Cromwell's activities in December 1648 created a 
vacuum. This persuaded a number of historians to accept Royalist accounts. But the evidence 
left by a professionaljournalist, and wishful thinking Royalists, should not be accepted 
without critical analysis. In light of the reservations noted concerning Professor Underdown's 
argument, I will now attempt to provide an alternative explanation concerning Cromwell's 
activities between the purge and regicide. 
It is important to re-state the orthodoxy which existed prior to Professor Underdown's work 
and admit that, until the trial commenced, we know very little about Cromwell's actions. 
Indeed, between the 7th and 13 th of December we know Practically nothing about him. 123 But 
on the 14'h of December it was widely reported that Cromwell visited Hamilton. The mission 
was intended to obtain "discoveries of Hamilton's correspondents in England, " during the 
Second Civil War. 124 It is clear from the contemporary accounts that this was an important 
mission, and Cromwell's reasons for making this visit are at one with his utterances and 
actions during the previous seven months. 
122 John Morrill The Nature of the English Revolution p. 21. 
123 On the 8 th December, Cromwell wrote a letter on behalf of an "old royalist". However, it 
has no political significance. Abbott i p. 709. We also know that Cromwell arrived in London 
upon the 6 th , and attended Parliament upon the 7 
th 
. Apart from this, his activities remain 
obscure. 
124 The Kingdomes Weekly Intelligence T. T E. 476 (39) Tuesday 12-19 December 1648; 
_A Declaration Collected out of the Journals T. T E. 477 (7) Wednesday 13-20 December 1648 
p. 19; Mercurius Elencticus T. T E. 476 (3 6) Tuesday 12 December - Tuesday 19 December 
1648 p. 540, Merc. Prag T. T E. 476 (35) Tuesday 12 December - Tuesday 19 December 1648. 
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As we have seen, the Army wished to bring the eleven members, plus Browne and Copley to 
justice, because it was believed that they were implicated in the decision to invite the Scots to 
invade England. Cromwell visited Hammond to secure evidence against these aforesaid 
rnembers. It was a mission Cromwell must have relished considering his contempt towards 
the men who had altered their allegiance from Parliament to the Royalists during the Second 
Civil War. After the siege of Pembroke, Cromwell condemned three Royalists who had 
earlier "apostatised"-ffom Parliament "judging their inequity double. " 125 As Blair Worden 
points out Cromwell believed that these men had failed to recognise God's providence. By 
changing sides they had been blind to all of God's marvellous dispensations. Cromwell's 
feelings towards anyone who had a hand in the invitation to the Scots is illustrated in a letter 
he wrote to Robert Jenner: 
"This being a more prodigious treason than any that had been perpetuated before; (because 
the former quarrel on their part was that Englishmen might rule over one another; this to 
vassalise us to a foreign nation. " 126 
Two other pieces of evidence place Cromwell at the forefront of moves against the 
Presbyterians. First, just days after the visit to Hamilton, a pamphlet claimed that Cromwell 
wished to execute Browne and Walker. 127 Also, Ireton, Cromwell and Peters attempted to 
stifle the Presbyterian clergy's opposition to the new regime. 128 These visits were designed to 
secure justice against men, for whom, Cromwell believed had betrayed a glorious cause. Also, 
as will be argued in the second chapter, the Commons were anxious for a charge to be brought 
125 Cromwell to Lenthall July 19 1648. Abbott i P. 62 1. 
126 Cromwell to Robert Jenner and John Ashe 20 November 1648 Abbott ii p. 691-92. See 
also B. Worden "Providence and Politics in Cromwellian England" P&P 109 (1985) p. 55-99. 
127 The Tyranny of Tyrannies. T. T. E. 476 (34) 19 December 1648. 
128 Ian Gentles The New ModelArmy p. 304. 
41 
in against the secluded members. It is possible that Cromwell was attempting to provide some 
cohesion to the Army's policy towards the imprisoned and secluded members. 
it is very likely that Cromwell also visited Hamilton to secure evidence against the King. 
There has been no concrete evidence suggesting that Cromwell favoured a solution with the 
monarch. His support for the Army's Remonstrance, and his two statements describing 
Charles as "that man-against whom God hath witnessed", suggest that he favoured bringing 
Charles to justice. Moreover, Mercurius Elencticus placed Cromwell "at the head of moves 
against the King". 129 Even Nedham, at this juncture, claimed that Cromwell visited Hammond 
to secure the "ruin- of his majesty 15 . 
130 
Professor Gentles argues that the purpose of Cromwell's visits to Windsor "may have 
included the overseeing of security arrangements. " 13 1 This argument is supported by a letter 
written by Cromwell and Ireton to the Governor of Windsor Castle. The letter provides 
instructions concerning the protection of their prisoner. It includes details about where horse 
guards should be positioned, where the King should be lodged and who should be allowed 
within the confines of the castle. This letter was probably the result of Cromwell's visits to 
Windsor and it is likely that Cromwell reported this back to the House of Commons. 132 
129 Mercurius. Elencticus T. T E. 476 (36) Tuesday 12 December - Tuesday 19 December 
1648 p. 539. 
130 Merc. Prag E. 476 (35) Tuesday 12 December - Tuesday 19 December 1648. 
131 Ian Gentles The New Model Army p. 299. 
132 Cromwell to Whitchcott 22 December 1648 Abbott i p. 714-15. 
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On the 18 th of December Cromwell visited Warwick to "confer about the dangers from the 
,, 133 
new fleet being prepared by Prince Charles. The visit should not be regarded as an 
example of Cromwell's wish to appease moderates. Warwick's loyalty to the new regime had 
already been "amply manifested. " 
134 Cromwell's expertise lay in the military rather than the 
135 
political field. Parliament had already began to 'new model' the Navy , making it quite 
natural for Cromwell to discuss naval matters with the Admiral. 
On the 23d of December Cromwell was the only officer to object to the requirement that a 
soldier must be present during Charles' conversations. 136 It has been suggested that Cromwell 
opposed this instruction because it inhibited last minute negotiations with the King. 137 But this 
view fails to take into account the safeguards which had already been undertaken before 
Cromwell voiced his objection. On the 22nd , Cromwell 
instructed the Governor of Windsor 
Castle to "turn out all malignant or Cavalierish inhabitants" and to remove "loose and idle 
persons. " Also, Whitchcote was instructed to " restrain any numerous or ordinary concourse 
, 438 of unnecessary people ... of whose affection and faithfulness was unknown. The letter to 
Whitchcote and another to Harrison are important for three reasons. First, they demonstrate 
Cromwell's concern for security arrangements. Second, having made these meticulous plans, 
Cromwell believed it unnecessary to insist on an officer being present during all the king's 
133 Abbott i p. 712. Three sources mention this visit. A Perfect Diumall, Rushworth and 
Whitelock. All corroborate the story that Cromwell made these visits to discuss the Navy, not 
to discuss a possible compromise. 
134 See above notes 101 and 102. 
135 B. S Capp Cromwell's Nayy: the Fleet and the English Revolution. 1648-1660 (Oxford 
1989), p. 42-45. 
136 Abbott i p. 713-15. 
137 Ian Gentles The New Model Anny p. 299. 
138 Cromwell to Whitchcote 22 December 1648, Abbott p. 714-15. 
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conversations. Third, as he saw during the Second Civil War, Cromwell was more concerned 
with military rather than political considerations. 
From Whitelock's account, it is clear that Cromwell was present during the discussions 
concerning the future constitution. But as mentioned previously, Cromwell was attempting to 
keep moderates in Parliament but his name is not linked with calls for the preservation of 
monarchy. It is likely'that the moderates who advocated the retention of Charles as Head of 
State, or the candidature of the Duke of Gloucester, were the same MPs who survived the 
purges but refused to be associated with the regicide. Whitelock's account that was used by 
Professor Underdown to show that Cromwell was attempting to undo the purge, does not 
prove that he was involved in the negotiations to spare the King's life. Moreover, there is 
nothing in Whitclock's account to prove that Cromwell was not one of the men that favoured 
"no King at all. " 
139 
Cromwell played a relatively minor role in December 1648. His name hardly appears in the 
Journals of the House of Commons and he played little part in the Whitehall debates. He 
evidently preferred to speak to Warwick about naval matters, make arrangements for the royal 
prisoner and interview Hammond. This thesis accepts that Cromwell attempted to keep 
moderates in Parliament but he was not willing to actively and enthusiastically endorse the 
perpetuation of Charles's rule. He was pursuing a policy of "realpolitique" attempting to 
provide moderates with an apparent voice in the framing of the future constitution without 
conceding upon the important issue of Charles's culpability for the blood that was shed in the 
Second Civil War. 
139 Whitelock, Memorials ii, p. 480. 
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Cromwell's actions once the trial began are well known and they do not require too much 
additional comment. He certainly played a leading role attending twenty-one of the twenty- 
three sessions in the Painted Chamber. His name also appears third on the death warrant. 140 
He had played little part in the parliamentary committees that determined the form of the trial, 
allowing others to perform the meticulous preparations. Despite the number of times 
Cromwell's name appears in Phelp's- account, the view that the future Lord Protector almost 
single-handedly drove-the trial forward is no longer accepted. A. W. McIntosh complained 
that many historians had accepted the accounts left by a number of regicides as though "they 
were calm, spontaneous and detached submissions of unbiased evidence. "14 1 Barry Coward 
has argued that Cromwell was one leader amongst many. Peter Gaunt has pointed out that we 
should not swallow all the colourful stories made by some of the regicides when they were on 
trial for their lives. These views are, I believe, correct. It is simply not tenable that Cromwell 
bullied, joked and humiliated MPs into signing the document. 142 In addition to the arguments 
outlined by Drs McIntosb, Gaunt and Coward a few more points can be added. First, not one 
contemporary account available during the trial substantiates the view that outright coercion 
was used. Second the accounts left by some of the regicides is most conflicting. Downes 
claimed that Cromwell's mood was one of acute seriousness and resolution refusing to 
countenance any view that did not correspond with his own. In contrast the testimony of 
Thomas Waite portrayed Cromwell as the callous and flippant tyrant laughing, smiling and 
jeering in the days before the execution. 143 Waite's testimony does not fit easily with the view 
propounded by some historians that accept the accounts of the regicides whilst suggesting that 
Cromwell had agonised over the decision to execute the King explaining this final decision 
140 Peter Gaunt, Oliver Cromwell (Oxford 1996) p. 64-5. 
141 A. W McIntosh, "The Number of English Regicides" History vol 67 (1982), p. 195-216. 
142 Gaunt and McIntosh cited above. Barry Coward, Oliver Cromwell (Harlow, 1991) p. 64-5. 
143 Wedgwood, Trial of Charles I p. 216-224. 
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upon the grounds of Godly providentialism. This thesis accepts the important part played by 
providence in Cromwell's mind, but it was always a serious business that had no room for 
frivolity. It is clear from his future comments vindicating the regicide that he always took the 
business seriously. It must also be remembered that many of the regicidcs refused to blame 
Cromwell for their part in the regicide. 144 Finally, we must not forget the atmosphere in which 
the regicide trials took place. On th& one hand, there was the prospect of clemency shown to 
William Heveningham' and Colonel Hutchinson that may have prompted regicides to use 
excuses with the hope that they could receive pardon. Linked to this was the prospect of death 
conducted, in the words of Professor Hutton, in an atmosphere of "bear baiting. " 145 In such 
circumstances, the arch enemy of the Royalist cause, with the added advantage of his being 
unable to speak for himself, seemed a convincing alibi. 
Contemporaries writing at the time of the regicide placed more than one person at the head of 
the moves against the King. Cromwell was amongst them but other names including Sir Peter 
Wentworth, Sir James Harrington, Sir Henry Mildmay, John Ven, Edmund Harvey, Francis 
Allen, John Blackiston, Sir Gilbert Pickering, Henry Marten and Thomas Scott were 
identified as leading radicals. 146 The Journals of the House of Commons and the Journals of 
the High Court of Justice show that Miles Corbet, Nicolas Love and Henry Smith played an 
important role in politics from the first day of the purge. John Gurdon, Thomas Boon and 
Thomas Widdrington attended Parliament at the time John Downes and Richard Ingoldsby 
swore that Cromwell was forcing everyone to sign the warrant. The testimony left by 
144 Ibid. 
145 Ronald Hutton, The Restoration A Political and Religious Histoly of England and Wales 
1658-1667. (Oxford 1986) p. 132-4. 
146 C-J vi, p. 93-126. See also chapter 2 below which analyses the role performed by a number 
of MPs in the High Court of Justice. 
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Buistrode Whitel6cke is also very revealing. His memoirs written at the time of the 
Restoration, went to great lengths to show his reluctance to support revolutionary change. He 
too was in the vicinity of Parliament at the time of the alleged onslaught for names. He also 
went to great lengths in 1660 to prevent punishment which even included parting with money 
to secure his freedom. It is noteworthy that he makes no mention of Cromwell prompting him 
to sign. 147 It is possible, even likely, -that Cromwell encouraged people to sign the warrant 
considering that such d high proportion of the nominated commissioners had refused to serve 
on the court. But the idea that he terrorised men, or in the case of Richard Ingoldsby forced 
his hand to sign, should be discounted as the testimony of frightened men. 
This thesis has challenged the notion that Cromwell almost single-handedly drove the 
revolution forward after his belated conversion to the principle of regicide. This next section 
will challenge the view advanced by Dr Worden that claims that Cromwell was the "architect 
of the Rump regime" whose "complex political temperament, and in particular his desire for 
constitutional propriety" pushed the Rump in a conservative direction after the regicide. Dr 
Worden suggests that Cromwell's conservative strain ensured that the Rump was full of 
unrevolutionary members. He also argues that the Godly zeal - the other strain running 
through Cromwell was never totally extinguished. After 1651 the regime that Cromwell had 
created refused to reform, resulting in acrimony that soured relations between the creator and 
his conservative colleagues. 148 It is a testimony to the dominance of Dr Worden's work upon 
the early Rump period that his views upon Cromwell have never been the subject of debate. 
Austin Woolrych, Ian Gentles and Sean Kelsey have questioned part of his argument in the 
147 Whitelock's role will be discussed in chapter 2. See Hutton, The Restoration cited above n. 
145, P. 13 3 -4. 
148 This is the one of the central themes of Blair Worden's Nvork on The Rump Parliament-, 
See in particular, p. 19 and 163 -93. 
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months leading up to the dissolution but little is mentioned on Cromwell's role in the first few 
months of 1649. Moreover, Dr Kelsey's desire to allow the Rump to speak for itself did not 
lend itself to a debate upon the politics of 1648/9.149 
There is a great deal to be said for Dr Worden's view that Cromwell was a moderating 
influence during the first few monthsý of the revolution. He did support the retention of the 
House of Lords, he appearý to have favoured the return of some of the secluded members and 
he may have been willing to see the confirmation of the Presbyterian church. He also 
supported a mild oath as a prerequisite for sitting on the Council of State and he was very 
hostile to the Levellers. This was more moderate than some of the policies favoured by men 
such as Henry Marten, but Cromwell's initiatives here do not demonstrate a dualist 
personality. They merely reflected a prudent approach to politics. Moreover, it is difficult to 
regard Cromwell as the architect of the regime since a number of the policies he promoted 
met with failure and he was still a rather nominal figure in the House of Commons. 
His decision to support the House of Lords was not an indication of his conservatism. 
Although the Lords rejected the decision to try the King, a number of the peers had shown a 
desire to remain in politics making it plain that they wanted to play a role in the future 
constitution. The reasons for his desire to retain the Lords were neatly summarised in one of 
his utterances: 
"they were mad to take these courses to incense the peers in the whole kingdom against them 
at such a time when they need to study a near union with them. "150 
These are the words of a prudent politician rather a man wishing to defend a conservative 
order. Three other factors require stipulation. First, when Cromwell made these utterances the 
149 Kelsey, Inventing a Republic (Manchester 1997) passim. 
150 The attendance of the members of the peerage is discussed in chapter 3. This quote is taken 
from J. S. A Adamson, 'The Peerage in Politics' (PhD thesis, Cambridge 1986), p. 277. 
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issue of the Peers role in the constitution was not concerned with parity. The final debate was 
whether the Lords should retain an advisory role within the constitution and therefore his 
decision to support the peers was about symbolism rather than political power. 151 Second, his 
initiative failed which is hardly a suggestion that he was controlling the character and nature 
of the Parliament. Finally, there is no evidence that Cromwell was the leading force behind 
the desire to retain the Lords LudloiNv remembered Cromwell's part in the debate but 
Ludlow's memory of Cromwell's significance owes a great deal to the events after after 1653. 
In the Commons Cromwell was not one of the tellers in the motion - that role was performed 
William Syclenharn and William Purefoy. 152 
The second role that points to Cromwell's conservatism was his support for an oath to join the 
Council of State which only required members to adhere to "this present Parliament in the 
maintenance and defence of the public liberty and freedom of this nation, as it is now declared 
by this Parliament. " Blair Worden has described the political background to this decision and 
for the purposes of this chapter I will briefly provide a summary of his account. 
Ireton and Harrison were not voted on to the Council of State. Ireton responded by demanding 
that all the members of the Council swear an oath approving the judicial proceedings of the 
regicide court. As is well known 22 of the elected members refused to subscribe. Cromwell 
secured a watered down oath by obtaining the support of some of the members who had 
recently returned to the House. However, his original proposal for an oath was replaced with 
the words that councillors would agree to "the settling of the govenunent of this nation for 
future in the way of a republic without King or House of Peers. " Again Cromwell failed to 
151 See C. J vi, p. 132. The background to the dissolution of the Lords is one of the central 
themes of chapter 3. 
152 C. J vi, p. 132. 
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secure an outright victory, but more importantly than this, his willingness to advocate a less 
rigid oath was not too much of a compromise. 
153 
The peers nominated had shown an inclination to support the regime and their role will be 
discussed later in the thesis. The judges were needed to provide legitimacy to the new regime. 
of the thirty four MPs nominated t6 sit on the Council, twenty two of them had demonstrated 
their support for the-regime by either taking the early test of dissent and/or signing the 
regicide document. A great deal has been made of the fact that so many MPs refused to 
endorse the events that brought the Commonwealth into existence. In Cromwell's original 
oath he still required the acceptance of de facto parliamentary rule. Moreover, the men who 
refused to accept a retrospective oath did have a radical pedigree. Gilbert Pickering, Bulstrode 
Whitelock and Rowland Wilson had been prominent between the purge and regicide. Of the 
MPs nominated, only Sir William Armyn, Alexander Popham, Sir Henry Heselrige and Sir 
William Masharn had played no part in the period between 6 th December 1648 and 3 01h 
January 1649. Sir Henry Vane was a well known radical who was more likely to support the 
perpetuation of the Commonwealth once it came into existence, than the majority of other so 
called revolutionary MPs. It appears that he attended Parliament on the 20th January and his 
reasons for objecting to the purge have remained a mystery, but his career, both before and 
after the regicide demonstrated his commitment to radical politics. 154 Sir Arthur Heselrige had 
been away from London dealing with Royalists and although he did not support the purge he 
would not have countenanced the return of a Stuart monarch. That effectively leaves only 
153 Worden, The Rump, p. 178-8 1. 
154 Cj vi, p. 93-126 for the names of MPs who sat after the purge. For Sir Harry Vane's 
attendance on the 20'h see, Underdown, Pride's Purge, p. 196-7, and sources listed in n. 62, 
which suggest that Vane attended on that date. See chapter 2 below for a discussion upon the 
activities of the members who survived the purge but avoided signing the regicide document. 
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Wallop, Popham and Sir William Masham as members whose attitude was potentially 
dubious. 
155 
This mirrors Cromwell's attitude in December 1648. He had a set of fixed principles but he 
was willing to accommodate more moderate opinion provided it did not undermine the 
revolution. This was once again prudent politics. In terms of public relations the regicide had 
not gone well. A small proportion of the nominated commissioners sat in the High Court; 
Charles produced a superb defcnee which must have confounded even his most staunch 
supporter. The Government was faced with chronic problems as their existence was 
threatened by external danger. For Cromwell, who never concerned himself with political 
faction a debate over retrospective support for regicide was unimportant. The new regime 
needed as many supporters as possible and it was not a time to become embroiled in a debate 
that essentially looked backwards. Finally, this was not a policy mamifactured by Cromwell 
alone. It had the support of a broad cross section of MPs, who appreciated that reform had to 
be delayed until the dangers both within Westminster and outside, had been dealt with. This is 
perhaps best illustrated by the actions of Ireton. His opposition to allowing MPs to sit on the 
Council, who would not endorse the regicide, was the last time that he differed with the 
mainstream majority. 
The return of the members who had played no part in the events leading up to the regicide 
almost certainly had Cromwell's support. This will be discussed in the next chapter, but for 
the purposes of this account it must be stressed that a number of the MPs who returned in 
February had demonstrated some support for the purge. John Gurdon had actually endorsed 
155 Sir Arthur Heselrige was in Newcastle. See A Perfect Diumall of some Passages in 
Parliament, E. 527 (19), Monday 5 th February -Monday 12 th February 1649, p. 2323. 
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the purge by introducing the test of dissent. He did not sign the regicide document, but 
returned in February. All of these returning MPs still had to demonstrate their hostility to 
negotiating with Charles, by taking their retrospective dissent to the Newport accord. 
Moreover, some of the people who Cromwell attempted to persuade to resume their 
membership had "resolved not to fall out with the Army", basing their objections to the 
projected settlement debated at Whi - tehall, rather than the purge and even the regicide. 156 
Finally, it will be argued that the Arrny was not concerned about the precise membership of 
the Commons apart from providing a more tractable Parliament. It was implied in January 
1649 that the secluded members were only going to face suspension. This was mooted at the 
time when Cromwell was in his "revolutionary mode" so his influence cannot be detected. 157 
Again this initiative was not original and it did not compromise the revolution. 
The same is true of his apparent offer to confirm the Presbyterian qhurch. The proposal, 
which was only mooted in one source, would still have allowed for a degree of liberty of 
conscience. It was reported that tithes would be retained until a viable alternative had been 
found. 158 Far from being a conservative initiative by Cromwell this is consistent with 
parliamentary politics from the start of the Long Parliament in 1640. The issue of the future of 
the church had essentially been fudged from the outset. It did cause the most division and 
MPs from Pym onwards had attempted a series of holding operations to appease as many 
factions as possible. By confirming tithes but affording the opportunity for a degree of liberty 
of conscience and suggesting that the system would be replaced in the future was an attempt 
156 William Ashurst, The Reasons Against Agreement, T. T. E. 536 (4), 26 th December 1648. 
157 The Humble Answer of the General Council, T. T. E. 537 (14), P January 1649, p. 2. See 
also chapter 2 below. 
158 Clement Walker, A Complete HistoKy of Independency, 4 vols (1661), Part ii, p. 57. 
Worden, The Rump, p. 191. A Modest Narrative of Intelligence, Saturday 31" April - 
Saturday 7 th April 1649, p. 4. 
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to appease radical sentiment. 159 With this achieved Cromwell could channel his efforts to the 
real issue of the day - the expedition to Ireland. Finally, as Professor Davis has shown, the 
issue of the form of the church government was never particularly important to Cromwell, 
provided that the majority could worship freely. In such dangerous circumstances a 
confirmation of the Presbyterian church was not important. 160 
His attitude towards the Levellers, was determined by an aversion to their doctrine and more 
importantly a belief that their activities would prevent the expedition to Ireland. This was 
consistent and does not require too much comment. The activities of Lilburne had a profound 
effect upon the discontent in the Army and it was widely reported that this could destroy the 
plans for Ireland. The Council of State had spent most of their time building up the Navy, 
which they had assumed direct responsibility for, along with ensuring that the Army were 
strong enough to counter the Royalist threat. ' 61 The reaction that'greeted the crushing of the 
Levellers at Burford shows that Cromwell's actions had broad support from the vast majority 
of the MPs. Most importantly, on the 12 th April Cromwell, Whitelock and Lisle attended a 
meeting with the Common Council. The aim was to secure a loan for the forthcoming trip to 
Ireland. It is clear from the assurances given by Cromwell that the Council expressed a 
concern about the divisions in the Army. Cromwell responded with the following guarantees. 
First, all of the money would go towards the expedition. He reminded the Council that this 
was a conflict to be fought by Protestants, against "popery and prelacy", and that this cause 
should override all other considerations. Second, he assured them that the Army would go to 
159 The Perfect Weekly Account, T. T. E. 550 (17), Wednesday 4h April - Wednesday I Ith 
April, p. 440. 
160 J. C Davis, "Cromwell's Religion, " in John Morrill (ed), Oliver Cromwell and the English 
Revolution, p. 18 1. 
161 CSPD, 1649-50 eg: p. 13,16,18. 
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ireland if they could have assurances about their pay. Finally, and related to the last point, he 
said that there were no major divisions in the Army. As Cromwell was spending most of his 
time working on the preparations for Ireland it was only logical that he would crush the 
mutiny. 1 
62 
What, therefore, were the main considerations at the forefront of Cromwell's mind after the 
regicide? The first and most important factor was the preservation of the new regime. As 
nientioned above, this aim was at the forefront of his mind when it came dealing with the 
Levellers. It also took up most of his time in the Council. He was involved in the survey of 
English forces to determine how many were needed for Ireland and what proportion should 
stay at home for the purposes of civil defence. He was also involved in the plans for the 
reorganisation of the fleet. As Ian Gentles pointed out Cromwell spent a vast amount of time 
ensuring that the Army was properly equipped. 163 As mentioned above Cromwell had acted as 
the spokesperson for his soldiers in the north. When he was in London after the revolution he 
did everything he could to ensure that his anny for Ireland would be well-equipped. His 
earlier utterances from Pontefract had not been hollow words and the efficiency of these 
preparations for Ireland are a testimony to his (and others) determination and efficiency. 
Above all else Cromwell remained a military man. In politics his initiatives did not meet with 
success but when it came to military matters he appears to have been omnipotent. This is a 
reflection of where his abilities lay and also of his own order of priorities. 
162 The Moderate Intelligence E. 551 (1), Thursday 12 th April -Thursday 18 th April 1649, 
P. 1989. CSPD, 1649-50, p. 9-10,19,22,33,77. 
163 CSPD, 1649-50 eg: p. 9-10,19,22,25-6,33,37,40,62-3,77,97. Ian Gentles, The New 
Model Anny, p. 353-356. 
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Conclusions. 
This chapter has highlighted three important aspects of Cromwell's personality. First, his 
attitude towards the campaigns in the Second Civil War reveal a man who was primarily 
concerned with military rather than yolitical considerations, a sentiment that he would 
continue to display after the regicide. Second, this thesis suggests that Cromwell was a man 
unwilling to initiate political programmes. Finally, by suggesting that Cromwell supported 
regicide prior to the purging of Parliament and remained a staunch supporter of the new 
regime, the chapter portrays Cromwell as a conviction politician. 164 It is worth considering 
how these findings correspond with the most recent studies of Cromwell during the 1640's. 165 
There is, I believe, a growing consensus upon his role in politics in the years leading up to the 
regicide. 
There is widespread agreement that Cromwell was one of the MPs who,. in John Morrill's 
words, "grasped the nettles" and took the initiative when it became clear that the nation was 
on the brink of Civil War. 166 Historians also accept that from 1642 until 1646, Cromwell's life 
was dominated by war. 167 During these years, apart from favouring a religious settlement 
164 See above for Cromwell's concern for military matters showing his preference to follow 
rather than initiate events see. I believe that this account portrays Cromwell's as more of a 
conviction politician than any of its predecessors. 
165 Most of what follows has been based upon: Peter Gaunt, Oliver Cromwell. Barry Coward, 
Oliver Cromwell. The essays in John Morrill (ed), Oliver Cromwell and the English 
Revolution. Ian Gentles, The New Model Army. 
166 John Morrill "The making of Oliver Cromwell" in Morrill (ed) Oliver Cromwell and the 
English Revolution p. 48; Austin Woolrych, 'Cromwell the Solider' in Morrill (ed) p. 94-95; 
Peter Gaunt, Oliver Cromwell p. 41; Barry Coward, Oliver Cromwell p. 219-22. 
167 Peter Gaunt, Oliver Cromwell p. 43. Morrill "Introduction" in Morrill (ed) p. 5. J. S. A. 
Adamson, 'Oliver Cromwell and the Long Parliament' in Morrill (ed) p. 55. 
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which would have provided a limited form of religious toleration 
168 
, Cromwell does not 
appear to have considered the constitutional restraints which would have had to be imposed 
upon the King. Instead he concentrated upon winning the war, allowing others in Parliament 
to discuss a future settlement. The two most recent studies of Cromwell have shown his pre- 
occupation with a desire to administer the defeat of the Royalists. 
169 Cromwell's appetite for 
victory accounts for his choice of soldiers of ability, irrespective of their social status. 
' 70 
Historians also agree that his heated argument with Manchester and his role in the self- 
denying ordinance reflected his determination to produce a more efficient army. 171 
As mentioned above, throughout the 1640's, Cromwell spent the majority of his time with the 
Army, and although he was involved in discussions at Putney, 172 most of his career in the 
1640's was spent fighting. Therefore, his decision to remain in the north in November 1648, 
his discussions with Warwick in December 1648, and his involvement in the security 
arrangements for the King, are consistent with a man whose career had been dominated by 
military concerns. ' 73 
168 For the limits of Cromwell's perception of religious toleration see Blair Worden, 
'Toleration and the Cromwellian Protectorate' in WJ Sheils, Persecution and Toleration: 
studies in Church HigM, (Oxford 1984) p. 199-233; See J. C Davis, 'Cromwell's Religion' in 
Morrill ed p. 181-208; J. P. Sommerville, 'Oliver Cromwell and English Political Thought' in 
Morrill (ed) p. 254-55. Peter Gaunt, Oliver Cromwell p. 54-5. 
169 Peter Gaunt, Oliver Cromwell p. 43-66. Barry Coward, Oliver Cromwell p. 24-42. For his 
attitude to the Second Civil War see above. I believe that my interpretation complements 
Cromwell's involvement in political and military affairs before the regicide 
170 For a sensible discussion of Cromwell's remarks upon the social origins of his soldiers see 
Peter Gaunt, Oliver Cromwell p. 49-50. Coward, Oliver Cromwell p. 28. 
171 Ian Gentles, The New Model Army p. 27. J. S. A. Adamson, 'Oliver Cromwell and the Long 
Parliament' in Morrill (ed) p. 63. Peter Gaunt, Oliver Cromwell p. 60-61, p. 56. 
172 See below. For discussions on Cromwell's role in the Putney Debates see, Ian Gentles, The 
New Model Army p. 202-19. For a first-class account of Cromwell's failure to control 




Although the bulk of Cromwell's time was spent fighting the Royalists, his exemption from 
the self-denying ordinance and his role as Lieutenant General in the New Model Army made 
him, potentially at least, one of the most important men in Parliament. It has been argued 
above that Cromwell was unwilling to take a lead in constitutional matters. We will now 
consider whether or not this view is c onsistent with his position in the 1640s. 
Peter Gaunt argues that there can be no doubt that Cromwell played a significant role in the 
opening of the Long Parliament. 174 He supported Lilbourne's petition asking for a review of 
his sentence for printing puritan pamphlets. He sat on various committees concerned with 
religious matters. Also, Cromwell attended the important committees which put the kingdom 
in a posture of defence. However, whilst acknowledging that Cromwell was a vocal member 
of Parliament in 1641-42, certain important factors require comment. First, John Morrill 
suggests that Cromwell was working for other more senior MpS. 175 Second, and most 
importantly, Cromwell was silent upon the most significant constitutional issues. He did not 
feature in the debates concerning the trial of Strafford, the Grand Remonstrance, the Militia 
Ordinance and the Nineteen Propositions. 176 Although Cromwell revealed his concern for 
religious and military issues, before the war commenced, it does not appear that Cromwell 
considered any practical solution which could have averted the crisis. 
174 Peter Gaunt, Oliver Cromwell p. 39. 
175 John Morrill, 'The Making of Oliver Cromwell'in Morrill ed p. 45-47; J. S. A. Adamson, 
'Oliver Cromwell and the Long Parliament' in Morrill (ed) p. 51-2, sees Cromwell acting in 
isolation. Peter Gaunt, Oliver Cromwell highlights the difficulty with the source material but 
believes Morrill's account to be the more likely, p. 40-1. Morrill's view appears, in light of 
this argument (Cromwell not an original political thinker), to be the more probable. 
176 John Morrill "The Making of Oliver Cromwell" in Morrill (ed) p. 47. Gaunt, Olive 
Cromwell p. 40. 
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In the summer of 1646, Cromwell returned to Parliament. The evidence concerning his 
activities is scarce but his letters in the summer of 1646, and in the early part of 1647, reveal a 
man distressed about the plight of his soldiers, a sentiment precipitated by Parliaments' desire 
to press ahead with disbandment. ' 77 It is clear that during 1646 and 1647 Cromwell genuinely 
attempted to heal the breach between Parliament and the Army. 178 Although his precise role 
remains unclear, Cromwell evidently failed in his task illustrated by the refusal of either 
Parliament or the Army to compromise. It is also evident that Cromwell made no concrete 
proposals to breach the gap which had developed. When the Presbyterian ascendancy in 
Parliament ended, Cromwell threw his weight behind the 'Heads of Proposals. ' Although 
there has been a fierce debate over who participated in the framing of these proposals, 
historians accept that Cromwell played little part. 179 Moreover, at the Reading Debates in July 
1647, Cromwell was not even familiar with the contents of the document. 180 This did not 
prevent him from vigorously advocating the proposals and this is another example of his 
tendency to follow, rather than initiate events. 
177 Peter Gaunt, Oliver Cromwell p. 70. See Ian Gentles, The New Model Ann p. 140-189. 
178 Peter Gaunt, Oliver Cromwell, p. 73-7. Gaunt rightly dismisses the accusations that 
Cromwell welcomed the growing militancy of the Army. 
179 John Adamson, 'The English Nobility and the Projected Settlement of 1647' HJ 30 (1987) 
p. 567-602. Adamson puts forward the case for Saye's involvement. This was attacked by 
Mark Kishlansky in 'Saye What' HJ 33 (1990) p. 917-937. Adamson slightly modified his 
account by acknowledging Ireton's involvement in HJ 34 (199 1) p. 23 1-255. Another 
broadside by Kishlansky was produced in 'Saye No More' JBS 30 (199 1). Although 
Kishlansky "challenges" Adamson's contention that Cromwell was closely associated with 
the Lords, neither historian suggests that Cromwell was involved in the drafting of proposals. 
Peter Gaunt, Oliver Cromwell p. 82 believes Ireton drafted the proposal. The same view is 
expressed by Ian Gentles, The New Model Army p. 181 although he does acknowledge the 
role of the peers, p. 182. The same line is taken by Austin Woolrych "Cromwell the Soldier" 
in Morrill ed P. 107. All these accounts make no mention of Cromwell's involvement in the 
framing of the proposals. 
180 Peter Gaunt, Oliver Cromwell p. 82. 
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This chapter has claimed that from the start of the Second Civil War Cromwell was a man of 
conviction, determined to bring the King to justice. This view coincides with modem 
interpretations which accept the predominant role of providence in Oliver Cromwell's 
political philosophy. 181 John Morrill argues that, by Nvaging another war, the Army believed 
that Charles had so offended God that he had to be destroyed. 182 Cromwell belonged to this 
school, hence his apocalyptic utterances describing Charles as "that man against whom God 
hath witnessed. "' 83 Theview that Cromwell was convinced that the King must die due to his 
role in precipitating the Second Civil War has been supported by Barry Coward. Dr Coward 
rightly points out, that for the first time in Cromwell's career, he came to a realisation that a 
future settlement would not include Charles 1. The foundation of Cromwell's belief rested 
with Charles' failure to accept the judgement of God, which had been expressed in the New 
Model's victory in the First Civil War. 184 
In addition to Cromwell's unwavering belief in providence, he also recognised the futility of 
negotiating with Charles. Upon the eve of the Second Civil War, Cromwell acknowledged 
that he should never have attempted to negotiate with the King. 185 Cromwell's distrust of 
Charles makes it highly unlikely that he would have countenanced a solution which resulted 
181 The best example remains, Blair Worden, "Toleration and the Cromwellian Protectorate" 
cited above. Also essays by Davis, Fletcher and Morrill in, Morrill (ed), Oliver Cromwell and 
the English Revolution, all show the centrality of providence in Cromwell's character. Also, 
republican writers such as Sarah Barber, accept the centrality of Cromwell's religion, Sarah 
Barber, Regicide and Republicanism (Edinburgh, 1998), p. 121-146. 
182 John Morrill, The Nature of the English Revolution p. 2 1. 
183 Cromwell to Hammond 25h November 1648, Abbott, i p. 696-699; Carlyle, i p. 393-400. 
184 Barry Coward, "Oliver Cromwell and the Regicide" The Historian (December 1996. ) 
185 Ian Gentles, The New Model Anny p. 235. 
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in Charles' abdication. ' 86 For an historian writing in the twenty first century, it is clear that 
Charles' temperament and principles would have ensured that he, and his supporters would 
not have accepted an enforced abdication. ' 87 We can be almost certain that, after two bloody 
Civil Wars and a number of failed peace initiatives this fact would not have been lost on 
Cromwell. 
The evidence presented in this chapter challenges Professor Underdown's view that from 
November 1648 until January 1649, Cromwell was "torn between the two conflicting 
principles of puritan idealism and constitutional propriety. " 188 In its place a different picture 
of Cromwell emerges which is at one with recent studies. We find a less complex but a more 
committed character. His behaviour during December 1648 and January 1649 was at one 
with his political stance during the 1640's. In November 1648 he found "a very great sense" 
in the petitions written by his regiments but, as noted, he had not participated in the framing 
of the documents. In December 1648 he played little part in the parliamentary committees 
which made provisions for the trial of the King; as with the November petitions, when 
preparations had been made he provided his unequivocal support. 189 From this information we 
should not view Cromwell as the calculating politician waiting to see how events materialised 
before seizing "control of the process"190. Instead during this revolutionary period we find 
not a conviction politician but a man unwilling to initiate events. This mirrors his attitude to 
186 My view differs from Gentles case, The New Model Army p. 299. Cromwell encouraged 
Hammond to stand against the King; and he used Hamilton's knowledge of Charles as a 
justification for the proceedings. Cromwell to Hamilton 25 th November 1648, Abbott p. 696- 
9; above n. 183. 
187 For Charles' fixed principles see, BM Harl Mss 6988 f. 208. 
188 Underdown, Pride's Purge p. 150. 
189 
See above. 
190 R. Hutton, The British Republic (1990) p. 59. 
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politics throughout the 1640's; he was willing to speak his mind but not prepared to draft 
proposals. In short this chapter confirms the view Cromwell was neither a "Westminster 
man" preoccupied with parliamentary committees or an intellectual in politics. 
191 His defence 
of monarchy during the highly charged Putney Debates perhaps shows that Cromwell found it 
difficult to look beyond the existing constitution. However, by the Autumn of 1648, 
Cromwell had decided that the King must die. As he wrote in a letter to Fairfax, the demands 
for impartial justice were "things God puts in our heart". 192 After the regicide he was 
concerned with the defence of the new regime but he was not concerned with the form that the 
Government should take and who made up the membership of the new regime, provided that 
they were willing to endorse the events of 1648/9. 
For Cromwell, the precise forin of the new Government was of peripheral importance because 
God had deterinined that the King must die. He was certainly not a republican. It is likely that 
he would have had sympathy with a pamphlet published in February 1649. This did call for 
reform but in a very ill defined fashion. It also stated that "names or titles are but tokens of 
things"193 If Cromwell did not care about the precise form the Church Government should 
take, he certainly was not interested in defining a new system of republicanism. His politics 
during the revolutionary period were determined by short terin considerations. It took 
Cromwell until the eve of the Second Civil War to believe that God had condemncd Charles. 
It did not require any sole searching to appreciate that God demanded action against the 
'Jesuits' in Ireland and it was this that dominated his politics in the early years of 
Commonwealth rule - it was also a view shared by many of his colleagues in Parliament. 
191 John Morrill's introduction in Morrill (ed) Oliver Cromwell and the English Revolution 
p. 8. 
192 Cromwell to Fairfax 20'h November 1648, Abbott i p. 690-1. Carlyle, i p. 390-1. 
193 The Parliament Justified, T. T. E. 545 (14), 27 Ih February 1649, p. I and 8. 
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The House of Commons 
The 4ast chapter argued that Oliver Cromwell should not be regarded as the architect of the 
new regime. It was also suggested that he demonstrated a remarkablY detached stance upon 
the precise forrn the new government should take. The position he assumed rested upon the 
mutually inclusive desire to defeat the Royalists and maintain the unity of the Army. This 
chapter will attempt to decide upon the levels of commitment to the new regime amongst the 
MPs who decided to play a role in revolutionary politics. It will also, where sources allow, ' 
endeavour to determine the motivating forces that governed the minds of these MPs. The 
chapter will also explore the relationship between the MPs and the Army in an attempt to 
determine the origins of this conflict which came to dominate politics from 1651 to 1653. The 
chapter will also consider the role of the Levellers 2 outside of Parliament assessing how this 
group influenced politics. The chapter will argue that events outside of Westminster had more 
1 For the problem with sources in this period see Blair Worden, The Rump Parliament 
(Cambridge 1974) p. 398-404; Sean Kelsey, Inventing a Republic (Manchester 1997) p. 1 1-19. 
This particular period is notorious for the dearth of sources. It is not, however, only the 
Interregnum that has suffered from this difficulty. The whole issue of allegiance in the Civil 
War has resulted in a protracted debate that is essentially due to the limitations of evidence. 
See Ronald Hutton, The Rise and Fall of MeEy England (Oxford 1994) p. 204. 
21 have deliberately separated the Army from the Levellers suggesting that the grievances of 
the Arrny were based primarily upon material concerns rather than a commitment to 
wholesale political reform. See Ronald Hutton, The British Republic (1990,1999) p. 15-49, 
especially p. 15, where he states that "the principle source of discontent was arrears of pay. " 
See also, Ian Gentles, The New Model Army (Oxford 1992) p. 315. 
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of an effect upon the early months of the Rump 
3 than any of the other accounts of this period 
have suggested. 4 
This chapter will, to an extent, support two very distinct schools of historiography. David 
Underdown and Blair Worden pointed out that membership of the Rump was not always 
synonymous with support for the events that brought it into existence. Although peripheral 
differences emerged in the two accounts, most notably their definition of a revolutionary, both 
historians pointed to the moderation and conformity of the majority of the members. 5 These 
two historians continue to dominate the historiography of this period. Derek Hirst's recent and 
thoroughly revised interpretation of the period still supports the arguments outlined in the 
works of Underdown and Worden. This chapter will support many of their findings, 
especially Professor Worden's view that many of the so-called revolutionaries supported the 
regicide because they objected to the person of the King rather than the institution of 
monarchy. 6 However, differences will emerge, most notably upon the issue of commitment to 
both regicide and to the post revolutionary parliament. This thesis will argue that both the 
revolutionary and conformist MPs demonstrated a greater willingness to actively support the 
31 have reluctantly retained the use of the unflattering ten-n of 'rump', for the MPs that sat in 
Parliament. This follows Blair Worden, The Rump Parliament, p. 25. For an alternative terni 
see Ronald Hutton, The British Republic p. 13 6.1 have decided to retain the term for two 
reasons. First, it is the word used by the majority of historians and it seems unnecessary to 
alter it. Second, however unflattering the term may be, it is a more pleasant word than the 
ones used by contemporaries. See Clement Walker, A Complete Histo! y of Independency (4 
vols 166 1) Part ii, p. 46-150. 
4 This will develop upon themes identified by Blair Worden. Blair Worden, The Rump 
Parliament p. 163 -9; Hutton The British Republic p. 15-16. 
5 David Underdown, Pride's Purge (Oxford 197 1) p. 4-5, p. 281-3; Blair Worden, The Rump 
Parliament p. 41-73. Worden points out that the term revolutionary should not apply to all the 
early dissenters and the regicides. 
6 Derek Hirst, England in Conflict, 1603-1660 (Oxford 1999), p. 255-282, also in his 
bibliography p. 342. Blair Worden, The Rump Parliament p. 50. 
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execution or, in the case of the confonnists, positively acquiesced with the new form of 
Ciovernment. 7 
The latter part of the 1990s saw an increased amount of interest in the intellectual origins of 
republicanism. 8 Both Sarah Barber and Scan Kelsey produced detailed accounts of the politics 
that governed the form the new republic would take, Both historians have attempted to 
demonstrate that there-was more of a deep rooted attachment to the principle of republicanism 
than the work of Dr Worden, and to a lesser extent Professor Underdown allowed. 9 Dr Barber 
revealed that a small clique of MPs favoured a republican solution that dates back to 1646.10 
Dr Kelsey did not concern himself with factional politics, but he described how the 
Commonwealth created a republican image for itself. " This chapter will accept that there was 
more enthusiasm in some quarters for a republican regime but it will be stressed that this 
opinion was only shared by a few. Moreover, this chapter will argue that the impetus for 
reform was destroyed both by the conservatism of the members and also by the activities of 
the Levellers outside Parliament. It will be argued th at Lilburne's largely unjustified attacks 
7 For a discussion of the terms 'revolutionary' and 'confon-nist', see Worden cited in n. 5 
above. This in many respects is closer to Sean Kelsey's view that there was more of an 
attachment to the Commonwealth than Blair Worden's account allowed. However, it will 
become clear that I do not regard the MPs as doctrinaire republicans. 
8 Sarah Barber, Regicide and Republicanism (Edinburghl998); Sean Kelsey, Inventing a 
Republic. David Norbrook, Poetry and Politics in the English Revolution (1984); David 
Norbrook Writing the English Republic: Poet! y, Rhetoric and Politics 1627-1660 (Cambridge 
1999). From a slightly different perspective see Jonathon Scott, England's Troubles 
(Cambridge 2000). 
9 Sarah Barber appears to support David Underdown's categorisations. See Regicide and 
Republicanism n. 9 p. 140. 
10 Sarah Barber cited above passim. 
Sean Kelsey, Inventing a Republic. This is the ma or theme of his book but he also j 
includes a fresh interpretation of the events that culminated in the dissolution p. 200-227. 
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against the new regime pushed even the most committed republican to a conservative stance. 
But to start, I will focus upon the first phase of the revolution- Pride's purge. 
The PurdnLy of Parliament 
David Underdown began his study of the background to, and consequences of the English 
Revolution with these words: 
"Pride's Purge is one of those venerable historical incidents known, as the old phrase has it, to 
every schoolboy. " 
He then wrote a book to illustrate that the background to this conflict was extremely complex 
and he demonstrated that the simple portrayal of a Colonel letting in radicals and secluding 
moderates does not survive under detailed scrutiny. 12 But the day itself has not lost its aura. 
Christopher Hill remarked that Colonel Pride, "the son of a drayman or a brewers employee" 
purged the gentry from the House of Commons. 13 Pride's Purge remains a great symbol of the 
revolution that brought condemnation upon the Colonel from contemporaries 14 and the image 
of Pride standing before the leading politicians allows schoolboys to remember the story and 
affords the opportunity for Marxists to celebrate. It also retains its significance for the history 
of the revolution. It was the first stage of a process of events that culminated in the execution 
of the King and ultimately the establishment of a Commonwealth without a monarch as the 
titular Head of State. But the significance of the day itself requires one serious qualification: 
Pride's purge, upon the 6 th December 1648, was a failure for the revolutionary minority that 
devised the plan. 
12 David Underdown, Pride's Purge p. 1. 
13 Christopher Hill, God's Englishman (Weidenfeld and Nicolson 1970) p. 102. 
14 See chapter 5 below for the attitude of the royalist press towards the Colonel. 
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On Monday II th December, George Wharton, the editor of Mercurius Elencticus, informed 
his r9aders that the "Little flock was currently debating the Anny's proposals. "15 He was, of 
course, referring to the remnant of the Long Parliament which continued to sit after Pride's 
purge. Such imagery depicting a diminutive and subservient Parliament was used by all the 
opponents of the purge. 16 Such disparaging comments did have a legitimate foundation; the 
Parliament that sat between the purge and regicide was a shadow of its former self, and it is 
true that the Army was in control of the nation's political destiny. However, this traditional 
picture of a subordinate Parliament does require comment. The Parliament that survived 
Pride's Purge on the Wednesday was a very different body to the one that sat on the 
Thursday. 
On 6 th December, as the secluded members vehemently protested against the Army's 
draconian measures, 17 approximately one hundred and twenty MPs took their seats. 18 These 
members immediately showed some sympathy for their secluded colleagues; hearing that 
various members had been carried to the Queen's Court or the Court of Wards 19 , the House 
commanded their Sergeant at Anns to go to them and require their attendance in the House. 
15 Mercurius Elencticus T. T. E. 476 (4) Wednesday 6h December - Wednesday I 11h December 
1648 p. 531. 
16 Clement Walker, A Complete Histoly of Independency (4 vols, 1661) Part ii, p. 46-50. 
17 The Presbyterian MPs will be discussed in chapter 4. See Parliament Under the Power of 
fte Sword T. T. 669 f, 15 (54) 7th December 1648; A True and Full Relation of the Armies 
Forcible Seising of Divers Eminent Members of the House of Commons T. T. E. 476 (14) 13 th 
December 1648; The Second Part of the Narrative Conceming the Annies Force and 
)5olence upon the Commons House T. T. E. 476 (14) 13 th December 1648. Most of these 
aPpear to have been written by William Prynne and it is likely that he exaggerated the scale of 
the Presbyterian hostility. 
18 Memoirs of Edmund Ludlow ed. C. H Firth, 2 vols, 1894, i p. 21 1. 
19 Cj vi p. 93. 
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The secluded members seemed willing to consent, but were prevented from doing so by an 
officer who informed the Sergeant that "he could not allow them to come until he had 
,, 20 
receiyed his orders. It is also possible that the Sergeant was sent again to restate the 
House's wishes, but upon this second attempt he was not even allowed out of the chamber. 21 
According to Edmund Ludlow (writing a long time after the purge, and who right up until his 
death firmly supported iQ the sending of the Sergeant was a token gesture "made upon 
account of decency, rather than from any desire that their message be obeyed. 9,22 Veronica 
Wedgwood supported this account by stating that this was "a formal gesture for the House 
was now composed only of the friends of the Army. , 23 Both these statements are at variance 
with other more contemporary accounts. It will be argued here that upon the Oh the majority 
of MPs were infuriated by the Army's entry into the political arena. Also, doubt must be cast 
on Ludlow's assertion that the men who drew up the list of MPs were mot mistaken in 
many. 24 
Nearly all of the contemporary accounts portray a Parliament at odds with their military 
employers. The editor of the Perfect Weekly Account stated that the Parliament "expressed 
20 Bulstrode Whitelock, Memorials of the English Affairs (4 vols, 1853) vol ii p. 468. 
21 Parliament Under the Power of the Sword T. T. 669 f. 13 7 th December 1648; A True and 
Full Relation p. 3. I use the tenn 'possible' because Prynne would not have seen the event, He 
was arrested before he had a chance to enter the chamber. He could, however, have been 
informed by one of the Members imprisoned on the 7 th 
22 Ludlow, Memoirs (i) p. 21 1. 
23 CN. Wedgwood, The Trial of Charles 1 (1964) p. 42. 
24 Ludlow, Memoirs (i) p. 2 10. Other sources admitted that the Army had allowed some 'bad 
Members' in, N. L. W, Mss ii, 434 (8) fol. 3. This source is cited by Blair Worden, The Rump 
ta-r-liament p. 43 n. I. I have checked the source. 
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Inuch sorrow" about the plight of their secluded colleagues. 
25 The editor of Mercurius 
Elencticus clearly revealed his hostility towards the remaining members but he did note that 
,, 26 
they, "showed much pity towards their distressed brethren. As I mentioned in the last 
chapter, the Moderate Intelligencier stated that there "was little hope of an accord or unity 
between Parliament and the Army by this days work. 1127 The Moderate claimed that 
Parliament refused to proceed with the Army's requests until their colleagues were set at 
Liberty. 28 Whitelock remembered MPs leaving the House in a troubled state of mind, part of 
the reason being the condition their friends were in . 
29 The future regicide Colonel Hutchinson 
viewed the purge as an "insolvent force upon the House. "30 A further account of the events 
upon the Oh, states that Parliament resolved not to enter any vote until their members were 
discharged. 31 
The assertion that Parliament resolved not to enter any vote until their members were 
discharged is supported by the evidence in the Journals of the House of Commons. 32 
Parliamentary business came to an almost complete standstill. Apart from concerning 
themselves about the plight of the secluded members, the MPs only attended to two issues. 
25 The Perfect Weekly Account T. T. E. 476 (15) Wednesday 6 th -Wednesday 13 Ih December 
1648 p. 306. 
26 Mercurius Elencticus T. T. E. 476 (4) Tuesday 5 th December -Tuesday 12 th December 1648 
p. 528. 
27 The Moderate Intelligence T. T. E. 476 (24), Thursday 7 th December -Thursday 14 Ih December 1648, p. 1777 
28 The Moderate T. T. E. 477 (4), Tuesday 12th December- Tuesday I gth December 1648. 
29 Whitelock Memorials ii P. 471 
30 Memoirs of Colonel Hutchinson of Nottingham by his Widow Lucy (1906) p. 269. Cited in 
Blair Worden, The Rump Parliament p. 46. 
31 A True and Full Relation p. 3. The Second Part of the Narrative p. 5. 
3.2 ýj vi p. 93-4. 
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N4ajor General Skippon was sent to the city to "employ his best endeavours to appease any 
tumults that might happen there. " Although Veronica Wedgwood has rightly stated that 
Skippon had thrown his weight behind the decision to purge Parliament, this does not reflect 
parliamentary approval of the purge. The mission was designed to ensure that the capital did 
not degenerate into a bloodbath. Apart from concerning themselves with the problems facing 
their colleagues, the MPs attended to only one other issue upon the 6 th - they did agree to hear 
the Army's proposals. 33 This again should not be regarded as a demonstration of support for 
Pride's Purge. Once it was decided not to suspend the session, 34 the Commons had little 
option but to hear what the Army had to say. Had they refused to even contemplate the 
Army's requests, it is possible that the dissolution favoured by Ireton would have been 
implemented. 35 
One final action by the Commons undertaken upon the 6 th'requires comment. As I mentioned 
above, the MPs sent a request for the secluded members held in the Court of Wards to return 
to the house. This was then followed by a formal request to Fairfax designed to secure the 
restitution of their members. The deputation was le d by William Pierrepont, a man who had 
made his opposition to the purge patently clear. Fairfax responded by stating that "he did not 
conceive it to be the positive pleasure of the House that the members be discharged. " 
33 C. V Wedgwood, Trial p. 4 1. Wedgwood portrays Skippon as a lending radical in the early 
weeks of the revolution, but then distanced himself from the regicide. Whilst I accept this 
view to an extent, I am prevented from adopting her case wholesale. Her claim that Skippon 
was implacably opposed to the Newport accord is only based on the evidence left by Clement 
Walker. Walker was implacably opposed to any MP that survived the purges and was 
indiscriminate in his attacks upon MPs. See Wedgwood, Trial , p. 76-7 for her view of Skippon based on Walker's account (and n. 29 p. 232. ) For her view of Skippon's attitude to 
the regicide see p. 98-9. For Walker's indiscriminate attacks upon MPs see Walker, 
Independency part ii passim. For the days proceedings see Cj vi p. 93-4. 
34 Underdown, Pride's Purge, p. 145. 
35 For Ireton's preference for a purge see: Underdown, Pride's Purge , p. 152' Ian Gentles, The New Model Army p. 28 1. 
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Pierrepont assured him that it was, but Fairfax retorted that no answer would be forthcoming 
until Parliament had responded to the Army's proposals. 36 
Despite the notoriety of Pride's Purge, it is clear that it failed in its attempts to produce a more 
tractable Parliament. The six men who planned the purge had anticipated that they would 
secure a legislature that would be willing to proceed with the Anny's requests. Instead, the 
MPs began and ended the day complaining about their colleagues under duress. Significantly, 
there was no hint that Parliament would proceed with the Army's requests. However, this was 
not, of course, a serious problem for the Army and the chore of radical MPs. 
37 It Simply 
required another purge and this is exactly what happened. 
On the 7h in order to "make councils more concise" the Army continued their management of 
the political process. It appears that some kind of meeting took place upon the evening of the 
6'h to make up a new list to ensure that a more compliant legislature was established. This was 
demonstrated by the new procedure that differed from the activities the day before . 
38 On the 
6 th ,a door keeper and Lord Grey of Groby had identified a number of MPs on Pride's list, 
necessary because the Colonel only knew a few by sight. 39 This time nothing was being left to 
chance. As each MP approached, the officers demanded to know their names. If they were on 
the list, they were denied entry into the chamber. Most contemporary accounts state that 
36 Cj vi p. 94. BM Add Mss vol iv 37,344 fol. 250. The failure of Pierrepont's mission was 
reported on the 7 th . 
37 A discussion of these MPs will take place later in the chapter. 
38 One of the most important factors being the replacement of Pride by Hewson. Underdown, 
kjýide's P E! Ir-&e, p. 152. 
39 lbid 
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approximately fifty MPs were prevented from performing their legislative ftinction 
40 it 
appears highly probable that those members denied entry had "stickled for the privilege of 
Parliqment and the restoration of their members, then in hold the day before". It is 
inconceivable to suppose that this second purge was a "moping up exercise" undertaken to 
remove those members who had figured on his list, but had managed to take their seats . 
41 The 
Army's motivation behind this second purge was neatly summarised by the editor of 
Mercurius Elencticus: 
"Some fifty more were kept from coming into the House, so that now they have separated the 
chaff from the wheat, the wicked from the Godly, and that now they have a pretty nimble bow 
of instruments, that will prosecute the end of their remonstranceS.,, 42 
Apart from this second purge, it is also highly likely that a number of MPs had decided to 
retire from politics after the events of the previous day. Although no friend of the Presbyterian 
cause, Clarendon conceded that many MPs "out of conscience or indignation, forbore coming 
any more to the House.,, 
43 
All the evidence suggests that the second purge had been successful. The House opened 
proceedings by voting thanks to Oliver Cromwell, for the actions "performed by him for his 
40 A Perfect Diurnall T. T. E. 526 (40) Monday 4 th December - Monday I 11h December 1648 
p. 2254, The Moderate Intelligencer T. T. E. 476 (24) Thursday 7 th December -Thursday 14 Ih 
December 1648 p. 1777; The Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer T. T. E. 476 (9) Wednesday Oh 
December -Wednesday 13 th December 1648 p. 1180; The latter comes to a figure of 
approximately 50. Underdown Pride's Purge p. 152. 
41 A True and Full Relation T. T. E. 476 (14) 13 th December 1648 pA Stephens and Birch were 
pulled out of the chamber. 
42 Mercurius Elenticus T. T. E. 476 (4) Tuesday 5h December -h Tuesday 12'h December 1648. Wedgwood, Trial , erroneously attributes this remark to the 6' , p. 42-3. 
43 Edward Clarendon, Histoly of the Great Rebellion and Civil Wars in Englan (ed) W. D. 
Macray 6 vols (Oxford 1888) vol. iv p. 513-14. 
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Parliament and the Kingdom'A4 The reference to this Parliament is significant; the day before 
N4Ps had all but refused to carry out any resolutions. By thanking Cromwell for his services to 
"this, Parliament", MPs were clearly beginning to regard themselves as a legitimate 
legislature. Also, some parliamentary business, not directly concerned with the purges was 
accomplished. The most important aim was achieved which illustrates the success of the 
purge - Parliament agreed to proceed with the Army's proposals. 
45 
Although a more cordial atmosphere now existed between the Army and Parliament, a 
number of MPs remained adamantly opposed to the Army. Encouraged by a number of 
secluded members who wrote a brief but courteous letter to the Speaker, indicating that they 
had been denied entry, 46 coupled with the knowledge of Pierrepont's failed negotiations with 
Fairfax the day before, there was still an element of hostility towards the Army. Twenty-eight 
47 MPs voted against proceeding with the Army's proposals. It was rumoured in the press that 
the House was unwilling to enact the Army's proposals until their members were released 
from custody. 48 Although the House agreed to proceed with the Arnly's proposals the debate 
was postponed until the following Saturday. 
The framers of the purges must have been more content at the completion of business upon 
the 7 th than they had been the previous day. However, there were still some MPs that held 
44 C. J. vi p. 94. 
45 C. J. vi p. 95. 
46 Henry Cary (ed), Memorials of the Great Civil War in England from 1646 -1652 (two 
volumes 1842) vol ii p. 74-5. C. J. vi p. 95. 
47 C. J vi p. 95. Erasmus Long and Sir John Trevor acted as tellers objecting to proceedings. It 
is impossible to tell the names of the other twenty six MPs. The vote passed by 50-28 with Sir 
Edward Bainton and William Heveningham supporting the motion. 
48 The Moderate Intelligence T. T. E. 476-(24) 7 th December - 14 th December 1648 P. 1178. 
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reservations about the purging of Parliament. On the 8 
th 
, the Commons 
listened to three 
sermons, ordered money to be sent to the treasurers of the poor and maimed soldiers and 
widoyvs, ordered their committees to sit during the adjournment (that decision had been taken 
upon the 7"') and made provision for a vote of thanks to the three preachers. With no other 
business attended to, the Commons adjourned at four o'clock . 
49 This fast day and the decision 
to adjourn does not suggest that all the MPs were enjoying the "power of refonnation". 50 
Instead it is an indication that many of the MPs held reservations about the purges. As the 
editor of the Moderate Intelligencer stated, Parliament was still unwilling to make decisions 
"without serious pre consultation and deliberation". 5 1 This hesitancy explains why a number 
of Pride's soldiers were found at the entrance of Parliament when business resumed the 
52 following Tuesday with a list in their hands. It appears that a further twelve MPs were 
denied entry. Nathaniel Stephens witnessed the whole affair and reported it to the House. He 
moved that the chamber should "vindicate their privileges and right their members by not 
,, 53 proceeding with any business. Stephens' outbursts fell on hollow ears, as the Army now 
had a more tractable Parliament. The following day they voted to enact the Army's proposals 
by destroying the framework of the New port negotiations and paving the way for the trial of 
49 CJ vi p. 95; The Moderate T. T. E. 476 (5) Tuesday 5 th December - Tuesday 12th December 
1648, p. 198; Mercurius Pragmaticus T. T. E. 476 (2), Tuesday 5 Ih December -Tuesday 12 Ih 
December 1648; Mercurius Elenticus E. 476 (4) Tuesday 5h December - Tuesday 12 th 
December 1648 p. 529; Second Part of the Narrative p. 3. 
so I do not share David Underdown's view that these MPs were enjoying the power of 
refon-nation. At this stage there were many MPs that wpe uneasy about the purge. This 
explains the Army's continued management of the House. 
51 The Moderate Intelligence T. T. E. 476 (24) Thursday 7 th December -Thursday 14'h 
December 1648 p. 1178. 
52 Mercurius Pragmaticus E. 476 (35) 12 th December -I gth December 1648. Second Part of 
the Narrative p. 4. Underdown, Pride's Purge p. 159. 
53 Second Part of the Narrative p. 4-5. 
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the King. 54 On the 15h December, in response to a Presbyterian pamphlet that bitterly 
denounced the purge, the Commons appeared, publicly at leaSt, 55 to restrict its own 
niemýership. They informed the nation that anyone who had a hand in "contriving, framing, 
printing or publishing this paper" would be "incapable of holding office or having any place 
of trust or authority in the Kingdom". Furthermore, the House insisted that "every member of 
either House respectively now absent, upon his first coming to sit in the House, whereof he is 
a member, for the manifestation of his innocency, shall disavow and disclaim" the aforesaid 
document. 56 Although there is no evidence that this was enforced, it was encouraging news 
for the Army. By the 15 th the Newport accord had been dismantled and Parliament had 
apparently restricted its membership. Although the hostile Mercurius Pragmatics reported 
another purge upon the 18"' is was a very low key affair. 57 The final confirmation that 
Parliament was comprised of the appropriate personnel was provided upon the 20th December. 
Upon the urging of John Gurdon, all MPs were asked to declare that they had or would have 
dissented to the 5h December Vote. 58 The purging of Parliament that began upon the 6 th was 
over, and the Army sat back and watched the remnant of the House of Commons Participate 
in the trial of the King. 
The Army and the Commons 
54 C. J vi p. 96. 
55 1 do not believe that this was implemented, this is discussed in chapter 3. 
56 A Solemn Protestation of the Imprisoned and Secluded Members T. T. E 669. f. 12,55,1 11h 
December 1648; A Declaration of the Lords and Commons Assembled quoted in A Perfect 
Diumall of some Passages in Parliament, E. 526 (4), Monday II th December -Monday 18 th 
December 1648, p. 2263. 
57 Mercurius Pragmaticus E. 476 (5) Tuesday 12 th December - Tuesday I gth December 1648. 
58 Mercurius Pragmaticus E. 477 (30) Tuesday I gth December - Tuesday 26 Ih December 1648; 
Walker, IndependenM part ii p. 48. 
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it therefore took the Army three purges to produce the legislature that would implement their 
prop9sals., The chaos that surrounded these events provides a clue as to the priorities that 
governed the leadership of the Army. Harrison remarked to the King, that the proceedings 
against him would be done in public and it was therefore important that a degree of 
parliamentary legitimacy prevailed in the weeks leading up to the execution. 59 The decision to 
purge rather than dissolve the chamber governed the nature of the revolution because the 
Army attempted to keep as many MPs in the House as possible. -As a consequence they 
tended to respond to the events in a rather ad hoc fashion by attempting to identify the most 
hostile members and denying them entry the following day. It is also clear that the leaders of 
the Army had a very limited agenda for the future of the Commons. They wanted a 
Parliament that would be willing to support the trial of the King and exclude the eleven 
members impeached in 1647 along with Major General Browne and Lionel Copley who was 
associated with the late engagement with the Scots. These demands featured in all their 
proclamations concerning the future membership of the Commons and this policy had the 
backing of their supporters in the localities. 60 The desire to censor these MPs is, by and large, 
supported by their actions. They failed to secure the arrest of all these members. John Glyn 
and Denzil Holles had fled abroad. It appears that Sir John Maynard, Anthony Nicholas and 
Walter Long did not attend Parliament at the time of the purge. Sir Philip Stapleton was dead 
and Sir Robert Harley appears to have been given preferential treatment because of his 
59 The Perfect Weekly Account T. T. E. 536 (33) Tuesday 26th December - Tuesday 2 nd 
January 1648/9 p. 327. BM Harley Mss 7369 f 13. 
60 The Declaration of his Excellency, the Lord General Fairfax, and his General Council of 
Officers showing the grounds of the Armies advance towards the City of London, T. T. E. 474 
(13) p. 13,0 December 1648; The Humble Proposals and Desires of His Excellency the Lord 
Fairfax, T. T. E. 475 (25), 6 th December 1648, p. 3-7. The Humble Answer of the General 
Council of the Anny to the Demands of the Commons in Parliament, concerning the securing 
and secluding of some members thereof, T. T. E. 537 (14) P January 1649. -The hostility of the secluded members is discussed in chapter 4. 
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family's close relationship with Fairfax. 61 Sir William Lewis, Sir John Clotworthy, Sir 
William Waller and Major-General Massey were imprisoned and, in contrast to all the other 
secluýed Members, they were kept in confinement (with the exception of Massey who 
escaped) for a very long time. 62 Further, whereas the other imprisoned members were held in 
various London inns, these members were moved to St James' Palace, where they kept in 
strict confinement. Copley and Browne, both of whom were closely associated with the 
engagement with the Scots, joined these members in custody. It is also clear that the Army 
wanted to secure evidence against these men and at one stage they were promised by their 
friends in Somerset that proof would be provided but the assurances came to nothing. 63 
in contrast, the framers of the purge were more forgiving to the members that had voted for 
the continuation of the Newport accord. It was officially suggested that they would only be 
suspended from the House until after the trial. 64 This shows an attachment to the institution of 
Parliament and a belief that to vote in favour of the Newport accord was in itself pardonable. 
61 For the close relationship between Fairfax and Harley see: Fairfax to Officers and Soldiers, 
HMQ Mss of the Duke of Portland (14 th report) p. 164-5. Also the letter of Colonel E. Harley 
to Lord Fairfax, 23 rd January 1648 (Portland 14t report) p. 167. The same Fairfax to the 
Marshall-General (Portland 14 th report) p. 167. It is highly unlikely, given the proclamations 
made by the Army, that Maynard, Nicholas, and Long would not have been arrested had they 
attended. None of these MPs were appointed as commissioners whereas other secluded 
members were. FirthanR. Raith(eds), TheActsandOrdinancesoflnterregnum(3vols 1911) voldi, 
p. 30-46. For Stapleton's death see, Underdown, Pride's Purgýj_p. 83. For Holles' departure see 
Underdown, Pride's Purge p. 147. I cannot accept Ivan Root's view that Holles was 
"strangely not secluded". I am certain that he was not there. Ivan Roots, The Great Rebellion, 
1642-1660 (Alan Sutton, 1995) p. 133. 
62 Most of these declarations were printed, quite accurately, in Walker, IndependenM part ii 
p. 39-41. A Declaration of the taking away of Sir William Waller, Sir John Clotworthy, Maio 
General Massie and Colonel Copla, Members of the House of Commons from the King's 
Head in the Strand to St. James, T. T. 669 f. 13 (55) 12 th December 1648. For Massey's escape 
see Underdown, Pride's Purge p. 195. 
63 A Perfect Diurnall of some passages in Parliament, T. T. E. 527 (4), Monday 1" January - 
Monday 8h January 1848/9 p. 2283. 
64 The Humble Answer of the General Council of the Army to the Demands of the Commons 
in Parliament concerning the securing or secluding of some members thereof, T. T. E. 537 (14) 
3rd January 1649 p. 2. 
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it also explains why the Arrny raised no objection to the return of the conformist MPs after 
the regicide. 65 They were not, however, so willing to forgive the activities of the men 
associated with the engagement with the Scots. This is illustrated by one pamphlet that stated 
that because of the MPs involvement with the Scots nobody in the capital "would lament 
their cause. 9ý66 
it is perhaps a reflection of modem-day values that explains why historians have tended to 
focus upon the debates over the Agreement of the People rather than the specific actions of 
the Army Council that conceived and then implemented the purge. 67 It was of course these 
actions rather than debates over a projected constitution that governed the nature of the 
revolution. 68 From the evidence obtained from the official publications of the Anny Council 
and the details presented concerning the purges we can learn a lot about the views of the 
leaders of the Army and the impact they had upon the course of the revolution. 
First it is clear that the ideological basis behind the desire to bring the King and the leading 
Presbyterians to justice was based upon their decision to engage with the Scots. This mirrors 
Cromwell's attitude and suggests that there was a direct line from the Windsor prayer meeting 
right up until the regicide. 69 Second, the rather limited nature of the assault upon Parliament 
demonstrates the rather contradictory nature of the Army's involvement in the political 
process. Upon the one hand they showed little inclination to consider the type of constitution 
65 This is discussed later in the chapter. Worden, The Rump Parliament p. 62-7. 
66 The Staffe set at Parliament's own door, T. T. E. 475 (25) 8 th 'December 1648 P. 8. 
67 B. Taft, "Voting Lists in the Council of Officers December 1648 Bulletin of the Institute of 
Historical Research Ll 1 (1979) p. 138-54; B. Taft, "The Council of Officers Agreement of the 
People, " H. J. 28 (1985) p. 169-85. Ian Gentles New Model Army p. 285-294. 
68 The Agreement of the People was only a projected settlement, and it will be shown that the 
overriding concern of the radicals in the counties was forjustice against the King. 
69 See n. 60 above. Also, A Vindication of the Army and Parliament, N. L. W Mss 11434 B f. I- 
2. Justifications of regicide upon the grounds that Charles went against the will of God 
continued after the regicide. 
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that would follow the execution, basing all their justifications for the alteration of the 
constitution on the grounds of the failings of this one particular monarch . 
70 But this inability 
to loqk beyond the regicide does not indicate a lack of commitment to the revolution. In one 
important respect it shows the levels of determination amongst the high ranking officers 
because all other considerations were of peripheral importance whilst Charles was alive. 71 The 
death of the King was the important issue for the Army and the form of the future constitution 
could, with certain qualifications, be left in the hands of the parliamentarians. This also 
supports the view that the King's rejection of the providence of God meant that he had to be 
brought to justice and this transcended constitutional forms. 72 
Second, it is interesting to note that the Array still had a great deal of respect for the 
institution of Parliament. In the weeks before the purge it was made clear that it was some of 
the personnel in Parliament whom were wanting, but the majority were worthy of the great 
institution. The House's vote to proceed with the negotiations altered this stance as it meant 
that there was a need to remove more members than they had originally intended, but their 
respect for the institution was maintained, demonstrated by the limited nature of the purge. 
This argument is enhanced further by the fact that some MPs, with William Pierrepont being 
the best example, were allowed to remain in the chamber despite their criticisms of the 
Army. 73 Also, the Army allowed the release of William Prynne who had produced almost a 
pamphlet a day condemning their actions. 74 
70 The Humble Answers (cited in n. 64 above) 3 rd January p. 12-13. 
71N. 69 above. See also God's Delight in the Progress of the Upright, sermon by Thomas 
Brooks to Parliament, 26 th December 1648 p. 1-47 T. T. E. 536 (6); An abridgement of the Late 
Remonstrance of the Army, signed by John Rushworth, T. T. E. 536 (8) 27 Ih January 1649 p. 3. 
72 See n. 60 above and n. 69 and 7 1. 
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. BM Add Mss vol. vi 37,344 fol. 250. HMCR Mss of the MaLquis of Onnond (14 
th report) 
vol. 11, Matthew Rowe to Colonel Michael Jones, 5 th March 1649 p. 87. 
74 Prynne's activities are discussed in chapter 4 below. Underdown, Pride's Purge p. 194. 
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Finally, despite all the criticisms levelled against the Army by Royalists and Presbyterians, 
who portrayed them as the great usurpers and complained about how the nation groaned under 
the power of the sword, the Army kept their involvement in the political process down to a 
rninirnum. 75 William Sedgwick had told "them not to meddle in politics" and the fact that 
Parliament was purged suggests that his advice was not heeded. 76 But one important 
qualification needs to be applied. There is no evidence that, in the weeks before the regicide, 
the Army were going to enforce their will upon the Commons with the exception of insisting 
upon the trial of the King and the other persons involved with the engagement with the Scots. 
By 1648/9 the latter was an issue of spiritual rather than temporal importance. 77 Finally, at 
Whitehall some members of the Army were discussing the possibility of a radical new 
constitution and when this was presented to Parliament the usual respect was accorded to the 
institution, with the only peculiarity being that the approval of the Lords was no longer 
necessary. The decision to remove the negative voice of the Lords had been taken by the 
Commons without prompting from the Army. 78 
The evidence used above has focussed upon the activities of the Army officers who directed 
policy in Westminster. It is worth considering some of the views held by the regiments in the 
75 The nature of the Presbyterian response is discussed in chapter 4 below. The term "under 
the power of the sword" was, apparently, first coined by Nathaniel Fiennes. Parliament Under 
the Power of the Sword, T. T. E. 669 f. 13 (54), Oh December 1649. 
76 William Sedgwick, Justice Upon the Annie Remonstrance, T. T. E. 475 (34), 11 th December 
1648 p. 48. 
77 This, in light of the reluctance to implement a programme for the future of Parliament, is 
the only logical suggestion for the Army's actions. It is also in line with Sarah Barber's view 
of the Army. Sarah Barber, Regicide and Republicanism (Edinburgh 1998) p. 96-113. 
78 Q* vi p. 122; A Petition from Lord Fairfax and the General Council T. T. E. 539 (2) 201h 
January 1648; S. R. Gardiner, Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution 1625-1660 
(Oxford 1906) p. 359-371; For the Commons having the supreme authority see, A Declaration 
of the House of Commons, T. T. E. 537 (18), 4h January 1649, see chapter 3 below. 
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localities and the supporters of the revolution who have been dubbed as the "honest 
radicalS,, 79 
it isclear that many of the supporters of the revolution had different hopes in the period 
between the first purge and the regicide. Rainsborowe's widow petitioned for money and 
other regiments stayed out of high politics by concentrating upon their own material 
grievances. One distraught soldier asked for E20 of his arrears to provide for his pregnant 
wife. 80 In stark contrast" other petitions called for the implementation of a wide-range of 
reforms that would include major alterations to the constitution. 81 But the vast majority of the 
pressure from the localities concerned the implementation of justice against the King and the 
eleven members using a very similar language to the one adopted by Arrny Council in 
London. 82 Few of the petitions were concerned with the precise form that the parliament 
79 David Underdown, "Honest Radicals in the Counties" p. 186-205. In D. H Pennington and 
Keith Thomas Puritans and Revolutionaries (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1978) p. 186-205. 
80 A Perfect Diurnall T. T. E 526 (43), Monday 18th December - Monday 25th December 1648 
p. 2268, Heads of a Diarie (Petition of Thomas King), T. T. E. 537 (25) Tuesday 2n. d January - 
Tuesday 9th January 1649 p. 46. 
81 A Perfect Diumall, E. 527 (1) Monday 25flDecember - Monday Vt January 1648/9 
(petition from Norwich), p. 2274; Perfect Occurrences, E. 527 (8) Friday 12 th January - 
Friday I 9th January 1649 (petition from the Common Council); The Moderate, T. T. E. 536 (2) 
Tuesday 19th December - Tuesday 26th December 1648 (petition from Kent), p. 213; The 
Kin. Rdomes Weekly Intelligencer T. T. E. 536 (33) Tuesday 26 th December - Tuesday 2 nd 
January 1648/9 (petition from Norwich), p. 1203; The Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer 
(petition from the Isle of Wight, Southampton, Portsmouth and Poole), also (same title) 
T. T. E. 539 (6) Tuesday 16 th January - Tuesday 23rd January 1649 p. 1228, (petition from 
London), p. 1229; The Moderate, T. T. E. 541 (15) (petition from Surrey), p. 286. 
82 A Perfect Diumall (letter from the Garisons of Hull), T. T. E. 527 (1) Monday 25th 
December - Monday I't January (petition from Shropshire), p. 2276-77; A Perfect Diurnall 
T. T. E. 527 (4) Monday I" January - Monday 8 
th January 1649 p. 2282. This shows the 
editor's dislike of the Presbyterians who were linked with the engagement. p. 2283 (letter from 
Somerset) suggesting that they must exact revenge against the King for their own 
preservation; A Perfect Diumall, T. T. E. 527 (16), Monday 8 th January - Monday 15 
1h January 
1649(letter quoted in the editorial), p. 2238. Perfect Occurrences, E. 527 (18) Friday 12 th 
January - Friday I 91h January 1649 (letter from the north), p. 797; A Perfect Diurnall, T. T. E. 
527 (9) Monday 15 th January - Monday 22 nd January 1649 (petition from the counties of 
North Wales) p. 2303. The Moderate Intelligencer, T. T. E. 476 (24) Thursday 7th December - 
Thursday 14 th December 1648 p. 1777 - this is an attack by the editor on the Presbyterians; 
(petition from Pride's regiment) p. 1778-1780. The Moderate T. T. E. 477 (4) See Over 
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should take, and if comment was made, it was done so in an ambiguous fashion, simply 
stating that there should be a dissolution at some stage. The date of April, stipulated in the 
Agr(; ement of the People did not feature in many of the petitions. 83 There was talk of power 
being vested in the people but it is remarkable how many justifications of regicide were made 
upon the basic premise of power and victory in war. The editor of 'A Perfect Summary' 
justified regicide upon the Old Testament notion of vengeance. A petition from Bristol called 
the Army "God's instru"ment", apparently providing them with a carte blanche right to 
implement a constitution of their choice. 84 A petition from Pride's regiment is a very good 
example of the attitude of the Army after the purging of Parliament. It began with a list of 
their material grievances and then went on to wam of the dangers of going against God's 
providences. They then listed their demands. First they wanted impartial justice for all, but 
they were quick to denounce the Leveller party. They demanded that none of the "royal or 
neutral party" should have any influence in the future government "lest their enemies become 
their rulers. " They conclude their desires with these words; 
"The grand capital enemy may, without delay be brought to justice which is the main root of 
,, 85 our misery, we finding all other ways attempted, altogether invalid. 
Tuesday 12"' December - Tuesday 19'h December 1648, (editorial comment); p. 201 p. 21 I 
(petition from Dover); The Perfect Weekly Account, E. 477 (15) Wednesday 13 th December - Wednesday 20th December 1648 p. 313 (letter from Exeter); p. 316 and petition from 
Warep. 317; The Moderate, T. T. E. 536 (30) Tuesday 26 th December - Tuesday 2 nd January 1648/9 (petition from the castle of Denbigh); The Kingdomes Weekly Intelligence E. 539 (6) 
Tuesday 16 th January - Tuesday 23d January 1649(petition from the Common Council), 
p. 1227. 
83 See n. 81 above. Some of these petitions asked that a time be set on the sitting of the current 
parliament, Gardiner, Constitutional Documents p. 359. 
84 A Perfect summa! y of Exact Passages, T. T. E. 527 (20) Monday 5 th February - Monday 12 th February 1649 p. 17; The Moderate, T. T. E. 477 (4) Tuesday 12 th December -Tuesday 19th December 1648 p. 210. 
85 The Moderate Intelligence T. T. E. 476(24) Thursday 7"' December- Thursday 14 th 
December 1648 p. 1778-1780. 
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tinderlying practically all of the radical petitions was the notion, articulated by one journalist, 
that "all the nation cry out, let justice be done"86 A letter from Somerset appeared in the 
N4odgrate newspaper on the 2 nd of January calling upon all the honest people in the country to 
unite. In many respects this happened and the survival of so many of these petitions is 
testimony to the determination of a small radical minority that existed all over England and 
Wales. 87 It also questions the view that a number of so called levellers objected to the 
regicide. This view tended to be propounded after the execution when they were complaining 
about the fact that their constitution had not been implemented in the manner they had 
demanded. 88 Although differences existed amongst these radical groups upon what kind of 
constitution should be enacted, upon the one central issue they were united : 89 Charles I had to 
be brought to justice for his actions over the last decade. From this evidence it is possible to 
make two gencralisations. First, there is no case to suggest that the officers in London, who 
managed the purge, were pursuing an agenda that was at variance with the wishes of their 
natural allies in the nation. Second, the revolution that was inspired by the petitions and 
actions of these people in the localities was based upon biblical justifications of punishment 
against an individual who had failed to recognise God's providence, rather than an attachment 
to a new republican order. 
The House of Commons and the Enillish Revolution 
86 A Declaration Collected Out of the Journals of Both Houses T. T. E. 475 (17) Wednesday 
29th November- Wednesday 6h December 1648 p. 1 
87 The Moderate T. T E. 536 (30) Tuesday 26h December-Tuesday 2 nd January 1648/9. 
88 The reaction of the Levellers is discussed below. I am slightly sceptical of Sarah Barber's 
view that significant "sections of the Leveller movement" had opposed the regicide. Barber 
Regicide and Republicanism p. 154. 
89 The petitions that demanded widespread reform almost invariably demanded justice first. 
See n. 81 above. 
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The membership of the House of Commons has been scrutinised very thoroughly by David 
tinderdown. and Blair Worden. As has been mentioned above, their view that the majority of 
the rumpers were conservative by nature has been questioned in the works of Sarah Barber 
and Scan Kelsey. Yet despite these challenges, the two books written in the 1970s remain the 
outstanding accounts upon the early years of the Rump Parliament. " David Underdown 
brilliantly explained the narrative of the events between the purge and regicide and in the 
course of this argument he attempted to show that his revolutionaries were eclipsed by the 
conformists in the Rump. It was this, rather than a degeneration into inertia, that explains why 
the revolution was not extended beyond the events of 1648/991. This view was confinned and 
extended by Dr Worden who politely pointed out that many of Underclown's revolutionaries 
were not in themselves committed to the principle of radicalism, being driven to act because 
of the activities of one particular monarch. 92 For the purposes of this thesis their works are 
more important than more recent accounts that have detected a republican tradition in 
England. Underdown and Worden have scrutinised the sources directly related to the 
revolution itself and despite Sean Kelsey's excellent description of how the Rump created an 
image for itself, his failure to explain how and why the republic was established means that 
Worden's account remains the definitive version. 93 
90 Underdown Pride's Purge, Worden Rump, Kelsey Inventing a Republic, Barber 
Regicide and Republicanism. They have all been cited in full in the notes above. 
91 Underdown's account replaced the narrative and the arguments of S. R. Gardiner. Blair 
Worden resurrected the reputation of the rump and this was taken even further by Sean 
Kelsey. I was surprised when Kelsey wrote that the rump had never received a favourable 
press from academics. See Inventing a Republic p. 2-6. He does admit that Blair Worden 
repaired the reputation of the rump but he still regards Worden's account as hostile. I believe 
that Worden salvaged the rump by essentially saying that the parliament was dissolved 
because it failed to meet the demands set of it by Oliver Cromwell. Worden Rump passim. 
92 Worden RjLmn p. 50. 
93 Worden Rump p. 163-195. Underdown Pride's Purge p. 143-207. 
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Professor Worden demonstrated that the Rump was not a regime that was radical at the onset 
and then became altered over the course of time. He suggests that Cromwell was the architect 
of t1je regime and was influential in establishing it as a conservative body. This argument was 
questioned in the last chapter as Cromwell was portrayed as a man who was not initiating 
events at the start of this revolutionary period. The remainder of this chapter will attempt to 
determine the levels of commitment to the new regime. In so doing, I will not follow the 
categorisation outlined by David Underdown that an early dissenter and/or a regicide 
necessarily acts as a neat demarcation between conservatism and radicalism. It is widely 
accepted that the Rump began its life surrounded by dangers and the horror that greeted the 
regicide could have resulted in dire reprisals from a Royalist party that simply described all 
the MPs who sat in Westminster as regicides. 94 Therefore to sit in the Parliament in early 
1649 arguably demonstrated a substantial commitment to the principle of a government 
without a monarch. 
Blair Worden suggested that there were approximately twenty men who demonstrated a real 
enthusiasm for either (or both) the purge and the regicide. The evidence in the Journals of the 
House of Commons supports this view and the attendance figures in the Painted Chamber 
95 
show these men supported the moves against the King. But the number of twenty can be 
extended. Francis Allen, who stood up and owned the court upon the 27 th , thus, became 
certainly liable to Royalist reprisals at the restoration. He had sat upon a committee that 
condemned the protestation made by the secluded members. He was also a member of a 
committee, designed to keep Royalists and Presbyterians out of London. Along with some 
94 For the attitude of the Royalist press see chapter 5 below. 
95 The MPs identified are: Scot, Marten, Carew, Sir John Danvers, Challenor, Blackiston, 
Millington, Humphrey Edwards, Sir Gregory Norton, Venn, Corbet, Purefoy, Garland, Lord 
Grey of Groby, Oliver Cromwell ' Marten, Ireton and Harrison; His view is undoubtedly 
correct. T. B. Howells A Complete Collection of State Trials (1816) vol iv p. 1057-1115; BM 
Add Mss, 35,322, fol. 118-119; C. J vi p. 93-126. 
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ceremonial responsibilities he deliberated on the committees that established the High Court 
of Justice and he consistently attended the meetings held in the Painted Chamber. 96 Sir John 
Bourghier. had hardly attended the chamber in the months before the purge and his apathetic 
posture towards Parliament remained, indicated by his poor attendance record when he was in 
London. However, his zeal for justice was evident throughout the meetings of the Painted 
Chamber where his name featured for majority of the sessions. John Dixwell was another MP 
who had failed to attend Parliament upon a regular basis but returned to play a role in the 
moves against the King. 97 A good example of commitment to the revolution is shown by the 
actions of Sir William Constable. As Blair Worden noted, he was governor of Gloucester with 
a very heavy workload. He returned to London at the time of the revolution to add his 
considerable presence to the moves against the King. 98 Edmund Harvey stormed away from 
the High Court in protest when the King was not allowed to speak towards the end of the 
week. This may have been a last minute scruple of conscience, or just, as he himself 
suggested, a dislike of the procedure. But he had previously shown a commitment to the 
principle of regicide demonstrated by his attendance in Parliament when the bills for creating 
a High Court of Justice were read. He also stood up in the Painted Chamber the day that the 
sentence was passed. 99 Another good example is John Fry who had not attended at all in 1648. 
He returned to Parliament in December and was an enthusiastic supporter of the moves 
against the King. He was prevented from signing the regicide document because he was 
96 For Francis Allen See C. J vi p. 97-98,111,112,120; State Trials iv p. 1062,1067; AW 
McIntosh "The Number of English Regicides" History (67) (1982) p. 198. 
97 For Sir John Bourchier See Worden RpM p. 40 n. 1; State Trials iv (eg) 1092,1099. For 
Dixwell Worden Rump p. 40 n. 1; L. J vi p. 112 119. State Trials iv (eg) 1068,1092,1099, 
1114-1115. 
98 Worden. RpmR p. 27,40 and 18 1. C. J vi p. 106. State Trials iv (eg) p. 1059. A. Wood 
Athanae Oxoniensus (3 vols 169 1) vol. i, p. 205. 
99 C. J vi: p. 102,105,107; State Trials iv, p. 1066. McIntosh, "History" p. 199. 
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expelled from the House for promoting socinian views but his zeal for justice cannot be 
doubted. 100 
Therp arefurther examples of men who made the choice to move against the King who Blair 
Worden failed to mention in his account, but whose names feature prominently in the Journals 
of the House of Commons and in the Painted Chamber. As mentioned in the first chapter 
there is little evidence of coercion compelling members to either remain in Parliament or sign 
the regicide document. Men such as Whitelock were nominated as commissioners but never 
attended a session in the Painted Chamber. It is surprising that Blair Worden chose to accept 
the testimony of men such as Thomas Waite, Simon Mayne and John Downes, who claimed 
that they were bullied into signing the death warrant when they were facing trial for their 
lives. They were not forced to sit in the Painted Chamber in the first place, and in the case of 
Downes he attended Parliament at the time when the format of the trial was decided upon. 101 
One other factor about the commitment to the moves against the King requires comment. The 
spectacle of the King's trial remains one of the most famous events in English history. For 
Charles it was a moment of triumph and his dignified stance was even admired by his 
contemporary critics and his performance has won him praise from the majority of 
historians. 102 He did prove more than a match for Bradshaw but this should not eclipse the 
100 Worden RLjmR p. 126; For examples of his attendance See C. J vi p. 103,106-7,110. 
101 Worden Rump p. 43. Downes' attendance in the Painted Chamber was not as impressive 
as some members but considering that no coercion was applied especially in the early stages 
he must have had an inclination to move against the King. He also sat in Parliament when the 
MPs moved against the secluded members. State Trials iv p. 1060 1068; L. J vi p. 97. p. 107. 
For a discussion of Whitelock's role see below. A List of the Names of the Judges of the Hi. 14h 
Court of Justice for the trial of the King. I lth Jan 1649, T. T 6691.13; more names could be 
added See C. J and State Trials cited above n. 95. 
102 For the generally favourable reaction from the press see chapter 5 below. Most historians 
have been impressed with Charles's performance. The classic remains C. V. Wedgwood Trial 
passim. Charles Carlton was not as impressed, Charles I The Personal Monarch (second 
edition) (1983) p. 343 -3 5 1. 
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fact that the planning that went on behind the scenes had been thorough, with many MPs 
involved in the preparations. Without this meticulous planning, the regicide would not have 
been, such a spectacle. The nature of the available evidence means that we have little 
knowledge of the motives which governed the decisions taken by the majority of these MPs. 
Yet, their tireless work committees suggests that they were very committed to the execution 
of their King. 
The solemn ritual of the event owed a great deal to the efforts of John Blackiston and John 
Fry. The large number of witnesses ready to testify against the King had been arranged by 
Nicholas Love. Augustine Garland decided upon the location of the trial. 103 A large 
committee was appointed to deal with problems as they arose, anticipating that Charles would 
question the legality of the court. 104 Ludlow, Purefoy and a number of Army officers were 
responsible for the transportation of the King to Westminster and the security arrangements 
during the trial. Colonel Harvey was responsible for reporting upon the reasons why some 
MPs had withdrawn from the court, although the attendance record during the latter part of 
the meetings in the Painted Chamber reveal that Harvey was rather under-employed as the 
numbers remained fairly consistent. 105 
The efficiency with which the regicides worked demonstrated a commitment to their cause 
however narrow this may have been. As mentioned, the absence of rhetoric justifying the 
regime should not be deemed as testimony of their lack of revolutionary zeal. Instead, the 
firm evidence left in the journals of the House of Commons and in the records of the Painted 
Chamber reveal a commitment to rid the nation of the King. 
103 For Blackiston and Fry State Trials iv p. 1058; they were assisted by Tichbourne and Roe; 
for Love p. 1110; for Garland p. 1060. 
104 The people on the committee were Millington, Marten, Harvey, Challoner, Harrison, 
Corbet, Scot, Lisle and Say. State Trials iv p. 1060. 
105 State Trials iv 1061,1079 1079 -1116. 
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one other point about these regicide MPs requires comment. The moves against the purging 
of Pailiament and the attack upon the King certainly caused a breach within the parliamentary 
party and there was no evidence that this was going to be temporary. It was also 
acknowledged by supporters of the regicide that they were part of an unpopular minority 
accused of being in the pockets of their Army employers. But this did not prevent them from 
playing an active role in the events. This determination to bring the King to justice was 
similar to the wishes of the leaders of the Army and the radicals in the counties. 106 Moreover, 
as the arrangements for the trial demonstrated, the Commons were capable of working with 
their colleagues in the Army. 
As I mentioned above, upon the 20th December the Commons decided to restrict their 
membership by imposing the test of dissent. Accordingly all the MPs were expected to 
pronounce that they had or would have dissented to the 5h December vote. According to 
Mercurius Pragmaticus, this resulted in another reduction in membership as a number of MPs 
had the grace to refuse subscription. Nedham cited the names of five MPs, Francis Rous, 
George Snelling, Rowland Wilson, Luke Hodges and John Carew 107 . David Underdown used 
the early dissent as a means of identifying his revolutionaries and Blair Worden, whilst 
accepting that some members managed to avoid taking the dissent, regarded this as a most 
important day as it marked the time that the Rump finally decided upon its membership. 108 
Both historians accept that the decision to take the test was significant for two reasons. First, 
according to David Underdown this demonstrated an undiluted commitment to revolution. A 
106 See Above n. 82-83. 
107 Mercurius PraRmaticus T. T. E. 477 (30) Tue Dec 19-Tue Dec 26. 
los Underdown, Pride's Purge p. 210,215-17 Worden RILmn 24-25. 
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number of members were allowed to take the test after the regicide and Underdown logically 
concluded that taking the test before the execution demonstrated more of a commitment 
among these members in comparison to those who took the test in early February. For Blair 
NVorden the emphasis was slightly different. He suggests that it was widely believed that in 
the event of a Royalist counter-revolution the late dissenters would not have been associated 
with regicide and therefore not culpable for punishment. This thesis will take a slightly 
different line by highlighting that the test of dissent upon the 20th had little impact upon the 
immediate membership of the Commons and it will also suggest that there was little 
distinction in contemporary circles between the early and late dissenters or indeed between 
the regicides and the members that resumed their seats having failed to sign the warrant. 
If we take Nedham's five members it becomes immediately apparent that he made a number 
of errors. John Carew actually took the test of dissent upon the 20th . George Snelling and 
Francis Rous may have gone home, but Rowland Wilson was in the chamber upon the 23 rd 
He was not an insignificant member as he took control of a bill that limited the membership 
of the Common Council. This would ultimately place the same restrictions upon the city of 
London that were placed upon the Parliament by the Army. 109 Luke Hodgets was also in 
London upon the 23rd and sat upon the committee that would consider the trial of the King. ' 10 
These are just two isolated examples, but Francis Thorpe and a minimum of eleven other MPs 
avoided taking the test of dissent but remained in Parliament after the 20 th December. In the 
case of William Lord Monson he would play a very prominent role right up until the end of 
109 For Carew see Underdown Pride's Purge p. 369; For Wilson see CJ vi, (23 rd December, 
) p. 103; Underdown believed that Nedham meant Current instead of Carew, Pride's Purge , 
n. 69 p. 166. This is possible, but it is also plausible that Nedham was mistaken; An Ordinance 
of the Lords and Commons Assembled in Parliament for the Choosing of Common 
Councilmen, T. T. E 476 (29), 18'h December 1648. 
110 CJ vi, p. 103. Luke Hodgets would return on 2 nd February 1649, C. J vi p. 129. 
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January. "' Some of these members had played a very important role in the radical politics 
prompted by the purge. John Gurdon actually proposed the test of dissent though he did not 
take. At himself. He was associated with radical politics in the weeks after the purge being 
responsible for a proclamation that would have debarred the most vocal of opponents of the 
purge from attending Parliament. 112 John Goodwin sat upon the committee to restrict the 
membership of the Common Council and he was still in Parliament at the time of the second 
reading of the bill against the King. Finally as Blair Worden noted the two "trimming" 
lawyers: Bulstrode Whitelock and Sir Thomas Widdrington attended intermittently right up 
until the trial. ' 13 
The number of people who failed to take the test of dissent shows that it was not a fixed 
principle. It was easily avoided and does not mark a turning point in the revolution. Further, it 
demonstrates that many MPs were willing to support the purge but not the regicide. In the last 
chapter, it was noted that there were discussions about the future of the monarchy, with some 
MPs supporting the retention of Charles whilst others favoured deposition. 114 To be opposed 
to regicide does distinguish these MPs from the active perpetrators, but their support of the 
purging of Parliament helps to explain why so many returned after the execution. From this 
111 Francis Thorpe, Sir Gilbert Pickering, Lislebone Long, Richard Aldworth, Sir William 
Allanson, Thomas Boone, John Browne, John Corbet, John Goodwin, John Gurdon, 
Bulstrode Whitelock, Sir Thomas Widdrington. This extends the number mentioned in 
Worden, The Rump Parliament, p. 33-35; For all of these members see C. J vi, p. 101-1 16. For 
Monson see C. J vi p. 103-120. 
112 Worden, The Rump Parliament p. 34; A Declaration of the Lords and Commons cited in 
The Moderate Intelligencer E. 477 (14), Thursday 14 th December - Thursday 21" December 
1648, p. 178 1. 
113 For Goodwin see C. J A p. 103 -6; For Whitelock Memorials ii 416-512. BM Add Mss (vol 
vi) 37,344 f. 232-254; Worden, The Rump Parliament p. 34. 
114 See chapter I above. 
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perspective it is worth looking at how Parliament treated the secluded members between the 
first purge and the regicide. 
As I mentioned above, the Parliament that survived Pride's clutches on the 6 th , complained 
bitterly about the plight of their secluded colleagues. On the 14 th December another 
committee was sent to the General, "to know of him upon what grounds the members of the 
House were restrained from coming to the House by the officers and soldiers of the Army. " 115 
Whitelock explained the reasons behind this request: 
to desire that a charge may be brought in against such of their members not admitted to 
sit against whom they have any matter; and that the rest against whom they have no matter 
may have the freedom to sit in the House. " 
Whitelock's account clearly reveals that this was a suggestion rather than a demand, although 
sixteen members did not feel that they should trouble the General. ' 16 Although this account 
shows that there was a certain unease about the scale of the purge, it may also have been an 
attempt to make the Army confirm its policy towards the secluded members. This desire for 
clarification is not synonymous with opposition to the Army's policy. This is revealed in three 
ways. First, on the 14 th Parliament had made their hostility to the most extreme Presbyterians 
clear by publishing their declaration which appeared to restrict membership to the House. ' 17 
Second, the Anny's charge, advocating the imprisomnent of those MPs who'engaged with the 
Scots and suspension for the supporters of the Newport Accord, was accepted by 
Parliament. 118 Third, the Commons would make it perfectly clear in a response to the Scottish 
115 
C. J A p. 97. 
116 Whitelock Memorials ii p. 475, lbid Smith and Marten opposed the moves. 
117 A Declaration of the Lords and Commons in The Moderate Intelligencer, T. T. E. 477, 
Thursday 14th December - Thursday 21sDecember 1648, p. 178 1. 
118 The Humble Answer of the General Council, T. T. E. 537 (14), 3rd January 1649. 
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commissioners that they were satisfied with the imprisonment of the members associated with 
the engagement with the Scots. 119 
Between the 20th December and I" February the MPs spent very little time considering their 
own membership. They did discuss the matter on Christmas day, but it was then put to one 
side. 120 From that date until the regicide they only discussed the Presbyterians on two 
occasions. On the 27h December Thomas Watson preached before the truncated House. The 
minister used the occasion to launch an unequivocal attack against the purges and the 
projected settlement without the King. Accusing Parliament of hypocrisy, he warned that God 
saw their inward desires and would ultimately cast his judgement upon them. On the same 
day, Thomas Brooks saw the apocalyptic opportunity, informing the congregation that they 
had the unique chance "to honour God" and do good to his saints. It is hardly surprising that 
when Parliament debated as to whether the preacher should be thanked, Mr Brooks was given 
the honour whereas Thomas Watson was not "thanked for his pains. " 12 1 The latter was also 
given a stem warning not to print the sermon. 122 
The next interlude concerned the "irrepressible" William Prynne. The House instructed Mr 
Edwards and Mr Fry to go to him and show him a pamphlet which began with the preamble 
"a brief memento to the unparliamentary juncto. " They were further ordered to ask Pyrnne if 
he would accept responsibility for the book. In the pamphlet Prynne had accused the Army 
119 The Resolution and Votes Conceming Major Browne, T. T. E. 550 (11), 1 oth April 1649, 
p. 2. 
120 BM Add Mss (vol iv) 37,344, fol. 250. 
121 Thomas Watson, Gods Anatomy Upon Mans Heart ' T. T. E. 536 (7), 27 
th December 1648. 
Thomas Brooks, Gods Delight in the progress of the Upright, T. T. E. 536 (6), 27th December 
1648. 
122 A Perfect Diumall, T. T. E. 527, Monday 25 th December 1648 - Monday I" January 1649, 
p. 2280. 
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and the remaining MPs of being involved in a Jesuit conspiracy. The MPs had clearly found 
the publication palpably annoying. They demanded that the Ordinance of the 27 th September 
1647, regarding the publication of scandalous pamphlets should be enacted. They also ordered 
the clerk to ensure that a copy of this publication did not end up in public circulation. 123 
When Edwards and Fry visited Prynne he refused to answer their questions because he did not 
regard them as a lawful authority. When this was reported to the House, Parliament instructed 
the Scargant at Arms to bring Prynne to the chamber. In a rather comic interlude Prynne told 
the Seargant that he could not attend Parliament because he was currently a prisoner of the 
Army. The bemused Seargant returned to Parliament and told them of Prynne's response. 
Before they had time to answer, it was reported that Waller had asked for a habeas corpus for 
Prynne. Whitelock informed the House that this could not be denied, and despite Prynne's 
previous hostility to the chamber, he was released from custody. As Professor Underdown 
states, "the decision to release so articulate an opponent is a striking demonstration of the 
revolutionaries continuing respect for legal formalities. iý124 However, there was no prospect of 
Prynne returning to Parliament. 
The actions undertaken against the secluded members does not reveal a Parliament that was 
too concerned about the Army's involvement in the political process. It is important to 
remember that this was not just the regicides or the early dissenters who suPported the 
purging of Parliament. The decision taken upon the I" of February to allow MPs to return, 
who either voted for an extension to the Newport accord or were absent at the time of the 
123 William Prynne, A Brief Memento, E. 537 (7), 4h January 1649; Q. J vi, p. 111; Lj vi, 
p. 319. Firth and Rait, Acts and Ordinances, vol I, p. 1021-1023. The Examination of Mr 
William Prynne. E. 537 (3), 11 th January 1649, p. 6. 
124 CJ vi, p. II I- I 15.; Whitelock Memorials vol ii, p. 493. Underdown, Pride's Purge p. 194. 
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vote, did not result in the return of many members who had been forcibly secluded at the 
purge. This suggests that there were some restrictions placed upon the membership and this 
would be extended after the 23 rd of February. 125 It is true that a number of these MPs had 
played little role in the events after the 6 th but their return to Parliament did not alter the 
policy towards the secluded members. 126 The principle that governed Cromwell's thinking 
was shared by a majority of the MPs who sat consistently between the purge and regicide. 
They would allow MPs to remain in Parliament upon the condition that they would not 
attempt to undermine the revolution. It is important to state that there was not a dissenting 
voice in the House against this policy of readmission. 127 With regard to the Presbyterians the 
returning MPs did not make a difference. The declaration made by Parliament upon the 18 th 
December which prevented any Londoner associated with the Second Civil War from sitting 
on the Common Council was continued after February 1649. In the case of the Lord Mayor 
125 Worden, The Rump Parliament p. 61; This was done in a very low key fashion and was 
'never official' polig. It was reported in, A Perfect Diurnall, T. T. E. 527 (16), Monday 29'h 
January - Monday 5" February 1649, p. 2313. 
126 MpS that did not play a major role: Robert Andrews, Sir William An-nine, William 
Annine, Edward Ashe, John Baker, John Bingham, Robert Blake, Robert Brewster, Abraham 
Burrell, William Current, John Dormer, John Fagge, John Feilder, George Fenwick, Charles 
Fleetwood, Roger Gratwich, Nathaniel Hallows, Sir Arthur Heselrige, William Hay, Thomas 
Hoyle, Sir Thomas Jervoise, Francis Lascelles, Nicholas Lechmere, William Leyman, John 
Lowry, William Masham, James Nelthorpe, John Palmer, Edward Poham. Alexander 
Popham, Robert Reynolds, Algenon Sidney, Philip Smith, William Stephens, Thomas 
Stockdale, Thomas Toll, Sir Hen. ry Vane, Sir Thomas Walsingham, John Weaver, Edmund 
West, Benjamin Weston. Some, but rather few, would sit on committees, State Papers, 23,28. 
See below for Sir Arthur Heselrige. For the dates they took the dissent see Underdown's 
Pride's Purge, p. 366-390. 
127 Throughout the text and the footnotes I have pointed to the limitations of the available 
evidence. In this case however, we can determine divisions. The traditional route is through 
the votes themselves. These were only called of the vote was close. Examples of these 
divisions can be found in C. J vi. p. 128,132,158,164,172,197. Proposals were dropped if it 
was clear that they did not have sufficient support, eg. Cj vi, 1 Oth March 1649 when Marten's 
bill for the poor was laid aside without a division. 
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Reynoldson, he was fined E2,000 for refusing to endorse the new fonn of government, 
stripped from office and prevented from being an aldernian. 
128 
it was- suggested earlier in the chapter that a number of MPs were active on the committees 
which paved the way for the regicide. This is testimony to their determination to see the 
execution of the King. Their motives for this will be considered later, but it is worth 
considering the views of these so called conformist members. As a short case study, I will use 
Bulstrode Whitelock descnbed by David Underdown as the "typical rumper. "129 
Whitelock has been depicted in a variety of ways. David Underdown hated him, Blair Worden 
regarded him as a trimmer, but he has been the subject of a favourable biography. He is also 
extremely useful for historians of the Civil Wars and Interregnum, because he provides a 
great deal of information upon the revolutionary period. It is clear that his memoirs may have 
been produced to vindicate his actions at the time of the restoration and that his diary has not 
provided historians with much more evidence than his more detailed memorials. Yet, he is 
still one of the few rumpers who demonstrates any indication of motive. He also provides a 
great deal of infon-nation upon his decision to serve the Commonwealth. 130 
128 For the same policy continuing see (for example): C. J vi p. 177 and The Moderate 
Intelligencer, E. 543 (3), Thursday 8 th February - Thursday 15 th February 1648, p. 1 186. For 
the episode with Reynoldson, C. J vi p. 177; The Restoration and Votes Concerning Maio 
Browne, T. T. E. 550 (11), 10th April 1649, p. 2. 
129 Underdown, Pride's Purge , p. 296. 
130 For a neat summary of Underdown and Worden's views upon Whitelock see Ruth 
Spalding, The Dia! y of Bulstrode Whitelock 1605-1675 Records of Social and Economic 
History New Series, xiii p. 25; For the limitations of the memoirs and the diary see Worden, 
"The Diary of Bulstrode Whitelock", EHR 12 (108), (1993), p. 122-34; See also Ronald 
Hutton, The British Republic 1649-1660 , p. 23; For the diary see Spalding cited above. Ruth Spalding, The Improbable Puritan (1975); Memorials ii p. 518-218. BM Add Mss (vol iv) 37, 
344, f. 256-267. 
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in 1651 Whitelock attended the famous meeting where it was claimed that he advocated the 
restoration of Charles II. The use historians have made of this source brought criticism from 
Professor Hutton who pointed out that Whitelock had the best possible reason to depict 
himself as a covert Royalist. The account was written at a time when Whitelock, as one of the 
leaders of the republican movement, was facing the prospect of arrest which could have 
culminated in execution. 131 It is essential that the circumstances in which Whitelock wrote his 
account are remembered. Moreover, he did have a great deal of explaining to do. He was one 
of the first of the February dissenters, having previously spent plenty of time in the Commons 
in the weeks between the first purge and the regicide. He claimed that he objected to the 
abolition of the Lords but he still drafted the ordinance that gave full sovereignty to the 
Commons. He witnessed the smashing of the great seal and he agreed to act as one of the new 
commissioners. In his memorials he recites all his attempts to persuade Parliament not employ 
him but they clearly regarded him as indispensable to their cause. In the end he did agree to 
serve, but it is interesting to note that his friend and colleague Widdrington managed to avoid 
OffiCe. 
132 So what were Whitelock's aims? He could have been a moderate who leapt onto a 
bandwagon, as Professor Underdown suggests, but this overlooks the fact that Whitelock 
could have jumped on earlier when it became clear that Charles was going to die. it is 
possible that he joined to keep power in civilian hands, a view suggested by Dr Worden and 
one that Whitelock would have supported. This argument may overlook two important 
factors. First, as outlined above this was a convenient excuse at the time of the restoration. 
Second, and most importantly, Whitelock's account was tarnished by the events of 1653 when 
there was a clash between the Army and Parliament. The same is true of the accounts written 
131 R. Hutton, The British Republic p. 23; Also, non regicides such as Heselrige and Vane did 
face execution. 
132 Whitelock Memorials ii p. 518-528. 
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F, 
by Lucy Hutchinson which talk of a perpetual conflict between the Anny and the 
-representative chamber. " 133 
There is, perhaps, an alternative explanation which is consistent with some of Whitelock's 
utterances. It is clear that he did not approve of the regicide - the fact that his name is not on 
the document is testament to this. But in his memoirs he does state that he was deeply 
engaged with "that party. "134 The decision to execute the King was one with which he could 
not agree, but it was not serious enough to alter his allegiance. This view may have been 
shared by a number of the conformists. The lack of a clear distinction between the regicide 
MPs and the non-subscribers is evident in a one other piece of evidence - the lack of an 
ideological conflict between the two groups in Parliament. 
If we take the first twenty-three divisions after February 1649 it becomes patently clear that 
there was not a split between the revolutionaries and the non-subscribers. 135 During these 
divisions they only divided neatly into their groups on one occasion. On the 2l't March 1649 
the House divided upon whether the current levels of assessment should remain the same for 
six months. 136 This was not regarded as a major concern since it failed to make the 
newspapers. Also, the issue of supplying the Anny for the trip to Ireland did not divide the 
MPs, and thus cannot be regarded as a major ideological issue. But the future of the House of 
133 Worden, The Rump Parliament p. 47 and nA I do have reservations about the use of 
Hutchinson Ludlow. See C. H Firth (ed), Memoirs of Colonel Hutchinson, Governor of 
Nottingham, by his Widow Lucy (1906) p. 269. 
134 Whitelock Memorials ii P. 524. 
135 Blair Worden notes that there was not such a significant divide between the revolutionaries 
and the conformists. I believe that it is even less than he thought. He retained both terms. As 
mentioned in the text, I have decided to dispense with conformist preferring non subscriber 
which relates to both the early test of dissent and the regicide. For the divisions see C. J vi 
p. 128,132,140,141-2,145.147,158,159,160,164,167,170,172,188,192,195,197. 
136 Sir John Bourchier and Henry Martin believed that they should remain the same for six 
months. Sir William Masharn and Sir John Goodwin opposed, C. J vi. p. 170. 
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Lords can, and one would imagine that if a great distinction did exist it would be over the 
nature of the future constitution. The regicide William Purefoy sided with William Sydenham 
a man who played no role in the events between the purge and regicide. 
137 Sir William 
Brereton, a non-subscriber, understandably supported the candidature of the Earl of Salisbury 
to the Council of State. He was joined by the committed Philip Lord Lisle. Against them 
stood Henry Martin who joined with Lord Monson who had failed to commit himself to either 
an early dissent or the regicide. 138 When it came to determining whether the Council should 
have a president it saw four revolutionaries battling it Out. 
139 On the 8 th of March Oliver 
Cromwell sided with Sir Arthur Heselrige against the revolutionary Ludlow and the non- 
subscribing Masham. 140 It was clear from all of these divisions that the issue of commitment 
to either the early dissent or the regicide had little impact upon the political groupings in the 
early months of the Commonwealth. Although it is claimed that the return of the non- 
subscribers had a profound effect upon the conservative nature of the new regime it is 
remarkable that out of all the divisions noted above the conformists only worked together as 
tellers on four occasions. 141 
Although it is no longer fashionable to consider seventeenth century politics in tenns of 
parties, it is clear that these members shared a number of common aims. 142 Had this not been 
the case than there would have been more of a division when the confonnists returned. This 
137 They were opposed by Lord Grey and Henry Martin C. J vi. p. 132. 
138 C. J vi. p. 14 1. 
139 Sir John Danvers and Colonel Wauton supported, whereas Sir Michael Livesey and Henry 
Marten opposed. The latter were successftil by 22 votes to 16, C. J vi p. 145. 
140 Cj vi, p. 159. 
141 Cj vi, p. 160,164,170 and 195. 
142 The issue of parties is discussed in chapter 4 below. 
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only happened over the oath to sit on the Council of State, where the opposition found 
themselves marginalized 143 . The main difference which separated the two was the execution 
of Charles 1. This is, of course, a major ideological factor, but the politics between February 
and May 1649 suggest that it was not an irreconcilable conflict that would dominate political I 
allegiance. In the first chapter it was argued that a large number of the people who sat upon 
the Council of State had demonstrated their support for the purging of Parliament. Earlier in 
this chapter it was suggested that a number of the non-subseribers may have favoured 
deposition and that many of them had endorsed the purging of Parliament. The MPs who 
countenanced either deposition or a major curtailment of Charles' power, were a group who 
showed a willingness to consider a major alteration to the Government. The precise form that 
this would take may not have pleased them, but they believed that it was not a sufficient 
enough obstacle to prevent them from serving. It can be argued that they had more in 
common with the revolutionaries than they did with their former colleagues who had decided 
to leave Westminster. 
Finally, the non subscribers risked a great deal by supporting the new regime. Although the 
Royalists were unable to mount an immediate challenge to the regicide, the events of 1649 
created bitter resentment in their circles. The notion of blood guilt is usually applied to the 
New Model Army. Yet, the vast amount of Royalist writings which poured out citing 
scriptural evidence suggesting that revenge would be exacted upon all the participants 
associated with the new regime, also points to vengeance. 144 This suggests that all the 
members of the Goverranent could have faced reprisals for their actions during the revolution. 
143 See chapter I for the view that many in the Council of State had supported the purge. 
144 For example: All is not Gold that Glisters , T. T. E. 536 (19), 291h December 1648, p. 6-7; Sir John Grenville to Sir E. Nicholas, 23d February 1649. The Nicholas Papers, (ed) George F. 
Warner vol i, Camden Society (1886), p. 107; HMCR Mss of F. W Leyborne-Popham (1889) 
P-9-1 1; B. Worden, "Providence and Politics in Cromwellian England" P&P no. 109, p. 55-57. 
Below n. 147. 
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The regicides would have been at the top of the list but it is likely that others would have 
faced the prospect of retribution also. The men that established the Commonwealth produced 
acts abolishing kingly Government and continued to persecute Royalists. In the event of an 
145 
immediate restoration, it is very likely that these men would have faced punishment . 
Moreover, it must be remembered that in the early years of the Commonwealth, Charles 11 
Nvas intent upon achieving a victory without makin g concessions to anyone in the 
Government. He would reluctantly endeavour to woo both English and Scottish Presbyterians, 
but this was only after Montrose had failed and the Royalist activities in Ireland had been 
crushed by Cromwell's forces. As far as the English Government was concerned, they had no 
reason to think that they would escape punishment in. the event of a restoration. Charles II was 
conciliatory at the Declaration of Breda after a decade in exile. In the early years of this exile 
he was the angry young man determined to avenge his father's death. 146 Finally, it is 
important to note that the Royalist press made no distinction between the regicides and the 
non-subscribers. They were passed on information abroad to the Royalist court speaking of 
the evils of this homogenous Government. An edition of Mercurius Pragmaticus placed some 
of the non-subscribers at the head of it. 147 Had a restoration occurred this party would have 
demanded retribution against all of the members of the new Government. Given the depth, 
scale and nature of these Royalist writings, the possibility of a vengeful Royalist party would 
not have been lost on the new executive. 148 Considering that the regime faced the prospect of 
145 S. R. Gardiner, The Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution, 1625-1660 (Third 
edition 1906) p. 381-3,384,388; Cj vi p. 159-61 for the moves against the leading Royalists. 
146 Ronald Hutton, Charles 11 (Oxford 1991) p. 34-70; B. M Egerton Mss 1533 fol. 18. 
147 The attitude of the Royalist press will be discussed below. Mercurius Pragmaticus T. T. E. 
540 (15), Tuesday 13 th February - Tuesday 201h February 1649. List includes: Vane, Salisbury, Pembroke, Wilson and Whitelock. For the newsletters see chapter I above, also 
Bodelian Library Clarendon Mss 34 fol. 73. 
148 For example, An Elegie on Charles I T. T. E. 553 (1) 4 Ih May 1649; E. 553 (1), A Hand- 
Kirchife for Loyal mourners T. T. E. 541 (6), 30'h January 1649. 
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irivasion from European monarchies, armed Royalists in Ireland and Scotland, a Royalist 
party in England that screamed for revenge and a group of Presbyterians who may 
have sided 
-, vith the royalists, the decision to serve demonstrates a certain courage and 
belief. The 
abstaining members certainly took the safest option. When Whitelock stated that he was 
taking a risk by joining the new Government, we have good reason to believe him. 
149 
This chapter has suggested that there was not a gulf between the majority of the MPs and the 
Army. The former accepted the purge and the latter were, superficially at least, content with 
the membership of the Commons. The remainder of the chapter will focus upon the motives 
that governed both groups and attempt to provide an answer to the question posed by Dr 
Kelsey about the degree of attachment to a form of republicanism. 150 The argument will also 
attempt to explain why there was so little reform on religious and constitutional issues during 
the first few months of the revolution. 
Dr Worden has explained the reasons for the Rump's conservatism. He has shown that many 
of the members of the Commonwealth did not possess sufficient social radicalism to extend 
the revolution beyond the events of 1649. This thesis supports this argument but I will place 
more emphasis upon the events outside of Westminster to explain why the Rump adopted 
such a conservative posture. 
A great deal of the research undertaken upon the Anny during this period has tended to focus 
upon the Leveller discontent during the early years of the Commonwealth. This culminated in 
the defeat of the Levellers at Burford in May 1649.151 It is also widely accepted that material 
149 Whitelock Memorials ii p. 525. 
150 Kelsey, Inventing a Republic passim. 
151 The most detailed account, can be found in Ian Gentles, The New Model Army p. 315-49. 
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grievances were at the core of this discontent and that there was not such a widespread 
attachment to Leveller ideology. This view is certainly confirmed by the findings in this 
thesis. It is also worth pointing out that many members of the Army were opposed to the 
nioves made by the so called Leveller movement. 
Upon the 14 1h March Colonel Deane's regiment made it perfectly plain that they wanted to 
fight in Ireland and that "this was only being prevented by the Leveller disturbances. 152 A 
petition from Norfolk called for union amongst the Godly. 153 From Leicester there appears to 
have been a rejection of Leveller doctrine as they professed support for the existing 
Parliament. 154 In early February a petitions asked that the defence of the seas be the most 
pressing issue. 155 A number of tracts written by supporters of the Army did not call for the 
extension of reform after regicide. A pamphlet entitled 'An Answer to the Cities 
Representative', published upon the 7 th February called for the union of Presbyterians and 
Independents. 156 The author's principle justification for regicide was based upon the notion 
that if Charles had remained as king with limited powers, he would have broken any 
agreement and become even more intransigent. 157 Another pamphlet which appeared upon the 
13th February was critical of the Presbyterian movement and based the justification for 
152 The Perfect Weekly Account E. 548 (10), Wednesday 14 th March - Wednesday 23 rd 
March 1649, p. 425. 
153 The Artnies Weekly Intelligencer T. T. E. 545 (3), Thursday 15 th February - Thursday 22 nd 
February 1649, p. 34-5. 
154 The Moderate T. T. E. 540 (2), Tuesday 13 th March - Tuesday 20th March 1649. Although 
this petition called for the abolition of tithes, it was clear that they wanted an expedition to 
Ireland. 
155 E. g. Perfect Occurances of Evej3ý Daies Journal E. 527 (17), Thursday 8'h February - 
Thursday 15'h February 1649, p. 822-3 and 830. 
156 An Answer to the Cities Representatives set forth by some Ministers of the Gospel T. T. E. 
541 (23), p. 3. 
157 
lbid p. 5. 
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regicide upon the grounds that the King had transgressed, but the author offered no suggestion 
of a system of Government to replace the monarchy. 
158 Five days later an Army petition from 
the Northern Associations called for the reform of laws, but this pamphlet was also, a ringing 
endorsement of Parliament and expressed an absolute belief in God's providence. ' 59 Two 
other pamphlets appeared in late February. They both blamed the regicide on Charles, and the 
second entitled 'The Parliament Justified' clearly expressed that they did not support the 
Leveller doctrine. 160 Finally, Fairfax so maligned by the Leveller leaders, received high praise 
from a number of his regiments. 161 
In many respects the Army did not put pressure on the new Government to reform. They did 
want to see some alteration to the laws bat they were not concerned with precise plans and 
timetables. Pressure would mount on the Parliament after the Battle of Worcester in 1651 but 
during the revolution this was not the case. Blair Worden rightly pointed out that for many 
MPs the events of 1649 took the revolution far enough. This view appears to have been 
shared by a number of members of the Army and it helps to explain why the revolution was 
not followed by radical reform; the purges had created the Parliament but not all of the Army 
had not followed this up with even more demands for change. As I mentioned above, the 
Anny stopped their involvement in the political process on the 20'h December and they did 
not intervene again throughout this revolutionary period. It is important also, to realise that 
158 Eye Salve to anoint the Minsiters in the Province of London, E. 542 (16), 13 th February 
1649, p. 2. 
159 A Declaration from the Nor-them Association of the Counties of England, T. T. E. 544 
(6), 1 gth February 1649, p. 1-5. 
160 The Execution of the late King Justified and the Anny and Parliament Vindicated, T. T. E. 
545(7), 26 th February 1649; The Parliament Justified T. T. E. 545 (14), 27 th February 1649, 
P. 8 for the anti Leveller stand. 
161 England's Fortress Exemplified T. T. E 554 (14), 20th February 1649, p. 1-8, esp. p. 2. 
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the Army should not be regarded as a homogenous body which always demanded progress 
, Ind reform. 
162 
NVhen David Underdown wrote his book Pride's Purge, it was generally assumed that the 
debates upon the Agreement of the People were not taken seriously; it was merely a means for 
the Grandees to keep the Levellers busy while they got on with the more important business 
of trying the King. 163 Since the publication of his book, Colin Davis, Barbara Taft and Ian 
Gentles have questioned this view. 164 An examination of the Clarke papers confirms the views 
of the historians cited above. Ireton clearly took the debates seriously and his lengthy and 
often bad tempered interventions are a testimony to his desire to see a constitution that he 
could work with. It is also clear that he did allow the Levellers to have a voice in the 
165 
proceedings demonstrated by the hostility that he faced from them. All of this makes a 
mockery of Lilburne's subsequent charge that the debates were not taken seriously. Indeed 
Barbara Taft argues that the Levellers, themselves were not committed to the agreement, 
illustrated by their refusal to "hammer out a constitution" which other revolutionary factions 
would have supported. 166 This thesis supports this view but will take the argument slightly 
162 1 therefore share some of the views outlined by Dr. Kelsey, Inventing a Republic p. 15 1- 
189. 
163 Underdown, Pride's Purge p. 198-9, and the sources listed in n. 70, p. 199. 
164 Barbara Taft, 'The Council of Officers Agreement of the People, 1648/9' HJ, 28 (1985).; 
'Voting lists of the Council of Officers, December 1648' BIHR, LII (1979); Ian Gentles, The 
New Model Army; J. C Davis, 'The Levellers and Christianity' in Brian Manning (ed), 
'Politics, Religion and the English Civil War' (1973); Full listings of these sources can be 
found in n. 67 above. 
165 The Clarke Papers (ed. ) C. H Firth, 4 vols (Camden New Series 1891-1901), vol ii p. 75-7, 
79,88-9,91-5,139-40,147. 
166 Barbara Taft, "The Council of Officers - Agreement of the People 1648/9" HJ 28 (1985) 
P. 180-81. 
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further by suggesting that Lilburne seriously undermined the prospects of reform by making 
his outspoken and unsubstantiated attacks upon the new regime. 
Before the publication of John Lilbume's tract 'England's New Chains Discovered', there had 
been rumblings of discontent amongst the Leveller faction. This bad feeling had coincided 
with Lilburne's return to London in early February. 167 Lilburne had been away from London 
before the regicide dealing with his estates in Durham but he officially entered the political 
debate on the 28 th February with an outspoken attack against the new regime. He welcomed 
some of the rhetoric used by the Commons, but he then outlined some of his reservations. 
First, he warned that the Council of State aimed at "an absolute domination of the 
Commonwealth" and that this had always been the intention of a number of the members. 
Second, he attacked Parliament for their policies against the press claiming that the 
restrictions were now as severe as they had been at the time of Holles and Stapleton. Finally, 
and most significantly, he accused them of deliberately using the soldiers when they were 
needed in the wars but now they were being described by MPs as, "Levellers, Anachists and 
Jesuits. s9168 
The criticisms levelled against the Parliament were unfair and bound to cause resentment 
against the Leveller cause. The charges created a gulf between his ideas and any possibility of 
implementation. Lilburne had every right to complain about the formation of the Council of 
State from a purist's perspective but it was designed to defend the Commonwealth from 
dangers and in 1649 it was certainly needed. 169 His criticisms of the press are also 
unsubstantiated since Gilbert Mabbott was still the Government's official censor who had 
167 Gentles, The New Model Anny p. 316. 
168 "Englands New Chains Discovered" in William Haller and Godfrey Davis (eds), The 
Leveller Tracts, 1647-53 p. 157-70 (New York 1944). 
169 C. S. P. D 1649-50, p. 5-8. 
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Leveller sympathies but who also allowed individual editors to put forward their own ideas in 
their respective papers. 170 Finally, the Commons needed the Army for the expedition to 
Ireland so they did not subject them to verbal assaults. By criticising the Government in this 
fashion Lilbume had raised the stakes and if the Government was to have any credibility they 
could not be seen to cave in to these demands which were essentially a statement of contempt 
for the new regime. 
This was not, of course, the last time that Lilburne would attack the ruling party. Ian Gentles 
has described 'The Second Part of England's New Chains Discovered' as a "declaration of 
war against the grandees". In this document Lilburne blamed the grandees for their role in 
provoking the Second Civil War, for orchestrating the death of Rainsborowe and even for the 
poor economic conditions that faced the nation. He concludes the pamphlet with these words; 
"(their actions) exceeds in the nature and measure of it, all the wickedness of both the other 
parties put together. " 
171 
This could only have one effect - it united the Anny and the Grandees yet further. 
It was not just Lilburne who was denouncing the new regime. Bray, Overton and Thompson 
had also produced pamphlets that bitterly attacked both the Parliament and the Army. 172 It is 
now worth considering the impact that this had upon the new regime. The Government's 
official Newspaper, A Modest Narrative of Intelligence claimed that the opposition to the 
Levellers was based upon the threat they posed to the expedition to Ireland. The editor warned 
that if Ireland was not dealt with the nation really would be subjected to slavery. In a 
170 This will be discussed in chapter 5 below, 
171 Gentles, The New Model Anny p. 321. "Second Part of Englands New Chains" in Haller 
and Davis, Leveller Tracts p. 170-89. 
172 Most of these are cited in, Gentles, The New Model Anny p. 315-349 and sources listed 
p. 528-537. See also, BM Egerton Mss, f. 93-97. 
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subsequent edition he warned that fresh elections were needed but that they could not happen 
i1nmediately because, without the proper provisions, the secluded members would return and 
this would mark the end of the Republic. 173 When considering why the Levellers were so 
brutally crushed, it must be remembered that the circumstances in 1649 pushed the radicals in 
Parliament in a conservative direction. The Navy required rcorganisation and the records of 
the Council of State show that the new Government was on war-footing throughout the 
period. 174 The men that made the revolution were capable of accepting political change and 
there were refonners in Parliament. Ireton and Harrison had been critical of the decision to 
allow an oath for the Council of State but they were silent after this date. Even Henry Marten 
seems to have dropped his quest for reform. 175 Whitelock remarked that after the regicide, that 
many opinions existed about the direction that the Government should take. Given the level of 
commitment to the regicide and the incontrovertible fact that the regime's survival depended 
upon the support of the Army, it is possible that if the right circumstances prevailed, the 
Rump could have become more of a reforming institution. But the grandees did not push 
Parliament in this direction because Lilburne was busy inciting the Army to mutiny. 
Moreover when a group of Anabaptists petitioned Parliament they received a favourable 
response which suggests that MPs were not oblivious to outside pressures. 176 Unfortunately, 
Lilburne and his fellow travellers were responsible for three future policies. First, he united 
the Army Grandees with the Parliament. Barbara Taft was critical of Ireton after the 
173 A Modest Narrative of Intelligence E. 551 (9), Saturday 14 th Apri I- Saturday 21" April 
1649, p. 17; A Modest Narrative of Intelligence T. T. E. 555 (32), Saturday 12 th May - 
Saturday I gth May, p. 49. 
174 The Navy will be discussed in chapter 3. For its importance see, C. S. P. D p. 6-149. 
175 This is clear from the lack of divisions mentioned earlier in the chapter. The formation of 
the Council of State is discussed in chapter 1. 
176 The Perfect Weekly Account, T. T. E 549 (3), Wednesday 28 th March - Wednesday 2 nd 
April 1649, p. 434. 
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Agreement accusing him of suffering from a lack of nerve by not pressing the Agreement on 
the new regime. In light of Lilburne's personal assaults against him, it is hardly surprising 
that, _at 
a time of chronic danger, Ireton distanced himself from a document which was 
intrinsically associated with the Leveller leader. Moreover, it was rumoured that the Levellers 
had made some overtures to the King. 177 Second, as I mentioned above, many in the Army did 
not support these Leveller ideas. As the conflict deepened between the Levellers and the 
Grandees the Army became less inclined to promote reform. Finally, Lilburne helped to 
ensure that the Government was even more distracted ftorn issues of reform than it would 
otherwise have been. This can be illustrated ftorn an account of the proceedings in the 
Council of State. 
On the 26 th of March the Council wrote to Captain Nicholls, the Governor of Chepstow 
Castle. The Council expressed a concern that there was a waste of timber which was 
hindering the building of ships. The letter went on to say that the Council had heard that much 
of the timber in the forest was being used for iron works but not enough attention was being 
paid to the preservation of the "corpses" which could be used by the Navy. This shows the 
attention to detail employed by the Council of State and how desperate they were to utilise all 
of the resources at their disposal to defend the Commonwealth from invasion. It was not an 
isolated incident and the records of the Council of State are testimony to the efficiency and 
effort they put in to both the reorganisation of the Navy and equipping of the Army for 
Ireland. 178 The day after this letter was sent to Nicholls the Council became aware of John 
Lilbume's 'Second Part of England's New Chains Discovered. ' It is hardly surprising that 
they endorsed a declaration from Parliament which condemned the document. The Council 
177 Taft, HJ, p. 185 cited n. 166 above. 
178 CSPD 1649-50, Council of State to Captain Nicholls, p. 1788. For the Navy see p. 3-107. 
All of the pages are littered with accounts about building up the strength of the Navy. 
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also Nvrote to Fairfax asking him to "proceed against them for attempting to raise a mutiny in 
the Army"179 When Lilburne was summoned before the Council he refused to recognise their 
authority. The Council, quite understandably threw him into the Tower. 
The pressures outside Westminster pushed the Parliament in a conservative direction. The 
revolution was full of ironies and one of the greatest, rests with the fact that Lilbume assisted 
the drift towards conservatism which was so apparent in the months after the regicide. It was, 
of course, not just Lilbume who was responsible for this. Blair Worden's analysis of the 
backgrounds of the MPs goes a long way in explaining why the regicide was not followed by 
a series of refonns. However, politicians are always influenced by external pressures. The 
conservative background of these MPs cannot be isolated from the circumstance in which 
they governed. Essentially politics was dominated by the issue of survival, and the Levellers 
merely succeeded in increasing the difficulties which faced the new regime. It will be argued 
in chapter four that some of the Presbyterians adopted a more positive approach towards the 
new regime than has been previously thought. The Government believed that their 
acquiescence was at least possible, but such a view could never have been taken of the 
Levellers. 
Conclusions. 
The publication of Sean Kelsey's book 'Inventing a Republic' challenged all of the 
conventional historiography of the Rump period. He suggests that due to a number of long- 
term conditioning factors of English history, the Commonwealth was able to establish itself 
because "Englishmen were perfectly adequately equipped to turn the unprecedented 




dormant in early modem culture. "180 This thesis will not attempt to judge the origins of 
republicanism apart from stating that the return of the non-subscribing members may indicate 
that Mýs did believe that the system could survive without a king. It is, however, difficult to 
determine whether these MPs had been influenced by a deep rooted attachment to 
republicanism. The lack of available evidence accentuates the problems faced by the historian 
of this period. It is possible to argue that there is a danger of looking at the outward form of 
government and regarding this as manifestation of an almost subconscious attachment to the 
principle of a government without a king. The leaders of the Commons had to present 
themselves as a legitimate authority when they executed Charles. It is clear from the evidence 
consulted in this thesis that they were not in a desperate hurry to make the transition to 
republicanism. 
As I mentioned above there is a real problem with evidence for the historian of this period. it 
is simply impossible to determine the views of the majority of the MPs. But where the 
evidence does exist it appears that the majority of the MPs decided to establish the 
Commonwealth because they disliked the person of the King rather than the institution of 
monarchy. This supports one of the central findings of Blair Worden's work. Thomas Scott 
produced a pamphlet before the regicide justifying the legislation against the King upon the 
grounds that Charles could not be trusted. He attacked the King for his religion, his record of 
government throughout his reign and most importantly his engagement with the Scots. 181 This 
testimony from one of the leading regicides, points to 'blood guilt' rather than a support for a 
new republican order. This hostility to the engagement with the Scots was a crucial issue in 
pushing men towards regicide. A series of votes passed before the regicide condemning the 
eleven members and Lionel Copley for their part in the engagement suggests that feelings ran 
180 Kelsey, Inventing a Republic, p. 201. 
18 1A Pair of Cristal Spectacles with which Any Man my see Plainly, T. T. E. 476 (30), 1 gth 
December 1648, p. 1-6. 
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high against the SCOtS. 182 At the time of the trial of the leading Royalists after the regicide, 
flolland, Capel, Goring and Owen had petitions on their behalf listened to, whereas 
Hamilton's was simply laid aside. 183 This was almost certainly due the latter's alleged 
involvement with the Scots. Parliament's declaration published upon the 22 nd February 
principally justified the purges and the regicide upon the grounds of Charles' engagement 
with the Scots. A further declaration by Parliament upon the 17'h March justified the 
destruction of the monarchy upon the grounds that Charles had abused his trust. 184 Dr Kelsey 
is only partially right when he says that at the trial of the King there was "an almost 
overwhelming amount of theory, both biblical and constitutional, as well as precedent, ancient 
and contemporary, justifying the inevitable regicide itSelf,. 185 It is true that justifications for 
regicide looked backwards and these apologias tended to focus predominantly upon the 
person of Charles. The people who supported the new regime tended to base their ideas upon 
the negative issue of being opposed to Charles and then would justify their actions upon the 
grounds of precedent. They are self-justificatory in tone and do not appear to have embraced a 
new order which had its origins embedded in English history. 186 Moreover, it must be 
recognised that this opinion was shared by both the MPs and many in the Army. It is 
interesting to note that Morgan Llwyd regarded them as one in the same. 187 
182 A Declaration Collected out of the Journals of Both Houses, T. T. E. 477 (7), Wednesday 
13 th January - Wednesday 20th January 1649, p. 19. 
183 C. J vi, p. 159-6 1. For Hamiliton's petition being laid aside, see p. 160. 
184 The Parliament Justified, T. T. E. 545 (14), 27th February 1649; A Declaration of 
Parliament T. T. E. 548 (12), 17 th March 1649, p. 1-20. 
185 Kelsey, Inventing a Republic, p. 204. 
186 A Declaration of Parliament and The Parliament Justified cited above n. 184; The 
Execution of the Late King Justified, T. T. E. 545 (7), 26h February 1649, esp. p. 25; The 
Golden Rule of Justice Advanced T. T. E. 543 (6), 16th February 1649. 
187 NLW, Mss. 1143B, fol. 1,2. 
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This is, of course, far closer to the arguments of Blair Worden than it is to the new writings 
Nvhicb see a republican tradition in England. My argument simply states that this hostility to 
the King was more widespread than Dr Worden's thesis allowed. Also, this thesis has argued 
that many of the sitting MPs supported the purging of Parliament, which was confirmed in an 
official parliamentary publication that appeared on 17'h March. 188 
Finally, the evidence presented here suggests that origins of the conflict between the Anny 
and the MPs should be studied from a fresh perspective. During the revolution both sides (and 
I am obviously distinguishing the Levellers from the Army leaders), united in their desire to 
see, first the execution of the King, and then the protection of the new regime from the variety 
of dangers it faced. The majority of the radicals demonstrated a scant desire to see the 
revolution extended beyond the actions of both the purge and regicide. It also disputes the 
argument first levelled by John Lilburne that the Parliament and the grandees pursued a set of 
policies that were at variance with the majority of the "radical" nation. It is not the place here 
to address the reasons for the future conflict between the Rump and the Anny but one 
explanation, which owes a great deal to the interpretations of Blair Worden, Austin Woolrych 
and Ian Gentles, can be mooted. Between its formation and 165 1, the New Model had not 
been idle. The success they enjoyed in England in the first two Civil Wars was succeeded 
with remarkable achievements in Ireland and Scotland. Their religion demanded action and 
they returned to England to find a government that had not displayed the same type of energy 
that they had experienced. However, they found a government that had grown in self- 
confidence and no longer believed that an Anny should play a significant role in politics. 
From the findings in this chapter, it must be stressed that this was not an inevitable conflict, 
rather, it would be conditioned by the events that followed the revolution. 
\I 
188 A Declaration of Parliament, 17 th March 1649, cited above n. 184. 
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What were the priorities which governed this new regime? The answer is, I believe, far closer 
to the interpretations of the 1970s than it is to the recent accounts expounding a republican 
tradition. The Commonwealth spent the first months of its rule fighting for survival. They 
found it difficult to look beyond the immediate problems they faced at home and abroad. 
They gave little thought to the future and displayed little concern about their republican 
image. 
On the 30th April 1649 the master of ceremonies, Sir Oliver Fleming submitted a report to the 
Council of State, which asked for direction upon how he should portray the Commonwealth 
when he was dealing with foreign dignitaries. Dr Kelsey attached a great deal of significance 
to this report; 
"Fleming's report gives an interesting insight into post-revolutionary political culture, 
indicating the awareness in England of the importance of maintaining and rewriting the 
familiar fictions of political theatre which were so important to diplomatic relations. " 
Dr Kelsey then goes on to add, "it would certainly seem that Rumpers needed little reminding 
of the importance of protocol and ceremony. " In many respects this is important and his work 
has certainly shown that by 1653 the Ruml) had managed to create an image for itself 
However, Fleming's report can be interpreted in a very different fashion. Instead of regarding 
it as an indication of the Rump's willingness to establish an image for itself, the report infers 
that the Rump had not taken its image seriously enough. 
Fleming begins the report by asking the members of the Rump Parliament to "know of the 
titles" he was to give to "the Council of State and the Commonwealth, " when he was 
"conversing with foreign ministers. " He suggested that without the necessary pomp the 
regime would not be taken seriously at a time when the support, or at least the acquiescence 
of foreign powers was desperately needed. He then described how official protocol worked in 
a number of other "republics. " He concluded his report with a list of recommendations upon 
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how the Commonwealth should treat foreign ambassadors visiting England. The list included 
the manner in which an ambassador should be greeted; where they should sit in the House, 
now t, hat the chamber was not "subject to another power" and where they should stay during 
their visit. Underlying all of his suggestions rested one simple principle: if the 
Commonwealth was going to be taken seriously, it had to adopt a protocol that befitted a great 
power. As Dr Kelsey has shown a great deal of this was accepted by the new Government but 
this was a consequence of the events of 1649 rather than a belief in a republican forra of 
govermnent. 
The mere fact that Fleming was forced to point out that the new Government had made little 
provision for the pomp and circumstance that surrounded the new regime, suggests that 
contemplation of the precise form that the new government should take was not high on the 
list of priorities for the members of the new regi . me. 189 
The Commonwealth was a republic, but as Blair Worden rightly states it was "triumphant by 
default. "190 This chapter suggests that the momentum that sustained it in the early months of 
its rule was the memory of a reprehensible prince. It is unlikely that either the MPs or the 
Army officers, (most notably Cromwell) had given much thought to the form that the new 
government should take. This lack of enthusiasm about the form of government, coupled with 
the dangers that faced the regime from abroad, explains the why the monarchy and the House 
of Lords were not formally abolished until March 1649 and why the Commonwealth was only 
established three months after the regicide. This in turn does not explain fully the reasons for 
the conservatism of the Rump; rather they are found in the events outside of Westminster 
where most radicals defended the new regime upon the grounds that the last king had done 
such an awful job. It is certainly possible that the Rump grew in confidence and started to 
adopt a more classically republican posture. However the evidence produced in this chapter 
1 89 Kelsey, Inventing a Republic, p. 56-60. CSPD 1649-50, p. 113-17. 
190 This view is discussed by Sean Kelsey, Inventing a Republic, p. 205. 
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suggests that the English Republic was bom out of a belief that Charles had to leave the 
political stage and, without a suitable replacement on offer, the monarchy went with him. 
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The House of Lords 
The last two chapters focussed upon the role of Cromwell and the House of Commons during 
the revolution. The findings suggest that there was more of an ideological commitment to the 
revolution than other accounts have claimed. This chapter will focus upon the attitude and 
activities of the peers during the first months of the revolution and it is intended that this will 
provide a more detailed narrative of events than any of the secondary sources mentioned in 
the introduction. This chapter will also comment upon the significance of the peers in the 
early months of 1649, and in the process a number of Dr Adamson's arguments will be tested. 
This chapter will attempt to question some of them, whilst also including inforination which 
has been neglected in his and other accounts. 
The Purge. 
Pride's Purge is viewed as one of the most famous interventions made by the Army during the 
period of the Civil War and Interregnum. It is rightly regarded as one of the key events in the 
revolution, but historians and contemporaries have, by and large, discussed the event in terms 
of the assault upon the privileges of the House of Commons., Its enduring legacy perhaps 
stems from the writings of William Prynne who claimed that he was prevented from asserting 
1 David Underdown, Pride's Purge Politics in the Puritan Revolution (Oxford 1972) p. 143- 
172.; Derek Hirst, England in Conflict (1999) p. 257-8; G. E. Aylmer, Rebellion or 
Revolution (Oxford 1986) p. 97-9; A. B. Worden, The Rump Parliament (Cambridge 1974) 
p. 23-6; Ian Gentles, The New Model Army (Cambridýc1986) p. 276-83; A Vindication of the 
t Imprisoned and Secluded Members T. T. E. 539 (5), 20t January 1649. Edward Clarendon, 
The Histojy of the Rebellion and Civil Wars in England, (ed) W. D Macray, 6 vols (Oxford 
1888) vol iv p. 512; J. S. A Adamson, "Eminent Victorians: S. R Gardiner and the Liberal as 
Hero" H. J 1990 vol 33 p. 641-57; Clement Walker, -A Complete Histo! Y of Independency 
(London 1661) part ii p. 46-7; Rushworth Historical Collections (8 vols), D. Browne (ed) vol 
vii p. 1333-6,1721-2; Ludlow Memoirs, (ed) C. H Firth 2 vols (Oxford 1894) vol i p. 470LA 
Voyce from the Watchtower' part five (ed) A. B Worden Camden Society 4 th series xxi (1978) 
p. 143; Whitelock Memorials of English Affairs' 4 vols (Oxford 1853) vol ii p. 468-470; BM 
Add Mss 37.344 f. 232-3; BM Egerton Mss 2618 fol 31. 
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the just rights of the English people through the institution of Parliament, 2 and in more 
modem times the image of an Army usurping an elected, (however undemocratic), chamber is 
unpalatable. But it is this affront to the supremacy of an elected chamber which makes the 
image of the purge so enduring. 
Most historians have tended to overlook the effect the purge had upon the House of Lords. 3 
David Underdown hardly mentions the Lords upon the day of the purge and his view of the 
irrelevancy of the Lords is sustained throughout his analysis of the political events between 
the first purge and the regicide. Professor Underdown does not imply that any force was used 
against the Lords. 4 In marked contrast to this argument, John Adamson suggests that the 
Army purged the House but it "soon became clear that the Army had adopted a far more 
lenient attitude to the peers involved in the treaty than it did towards the members of the 
House of Commons. "5 Dr Adamson's argument rests comfortably with his earlier work upon 
the Lords in two important respects. First, he shows that the Lords were significant 
participants in the Newport negotiations and therefore they too had to become victims of the 
2 William Prynne, A Brief Memento to the present Unparliamenta1y Juncto T. T. E. 537 (7) 41h 
January 1649. Walker, Independengy part ii p. 49. All of Prynne's writings and actions will 
be discussed in Chapter 4 below. 
3 Sources listed in note I above. The effect of the purge was not subjected to serious scrutiny 
by C. H Firth, The House of Lords During the English Civil War (1910) p. 206; The same is 
true of G. F Trevallyn Jones, Saw-Pit Wharton Stuart Historical Studies (Sydney 1967) 
p. 13 0-13 1; As will be seen, I agree with Firth's , view 
that the Lords were not subjected to a 
purge, but he failed to develop his case. I will attempt to show that the Lords were not purged 
but the seclusion of the members of the Lower Chamber had a profound effect upon the 
number of Peers attending their chamber. See also'lPavid Smith, The Stuart Parliaments 1603- 
1689 (1999) p. 13 5; Ian Ward, 'The English Peerage 1649-1660: Government Authority and 
Estates' (PhD thesis Cambridge 1989) p. 1-4. 
4 Underdown, Pride's Purge p. 157. Firth, The House of Lords p. 204. Most historians have 
supported these accounts. See n. 1 above. 
5 J. S. A Adamson, 'The Peerage in Politics 1645- 1649' (PhD thesis Cambridge 1986) p. 258. 
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Army. Second, the Anny had such deference for the Lords that they were unwilling to place 
any peer in custody. 6 
There is no doubt that the events in early December had a profound effect upon the number of 
peers attending the chamber. In the month before the purge twenty-seven peers showed their 
faces in the upper chamber; this reduced to twenty in the month after the purge. 7 Far more 
dramatically was the average attendance which dropped from approximately fourteen in 
November, down to an average of six in the period between the 6 
th 
of December and the 2 
nd of 
8 January. For a number of peers the purge marked the end of their active involvement in 
politics. The Earl of Lincoln was a fairly active member in November and early December 
1648, but he refused to take his seat after the purge of the Commons. The Earl of Rutland 
attended most sessions from the 3rd of November until the 5 th of December but only appeared 
in the chamber upon the 6th and 7h of December and again upon the 2 nd of January to reject 
the moves against the King. Lord Hunsdon was another who attended upon the 6th of 
December, withdrew only to return to reject the moves against the King. 9 The same scenario 
can be seen with Manchester, Rutland, North, Maynard, Dacres and Berkeley. 10 Some peers, 
despite pressure to do so, " did not attend at all after the purging of the Commons. It is 
6 lbid p. 258-260. All of these contentions will be discussed in this chapter. 
7 Lj x p. 572-650; Table 4 below identifies the exact attendance during this period. 
8 LJ x p. 572-641 and Table 4 below. For the attendance figures for all the Stuart Parliaments 
see Smith, Stuart Parliaments p. 19-22- Dr Smith notes the decline in the attendance figures in 
December 1648 but he does not attribute this to the purge - 
9 For Lincoln's attendance see Table 4 below. On the 28t" December he made a rather feeble 
excuse for not attending. See Lj x p. 639. For Rutland's attendance see Lj x p. 572-624. For 
his attendance after the purge L. J 624.625,641; see Table 4 below. For Hunsdon see L. J x 
p. 624,641, and table 4 below. 
10 L. J x p. 624+641. Table 4 below. This table shows the exact days that Manchester, North, 
Maynard, Dacres and Berkeley attended. 
" L. J x p. 636-7 648. 
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therefore important to note the effect the purge had upon the Lords, but two important 
questions remains. How much force did the Army use against the peers upon the 6 th and 7h of 
Decerqber and did the Army continue to restrict the membership of the Lords throughout 
January and February? 
have found no evidence to support the view that the Lords were physically denied entry into 
the House. It is clear that the Anny surrounded the streets adjacent to both Houses and certain 
threats were made to members of Parliament and it appears that certain Lords were 
encouraged not to attend their chamber. 12 This mirrors the treatment the Commons received in 
the early hours of Wednesday morning. 13 But one significant difference remains: if the Lords 
did not bow to pressure and decided to enter the chamber, there was not another group of 
soldiers acting as a back up with a list of names for those who were, under no circumstances, 
allowed to enter the House. 14 The newspapers which covered the purges in great detail, make 
no reference to the purging of the upper chamber. 15 Also, all the Presbyterian literature and 
the correspondence of some of the peers, attack the purge as an assault upon the liberties of 
12 BM Add Mss 37,344. f. 258. 
13 BM Add Mss 37,344 E233. 
14 See Chapter 2 above. 
15 Mercurius Elencticus, E. 476 (4) Tuesday 5 th December -Tuesday 12 th December 1648, 
p. 527; Mercurius Imparticalis, T. T. E. 476(3) Tuesday 5"' December - Tuesday 12 Ih December 
1649, p. 3 (Although this source does not provide a great deal of detail upon the purge it is 
clear that the editor is referring to a purge of the lowýr chamber by his references to Prynne); 
A Perfect Diurnal, E. 526 (40) Monday 4 th December - Mon I lth December 1648, p. 2552, The 
Perfect Weekly Account, T. T. E. 476 (15) Wednesday 6th December - Wed 13 th December 
1648, p. 306; A Declaration Collected Out of the Journals of Both Houses, T. T. E. 476 (17), 
Wednesday 6 th December - Wednesday 13th December 1648, p. 1 1; It is clear from Whitelock's 
account that the Lords were being kept in the dark but they were not subjected to a purge. See 
BM Add Mss, 37,344 f. 233; Also Alvise Contarini to Michael Morosisni C. S. P. V 1649 p. 83. 
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parliament but made no reference to the seclusion of the peers. 16 More importantly, the 
Inoderate peers who complained about the alteration of the constitution did not attack the 
Army for secluding them from the chamber. 
As mentioned earlier, the Army kept a strict eye upon the membership of the Commons 17 but 
the same policy was not adopted for the Lords. After the 12 th of December, attendance did 
decrease, but there is no evidence that this was a result of Army influence. 18 The Lords who 
failed to attend may have become disillusioned with their function within the legislative 
process; upon the 6 th and 7 th of December they had hardly attended to any business. 19 It is 
very likely that a number of peers objected to the Army's role in the political process and 
withdrew in protest. This certainly appears to be the case for the fourth Earl of Wharton who 
within a month of the Restoration wrote; 
"When the Army first invaded the House of Commons, in order to his death I declared against 
that horrid act and never came into the House after. , 20 
16 Parliament Under the Power of the Sword, T. T 669 f. 13,7 th December 1648; A True and 
Full Relation of the army's forcible seizing of Eminent Members T. T. E 476 (5); Sir Thomas 
Dacres and Mr Doddridge to the Speaker, Cary Memorials of the Civil Wars (2 vols) ii p. 74- 
75; Rushworth Historical Collections vii p. 1355; The Second Part of the Narrative 
Concerning the Armies Force and violence on the Secluded Members, T. T. E. 477 (19), 23rd 
December 1648; A Vindication of the Imprisoned and Secluded Members, T. T E. 539 (5) 20 th 
January 1649; Clarendon Histojy iv p. 512; George Booth to the Inhabitants of Chesire Clarke 
Papers ii p. 136; A Public Declaration and Protestation of the Secured and Secluded Members 
of the Commons, C. S. P. D p. 6-9,13 th January 1649; For the Lords see, A Declaration of the 
Peerage C. S. P. D 1649-50 p. 2-6. 17 See Chapter 2. 
18 Contrast L. J x p. 624 with L. J x p. 626-7. 
19 L. J x p. 624-625; The Moderate IntelligenCer E. 476 (24), Thursday December 7 1h - Thursday 14 th December 1648, p. 1778 (corr pag). 
20 The Moderate Intelligencer cited n. 19 above. This quote is found in Trevallyn-Jones 'Saw 
Pit Wharton', p. 129.1 have tended to avoid retrospective statements taken at the time of the 
Restoration following the method used a number of years ago by Mark Kishlansky, The New 
Lpassim; I am satisfi _Model Army ied with this quotation 
because it is corroborated by evidence 
found in the Journals of the House of Lords and by contemporary sources. See note 19 above. 
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The clearest indication that force was not used to keep peers away can be shown with the 
return of so many Lords upon the day of the vote for erecting a High Court of Justice to try 
the King. 2 1 Had the Army been concerned with the membership of the Lords they would have 
refused the moderates entry. 22 
The purging of the House of Commons did have an effect upon the numbers of peers 
attending the Lords but the latter were not physically prevented from attending the chamber. 
This reduction in membership was due to a combination of fear, 23 a sense of redundancy 
precipitated by the Army's involvement in the political process and disgust with the manner 
in which parliamentary politics was now dominated by the Army. 24 
The Role of the Lords in the Legislative Process. 
On the 6 th of December, seven Lords attended the chamber. Although their numbers had 
reduced, the influential Manchester remained as Speaker. 25 The Lords attended to very little 
business spending most of their time attempting to discern the aims of the Army and, when 
this was not forthcoming, they adjourned without censoring the Army in any way. 26 The 
21L. J x p. 641; Walker Independengy Part ii p. 55. 
22 The Army kept a very close eye upon the Commons in the days following Pride's initial 
purge. See Chapter 2 above. 
23 This certainly happened to members of the Commons. See Walker, Independengy ii p. 46. 
24 Clarendon HistoEy iv p. 520; The Moderate Intelligencer cited above n. 19. The newspaper 
states that the Lords "thought not fit to act until the Commons House was free" 
25 LJ x p. 624; BM Harley Mss 7001 fol 10; Declaration Collected Out of the Journals of Both 
Houses T. T E. 477 (7) Wednesday 13 th _ Wednesday 20th December, p. 19 (This editor 
referred to Denbigh as the temporary Speaker but it is not supported by the evidence in the 
Journals. ) 
26 L. J x p. 625; BM ADD Mss 37,344 f. 233. 
121 
following day eight Lords attended the chamber which included Manchester acting as Speaker 
again and also the very influential Viscount Saye and Scle was present. 
27 The peers did not 
attend to any business apart from stating that they did not "think it fit to act until the 
CO OnS H Se Was f &928 . 
29 
mm ou re A motion to adjourn until the following Tuesday was passed 
This decision by the Lords to reject their legitimate role in the legislative process was not 
discussed by Dr Adamson but it would act as an important principle which explains why so 
niany Lords reftised to attend the chamber during December 1648. Manchester and Rutland 
would only return to reject the moves against the King. Wharton, and Saye and Sele did not 
attend a session again. 30 As mentioned above, the initial purge of the Commons had a 
dramatic effect upon the membership of the Lords and when this is combined with the 
decision taken upon the 7 th , it 
is possible to account for the low attendance figures for the 
remainder of December. lt also demonstrates the principles which governed the minds of 
many of the Presbyterian peers. Although they did not write vociferous pamphlets attacking 
the new regime -a device which was left to their secluded colleagues in the other House '31 it 
is clear that these peers did not wish to perform a legislative function until the restrictions 
upon the membership of the Commons had been lifted. 32 
27 Adamson, "The English Nobility and the Pro . ected Settlement of 1647" HJ 30 1987 p. 567- 
602. 
28 See n. 24 above. 
29 Uxp. 625. 
30 Manchester and Rutland returned upon the 2 nd L. J x p. 641; For the end of Wharton and 
Saye see L. J x p. 641-650; See Also Table 4 below and Trevallyn Jones Saw Pit Wharton 
p-128-137. 
31 The opposition to the new regime is discussed below. See Ward, 'The English Peerage', 
p. 14-16. 
32 The Moderate Intelligence , T. T E. 476 (24) Thursday December 7'h - Thursday December 14 th 1649, p. 1778 (corr pag). 
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For one newspaper editor, the decision to adjourn marked the end of the Lords as a credible 
part.. of the legislature 33 and from this moment on the Lords would face taunts about their 
diminutive attendance record 34 . The low average attendance was also an issue of concern for 
the handful of Lords who remained in the chamber which explains the decision to issue orders 
for all Lords within the vicinity of London to attend the chamber. 35 But despite these rumours, 
between the 12 th of December and the 2 nd of January, under the leadership of Denbigh the 
handftil of Lords who sat in the Chamber continued to perform a legislative function. It is also 
clear that they were willing to support some radical legislation. Upon the 14 th of December 
the Lords (Denbigh, Pembroke and Grey) supported motions sent to them by the Commons 
which destroyed the principles underlying the Newport negotiations. 36 Two days later the 
Lords supported the revocation of the militia Ordinance. The journals of both Houses suggest 
that there was little animosity between the two HouseS37 and it provides some support for Dr 
Adamson's view that there was "nothing about the actions of either the Army or Commons in 
the month after the purge which suggest that they saw the Lords as being implacably opposed 
to bringing the king to trial"38 Moreover the evidence appears to support his view that the 
33 A Declaration Collected Out of the Journals of Both Houses T. T E. 476 (17) p. 1 1; The 
editor wrote: "The Lords sat very little and adjourned until Tuesday, Sic Transit Gloria 
Mundis" 
34 The Moderate T. T E 536 (2) Tuesday 19'h- Tuesday 26 th December, p. 216.; Clarendon 
Histo iv p. 519. 
35 L. J x p. 636-7 and p. 648, \ 
36 Underdown, Pride's Purge, p. 160 and sources listed; See also L. J x p. 632. 
37 C. J vi p. 95,96,97,98,99,101,102,104,106; L. J x p. 627,631,632,633,635; Rushworth 
Historical Collections vii p. 1362. 
38 Adamson, 'The Peerage in Politics' p. 267 
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peers were willing to support the trial of the King provided that the result was deposition 
rather than regicide. 
39 
Although it is possible to support the view that the remaining peers were willing to 
countenance the trial of the King, there existed limitations to their radicalism. As mentioned 
in the previous chapter, upon the 13 th of December the secluded members issued a pamphlet 
which attacked the purging of Parliament stating that the new Parliament did not possess the 
legitimacy to enact legislation . 
40 The Commons reacted swiftly to this asking the Lords to 
delay their adjournment so a joint declaration could be issued which condemned the 
Presbyterian actions. As was the norin the Lords agreed to the request and a statement was 
issued which proclaimed that any member wishing to attend either chamber would be 
compelled to disclaim the Presbyterian publication. 41 
Dr Adamson appears to suggest that this was a deliberate ploy, employed by the Earl of 
Denbigh to secure his pro-Army majority. However the evidence does not support this view. 
First, it is clear from the surviving evidence that the decision to issue a declaration against the 
Presbyterians originated in the Commons rather than the Lords. 42 It was not, therefore, a 
deliberate policy concocted by the Earl of Denbigh designed to ensure that he could control 
the upper chamber. Second, it is not clear why Dr Adamson highlights this one particular 
policy, since between the 12'h of December and the 2 nd of January the Lords supported 
39 'Ibid' p. 262 
40 A Solemn Protestation of the Imprisoned and Secluded Members T. T. 669 f 13 (53), 1 Vh 
December 1648. 
41A Declaration of Parliament T. T 669 f. 13(56), 15'h December 1648. 
42 C. J vi p. 97-98; L. J x p. 630-63 1. 
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practically all of the legislation sent to them. 43 Moreover, contemporary accounts do not make 
any distinction between the Lords' support for this piece of legislation and their approval of 
all the other bills. 44 Third, there is no evidence that this proclamation was used by either 
House as a means of restricting membership. In the House of Commons the test of dissent 
was used as the method of ensuring that a pro-Arn-iy majority was sustained. 45 But most 
importantly, the Earl of Denbigh wanted to increase the size of the chamber, not to place even 
more restrictions upon the membership. This explains his decision upon the 23rd of December 
to call upon over twenty- five peers to attend the chamber. 46 These peers were not all radicals. 
They included Middlesex, who only a few days earlier had discovered his name in the press 
for fighting a group of troopers in the name of the King. 47 Former moderates including 
Hunsdon and Suffolk were invited to attend, men who had been identified as moderates as far 
48 back as 1647. The list also included Manchester, Saye and Sele and Wharton whose 
conspicuous absence since the 7th of December demonstrated their dislike of the purge. 49 if 
43 See note 43 above. Also The Moderate Intelligence T. T E. 477 (14) Thursday 14 th_ 
Thursday 21't January p. 1788; The Perfect Weekly Account T. T. E. 536 (10) Wednesday 
December 20th _ Wednesday December 27 th 1648, p. 322; The Kingdomes Weekly 
Intelligencer, T. T. E 536(5) Tuesday December I 9th - Tuesday December 26 th p. 1196. The 
Moderate T. T E. 536(2) Tuesday December 19th- Tuesday December 20h, p. 215-16; The 
Perfect Weekly Account, T. T. E. 536 (37), Wednesday 27 th December- Wednesday P 
January, p. 325. 
44 All the sources listed in n. 43 above. Rushworth Historical Collections vii p. 1363 1365. 
45 Rushworth Historical Collections vii p. 1366. 
46 L. J x p. 636-7; Perfect Occurences T. T. E. 52.7(3) Friday December 29- Friday January 5h 
p. 782.1 
47 The Joint Resolution and Declaration of the Parliament and the Council the Army for 
taking away the King and the Lords, T. T. E. 538 (1), 11 th January 1649 p. 1; Adamson, 'The 
Peerage in Politics' p. 265-6. Wedgwood, The Trial of Charles 1 (1964), p. 52. 
48 Adamson, "The English Nobility and the Projected Settlement of 1647", HJ xxx 1987 
p. 567-602. 
49 Manchester's role on the 2 nd January is discussed below. Adamson, 'The Peerage in 
Politics', p. 268-70; Wedgwood, The Trial p. 84-5; C. H. Firth, The House of Lords During the 
Civil War p. 207. 
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penbigh had been so content upon retaining a chamber full of radicals he would not have 
allowed these peers to return. Finally and most importantly, the contents of the Declaration 
were pot used as a means of preventing the return of the moderate peers, illustrated by those 
who precipitated the rejection of the moves against the King. 
50 
J)r Adamson was at pains to point out that Denbigh also enjoyed the support of the Army, but 
if this relationship was as close as he claimed, bearing in mind that Denbigh was attempting 
to manage the House of Lords, it is surprising that the Army was not evident upon the day of 
51 the vote to promote the trial of the King. 
Upon the 2 nd of January two bills arrived in the Lords: the first proclaimed that it was treason 
for a King to levy war against Parliament, and the second was a bill for the erection of a High 
Court of Justice. 52 The bills were presented, in a background of. cordiality between the two 
Houses. 53 Dr Adamson claims that the bills were rejected because of the unexpected return of 
50 L. J x p. 641-2; The Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer T. T E. 537 (3) Tuesday January 3rd - 
Tuesday 9th January, p. 1209. 
51 This has never been disputed by Historians but it is worth pointing out that Nedham, as 
editor of Mercurius Pragmaticus was always attempting to show that the legislature was under 
the control of the Army. He never suggests that the Army restricted the membership of the 
Lords. See Mercurius Pragmaticus, T. T. E. 537 (20), Tuesday December 26 th - Tuesday 
January 9h 1648/9- although obviously biased this is the most detailed contemporary account 
of the debate that took place upon the 2 nd January. 
52 Adamson, 'The Peerage in Politics', p. 268-9. Firth, The House of Lords p. 207-8. 
Although this is a detailed account of the debate there is too much reliance upon Royalist 
writings where there was a natural tendency to exaggerate the scale of the opposition to the 
trial. The same is true of Veronnica Wedgwood's account The Trial, p. 84-5; For 
contemporary accounts see Mercurius Pragmaticus, T. T E. 537 (20) Tuesday December 26 th 
Tuesday January 9th 1648/9; HMCR De L'Isle and Dudley Manuscripts 77 (vol 3) p. 583; 
Walker, Independengy Part 2 p. 55-6; Clarendon Histo[y iv, p. 520; Rushworth Historical 
Collections vii p. 13 82; Whitelock Memorials ii p. 487-8. 
53 Adamson, 'The Peerage in Politics', p. 267. I accept that cordial relations were maintained 
at this stage but that was due to the fact that the Lords had acquiesced with all of the 
legislation sent to them. Examples of this can be found in n. 37 above.; Perfect Occurrences 
T. T E. 526 (42), Friday December 15 th - Friday December 22 nd , p. 768; T. T E. 536 (10), Wednesday December; BM Add MSS 37,344 E237. 
126 
a number of moderate peers. Denbigh saw that his pro-Army majority was under threat so he 
attempted to delay the vote to give him time to mobilise his supporters. This was not agreed 
to, a. nd the two bills were rejected. Dr Adamson suggests that Denbigh had been thwarted by 
Manchester's tactics but this did not represent Denbigh's reluctance to countenance the trial 
of the King. 
54 
It is possible to provide a different explanation. Although the peers who sat in the chamber 
after 12 th of December did support some of the radical legislation sent to them by the 
55 Commons, it is important to note that the peers did not initiate any of this legislation. This 
suggests that there may have been limits to their radicalism. Four other issues require 
comment. First, an acknowledgement that the Newport negotiations were misguided is not 
synonymous with support for the trial of the monarch. Denbigh and the other so-called 
radicals may have felt that a trial was not an appropriate course of action. There is certainly 
more evidence to support this traditional view, which is clearly expressed in one newspaper 
which states that "their Lordships laid aside the ordinance for the trail of the King and 
adjourned their House for a week. 9ý56 Second, there were signs that in the weeks leading up to 
the 2 nd of January vote, the Lords were starting to question the direction of policy illustrated 
54 Adamson, 'The Peerage in Politics', p. 270-1., 
55 See note 37 above for the listings in the Journals and supporting evidence can be found in 
the sources listed in note 53 above. Also The Kingdomes Weekly Intelligence T. T. E 536(5) 
Tue Dec 1 9th - Tue Dec 26 th 1648 p. 1196; The Moderate T. T. E. 536 (30) Tue Dec 26 th - Tue 
Jan 2 nd 1648/9 p 225. 
56 This is based upon the fact some of the Peers demonstrated their hostility to the trial again 
when they were asked to swear an oath supporting the Regicide. Second, the simple but 
obvious fact that the Lords rejected the Bill without a dissenting voice. See L. J x p. 641; I have 
not used the majority of the sources hostile to the Rump to fon-nulate this view as they had a 
vested interest in showing the unity that existed amongst the opposition. I do however feel 
that Clarendon's assertion that "not one person concurred with them" is important. Although 
Clarendon disliked the Rump, he was more scornful of the Presbyterians and he displayed no 
affection for the peers even when they rejected the Bill. He therefore had little reason to 
fabricate the story. For his opposition to the Presbyterians see Histoly iv p. 51 1 and for his 
account of the 2 nd January p. 520. Ronald Hutton, Charles 11 (Oxford 199 1), p. 4 1. 
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by their desire to hold a day of humiliation to remove'the "heavy judgements of God now 
upon this Kingdom". 57 Instead of supporting the trial Denbigh refused to act as one of the 
comMissioners to try the King, suggesting that far from being defeated by superior tactics 
Denbigh was ideologically opposed to the trial of the King. 58 His opposition to the trial would 
be demonstrated again when he refused to be associated with the regicide just before he 
joined the Council of State . 
59 Finally, there is no evidence that Denbigh wished to delay the 
reading of the two bills because of the return of so many of the moderates. A more plausible 
reason for his attempt to delay the proceedings was the fact that not enough Lords attended 
the chamber to make such an important decision. This explanation is consistent with his 
previous attempts to persuade more Lords to attend the chamber, and prior to this vote 
Denbigh had involved Black Roo in an attempt to fill the chamber. 60 Further, as Denbigh 
would make clear when he rejected the initial oath to sit upon the Council of State, he would 
not take an unilateral decision if it went against the votes and wishes of the majority of the 
members. 61 This evidence is more reliable than the single newspaper which reported upon 
theve of the debate that the Lords were in favour of the trial. This journalist may have paid 
too much attention to the apparent cordiality which existed between the two Houses or he 
may have been attempting to show the continuity between the aims of the Arrny and 
57 Lj x p. 632; The Commons did not agree to this request, see, The Moderate T. T E. 477 (4) 
Tue Dee 12'h- Tue Dec 19'h 1648 p. 212; The Perfect Weekly Account T. T E. 477 (13) Wed 
Dec 13 th - Wed Dec 20th 1648 p. 318. 
58 The evidence lfe-r, e is not straightforward. Denbigh was nominated as a Commissioner and 
as is well known he did not take up the offer. Historians have assumed that this was due to his 
own conviction and this view is supported in this thesis. It was also accepted by Adamson. 
But according to Rushworth's account the Lords were removed as Commissioners. Denbigh 
and the other peers were not afforded the opportunity to register their dissents. Adamson, 
'Peerage in Politics', p. 271. Rushworth vii Historical Collections, p. 1383. 
59 C. S. P. D 1649-50 p. 9; Worden, The Rump Parliament, p. 180-81; Ward, 'English Peerage, 
P. 19. 
60 L. J x P. 636-7. 
61 Denbigh's speech can be found in Firth, House of Lords , p. 222-223. 
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62 
Parliament. Although, it is unlikely that Denbigh said that he would rather be "tom to pieces 
563 than have any part in such an infamous business' , the evidence suggests that he was either 
reluctant to countenance the trial of the King or if he did support the trial, he was not willing 
to go against the majority view. It is also possible that Denbigh objected to the trial because 
there was no precedent to support such an act. 64 
Dr Adamson argues that it was Manchester's brilliance in the debate which persuaded 
Denbigh and others to reject service as commissioners in the trial of the King. Dr Adamson 
also suggests that Manchester persuaded the Lords to vote for an adjournment to prevent the 
realignment of the radical peerage and thus destroy the vote to reject the trial. Both 
suggestions are open to question.. The view that one speech could influence Denbigh is at 
variance with his depiction of the Earl as the intransigent radical attempting to supervise the 
chamber to suit his own agenda. Also Denbigh was Speaker that day and his eclipse at the 
hands of Manchester remains inexplicable. 65 Finally, rather than managing the House, an 
adjournment was consistent with Manchester's view that little good could come from the 
truncated House of Lords with a Commons which was under the almost complete control of 
the Army. It is unlikely that Manchester hoped that his actions "would force the Commons" to 
62 The source stating that the Lords supported the trial, Heads of a Dairie T. T E. 536 (34) Tue 
Dec 26- Tue Jan 2 1648/9 p. 38. 
63 Mercurius Pragramiticus T. T E. 537 (20) Tue Dec 26- Tue Jan 9. Nedham remained hostile 
to the Lords, but he did say that they all came out against the trial. The exception was Lord 
Grey who introduced the Bill and made a speech in "favour of it. " I am reluctant to accept 
Nedham's account wholesale since Grey would refuse to serve the new Commonwealth. 
Although he introduced the Bill it originated in the Commons, and the introduction of the Bill 
does not mean that he supported it. 
64 The Perfect Weekly Account T. T E. 537 (32) Wed Jan 3 rd Wed Jan I Oth 1649 p. 342; L. J x 
p. 641. 
65 Mercurius Pragmaticus T. T. E 537 (20) Tue Dec 26th- Tue Jan 9'h . This was accepted by Adamson "Peerage in Politics" p. 270. His depiction of Denbigh as the tactician is central to 
his thesis p. 257-279. 
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delay the trial. This was his farewell to revolutionary politics, the clearest expression of his 
contempt for the political situation which had existed since the first purge of Parliament. 66 
Traditional accounts of the build up to the trial regard the 2 nd of January as the effective end 
67 
of the Lords as a participant in the legislative process. Two very good reasons account for 
this view. Upon the 4h of January the Commons famously declared that they "being chosen 
by, and representing the people have supreme power in this nation"68 This simple statement 
embodied the omnipotence of the Commons making resurgence of the "dying" second 
chamber a futile exercise. Also, as Veronica Wedgwood rightly pointed out, many peers left 
London never to return to Westminster to sit in their chamber. But this view is too simple, and 
Dr Adamson has resurrected the role of the peers in the month after the 2 nd of January by 
suggesting that the eventual abolition of the Lords was not inevitable. What follows is a 
narrative of events which will incorporate, question and extend some of his findings. 69 
Uponthe 9th of January Denbigh, Salisbury, Mulgrave, Kent, Howard and Hunsdon attended 
the chamber and it appears that they immediately attempted to court favour with the 
66 1 cannot accept Dr Adamson's view that this was deliberate "brinkmanship upon the part of 
Manchester to force the Commons to delay the trial. " Adamson suggests that this was based 
upon "an over-confident but not ill-founded belief in the Commons respect for the authority 
of the House. " Manchester was registering his dislike of the proceedings against the king and 
this episode demonstrates his contempt for the Army and the purged house. My explanation is 
consistent with his, attitude from the first day of the purge. Adamson 'Peerage in Politics' 
p. 274-5. 
67 Underdown, Pride's Purge p. 173-207. 
68 lbid p. 143; C. J vi p. 110. 
69 Wedgwood, Trial, p. 85; Trevallyn Jones, Sa, %v Pit Wharton p. 130. Adamson, 'Peerage in 
Politics', P. 258-279. 
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Commons . 
70 They passed some outstanding bills, and more importantly they considered the 
following ordinance which included this preamble: 
"That... whatsoever King of England shall hereafter levy war against Parliament and the 
kingdom of England shall be guilty of high treason and be tried in Parliament. ýv7 1 
This was both a revolutionary and conciliatory step. Had this been passed it could have 
provided the basis for a settlement with Charles which would have allowed him to live, and 
yet would have been subjected to the same sanction as his evil councillors had been in the 
first years of the Long Parliament. This was far more radical than the projected settlement 
negotiated between September and December 1648.72 But in the circumstances it was 
obviously a far less dramatic course of action than the trial and execution of the King. It may 
have answered some of the reservations outlined during the debate upon the trial of the King, 
considering that one account claimed the Lords could not sanction the trial due to the absence 
of a firm precedent. It is also possible that this was designed to placate the Commons and 
bring the Lords back into the legislative process. It was widely rumoured that some radical 
MPs favoured outright dissolution. 73 
At a number of points in this thesis, I have pointed to the limitations of the available evidence, 
and this problem is perhaps most pronounced at this juncture. It is impossible to state 
categorically the reasons behind this initiative to alter the treason laws. 74 Although one 
70 L. J x p. 643-5. 
71 Ibid. 
72 For the Newport negotiations See Underdown, Pride's Purge , p. 106-42; Hirst, England 
in 
Conflic p. 252-3; Worden, Rump, p. 15,164,247. Gentles, New Model Army, p. 270. 
73 Mercurius Pragmaticus T. T E. 537 (20) Tuesday December 26 th - Tuesday January 9"'. 
Nedham stated that some members of the Commons wanted to place a "padlock on the Lords 
House; " Adamson, 'Peerage in Politics', p. 273. 
74 The problems with the source material for the entire period is discusses in Chapter 5. See 
Worden, Rump p. 398-404;. 
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newspaper reported that "Lords made progress" with the treason laws 75 it is clear that after the 
9" January this issue was not considered again. 76 On the 10'h only three peers attended the 
chamber (Denbigh, Pembroke and Howard) and a couple of writs were issued, but discussion 
about the future constitution was left in abeyance. The same scenario continued until the 18'h 
January. Politics in the Lords consisted of small attendance figures and an aversion to taking 
difficult decisions. 77 It is difficult to state the reasons for this failure to consider the 
constitution, considering that an initiative was taken upon the 9th January. But it is possible, as 
one contemporary observed, that the Lords had deliberately avoided offending the Commons 
by broaching constitutional issues. They had considered issuing a declaration explaining their 
reasons for not moving against the King but this was rejected, in all probability, because they 
did not wish to offend the Commons. 78 Although the Commons had kept certain channels of 
communication open and the committees of both Houses continued to function, 79 the 
Commons had passed over some of the writs sent to them. Moreover three important points 
should be stressed. First, the majority of available evidence suggests that the House of Lords 
was a redundant chamber. Second although the Lords were allowed to sit upon committees 
they tended to refrain from attending. Finally, the Commons had made provision for 
committees to function without the peers demonstrating their tacit approval of the superiority 
of the Commons. 80 
75 The Kingdomes Weekly Intelligence T. T E. 538 (17) Tue 9th Jan- Tue 9th Jan 1649 
p. 122 1. 
76 L. J x p. 642-9; 
77 Ibid. BM ADD Mss 37,344 fal 243. 
78 Perfect Occurences T. T E. 527(8) Fridayl2'h Jan- Friday 19'h Jan 1649 p. 799. 
79 State Papers 23/5 fol. 48. State Papers 28/66 fol. 461. BM ADD Mss 35,322 fol 117. 
so For the Lords not taking the opportunity to sit upon committees see BM ADD Mss 35,322 
fols 118,119,120,121,122,130; Also HMCR De Lisle and Dudley Manuscripts (vol iv) 
p. 578; BM ADD Mss 37,344 fol. 243- Whitelock stated that the Lords considered See over 
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on the 18 th January, having behaved impeccably in the preceding week, 81 the peers tentatively 
appro. ached an issue relating to the constitution. The five peers (Denbigh, Kent, Pembroke and 
Grey and Howard) asked for the concurrence of the Commons to adjourn until the following 
term. 82 The Commons considered the request and then politely reminded the Lords of the 4'h 
of January vote and rejected the request. 83 After this the Lords reverted to their more 
accustomed role of avoiding constitutional issues which might cause offence to the 
Commons. 84 
The evidence presented above does provide some support for Dr Adamson's findings. It is 
clear that the 2 nd January vote did not result in the absolute end of the Lords as a legislative 
body, 85 but it is also apparent that the Lords, by and large, refrained from indulging in high 
politics. The attitude of the Commons towards the Lords will be discussed later in this 
chapter, 86 but it is worth considering the role of the Lords in the week before the dissolution. 87 
(see n. p. 133 declaration to explain why they rejected the Bill for the creation of the High 
Court of Justice but they decided against it. This may have been because they did not wish to 
antagonise the Commons; Rushworth Historical Collections vii p. 13 87; The Perfect Weekly 
Account T. T. E. 538 (20) Wed IOh Jan- Wed 17 th Jan 1648/9 p. 349; For depictions of the 
Lords as a redundant chamber see the list above. Also Perfect Diumall Monday Jan 8h 1649 
T. T. E. 527 (16) p. 2238; Perfect Occurances E. 527 (17) Friday Feb 2 nd - Friday Feb 9th 1649 
p. 818; The Moderate T. T E. 538 (15) Tue Jan 9th Tue Jan 16 th 1649 p. 250. For the Commons 
attitude to the Lords See C. J vi p. 12 1. 
81 L. J x p. 643-7. 
82 Ibid p. 646. 
83 C. J A p. 12 1; The Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer T. T. E, 539(6) Tue 16 th Jan- Tue 23 rd 
Jan 1649 p. 1288. 
84 L. J x p. 646-8. 
85 Although it will be clear that I do not believe that the Lords were performing an important 
legislative function, Adamson's account of the final days of the Lords is more substantive 
than the detail found in C. H. Firth. See Adamson 'Peerage in Politics' p. 275-287. Firth 
House of Lords p. 210-221. 
86 See the Conclusion to this chapter. 
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on the 28'h January Denbigh spent the day with the Ambassadors of the States General and 
receiYed a letter from the Government asking for an audience with the Lords. 88 The 
Ambassadors had been instructed to mediate in behalf of the King in an attempt to preserve 
Charles's power, and if this was not possible to spare his life. This was not the first time 
foreign nations had made a direct appeal to the Lords, and Denbigh took the matter 
scriously. 89 The following day, instead of reading the letter to their fellow peers, the 
Ambassadors were invited to speak directly to the Lords. Although the Lords had played little 
formal part in the political process since the 2 nd of January, they adhered to the normal 
protocol that befitted a state occasion. As the master of ceremonies greeted the guests in the 
splendour of one of the great chambers of power, the Ambassadors delivered their message to 
six peers. 9() The contents of the plea from the State's General included a desire for close 
relations to be kept between the two nations and a plea that the King would be restored to his 
legitimate role as Head of the Govenu-nent; appreciating that this was an unlikely scenario 
they asked if the person of the King could be preserved without an alteration to the 
Government. 91 This may have been a reference to either maintaining Charles as the symbolic 
Head of State or transferring the crown to the Duke of Gloucester. 92 The Lords listened 
87 Adamson 'Peerage in Politics' p. 275-287. 
88 Lj x p. 647. 
89 BM Harley Mss 7001 fol. 2 10. 
90 L. J x p. 647; Summary of a relation made by the Ambassador Pau in the States General 6PV 1649 p. 90. 
91 HMCR De L'Isle and Dudley Manuscripts 77 Vol 1V p. 582. 
92 There is no direct evidence for this but the ambassadors stated that if it was not possible for 
Charles to remain as King, they hoped that there would be no harm done to his person and 
that there would be no alteration of the Government. The Duke of Gloucester was mentioned 
in some quarters but not specifically by the Ambassadors. 
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politely but, of course, there was little they could do. The messages were passed on to the 
Commons but they were not dealt with until after the regicide. 93 
The 29th also saw another attempt by the Lords to secure a greater number of representatives 
in the chamber and again this met with no success. 94 On the day of the regicide only five 
Lords (Denbigh, Pembroke, Mulgrave, Kent and Grey)95 attended the chamber. The peers 
registered no protest to the execution but they did attempt to deliver a projected settlement 
which would have provided the Lords with a role in the legislature. To demonstrate their 
importance all judges were summoned to the chamber the following Thursday. More 
importantly a message was sent to the Commons proposing that ten peers and a proportionate 
number of MPs should meet to discuss the future constitution. It is clear the Lords still 
envisaged playing a role in the Government after the execution of the King. 96 
In keeping with their persistent desire to adhere to the 4 th January vote the Commons refused 
to consider the messages from the Lords in the traditional fashion. 97 But this request did 
precipitate a debate in the Commons upon the future role of the Lords which culminated in 
the decision to abolish the Chamber. 98 
93 C. J vi p. 13 0, f3"4. 
94 L. J x p. 648. 
95 Ibid; Ward, 'English Peerage' p. 14. 
96 L. J x p. 649; Adamson 'Peerage in Politics' p. 279; The Perfect Weekly Account T. T. E. 541 
3 1ý' Jan- 7 th Feb 1649 p. 376; The Moderate Intelligencer T. T. E 541 (27) Thur Is'Feb- Thur 
8'h Feb 1649 p. 1875. The Moderate T. T. E. 541 (15) Tue 30th Jan-Tue 6 th Feb1649. 
97 C. J vi p. 130. The Perfect Weekly Account T. T. E 5413 I't Jan- 7 th Feb 1649 p. 376. 
98 The debates can be found in C. j vi p. 131-2. 
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Dr Adamson has shown that the formal abolition of the Lords was not inevitable from the 
moment that the debate started. He is not the only historian to have demonstrated that a 
number of MPs favoured the retention of the Lords in some capacity 99 the most famous being 
Oliver Cromwell. 100 When the final vote was taken twenty-nine MPs objected to outright 
abolition. 101 But the most significant contribution made by Dr Adamson rests with his view 
that outright abolition arose due to circumstance rather that ideology. He suggests that the 
Lords were not facing abolition until the 5h February. On the 5th two events occurred which 
persuaded MPs to vote for abolition. First, the text of the King's speech was in circulation on 
the streets of London and the originator of this had been one of the peers. Second, also on the 
5 th ,a Royalist publication proclaimed 
Charles 11 King, nominating the Lords as the legitimate 
government. 102 
This view is very tenable, but it must be remembered that the debate centred upon whether the 
Lords should enjoy any role in the future constitution; it was not concerned with providing the 
Lords with an equal share in the Government. 103 It was clear to contemporaries that the 
Commons were willing to proceed without the Lords 104 , the issue was whether the Lords 
99 Adamson 'The Peerage in Politics' p. 282-6. 
100 This was discussed in Chapter I where it was argued that Cromwell favoured the retention 
of the Lords for pragmatic political reasons rather than an attachment to political forms. 
101 Cj vi p. 132. We know the names of three mps who supported the retention of the Lords. 
Purefay and Sydenham acted as tellers; Cromwell's utterances in support of the Lords are 
well known. See Abbott vol 3 p. 10; Adamson 'Peerage in Politics' p. 277. 
102 Adamson 'Peerage in Politics' p. 284. 
103 Cj vi p. 32; The Moderate T. T. E. 542 (11) Tue 6 th Feb- Tue 13 th Feb 1649 p. 298; The 
Armies Modest Intelligence T. T. E. 541 (28) Thur I" Feb- Thur 8 th Feb 1649 p. 10; Whitelock 
Memorials ii p. 521; HMCR MSS of the Marquis of Ormond Vol 2 Matthew Rowe to 
William Cadogan p. 87; BM Add MSS 37,344 fol. 255-6; CF Adamson 'Peerage in Politics' p. 
282-4. 
104 Perfect Diumall T. T E. 527 (16) Mon 8 th Jan - Mon 15 th Jan 1649 p. 2238. 
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should be able to offer "advice in the exercise of legislative power. "105 Although the Lords 
may have believed that they could secure an equal share in Government this was nothing 
niore. -that wishful 
thinking and there is little evidence to support Dr Adamson's view that the 
Lords insisted upon parity in Government - they were not in a position to make such a bold 
request. 106 The two events of the 5th may have altered the perspective of some MPs, 
persuading them to support outright abolition but it is inconceivable to imagine that these two 
circumstances shifted opinion from support for full constitutional status to outright abolition. 
Moreover, it is clear, from the 4 th of January onwards, illustrated by the reftisal of the 
Commons to engage in debate with the Lords, that the commoners believed that they were 
omnipotent in the legislative process. 107 
The formal abolition of the Lords did not prevent peers from serving in the House of 
Commons provided that they stood for election. 108 The peers were also allowed to sit upon the 
Council of State. Recent accounts have shown that this was another example of the 
moderation of some of the MPs. 109 This is certainly true, but the event also illustrates the 
desire amongst the MPs to secure the services of as many people as possible provided that 
105 This is patently clear in the Journals of the House of Commons. The question was put that 
the House shall take "the advice" of the Lords in the exercise of legislative powers. Cj vi 
p. 132. 
106 The source that suggests that the lords expected to keep full powers is HMCR De L'Isle 
and Dudley Manuscripts 77 vol. iv p. 583. The source does not, however, state that the Lords 
had good reason to believe they would achieve equal status. I cannot accept Dr Adamson's 
view that the Peers insisted upon equal status. It is certainly not mentioned in the source cited 
above. CF Adamson 'Peerage in Politics' p. 286. 
107 The Kingdomes Weekly Intelligence T. T. E. 538 (17) Tue 9th Jan - Tue 16 th Jan 1649 
p. 1218; The Kingdomcs Weekly Intelligencer T. T. E.. 539 (6) Tue 16th Jan- Tue 23 rd Jan 1649 
p. 1228; The Moderate T. T E. 538 (15) Tue 9th Jan- Tue 16 th Jan 1649 p. 250; BM ADD Mss 
37,344 fol. 243,246. 
108 Worden Rump p. 73. 
109 Worden Rump p. 61-73, p. 192-3. 
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they showed a retrospective support for the revolution. 'The same principle seen in the last 
chapter with regard to the conformist MPs was adhered to with the Lords who agreed to sit 
upon the Council. 110 An oath would have had to have been taken to demonstrate their 
acquiescence with the events which culminated in regicide. "' 
Five Lords (Denbigh, Pembroke, Mulgrave, Grey of Warke and Salisbury) were nominated to 
the Council of State. In keeping with tradition, the Lords, with one exception, appeared at the 
top of the list. For Denbigh and Warke there was no controversy surrounding their 
nomination. The same was not true for Pembroke and Salisbury. Twenty five MPs registered 
their protest against Pembroke's candidature but fortunately, for the Earl, double that number 
supported him. 112 It was far closer for Salisbury, as his nomination was only secured by three 
votes. 11 3 It appears likely that Salisbury was not initially considered as a potential candidate. 
His name appears towards the end of the list. This was not in keeping with either the format 
for the election of the other peers, or with the procedure followed when the Lords were 
appointed as commissioners for the trial of the King. He may have been a last minute 
replacement to prevent the election of Hanison and Marten. ' 14 
The decision to allow the Lords to sit upon. the Council raises two important questions 
concerning the, nature of the English Revolution. First, does the presence of the peers 
110 See Chapter 2 Below. 
111 See n. 111 Above Also C. S. P. D 1649-50 p. 6-8; Worden Rump p. 180. 
112 Cj vi p. 140-142; Miles Corbet and William Heveningharn supported Pembroke's 
candidature. It was opposed by Michael Liversey and Henry Martin. The vote was 50-25 in 
Pembroke's favour. 
113 Ibid- Sir William Brereton and Lord Lysle supported Salisbury. Lord Munson and Henry 
Martin opposed his candidature. The vote was 23-20 in Salisbury's favour. 
114 Ibid. There was no division over the rejection of Harrison and Martin. Worden Rump 
P. 180-18 1. 
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demonstrate the desire upon the part of the Commons to limit the revolution? By allowing the 
peers to return it was less likely that social revolution would follow the execution of the King. 
Second, the decision upon the part of the peers themselves to participate in the new executive 
raises questions that lie at the heart of the current historiography. Were they joining a 
bandwagon, caught up in the exciting times of revolutionary England but would later 
demonstrate their moderation by rejecting radical reform? Conversely were the Lords 
accepting office so they could limit the revolution from a position of principled conservatism? 
Finally it is possible that the decision to sit upon the Council provides some support for Dr 
Adamson's view that the peers possessed certain radical credentials. ' 15 
It is important to emphasise that the abolition of the Lords was, in itself, a revolutionary step. 
It was part of a process which shattered the traditional trinity that had governed England for 
generations. Upon the 5 th of December 1648 the Commons supported a settlement with the 
King but within a very short period of time the King was dead, monarchy abolished, 
executive power vested in a Council of State, and the second chamber discarded because it 
was "useless and dangerous. "' 16 Although the background to these acts and ordinance require 
scrutiny, 
_ 
this should not eclipse the fact that the Lords was abolished - the presence of five 
peers sitting on the Council of State did not compensate for the loss of their chamber. ' 17 
There is no doubt that the inclusion of some of the peers at the expense of Marten and 
Harrison demonstrates the social conservatism of the majority of the members of the 
115 The historiography of the parliamentary politics in this period is still dominated by David 
Underdown and Blair Worden. See David Smith Stuart Parliaments n. 104 p. 220. Their views 
can be found in the introduction above p. Sean Kelsey work deals with the evolution of the 
Rump once it had been established. 
116 C. J vi p. 132. 
117 This is the value of Sean Kelsey's work allowing the Rump to speak for itself. Inventing a 
Republic p. 1-2. This will be discussed in the conclusion to this thesis. 
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Commons. It supports Blair Worden's argument that the'conservative nature of many of the 
N4Ps prevented the implementation of a wide programme of political and religious reform. 118 
Ilowqvcr, it may be wrong to explain the decision to allow the peers to return solely upon the 
grounds of the conservatism of the members of the Commons. 
It is possible that the peers were asked to sit upon the Council for pragmatic reasons. 
Cromwell objected to the destruction of the chamber upon the grounds that this would unite 
the entire peerage against the new regime. As I mentioned in the first chapter of the thesis, 
Cromwell's objection to the abolition was, in part, based upon the fact that it coincided with 
outbursts of hostility to the new regime from a wide cross-section of opinion. ' 19 It was not 
just the situation within England that caused concern for the MPs. Before the regicide a 
declaration from France warned the purged Parliament of retribution, should they take the 
ultimate sanction against the King. 120 As Professor Hutton remarked, "in an age when most 
European states were monarchies, it was a reasonable expectation that the unprecedented act 
of formal regicide would produce widespread revulsion and general sympathy for the exiled 
heir. " The problem for the new regime was compounded by the fact that Charles 11 launched a 
diplomatic offensive which spanned thirteen nations in an attempt to secure the support of his 
fellow monarchs against the new regime. 121 Itwas already clear from the activities of the 
Dutch Ambassadors that foreign states regarded the House of Lords as an important 
118 Worden Rump p. 33-73. 
119 See Above Chapter 1. 
120 The Declaration of his most Christian Majesty the King of France and Navarre against the 
most horrid proceedings of a rebellion part of Parliament. Thomas Carte A Collection of 
Original Letters and Papers... 1641-1660. Found Among the Duke of Ormond's Papers (2 
vols, A Millar ed 173 9) ii p. 195-7; C. V Wedgwood "European Reaction to the death of 
Charles V in C. H Carter (ed) From the Renaissance to the counter-Reformation. Essays in 
Honour of Garrett Mattingly (1966); Worden &W p. 163-4; Wedgwood Trial p. 15 1; The 
problems facing the Rump will be developed in the conclusion of this thesis. 
121 Hutton Charles 11, p. 34-35. 
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component in the legislature. 122 One of the roles of the Council of State was to cultivate 
relationships with foreign powers and it may not be a coincidence that this job was given to 
the ýarl of Denbigh. 123 If these potential difficulties are added to the problems within the 
British archipelago, 124 it is hardly surprising that a gesture was made to the peerage designed 
to placate some of them in the aftermath of the revolution. 
The whole question of the conservatism of the members is undermined by the fact that the 
Commons actually conceded very little in allowing the Lords to return to sit upon the Council. 
Although the Lords rejected the initial oath which provided direct support for the regicide, the 
oath that was finally subscribed to was an unequivocal acceptance of the Rump as the de facto 
government which was accompanied by a promise to "live and die" for the new regime. 125 In 
light of the difficulties surrounding the new Government, which prompted the attempt to 
widen its support base, concessions over retrospective support for the regicide were hardly of 
vital importance. As mentioned earlier, the important prerequisite for the Commons was 
commitment to government without the King. The first four clauses in the Council's 
statement of responsibilities concerned the preservation of the Republic. 126 
122 BM Harley Mss 7001 fol 2 10. 
123 C. S. P. D 1649-1650 p. 6 (clause 6), p. 37 for Denbigh dealing with foreign alliances 
C. S. P. D p. 37. 
124 Worden Rump p. 163-70. 
125 This is quoted quite accurately by C. H Firth House of Lords 
rd 
p. 222 The Kingdomes 
Faithful and Impartial Scout T. T. E. 545 (6) Fri 16th Feb- Fri 23 Feb 1649 p. 28. The Perfect 
Weekly Account T. T. E. 546 (20) Wed 28ýh Feb- Wed 7h March 1649 p. 410; I do not agree 
with Dr Ward that this was a significant climbdown 'English Peerage' p. 9. 
126 C. S. P. D 1649-1650 p. 6 
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Another important consideration rests with the fact that the Lords whom were invited to sit 
upon the council were not chosen on an entirely ad hoc basis, designed solely to placate the 
English aristocracy. Denbigh and Pembroke had shown their hostility to the Newport 
negotiations by supporting the moves that destroyed the framework upon which the treaty was 
based. 127 Both peers had attended the chamber in the weeks after the 2 nd of January vote and 
they had hinted that they would serve the new regime. 128 Mulgrave too was a regular attender 
of the chamber, and significantly he broke the solidarity agreed by those Peers who had 
attended upon the 7 th and then vowed that they would not attend the chamber until the 
restrictions upon the membership of the Commons had been lifted. 129 Lord Grey's actions are 
more obscure. He was present upon a number of occasions before the l't of January. He 
introduced the bill claiming that it was treason for a King to levy war against Parliament, but 
after this vote he retired from the House until the 29th January. Although his attendance was 
not as regular as the three mentioned above, he was present during the important vote upon 
the decision to destroy the Newport negotiations and it was believed in Royalist circles that he 
supported the trial. He also sat upon a parliamentary committee in late January which may 
have made the MPs believe that he would serve the new regime. 130 The decision to elect Grey 
13 to the Council was, of course, a mistake as. he refused to serve the new regime. 1 The Earl of 
127 LJ x p. 632; A Declaration of Parliament T. T. 669 f. 13 (56) Dec 15 th 1648 
128 th th L. J x p. 641- 650; The Moderate T. T. E. 544 (10) Tue Feb 13 - Tue 20 Feb 1649 p. 312. 
Although Mabbott erroneously stated that the Peers had supported the trial, he was right to 
point out that they had at least been privy to politics. 
129 For Mulgrave's attendance see L. J x 624,625,626,627,632,633,635,636,638,639, 
641,642,645,647,649. Table 4 Below. 
130 L. J x p. 641 (attendance upon the 2 nd Jan), p. 647 (attendance upon the 29th Jan) For his 
alleged support of the Bill See Mercurius Pragmaticus T. T. E. 537 (20) Tue 26 th Dec- Tue 9h 
Jan 1649- Nedham states that Grey supported the ordinance to secure the return of his 
"cracked fortunes. " For his sitting upon a parliamentary committee See Worden Rump p. 178. 
131 Worden Rump p. 178; The Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer T. T. E 546 (7) Tue 27 th Feb- 
Tue 7th March 1649 p. 1277. 
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Salisbury was not such a regular attendee of the chamber'and his "radical credentials" 132 are 
not so easy to define. This may explain why the Commons were divided over his 
appoiiýtment. But it is significant to note that he was present upon the day the Lords 
considered introducing a bill affirming that it would be treason hereafter for a king to levy 
war against Parliament. This was certainly a sign that Salisbury was willing to consider a 
rnajor change to the constitution. "' 
it is clear from the backgrounds of all these peers that the Commons thought carefully before 
they nominated peers to the new executive. Although none of these peers had supported the 
regicide, their action had given the MPs some cause to believe that they would support the 
new regime. Moreover, considering that the peers had rejected offers to act as commissioners 
to try the King -a fact that Charles had used to his advantage 
134 
, it was perceived to be 
expedient to invite a select few to sit upon the Council of State. In some respects the decision 
to appoint peers to the Council of State demonstrated the desire upon the part of the 
Commons to consolidate, rather than extend the revolution. They were responding also to the 
unpopularity of the new regime, attempting to court favour with a group that had been 
identified with the parliamentary cause. However, behind this notion of expediency and 
conservatism rested a firm principle to place men. who had shown an inclination to support the 
regime in positions of power. 135 
132 L. J x p. 626,632,639,642. 
133 C. J vi p. 14 1; Note 114 Above; For his attendance upon the 9th January See L. J x p. 642. 
134 BM ADD Mss 37,344 fol. 247; Howell State Trials iv p. 995; Adamson 'Peerage in 
Politics' P. 275. 
135 In this important respect my findings differ from those found in Worden and Underdown's 
accounts. 
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The question as to why the peers sat upon the Council. is far more difficult to determine. Did 
they join what Professor Underdown has called a revolutionary bandwagon or were there 
more. positive reasons, as Dr Worden argued, for taking their place on the Council?, 36 
Unfortunately the available evidence is again very thin and information gleaned from their 
attendance upon the Council of State does not provide for a definitive conclusion. 
The Earl of Pembroke was held in contempt by Royalists, Levellers and by his own peers, but 
this criticism was not based upon the tireless work he performed for the new regirne. ' 37 A 
number of MPs objected to his candidature and Pembroke repaid his supporters by attending 
the Council three times in February, once in March and five times in April. 138 He was elected 
as a Knight of the shire of Berkshire in April but this did not create a desire to take more 
responsibility in the Council as he failed to attend any of the sessions in May. 139 Pembroke's 
contribution to the politics during this revolutionary period was negligible. After July he 
rarely attended until November and December when he suddenly became a more active 
member. 140 He was perhaps aiming for re-election 14 1 but such a hope was ended by his 
136 Underdown Pride's Purge p. 281-3; Worden Rump p. 45-48,62-7. 
137 For the attacks upon Pembroke in the Royalist Press See Chapter 5 Below ; The Earl of 
Pembroke's Farewell to the King T. T. E. 476 (22) 19th Dec 1648; The Speech of the Earl of 
Pembroke at his admittance as a member of the House of Commons T. T. 9.551 (6) 16 th 
April 1649; The manner and election of Philip Herbert Late Earl of Pembroke -A satire T. T. 
E. 551 (16) 16th April 1649. For the Leveller view The Moderate T. T. E. 536 (2) Tue I 91h 
Dec- Tue 26 th Dec 1648 p. 216,216; For the attitude'shown by his Peers See Worden Rump 
p. 73; Mercurius Pragmaticus T. T. E. 477 (30) Tue I gth Dec- Tue 26 th Dec 1648. 
138 Cj Vi P. 140- 1; Pembroke attended upon the , gth , 23, and 24 
th of February: Upon the I" 
and 3rd of March: Upon the 16 th , 17'h, 20th, 2l't, and 23rd April. He did not attend in May. All 
this is taken from the attendance record for the Council of State. See C. S. P. D 1648-9 
(introduction). 
139 Worden RuM p. 192-3 and sources listed in n. 1 p. 193; Also Cj vi p. 187; 
140 C. H. Firth House of Lords p. 224. 
141 As it happened most of the members were reelected (not Pembroke because he had died) 
but this was not a certainty. Worden Rump p. 221-2. 
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premature death. He was afforded a state funeral to which all the MPs were instructed to 
attend. The precise views of the members attending the funeral are probably lost to us forever, 
but if-they were in a genuine state of mourning it was not for the loss of a hard working and 
able politician. 142 But Pembroke's attendance was not the exception amongst the peerage. 
Salisbury's is little better, but both were surpassed by Mulgrave. He did not attend one 
session of the Council, and was thus not elected the following year. 143 
The Earl of Denbigh was the exception; more than any other peer he was willing to support 
the new regime basing his justification upon the grounds that he had served Parliament during 
the Civil War coupled with the simple notion that the Commons were now the de facto rulers. 
In February his attendance was better than the majority of the members of the Council; he 
attended more sessions than Sir Henry Vane and Alderman Wilson, but not as many as Oliver 
Cromwell. 144 His attendance in March and April-7as not quite so impressive but he was 
above the norm in May 1649. Denbigh also sat upon a number of committees 145, but given the 
wide powers given to the Council in terms of high politics, he only played a peripheral role. 
Although he sat upon an important committee concerning future alliances with foreign states 
this was the exception rather than the norm. It also supports the idea that the peers were 
included upon the Council to provide a certain amount of respectability from foreign nations. 
For the majority of the time, Denbigh was not involved in issues concerning either reform or 
on the important issue of the Commonwealth's survival. His responsibilities concerned 
142 Blair Worden was not too critical of Pembroke but I (for once) have some sympathy with 
the Royalist polemicists. For Worden's discussion of Pembroke See Rump p. 27-8,73,77,97, 
178,180,192,221. See n. 137 Above for examples of Royalist attacks upon the Earl. 
143 Firth House of Lords p. 223; Worden ELmp p. 22 1. 
144 This is all based upon the introduction in the C. S. P. D 1649-50 and p. 1- 149. 
145 C. S. p. D 1649-5 0 p. 3 7,42,44,13 1. 
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arrangements for Dr Dorislaus' funeral, negotiations with individual merchants, dealing with 
isolated Royalists and ceremonial responsibilities in London, and looking after foreign 
dignitaries. 146 Although a relatively active member of the Council, Denbigh was not afforded, 
or did not take the opportunity to become involved in the weighty issues of state. 
Although some peers were allowed back to central politics after the abolition of their 
chamber, in terms of their influence upon central politics, they exerted an influence that can 
only be described as marginal. Circumstance had upon the one hand provided them with a 
small opportunity to remain working within the Government but on the other side. It was clear 
that the Civil Wars and the Interregnum had reduced the power of the Lords in central 
government. The English Revolution resulted in the execution of the King - the head of the 
nation both socially and politically. It also shattered the political power and influence of the 
Lords, albeit for a short time. 147 The available evidenc6)does not provide a simple explanation 
as to why the peers returned to central politics. Their role in the Council does not support the 
idea that they were committed moderates determined to halt any extension of the revolution. 
Moreover, the evidence produced hitherto does not imply that the moderates in the Commons 
wanted the Lords to sit upon the Council to represent the old order and to act as a buffer 
against the Arrny. It is possible to tentatively suggest that the Lords were invited to sit 
because they had shown certain radical credentials and their presence would make the events 
of December and January more acceptable to the conservative nation. The peers accepted 
146 He sat upon a committee "to consider what alliances this crown had with foreign states, 
and whether to continue the same" C. S. P. D 1649-50 p. 37; For Dorislaus's funeral See p. 159; 
for negotiation with merchants p. 42,44; for his responsibility for ceremonial occasions see 
p. 173; for his dealings with individual Royalists See p. 139. 
147 The Lords would of course return. See Ronald Hutton The Restoration (Oxford 1986) p. 
133 forjust one example of the Lords functioning at the start of the Restoration process. For 
an account of the recent decline of the aristocracy see Daid Carmadine, The Decline and fall 
of the British AristocrqM, (1990). 
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office out of habit and, after the abolition of the chamber, they were at least afforded a certain 
amount of dignity. 
The Lords in Opposition. 
The last section was concerned with the Lords who remained at Westminster and played a 
role in Westminster politics. The next part of this chapter considers the Lords who played 
either no or little part in central politics. I am not going to consider the peers who were 
regarded as Royalists because they have been the subject of three excellent studies. 148 This 
chapter deals with those members of the peerage who either wrote pamphlets objecting to the 
revolution or decided against attending the chamber despite having the option to do so. 
On two occasions the Earl of Denbigh attempted to increase the membership of the Lords. 149 
He only met with limited success, and it is clear that a number of Lords did not wish to 
participate in radical politics. The Lords Dacres, Northumberland and Middlesex, sent 
messages saying that they could not attend due to illness. 150 Middlesex's excuse was rather 
absurd because a few days earlier he had been in good enough health to challenge a group of 
troopers. 15 1 The Earl of Lincoln asked for leave to go to his county due to urgent business 
there, "he having not been there for many years. " 152 The Earl of Mulgrave gave an early 
148 Insights into the role of the royalist aristocracy can be found in D. E Underdown Royalist 
ConSDiracy in England (Yale 1960) passim; Hutton Charles 11 p. 14-48. 
149 L. J x p. 636-7,648; Whitelock Memorials vol ii p. 481. 
ISO L. J x p. 639 for Dacres and Northumberland; L. J x p. 641 for Middlesex; G. F Trevallyn 
Jones Saw Pit Wharton p. 130. 
151 The Joint Resolution and Declaration of the Parliament and the Council for taking away 
the King and the House of Lords T. T. E. 538 (1) 1 Ith Jan 1649 p. 1; n. 47 above. 
152 L. J x p. 639; Trevallyn Jones Saw Pit Wharton p. 130. 
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indication about Wharton's disinclination to become involved in politics by informing the 
lJouse that the Earl could not attend due to "urgent business. "153 Lord Hunsdon used the death 
of his. mother in law as an excuse not to attend upon the 28 th of December accompanied by an 
assurance that he would attend at a later date. 
154 He kept to this promise, entering the chamber 
on the 2 nd and 9th of January but this was the total extent of his commitment. 
155 Many peers 
did not have the courtesy to send excuses. On the 23 Td of December Denbigh sent messages to 
twenty nine peers asking them to attend the chamber the following Thursday. The members 
mentioned did send their excuses, but the Lords Suffolk, Stamford, Saye and Sele, Hereford, 
La Warr, Montagu and Bruce failed to offer any excuse. 156 Some of these peers were 
conspicuous by their absence, 157 but the majority of the eligible Lords did not want to play a 
part in the politics post purge era. They demonstrated their opposition to the new regime in 
three ways: through voting against the bill to place the King on trial, by sending rather feeble 
explanations for not attending the chamber and by simply not acknowledging requests to take 
their seats. 
This type of passive resistance was the norm. Unlike the political and religious Presbyterians, 
the Lords tended to refrain from rather public displays of opposition. 158 There were occasions 
when certain individual peers would vent their hostility to the regime. The Earl of 
Northampton challenged Sir William Brereton to a fight in one of London's narrow streets; 
153 Ibid. 
154 L. J x p. 641. 
155 L. J x p. 642-3. 
156 L. J x p. 639. 
157 Mercurius Pragmaticus T. T. E. 538 (18). Tue 9th Jan- Tue 26 th Jan 1648. 
158 See Chapter 4 below. For the best account of Presbyterian Literature See Underdown 
Pride's Purge p. 146-7,152-3,161-4,167,174-8; Worden Rump p. 84-5,123-6,264-8. 
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Northampton was defending the integrity of the monarch and also settling an old family 
score. 159 Lord Middlesex, in the words of Veronica Wedgwood, "expressed his feelings for 
some troopers in the streets below by emptying a chamber pot" on the heads of a number of 
soldiers. 160 These were isolated examples and they represented the frustration of individuals 
rather than a deliberate and coordinated response to the new regime. 
Upon the 8 th February a document appeared that attacked the new regime in a direct and 
forthright fashion. 'The Declaration and Protest of the Peers of the Land' criticised the 
purging of the Commons, the execution of the King and it brought a warning that the ensuing 
constitution would result in "anarchy and confusion. "161 Using language that was similar to 
the political Presbyterians, 162 the peers claimed that the rightful succession rested with the 
nearest heir and government should reside with the peers until Charles 11 was restored. 163 
Although this was a formidable document, it was a rare example of an outspoken attack upon 
the part of the peers. There is plenty of evidence of hostility to the revolution, as various 
groups spoke out against the new regime, but the Lords appear to have preferred the more 
dignified approach with most of them retiring from active politics. This passivity has 
prompted one historian to comment upon, the "moral redundancy" that appeared to consume 
the English peerage at the time of the regicide as they refused to stand up for their beliefs. It 
must, however, be remembered that these peers had fought against the King and to risk 
anything for him was always going to be a difficult option. During any time of dramatic 
change it is difficult to remain neutral and there is a propensity to condemn the neutral as 
159 Wedgwood Trial p. 162. 
160 lbid; n. 47 and 152 above. 
161 C. S. P. D 1649-50 pA 
162 See note 159 above. 
163 C. S. P. D 1649-50 pA 
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being ideologically weak or deliberately protecting their own interests. Such a depiction of the 
presbyterian peerage is unduly derogatory. First, by denouncing the trial the peers excluded 
themselves from power illustrating a principled attachment to the notion of monarchical 
government. Second, they did face a dilemma; they wished to preserve the old order but it 
would have left Charles as the Head of the Government. They were willing to advocate such 
an unpalatable situation but they were not prepared to risk life or imprisonment to help an 
untrustworthy king. This appears to be an understandable position to assume. Moreover, as 
the peers were subjected to taunts form the Royalist press, it must be remembered that not a 
single royalist risked their life in the weeks before the regicide to save the King. Royalists 
wrote prolifically about their martyred monarch without following his example. 164 
One other peer requires comment. The Earl of Warwick's role in the revolution is difficult to 
determine. In the weeks after the purge there were a number of conflicting accounts about 
Warwick's motives. As I mentioned in the first chapter, Nedham seized upon the ambiguity 
that surrounded Warwick's role to claim that the Earl was planning to move against the new 
regime. 165 Warwick's reasons for returning to London in early December were the subject of 
speculation in the press. 'The Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer' suggested that Warwick had 
returned due to poor weather. 166 The paper entitled 'A Declaration from Both Houses' 
claimed that the Earl's poor health precipitated his return to London. 167 Even some Seamen 
164 Ian Ward 'The English Peerage' p. 14. 
165 Nedham's tactics as a journalistic are discussed in chapter 1. For his account of Wanvick 
see Mercurius Pragmaticus T. T. E. 476 (35) Tue 12 th - Tue I 9th Dec 1648. 
166 The Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer T. T. E. 476 (39) Tue 12 1h - Tue 19 th Dec 1648. The 
same report can be found in The Moderate T. T. E. 477 (4). 
167 A Declaration from Both Houses T. T. E. 477 (7) Wednesday 13 th_ Wednesday 20"' 1648. 
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questioned Warwick's commitment to the new regime. 
168 Given Warwick's Presbyterian 
background it is not surprising that there was speculation about his attitude towards the new 
regime and it is also clear that Warwick had some misgivings about the trial of the King, 
demonstrated by his refusal to serve as a commissioner to try the King. 169 However, as 
Bernard Capp has shown there is "no evidence that Warwick ever thought of betraying 
Parliament" and this view is confirmed by all of the available evidence., 70 However, the fleet 
was of vital importance to the Rump given the reaction from abroad to the moves against the 
King. 171 In the. period between the purge and the regicide the Rump took a number of 
initiatives to secure the support of Warwick: he was praised for his good affections, he was in 
close contact with Cromwell and protestations of loyalty to the Earl were made from his own 
Seamen. 172 The support of Warwick was regarded, in the short term, as essential because it 
was believed that his dismissal from office could induce another revolt in the Navy. 173 But it 
is unlikely that the Rump ever intended to retain Warwick in the longer term and his dismissal 
from office occurred when it was clear that he would not move against the new regime. His 
.1 174 loss of commission also prompted a major reorganisation of the Navy. 
168 The Declaration and Engagement of the Commanders, Officers and Seamen Under the 
Control of Robert Earl of Warwick. T. T. E. 536 (11). 14 Ih Dec 1648. 
169 Adamson 'The Peerage in Politics' p. 270; Trevallyn- Jones Saw pit Wharton p. 142. 
170 BemardCapp Cromwell'sNayy p. 41. 
171 Bernard Capp "Naval Operations" in John Kenyon and Jane OhImeyer (ed), The Civil 
Wars: A Militajy Histoly of England Scotland and Ireland 163 8-1660 (1998) p. 182-7. 
172 The Naval Expedition of the Right Honourable Robert Earl of Warwick T. T. E. 536 (32) 
2 nd Jan 1649. 
173 Capp Cromwell's Nayy p. 43. 
174 lbid p. 45-72. 
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Warwick's opposition to the revolution was diluted. Despite the considerable attempts to 
secure his support he did not act as a commissioner and he failed to attend the chamber. 
However, he was not willing to move against the new regime and even on the day of the 
regicide he signed an official paper for the Navy. 175 He was not willing to move against 
Parliament and he epitomises the position of many of the Lords. Although he would petition 
Parliament on behalf of his half-brother the Earl of Holland, Warwick accepted his dismissal 
and he retired from politics. He was an old man who had served the parliamentary cause with 
distinction but the revolution was not the outcome he had envisaged. 176 It is interesting to note 
that his position was rather similar to that of Fairfax. Both men were torn between loyalty to 
the traditional order which explains their reluctance to countenance the trial of the King, with 
a deep rooted dislike of Charles' person, coupled with a sense of affection for many of the 
men who framed the English Revolution. It is possible that if both men had joined forces they 
could have prevented the regicide. This was not lost on the Parliamentarians, as it was 
rumoured that a close eye was kept on Fairfax on the eve of the regicide and Warwick's 
177 
candidature for a position upon the Council of State was considered. But this was not an 
issue for either man. Another conservative reaction to the projected revolution would have 
plunged the nation into another Civil War and they were not willing (and the possibility of 
success would have been extremely doubtful) to do this in the name of Charles Stuart. Recent 
historians have tended to focus upon the lack of ideological commitment upon the part of the 
parliamentarians. In many respects this is true, but the framers of the English Revolution 
demonstrated more of a commitment to their cause than the peerage did for theirs. 
175 Capp Cromwell's NM p. 44. 
176 lbid p. 41 
177 Worden Lump n -9,311. p. 186; Gentles New Model Anny p. 3 07 
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Conclusions. 
The conclusions to this chapter will concentrate upon four themes. First, I will consider the 
historiography paying especial attention to Dr Adamson's findings. Second, comment will be 
made on the view that a core of peers remained in the chamber after the purge who were 
willing to support radical legislation and even countenance the trial of the King provided that 
the result was deposition rather than regicide. 178 Third, I will consider Dr Adamson's view 
that the Commons and the Ariny showed a certain deference to the Lords; according to Dr 
Adamson this explains the lenient treatment they received at the hands of the Army. 179 
Finally, I will attempt to place the information in this chapter in the context of the political 
situation in 1648/9 endeavouring to demonstrate the importance of the Lords within the wider 
context of the revolution itself 
It is often inevitable that tr historians covering the same period will arrive at different 
conclusions. 180 It will already be clear that my findings differ from those found in Dr 
Adamson's work. Over the forthcoming pages some of my criticisms of his work will be 
developed in greater detail, but it is important to state that I have found no evidence to support 
the view that he has stretched the sources beyond acceptable levels. It is true that he uses 
"rhetorical stratagems" to demonstrate the importance of the Lords, but this is very different 
to a deliberate attempt at the distortion of evidence to challenge accepted views. 18 1 The area 
178 Adamson 'Peerage in Politics' p. 262,272. 
179 'Ibid' p. 258-62,265-6. 
180 The same was true of Blair Worden's study of the Rump Parliament just after the 
publication of David Underdown's Pride's Purge. See Worden Rum p. 41-2 esp n. 2 p. 42. 
181 Thus I step rather gingerly into the debate between Adamson and Kishlansky. It will be 
clear that I agree with Kishlansky that Adamson used rhetorical stratagems to support his case 
and that he overstated the importance of the Lords. See Kishlansky "Saye What? " H. J 33,4 
1990 p. 919-923; For an example of this see Adamson 'Peerage in Politics' p. 260. (cont over) 
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of disagreement rests with his view that the Anny and the Commons were prepared to fashion 
legislation to suit the Lords coupled with his belief that Denbigh was willing to employ subtle 
tactics, to preserve his radical majority. This inevitably results in a challenge to one of his 
central arguments - the notion that the Lords still performed an essential role in the legislative 
process. In many ways this thesis provides support for Dr Adamson's argument. Prior to his 
pioneering work upon the Lords it was assumed that the abolition of the chamber was the 
natural consequence of the purging of Parliament, since all of the Lords reftised to 
countenance radical politics. 182 This thesis provides support for the view that the final demise 
of the Lords was not inevitable from the moment that Pride stood at the entrance of the House 
of Commons thus concurring with the notion that there was not a strong ideological 
movement to rid the Lords of their political power. 183 Also a study of the Lords in this period 
is as justified as the more popular investigations into the trial of the King and the Whitehall 
debates. 184 
The decision by a small group of peers to support the destruction of the Newport negotiations, 
remain in the chamber after the 4 th January vote and to take their seats in the Council of State 
shows that the Lords were divided amongst themselves upon how best to respond to the 
This said, I do not feel that Adamson has deliberately manufactured evidence to support his 
case. I am of course referring to the final chapter of his doctoral thesis and I am not in a 
position to comment position upon the period considered by Kishlansky. It appears to me that 
a solution to this argument would have to include a personal check of all the sources in 
question. For the entire debate see J. S. A Adamson "The English Nobility and the Projected 
Settlement of 1647" HJ xxx (1987) p. 567-602; Mark A Kishlansky "Saye What" HJ xxxiii 
(1990) p. 917-37; J. S. A. Adamson "Politics and the Nobility in Civil War England" HJ xxxiv 
(1991) p. 231-55; Mark A. Kishlansky "Saye no More" JBS xxx (1991) p. 399-488. 
182 See the comments made in the introduction. Underdown Pride's Purge Wedgwood Trial 
and Firth House of Lords all see the destruction of the Lords as being almost inevitable. This 
view was followed in Jonathan Scott England's Troubles (Cambridge 2000) p. 156; Ward 
'The English Peerage' p. 15. 
183 It will be argued that the demise of the Lords was not inevitable. 
184 Ian Gentles New Model Army p. 285-294. 
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revolution. Denbigh believed that the peers could work With the Commons but Manchester, 
apart from returning to make it clear that he would allow his name to be associated with the 
trial of the King, subscribed to the view that nothing could be achieved without a full House 
of Commons. 185 This contempt for the legislature, shared by the majority of the peers, 
mirrored the attitude of many of the Presbyterian MPs in the lower chamber. 186 The passion 
for retaining the traditional trinity was demonstrated in their utterances during the debate held 
on the 2 nd of January - this too was a testimony of their social and political conservatism. 187 It 
is likely that the King was still not trusted, but some of the peers may have started to have 
more sympathy for his person. The growing radicalism that had been evident since the 
Windsor prayer meeting certainly pushed the peers in a conservative direction. 188 They may 
also have been impressed with the position Charles took during the Newport negotiations. 
Traditional accounts have tended to highlight Charles' ability during his trial, but his actions 
on the Isle of Wight certainly won him the admiration of some of those he came into contact 
with. It is interesting to note that the fonner radical Say and Sele, who had played a key part 
in the Newport negotiations refused to participate in politics after the 7 th December. 189 
Moreover, Charles' correspondence from Newport, which went directly to Manchester, 
185 See n. 66 above. 
186 Many Commoners entitled to sit in the House also retired from politics. Worden Rump 
p. 23. 
187 Lj x p. 641. 
188 Patricia Crawford "Charles Stuart, That Man of Blood" JBS xvi (1977) 
189 BM Harl Mss 6988 E211-12,14,16; BM Egerton Mss 254 089,390,392(letter to 
th Fairfax); His Majesties last speech to the Lords Commissioners T. T. E. 475 (21) Dec 6 
1648; His Majesties Declaration concerning the proceedings of the Army T. T. E. 476 
(23). Dec 12 th 1648. 
155 
demonstrated Charles' apparent willingness to support the treaty, a stance he would maintain 
right up to his death. 190 
The attitude of the few peers who attended the chamber on a regular basis after the purging of 
the lower chamber is more difficult to discem. As mentioned above they were willing to 
countenance radical legislation, but it has been suggested that they were not willing to support 
the trial of the King. 191 Dr Adamson's claim that a radical peerage remained in the chamber, a 
group whose support was courted by the Commons, requires qualification. Instead of 
regarding these peers as equal partners in the legislative process it is possible to depict the 
Lords in a very different light. It will be argued that they were not willing to support the 
notion of a trial but they attempted to avoid controversy by consistently attempting to appease 
the Commons. 
192 
Until the 2 nd January the Lords accepted practically all of the legislation sent to them by the 
Commons. 193 On the 20th December the Commons sent an ordinance to the Lords for the 
payment of E3,000 to John Lilburne for money owed to him from his services to the 
parliamentary cause. Dr Adamson claims that this ordinance encountered opposition in the 
Lords and that the Commons accepted the amendments "without demur. " 194 But this was not 
an example of the Lords asserting their constitutional parity with the Commons. The 
amendment to the ordinance simply asked that the deserts of Oliver Cromwell "be 
190 BM Harl Mss 6988 Mss E211-16. 
191 1 have found no evidence to support the view that any of the Lords were willing to sanction 
the trial. 
192 This is discussed above. See Lj x p. 624- 652. 
193 L. J x p. 642-64 1. 
194 Adamson 'Peerage in Politics' p. 260-1. 
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recommended to the House of Commons for the same. " This was not opposition to the 
ordinance but merely an addition which would have inevitably resulted in approval from the 
Commons. 195 As mentioned earlier, the Lords considered a bill on the gth January that it 
would be treason hereafter for a king to levy war against Parliament but this was dropped, in 
all likelihood, because the Lords knew that such an innovation would not have won support in 
the Commons. Although Dr Adamson has placed great emphasis on a letter sent by Algernon 
Sidney to his patron the Earl of Leicester, it is possible to interpret the source in a rather 
different light. In his letter written on the 9h of January Sidney suggested that the House of 
Commons had been "too hasty" in discarding the Lords, since the peers that attended upon the 
9" were prepared to sanction the trial of the King. Despite the fact that this source shows a 
certain inclination upon the part of the peers to support radical legislation it cannot be 
regarded as a definitive statement of intent. The source certainly proves that the peers who 
attended upon the 9h were more radical as a body than those who attended upon the 2 nd . 
However, they were still not willing to support the trial as the legislation considered upon the 
9th categorically stated that it would be treasonhereafter for a king to wage war against his 
people. This could be regarded as a rejection of any attempt to try Charles for his guilt during 
the Civil War. It is more likely that the Lords were attempting to court favour with the 
Commons by demonstrating their radical credentials, whilst also preventing the trial of the 
King. This rather cautious approach explains the limited opposition made by the peers to both 
the 4 th January vote and the final decision to abolish the chamber. 196 There is not sufficient 
evidence to support the view that the Lords would have favoured deposition rather that 
regicide for two reasons: First, the bill considered upon the 9th January suggests that Charles 
195 It is obvious that the Commons would not have objected to this amendment considering 
that upon the 7 th December they had voted their thanks to Cromwell for his services to the 
kingdom. C. J A p. 94. 
196 It was believed that the Lords were contemplating issuing a Declaration against the vote 
taken by the Commons upon the 4 th but they decided against it. BM Add Mss 37,344 fol. 243; 
Sidney's letter is housed in the British Library- BM ADD Mss 21,506 fol 55. 
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would have remained on the throne with provision that any further indiscretion would result 
in the ultimate sanction. Second, the decision not to proceed with the bill supports Ian Ward's 
view, that the "by 1649 the English peerage was quite unable and quite unwilling, to speak in a 
united voice about anything. "197 As mentioned earlier there was a division amongst the 
peerage upon how best to respond both to the purging of Parliament and the 4 th January 
vote. 198 Of those attending upon the 9th , Denbigh, Salisbury and Mulgrave were 
invited to sit 
upon the Council but their role in the future would demonstrate different attitudes towards the 
Commonwealth. 199 
The desire to avoid controversial legislation was part of a plan conjured up by the Earl of 
Denbigh and a handful of peers to provide the Lords with their only opportunity to retain a 
certain amount of influence in the legislature . 
200 The position of the Lords meant that they had 
little option but to avoid the wrath of the Commons. It was inevitable that after the regicide 
the issue of the role of the peerage in politics would have to be debated. The position of the 
Lords as an equal partner in the legislative process was destroyed after the 4 th January vote, 
but it was still possible that they could have perfon-ned a consultative role. This possibility 
was shattered by both ideology and circumstance . 
20 1 Denbigh and his fellow peers had been 
attempting to avoid confrontation clinging to the hope that their chamber would avoid 
outright abolition. 
197 Ward 'The English Peerage' p. 15-16. 
19' But I would suggest that they were united against the trial. 
199 See above. 
200 Denbigh's tactics were simple- to retain some kind of legislative role by avoiding 
confrontation. 
201 Adamson 'Peerage in Politics' p. 286-7. Dr Adamson attributes abolition to circumstance 
but I feel that it was a combination of this and ideology. 
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Upon the day of the regicide the Lords considered a petitioners complaint concerning Dr 
Dove's ejection from college offices in Cambridge. Dr Ward stated that this showed the 
"moral redundancy" of the peers. 202 This was part of Dr Ward's argument that suggests that 
the Lords were not willing to cause disruption throughout the Interregnum. It also provides a 
challenge to Dr Adamson's view that a radical aristocracy survived the purging of Parliament. 
My argument provides some support for both of these views but both accounts overstate their 
respective cases. Dr Ward is correct when he argues that the Lords had little influence over 
politics from Pride's Purge onwards and his view that the Lords were "useless" by the start of 
February is supported by the available evidence and it is clear that after the 2 nd of January the 
Lords did not influence a single piece of legislation. 203 However, his view that the abolition of 
the Lords was inevitable as part of a republican "cleansing process" is open to question. It 
will be argued later that the purging of the lower chamber and even the regicide did not in 
themselves ensure that the Lords would be formally abolished. 204 Moreover, as mentioned 
above, the peers cannot be regarded as a homogenous body as they were divided upon how 
best to respond to the revolution. 205 
Although there was a divergence of opinion upon how best to respond to the revolution 
between those who thought that something could be achieved by remaining at Westminster, 
and those who believed that a retreat from politics was the only option, Dr Adamson's view 
of the survival of a radical aristocracy is open to question. Denbigh and the other peers 
202 Ward 'English Peerage' p. 14. 
203 Examples can be found in Lj x p. 624-65 1; Cj vi p. 93-133. 
204 Ward 'English Peerage' p. 15. My case is argued below. 
205 There appears to be little point attempting to name the Lords as presbyterian or 
Independent at this stage considering that so few would serve the new regime. For a 
discussion of the term presbyterian see Chapter 4 below. Worden Rump p. 4-1 1. 
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nominated to join the Council of State were not willing to support the trial of the King, 
illustrated by their decision not to act as a Commissioner, their rejection of the 2 nd of January 
votes and their refusal to sit upon the Council of State until their names were disassociated 
from the regicide. The decision to serve the new Government showed that these peers were 
more radical than some of their colleagues, but they were still not willing to support the trial 
of the King. Also, the evidence presented in this chapter argues that Denbigh was not 
attempting to control the membership of the chamber206; wanting rather to ensure that as 
many Lords as possible joined the chamber. Both Drs. Adamson and Ward depict Denbigh as 
the master tactician attempting to keep his majority, to either push through the trial or to 
ensure that the members who did return were willing to placate the Commons. 207 The 
evidence presented in this chapter portrays Denbigh in a different light. He was a man who 
took the lead in attempts to ensure that the Lords would play a role in a future constitution and 
this prevented him from making protests against the regicide. But he should not be viewed as 
a man lacking in principle. When the Lords rejected the bill to support the trial Denbigh 
refused to act as a commissioner. He would adopt the same stance when he was asked to join 
the Council of State pointing out that the original oath was contrary to how he acted "as a peer 
in the House of Lords"208 There is no doubt that Denbigh was the most influential peer in 
politics but he was not attempting to manipulate the chamber to suit his own political agenda. 
In more modem times he would be regarded as a man who assumed the role of "primus inter 
pares" willing to adhere to a majority decision. 209 
206 See Above, for Denbigh's attempts to fill the Chamber. 
207 Ward 'English Peerage' p. 6; Adamson 'Peerage in Politics' p. 265-7. 
208 Firth House of Lords p. 222-3. 
209 His objection to the oath to join the Council of State defended his position as a peer in the 
chamber as much as this being a reflection of his personal position. 
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one aspect of Dr Adamson's thesis that requires serious: qualification is his view that the 
Army and the Commons showed a certain deference towards the Lords. Dr Adamson claims 
that the Army took a far more lenient approach to the Presbyterian peers than they did to their 
colleagues in the lower chamber. He points out that the peers were not arrested for their part 
in the Newport negotiations; Michael Oldisworth Pembroke's patronage secretary was 
f 
"carefully omitted from the list of MPs to be imprisoned; he cited the story of the Earl of 
Middlesex, stating that the Anny deliberately played down the incident and this "once again 
showed the Army's concern to maintain the support of the remaining peers. " Throughout the 
final chapter of his thesis Dr Adamson claims that the Army went to great lengths to pacify 
the Lords suggesting that this amounted to "one rule for the Commons but another for the 
Lords" . 
210 
This evidence cited by Dr Adamson is open to question. There is no evidence to support the 
view that Oldsworth was deliberately omitted from the list of MPs to be secluded. As I 
mentioned in the first chapter of this thesis the first purge was poorly planned and a number 
of moderates survived Pride's clutches and entered the chamber. To single out Oldsworth 
(without a single footnote to support it) as a special case does not take account of the nature of 
the purges and the argument is further undermined by the fact that Oldsworth would become a 
regicide .2 
11 The same is true of the Earl of Middlesex. Although it is true that he did not 
receive punishment for the assault upon the soldiers Fairfax went to great lengths to 
demonstrate that the soldiers would show restraint. He made it perfectly clear that he expected 
his soldiers to "behave and demeane themselves civilly and peaceably to all sorts of 
21 0 Adamson 'Peerage in Politics' p. 260 (for Oldisworth)- his view was supported by Ian 
Gentles The New Model Army p. 282; For Middlesex Adamson 'Peerage in Politics' p. 265- 
6. 
211 Chapter 2 above. 
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people"212 ,a stance he would maintain after the regicide. Although opposed to the moves 
against the King, Fairfax was not idle in the weeks between the purge and regicide. He 
channelled his efforts into attempts to ensure that the Army would be paid their arrears, 
believing that respectable behaviour would help this cause. He also wanted to counter 
Royalist accusations concerning the nefarious activities of the soldiery. To do this the troopers 
were subjected to harsh punishment for any indiscretion, including riding the wooden Horse 
and being stripped to the waist and hit by every member of the regiment. 213 Middlesex was 
spared from punishment not out of deference to the peerage but because the leaders of the 
I 
Army wished to appear as reasonable as possible. To imprison an old Earl for a couple of 
drunken remarks would have been seized upon by the enemies of the new regime as 
confirmation of all the evils they had predicted. 214 
One question does remain. Why did the Army manage the House of Commons but decided to 
leave the Lords alone? There is I believe an answer to this question but it is not found through 
notions of respect for the integrity of the upper chamber. 
First, although the Lords supported the Newport negotiations, the passion was found in the 
Commons. It was William Prynne who on the eve of Pride's Purge made long speeches 
defending the integrity of Parliament. Moreover, the attendance in the Commons was far 
greater than in the Lords and it was clear to the Army that the ideological force behind the 
212 There is a shortage of secondary sources upon Fairfax's actions at this stage. This is 
quoted from Three Proclamations by His Excellency T. T. E. 475 (9) p. 3 See p. 5-6 for further 
controls of the soldiers; A Letter from the Lord General Fairfax to the Lord Mayor, 
Alderman and common Council of London. All of the above were dated December 1648. 
Further examples can be found in Rushworth Historical Collections vii p. 1356-1358,13 85. 
213 The Perfect Weekly Account Wed 20'h Dec- Wed 27th Dec 1648 ; Whitelock ii 
th Memorials P. 478, The Kingdomes Weekly Intelligence T. T. E. 536 (5) Tue 19'h-Tue 26 
Dec 1648 p. 1197-8. 
214 
See Chapter 5 below. 
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conservative reaction came from the Commons not the Lords. 215 Second, the Lords effectively 
purged themselves; after the first purge of the Commons attendance figures in the upper 
chamber were at a record low. The Commons still needed to be managed and this explains the 
Army's presence outside their door in the month after the initial purge. 216 Third, the Lords 
supported all the necessary legislation until the 2 nd of January vote. After that date the 
Commons assumed control so a purge of the Lords was not required. Fourth, the same 
argument used with the Earl of Middlesex is appropriate here; to send in the troops to remove 
four or five peers would have been regarded as an unnecessary use of force. Finally, and 
underpinning all of these factors is the simple but pertinent fact that the Lords were not 
regarded as important participants in the legislative process. Their support for the revolution 
was forinal but not essential. Some peers were nominated as commissioners in the hope that 
this would make the revolution look more respectable but they were never regarded as 
essential to its success. 217 
One other reason explains why the Army was more lenient towards the Lords than they were 
to the Commons. The petitions that flooded to Fairfax from Norwich, Hull, Portsmouth, 
Warwick, Boston, Surrey and from the Northern Armies demanded justice against the King 
218 and the leading members of the Commons with little or no reference to the-Lords. In the 
215 The Substance of a speech in the House of Commons by William PLYnne T. T. E 539 (11) 
4 th Dee 1648; 
216 Chapter I above. 
217 Rushworth Historical Collections vii p. 1383. 
218 Examples of Petitions can be found in A New Remonstrance from the Northern Army 
T. T. E. 475 (4) 4 Ih Dee 1648; The Declarations and Humble Representation of the Officers and 
Soldiers in Col Scroops, Col Saunders and Col Wauton's Regiments. T. T. E. 475 (24) 51h 
December 1648; The Humble Petition of the Regiments at Dover Castle in The Moderate 
T. T. E. 477 (4) Tue 5 th Dec- Tue 15 th Dec 1648 p. 211 (cp), See also an anonymous letter 
p. 204; The Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer T. T E. 536 (5) Tue I gth Dec- Tue 26 th Dec 1648 
p. 1197; The Humble Petition and Addresses of the Officers and Soldiers in Boston (see over) 
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absence of such pressure coupled with the apparent redundancy of the upper chamber, the 
leaders of the Army felt little need to move against the peers. 
The findings in this chapter suggest that the Lords did not play a significant role in the 
revolution. It has been argued that, although the peers differed amongst themselves upon how 
to respond to the events between December and February, they displayed a degree of unity 
upon the issue of the trial of the King. This thesis has challenged notions of deference upon 
the part of the Commons and the Army towards the Lords. As it happened, the Commons 
discarded the opinions of the Lords with consummate case. A simple chronology of the events 
illustrates this point. Upon the 2 nd January the Lords rejected the bill for the erection of a High 
Court of Justice. As soon as the Commons appreciated what had happened they voted 
themselves supreme in the legislature. The Lords attempted to secure a "fair correspondence" 
but their pleas were not listened to by the now omnipotent lower chamber. Finally, when the 
King had been dealt with the Lords were abolished as a chamber. It is true that some MPs 
hoped that the second chamber would remain, but as a consultative body only. This shows 
that when the debate occurred upon the 5 th February the goal posts had shifted dramatically. 
Even if the moderates had won the day and the Lords had been allowed to remain - albeit with 
diminutive powers, the simple fact remains that the Lords' decision upon the 2 nd January 
ensured that the Commons would dominate the new Government. To demonstrate their 
found in The Moderate T. T. E. 536 (2) Tue I 91h - Tue 26 th Dec 1648 also Humble Petition 
from Kent p. 222; Petitions from Glamorgan and Denbigh can be found in The Moderate T. T. 
E. 536 (30) Tue 26h- Tue 2 nd Jan 1648/9 p. 23 1; Petition from Norwich in The Kingdomes 
Weekly Intelligencer Tue 26 th Dec- Tue 2 nd Jan 1648/9; Petition from the Common Council of 
London in The Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer T. T. E. 539 (6) Tue 16'h Jan- Tue 23 rd Jan 
1649 p. 1227; Whitelock Memorials vol iv p. 478-82,496,518; Rushworth Historical 
Collections vii p. 1368,1372,1373,1388,1389,1400; See also David Underdown " Honest 
Radicals in the Counties" in Pennington and Roots (eds) Puritans and Revolutionaries(Oxford 
1978) p. 186-205; Fairfax was also under pressure to provide material aid to his soldiers- eg 
The Humble Petition of the Hundred maimed soldiers, widows and orphans" Heads of a 
Dairie T. T. E. 537 (25) Tue 2h-Tue 9h Jan p. 41. 
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commitment to the omnipotence of their chamber the Commons removed the Lords as 
commissioners the day after the 2 nd January vote. 219 
John Adamson concludes his doctoral thesis by stating that the House of Lords was abolished 
due to a functional breakdown rather than a crisis that had engulfed the aristocracy. His claim 
that it was the decision upon the part of the Lords to insist upon equal status coupled with the 
publication of the text of the King's speech appearing upon the 5h, along with the Royalist 
declaration nominating the peers as the legal government, was questioned in this chapter. 220 
These circumstances helped to ensure that the peers faced outright abolition but the issue of 
an equal share in government was not the principle at stake. However, in one respect his 
argument upon the so called crisis facing the aristocracy can be supported. Although the 
discussions at Whitehall assumed the destruction of the House of Lords, their demise was not 
inevitable from the first day of the purge of the Commons. If the Lords had supported the trial 
and the execution of the King their chamber would have survived but its perpetuation would 
have been depenclant upon the wishes of the Commons. It was the Commons who took all of 
the initiatives during the revolution and they had the support of the Army but, had the Lords 
been prepared to acquiesce 
with the revolution, the abolitionists would not have been able to muster sufficient support. 
This, however, does suggest that there was a certain crisis facing the aristocracy involved in 
politics. The days of the Baronial magnate influencing their clients in the Lower Chamber 
can, arguably, be identified in the early stages of the Long Parliament, but by 1648/9 this 
221 
r 
situation had altered dramatically. The only means of protecting their political status was to 
219 Rushworth Historical Collections vii p. 1383. 
220 Adamson Peerage in Politics p. 287. 
221 J. S. A. Adamson "The Baronial context of the English Civil Wae'TRHS 5 Ih ser 40 (1990) 
p. 92-132; John Morrill "The making of Oliver Cromwell" in John Morrill (ed) Oliver 
Cromwell and the English Revolution (1990) p. 45-7. 
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support the revolutionary aspirations advanced in the Commons. The Lords were not willing 
to do this and they paid the political price for their principles. 
Considering that this chapter has suggested that the Lords played a rather inconsequential role 
in affecting the course of the events leading up to the regicide, it is worth considering what 
conclusions can be drawn concerning the nature of the English Revolution. 
In some respects we have to return to the Whig interpretation of events. This was a revolution 
dominated by a small clique of determined radicals, who with the support of the Army, were 
willing to dramatically alter the English constitution and as a consequence the House of Lords 
were swept away. 222 Although these findings support this traditional picture two reservations 
require stipulation. First, it is too much of a teleological approach to history if we assume that 
the abolition of this chamber was inevitable from the moment that Pride and Grey stood at the 
door of the Commons to restrict the membership. Second, and more importantly, these MPs 
who would finally abolish the second chamber did not regard themselves as the bastions of a 
new constitutional order. This study shows that, despite all of the rhetoric about elected 
chambers and power being vested in the people, the Commoners were not initially determined 
to rob the Lords of their constitutional position.. 
Both Jonathan Scott and Colin Davies have placed great influence upon "religious and 
constitutional anti-formaliSM. "223 Dr Scott claims that there was a tradition of republicanism 
f rMS. 
224 that was more concerned with "principles of Government and persons" rather than 0 
222 
r, 
S. R. Gardiner Histojy of the Great Civil War vol iv. This appears to be his main argument. 
223 Scott England's Troubles p. 158-9,230,242-3; J. C. Davis "Cromwell's Religion" in 
Morrill ed Oliver Cromwell and the English Revolution p. 181-208. 
224 Scott England's Troubles p. 156. 
166 
This chapter provides some support for his argument. The Commons were willing to dispense 
Nvith constitutional forms when it hindered their goal of attacking the Monarch but this is 
different to an ideological fixation that wanted to sweep away all of the conventional forins of 
government. The House of Lords was abolished, not because of an attachment to a belief in 
classical republicanism but, because the personnel were found to be wanting. There was no 
need to remove the Lords whilst they supported the moves against the King but when the 
peers rejected this move they had to be usurped, and what is more they would not be trusted 
again. This provides more support for Blair Worden's argument that the majority of the 
regicides "opposed not the office of kingship but the person of the King" than it does for 
accounts that see a great republican tradition in England . 
225 But in turn this should not obscure 
the ideology or question the motivation and determination of the MPs. Although the evidence 
left by the regicides is woefully inadequate, their detennination to dispense with the King was 
226 
very similar to the attitude of the more militant members of the New Model Army. It was 
inevitable that regicide would culminate in more bloodshed and this could have embroiled the 
nation in a continental war but, in the minds of many of the MPs, this was a risk that had to be 
taken. Upon two occasions during his trial Charles commented that there were no Lords 
present as he endeavoured to show the illegality of the court. 227 It is perhaps one of the most 
ironic episodes of the English Revolution that the abolition of the Lords was not due to 
Charles death, but more to do with his life. 
228 
225 This chapter has suggested that there were limits to the republicanism of the MPs. I regard 
the Revolution as being provoked by a desire to destroy Charles rather than an ideological 
attachment to Republicanism. This will be developed in the conclusion of this thesis. Worden 
Rump p. 50. 
226 Examples can be found in n. 219 above. 
227 BM Add Mss 37,344 fol. 247. 
228 This was partially inspired by Ronald Hutton's remarks upon Cromwell; Ronald Hutton 




The last three chapters have focussed upon an individual, and two groups of politicians who 
were allowed to participate in revolutionary politics. This chapter will concentrate upon a 
very disparate group that were either excluded from the political process or retired from 
Westminster because they objected to the purging of Parliament. Traditionally historians have 
labelled this group as the "Presbyterians. " However, the tenn itself has created a great deal of 
controversy, ' and without wishing to become embroiled in the intricacies of the debate, I will 
attempt to provide a justification for the retention of the term, whilst making it plain that my 
use of the word Presbyterian does not in anyway suggest that this group were a homogenous 
entity. Moreover, the central theme of this chapter will suggest that both the former MPs and 
the Prqsbyterians not involved in Westminster politics were not united upon how to respond 
to the revolution. 
In the introduction to 'The Rump Parliament' Blair Worden noted that; 
"the use of the terms Presbyterian and Independent has provoked a vigorous debate, 
conducted in the pages of Journals, whose convolutions and technicalities must recently have 
bewildered or wearied the non-specialist reader still more than the argument about who, at the 
end of the seventeenth century, were respectively the Whigs and the Tories. Yet no one 
writing about Rump politics could, or should avoid reference to the issue, and it is necessary 
to create some kind of order to the apparent chaos surrounding it. " 
1 David Underdown, Pride's Purge, Politics in the English Revolution (Oxford 1971) p. 45- 
75. Blair Worden, The Rump Parliament (Cambridge 1975) p. 1-19. A summary of the whole 
debate can be found in an article in Past and Present 44 (1969) S. Foster, "Presbyterian 
Independent Exorcised" p. 52-75; There then followed a series of articles in Past and Present 
47 (1970): J. H Hexter, "Presbyterians, Independents and Puritans: A Voice from the Past" 
p. 134-36; B. Worden, "The Independents: A Reprisal in Histor-y7'p. 116-21; V. Pearl, 
"Exorcist or Historian: The Dangers of Ghost Hunting" p. 122-27; D. Underdown, "The 
Presbyterian Independents Exorcised: A Brief Comment" p. 128-29; G. Yule, "Presbyterians 
and Independents: Some Comments" p. 130-33; S. Foster, "A Rejoinder" p. 137-46 
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The clarity of Worden's research appeared to put an end to the debate. He concluded the 
picture, started by Jack Hexter and developed by Valerie Pearl and David Underdown, which 
demonstrated that seventeenth century politics was not a firm structure of a war and peace 
parties that would develop into the Independents and Presbyterians respectively. 2 Most 
importantly he was able to show that Pride's purge did not result in the exclusion of a 
Presbyterian party leaving a radical Independent party to govern the nation. Dr Worden 
therefore, used the tenn independent sparingly as a description of the MPs that sat in the 
Rump, whilst retaining the term 'Presbyterian' as a description of "that section of opinion 
which had supported the parliamentary cause in the Civil War but which was alienated by, 
,, 3 and which steered clear of politics after, Pride's Purge and the execution of the King. 
This chapter will follow the definition made by Dr Worden upon the grounds that the term is 
derived from contemporary usage. Although the term is very broad it does have its uses if it is 
remembered that Presbyterian means opposition to the purge and the regicide. The use of the 
ten-n for the secluded and the abstaining members does not demonstrate support for the view 
that these men belonged to a political party that was excluded from Parliament as a result of 
the purges. Two useftil studies of the Presbyterians by Lehand Carlson and George Abernathy 
portrayed the Presbyterians as a homogenous group with both historians following Samuel 
Gardiner's view that the purging of Parliament separated two distinct political parties. 4 Both 
Professor Underdown and Dr Worden have shown that the members of the Rump were a 
heterogeneous group and the Presbyterians must be treated in the same fashion. Nathaniel 
Fiennes, John Crewe, Sir John Evelyn, William Pierrepont and PhiliP Lord Wharton had 
2 Worden Rump p. 6. See articles inn. I above. 
lbid p. 6-7 
4 L. H Carlson "A History of the Presbyterians from Pride's Purge to-tfiýe Dissolution of the 
Long Parliament, " Church Histo! y xi (1942); G. Abernathy The English Presbyterians and 
the Stuart Restoration 1648-1663. Transactions of the American Philosophical Society (1965). 
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opposed the Presbyterians in 1647, demonstrated by their fleeing from the Parliament and/or 
taking the 4h of August engagement. 5 In 1647 they were opposed to the Presbyterian faction 
headed by Denzil Holles, but if we are to accept the traditional two party view, they became 
members of the enlarged Presbyterian party upon the first day of the purge. It is true that the 
events in December and January provided them with some common ground, but this chapter 
will argue that their dislike of the revolution did not result in a shared ideology that 
transcended fon-ner differences of opinion. This chapter will suggest that there was a 
remarkable absence of a corporate response by this group. Moreover, in some respects the 
chapter will suggest that the term Presbyterian was far broader than contemporaries 
appreciated. Although the polemists endeavoured to portray a united political group in reality 
Presbyterianism can hardly be described as a loose collective mentality yet alone a political 
party. But as mentioned above it is justified by contemporary usage. William Sedgwick was 
regarded by contemporaries in 1649 as a Presbyterian but before that date he was regarded as 
one of the New Model's radical chaplains. William Prynne described himself as a member of 
the Presbyterian party, but in his writings after the purge he did not demonstrate any desire to 
support a rigid Presbyterian church settlement. At the other end of the scale Massey escaped 
from custody and joined the Royalist cause and this has clouded the term even more. 
Moreover in a declaration just after his escape he makes it plain that he was starting to have 
reservations about having joined the parliamentary cause in the first place. This chapter will, 
whilst taking into account the difficulty with the source material at our disposal, suggest that 
the term 'Presbyterian' essentially means constitutional royalism but this is not helpful 
because of they could not agree upon what they objected to most about the revolution. 
5 Underdown. Pride's Purge p. 366-390 for a ftill listing of MPs early political bebaviour. See 
also, Denzil Holles, Memoirs (T. Goodwin, London 1699) p. 210. 
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It is also important to state that the retention of the term Presbyterian does not imply that the 
secluded and abstaining MPs subscribed to a form of religious Presbyterianism. Professor 
Hexter was the first historian to note that there was a problem with the Presbyterian 
independent and it was this article that precipitated the debate upon the nature of allegiances 
6 in the Long Parliament. The historian is confronted with a series of problems when 
attempting to determine the religious beliefs of a group of individuals who lived over three 
hundred years ago. The first is the nature of the available evidence; few of these Presbyterian 
MPs left diaries, statements and letters that provide an insight into their spiritual convictions. 
Even Cromwell's religion is difficult to define within the protestant demarcations established 
by contemporaries and followed by historians. 7 Where it is possible to detennine the religious 
beliefs of these Presbyterian MPs they do not fall into a neat category. Some MPs, for 
example Sir Samuel Luke, favoured a ridged Presbyterianism based upon the Scottish Model. 
Others including Sir Simonds D'Ewes, William Pierrepont and arguably the most famous 
Presbyterian William Prynnc favoured a primitive form of episcopacy. 8 If a generalisation is 
to be made concerning the religious beliefs of the secluded and abstaining members in the 
1640s, it seems that few of them were willing to countenance a rigid Presbyterian settlement 
based upon the Scottish model. Most MPs objected to Laudianism and lended support to the 
crastian church settlement which was established in 1646. As Clare Cross pointed out few 
MPs were willing to substitute "one form of government, prelacy, with another 
Presbyterianism even less susceptible to lay control. "9 This view is supported when it is 
6JH Hexter, See Note 1 above. 
7 J. C. Davis, "Cromwell's Religion" in Morrill (ed), Oliver Cromwell and the English 
Revolution (1990) p. 181-208. Davis found the traditional labels used by contempories as 
being singularly unhelpful when it came to Cromwell's religion. 
8 Underdown, Pride's Purge p. 21 and 63. 
9 Claire Cross, "The Church in England 1646-60", in G. E Aylmer (ed), The Interregnum: The 
Quest for Settlement (1972) p. 10 1. 
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acknowledged that from 1645 onwards the Scots, the Presbyterian Divines and the citizens of 
London waged an intensive campaign to secure the establishment of jure-divino 
Presbyterianism. Mark Kishlansky has shown that from 1645 onwards Parliament was 
subjected, first to petitions and then remonstrances demanding the establishment of a high 
Presbyterian church settlement. The rejection of the proposals of the Westminster Assembly 
shows that few MPs were doctrinaire Presbytcrians. 10 The findings in this chapter will attempt 
to reveal the religious beliefs of the MPs after the purging of Parliament. It was widely 
reported by Royalist writers that the regicide would see the end of any kind of order in church 
and state; for some radicals this was the first step on the way to a new Jerusalem. It would not 
be inconceivable to imagine that the conservative MPs, fearing the breakdown of order lended 
their support to the Divines to halt the possible degeneration into a state of anarchy. This 
would be part of what Professor Davis has called "the rage for confonnity. "11 This chapter 
will suggest, where the sources allow, that this was not the case and that there is much 
evidence of common ground between the Presbyterian laity and the clergy. 
This chapter will not attempt to provide a history of the Presbyterians during the revolution. 
David Underdown's book 'Pride's Purge' provides a very useful narrative of their actions 
between the purge and regicide and he pays particular attention to the activities of the clergy. 
Therefore the chapter will not make too much reference to the reaction of the divines, 
especially between the purge and regicide. The chapter will not deal with the issue of 
Presbyterian involvement in conspiracies. This has already been the subject of a good study 
and the development of conspiracies appears to have commenced after the period covered by 
10 Mark Kishlansky The Rise of the New Model Anny (Cambridge 1979) p. 76-102. Valerie 
Pearl, "London's Counter Revolution" in G. E Alymer, The Interregnum: The Quest for 
Settlement 1646-1660. (1972) 
11 See chapter 5 below. Underdown, Pride's Purge p. 156-7. This was one of the main 
themes of J. C Davis' work on the Ranters, Fear, Myth and Histojy ... the Ranters and the Historians (Cambridge 1986) passim. 
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this thesis. This account will look at the issues raised above concerning the nature of 
Presbyterianism but it will also endeavour to answer one other important issue. As mentioned 
above, the Rump Parliament found itself in an unenviable position in February 1649. It was 
remarkably unpopular and it faced problems from all quarters. Dr Worden has convincingly 
argued that one of the major considerations in the early months of the Rump was to isolate 
Royalists from Presbyterians. It was suggested in chapter one above that the Levellers were 
excluded from influence, partially because of the actions of their leaders. This chapter will 
suggest that sufficient Presbyterians showed enough of a willingness to support the regime so 
as to encourage the Rump to adopt a conciliatory policy. It will be suggested in the conclusion 
that if the Levellers had adopted the same approach the revolution may have been very 
different. 
The last three chapters have attempted to provide a revised account of the purge itself. This 
one will begin with an account of the members excluded as a result of the purges. 
The Purges 
Upon the 4h January 1649 William Prynne claimed that more than two hundred MPs had 
been secluded from Parliament as a result of the Army's "unparalled force upon the House". 12 
Since Prynne's publication, a number of historians have provided their own estimates. 13 There 
12 William Prynne, A Brief Memento to the Present Unparliamenta! y Juncto , T. T. E. 537 (7), 4 th January 1649, p. 3. 
13 The three main texts are Brunton and Pennington Members of the Long Parliament (1968) 
Underdown Pride's Purge; Worden The Rump Parliament. Other texts which have not 
discussed the different findings of these three works include G. E. Aylmer, Rebellion or 
Revolution who places the figure "between 95 and 120 MPs"; David L. Smith "The struggle 
for New Constitutional and Institutional forms" in Morrill ed Revolution and Restoration , p. 16 followed Underdown's figure of 186 secluded members (see below for Underdown's 
methodology. 
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are three studies which stand above the rest. In 1954, Douglas Brunton and Donald 
Pennington suggested that two hundred and fifteen MPs were secluded as a result of Pride's 
purge. 14 Professor Underdown argued that one hundred and eighty six MPs were denied entry, 
with a further forty five imprisoned. 15 Dr Worden questioned both these figures. Worden 
suggested that both totals were too high, and that in all probability no more than one hundred 
and ten MPs (including the imprisoned members) were secluded. The argument outlined 
below, will to an extent support Dr Worden's assertion. There are two reasons which have 
prevented me from accepting his case wholesale. First, he failed to develop his argument; this 
was not a neglect of duty by Dr Worden, since his study concentrated upon the sitting MPs 
rather than those secluded. Second, in this paper, it will be suggested that the number of MPs 
secluded was slightly higher than Worden suggested. 16 
The different findings of these three historians cited above has primarily arisen because of the 
nature of the available evidence. 17 The list of MPs in Pride and Hewson's hands does not 
survive. There are a number of later lists, but. they do not inspire much confidence as they 
make little distinction between the secluded and abstaining MPs. Only two contemporary lists 
survive, but neither can be regarded as foolproof guides as to the number of secluded 
members. 18 Although a number of contemporary newspapers provide useful details of the 
14 D. Brunton and D. H Pennington, Members of the Long Parliament (1968) p. 41-3, p. 225- 
45. 
15 Underdown, Pride's Purge p. 212-13, p. 361-90. 
16 Worden, The Rump, p. 391-2. See also below. 
17 The problem with the source material for the period between 1649 and 1653 is brilliantly 
discussed by Worden, The Rump Parliament p. 348-404. See also, Sean Kelsey, Inventing a 
Republic (Manchester 1997 ) p. 11- 19. 
18 A List of the Imprisoned and Secluded Members, T. T. 669 f. 13 (62), 26 th December 1648. 
A Vindication of the Imprisoned and Secluded Members T. T. E. 539 (5), 23rd January 1649. 
See below Table 1. The problems involved with both sources are discussed below. 
174 
events surrounding the purge, they failed to print the names of the secluded members. A 
number of Presbyterian pamphlets can be consulted but they cannot be entirely trusted. The 
'Presbyterians' were determined to show the notorious nature of the Army's actions. Had they 
admitted that a number of MPs decided to leave Westminster out of their own volition, it 
would have undennined their repetitive onslaughts about the illegality of the purge. 19 
Conversely, the Anny played down the scale of the purge, attempting to persuade the nation 
that they would not be unreasonable. 20 Such problems with evidence are insoluble. What it 
does mean is that it is most difficult to compile a definitive list of secluded MPs. 
Professor Underdown 21 rightly disregarded the later IiStS, 22 arriving at his total of one hundred 
and eighty-six MPs, by making extensive use of the two available contemporary lists. The 
first list he used was almost certainly written by William Prynne. 23 It appeared in the 
pamphlet entitled 'The Vindication of the Imprisoned and Secluded Members', and contained 
the names of ninety-eight MPs. The second list he used was an anonymous publication which 
possessed the names of two hundred and fourteen MPs. Underdown's method was 
straightforward, "collating the anonymous list with Prynne's, excluding the obvious errors 
19 For an account of the Presbyterian opposition see below. Clement Walker, A Complete 
Histo! y of IndependencY, Part 11,4 vols (166 1) p. 33-178. 
20 See A letter of Lord Fairfax ... right understanding between the City and An-ny T. T. E. 475 (32), 8'h December 1648. 
21 Although this section differs from Underdown's account, his remains by far the most 
detailed and useful account of the purges. Pride's Purge p. 143-207. 
22 Brunton and Pennington made extensive use of the later lists; for the difference between 
their findings and Underdown see Members of the Long PaLliament p. 225-45 and 
Underdown, Pride's Purge p. 361-90. 
23 Underdown came to this conclusion. It will be discussed in slightly more detail in my 
forthcoming section upon the Presbyterians - footnote 8 above. 
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and adding the names which do not appear in either. , 24 It is his use of these two sources, 
which I believe, requires qualification. 
Although he did not support his assertion with evidence, Dr Worden described this 
anonymous publication as "patently unreliable". 25 By Underdown's own admission the list 
was not ideal, conceding that "the author must have been working to some extent from 
guesswork". Underdown clearly held four substantial reservations about using the list. First it 
was hastilY compiled. Second, it contained several confusing misspellings. Third, it made no 
distinction between the imprisoned and secluded members. Fourth, it included Herbert Board 
who had been dead for months. Most significantly, Underdown admitted that the author 
"could not possibly have known whether members absent in the country had been actually 
secluded or were merely abstaining voluntaril Y.,, 26 All these justified reservations did not 
prevent Underdown from making extensive use of the list. Eighty-one MPs in his secluded 
category came from the anonymous publication without any supporting evidence. 27 
Apart from Herbert Board mentioned above, Underdown was forced to concede that the 
anonymous publication made a number of errors. 28 William Ashurst, William Pierrepont, 
John Baker and Sir Gilbert Pickering featured in the anonymous publication but were not 
identified by Underdown as secluded MPs. Ashurst and Pierrepont were two of the Long 
Parliament's most prominent politicians. Pierrepont's decision to voluntarily withdraw from 
24 Quoted in Underdown Pride's Purge p. 212. 
25 Worden Rump p. 391. 
26 Underdown, Pride's Purge, p. 212. 
27 See Table 3 below; Underdown, Pride's Purge. p. 361 - 90. 
28 See Table I&3 below. 
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the purged Parliament was reported in the press . 
29 Although he remained critical of the purge, 
30 
as late as 26"' January 1649, he was not identified as one of the Army's opponents. William 
Ashurst remained in Parliament until the I gth December, and was therefore not a victim of the 
three purges. Like Pierrepont, Ashurst was critical of the purges, but he remained "resolved 
not to fall out" with the Army. 31 Although the author of the anonymous publication can be 
excused a few mistakes, the fact that two such high profile politicians were wrongly 
categorised is significant. As mentioned above, Underdown named eighty-one MPs using the 
anonymous publication as his sole reference. Out of these eighty-one MPs, forty-eight have 
untraceable political backgrounds and do not feature in the journals of the House of Commons 
during the five weeks before the original purge. Since the author of the anonymous 
publication was mistaken about Pierrepont and Ashurst, it is surely logical to assume that he 
would have confused a number. of these faceless MPs. 32 
The author of the anonymous publication was not just confused or mistaken upon a few 
isolated occasions. It is clear that he knew very little about the MPs he claimed were secluded. 
He did not know the christian names of forty-three of them; upon nine occasions he wrongly 
asserted a christian name. 33 Underdown felt obliged to alter the author's spelling seventy-two 
times. Although many of these were minor alterations, a number required substantial 
29 Mercurius Elencticus ' T. T. E. 476 (4), Tuesday 5 
th December -Tuesday 12 th December, p. 
53 1; BM Add Mss 37,344 f. 236. 
30 Whitelock Memorials ii p. 509. 
31 William Ashurst, Reasons Against the Agreement of the People T. T. E. 536 (4), 20 Ih 
December 1648, quoted p. 14. Worden, The Rump Parliament p. 24. 
32 See Table 3 below. Underdown, Pride's Purge, p. 361-90. C-J vi, p. 66-93. 
33 The anonymous publication wrongly cited the christian names of Edward Fowell, Sir 
Thomas Parker, Richard Rose, Sir Edward Spencer, Sir William Spring, Sir Thomas 
Trenchard, Sir Simonds D'Ewes. Sir Henry Yelverton, John Thyne; see Table I below. 
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adjustment. Elisha Crymes appeared in the anonymous publication as 'Grimes', Arthur 
Annesley as 'Anslow', Sir Edmund Fowell as 'Edward Vowell', Sir John Hippisley as 'Sir 
John lpsley', Robert Jennings as 'Gennings' and Sir William Uvedale as 'Sir William Udall'. 
William Gell appeared twice in the anonymous publication, but upon both occasions he was 
not granted a christian name. 34 1 have been unable to place two names, those of Tickers' and 
'Gette'. 35 Considering the number of errors in this list, it is impossible to accept it as an 
authentic guide. The list was quickly compiled, probably designed to exaggerate the scale of 
the Army's intervention into the political arena. 
William Prynne's list does not contain the basic errors which characterised the anonymous 
publication. 36 However, Prynne's list does include one fundamental problem; should we 
accept a list compiled by the Army's most outspoken critic? Between the first purge and the 
regicide, Prynne produced an enormous amount of literature. For the most part, his literary 
campaign was designed to discredit the Army and those parliamentarians who remained at 
Westminster. Prynne argued that the purge had prevented an honourable treaty with the King, 
subverted the ancient constitution and produced a military anarchy which would result in the 
ruin of most Englishmen. 37 Prynne needed to demonstrate the grand scale of the Anny's 
attack upon Parliament and he also wished to marginalise the sitting MPs. Therefore, it is 
possible that Prynne exaggerated the number of secluded MPs. 
34 John Birch also appeared twice in the anonymous publication. 
35 A list of the Imprisoned and Secluded Members, T. T. 669 f. 13 (62), 26h December 1648, 
36 See Table 1 below. 
37 Prynne's writings will be fully discussed below. For a discussion of his writings see below. 
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There is one reservation that can be levelled against Prynne's list. Dr Worden noted that 
Prynne's list contained a "suspiciously high proportion of members whose names do not 
appear in the Journals of the House of Commons, at any time during the autumn of 1648" . 
38 
From a close inspection of the attendance records of the MPs in the five weeks before the 
purge, we can support Worden's assertion. Between the I" November and the 5 th December, 
only twenty-eight MPs who figured in Prynne's list appear in the journals of the House of 
Commons. 39 Although I am aware that this cannot be regarded as foolproof evidence which 
utterly discredits Prynne's list, the method is not totally unsatisfactory. There are a number of 
lists detailing the MPs imprisoned at the purge, and this, coupled with Underdown's 
meticulous research, means that we know the names of the forty-five MPs taken into custody 
as a result of the purges . 
40 These imprisoned MPs were obviously secluded from Parliament. 
By using the same method, thirty-six of them attended Parliament in the month before the 
purge. 41 Furthermore, apart from these imprisoned MPs, it is possible to determine the names 
of a further twenty-two MPs who were definitely secluded. 42 Seventeen of these MPs appear 
to have attended Parliament in the month before the purge. This high percentage of 
unmistakably purged MPs appearing in the journals, compared with the low percentage in 
Prynne's list, suggests that the MP for Newport may have confused absenteeism with 
seclusion. Unfortunately, considering the absence of other reliable lists, it is impossible to 
scrutinise Prynne's listings. 
38 Worden, The Rump p. 39 1. Table 1 below. 
39 Cj vi, p. 66-93; Table 1 below. 
40 No alteration to Underdown's figure of 45 is required, Pride's Purge p. 366-90. 
41 See Table 2 below. C. j vi, p. 66-93. 
42 See below. Although he did not cite the sources Worden suggested that (apart from those 
imprisoned) we know the names of "only about twenty of the MPs turned away by the army", 
The Rump p. 391. 
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If we add the imprisoned members to Underdown's List of secluded members, he believed 
that two hundred and thirty-one MPs were denied access to the Commons. If this figure is 
accepted, we have to acknowledge that between the 4h and 6h December, there was a 
dramatic increase in the number of MPs wishing to take their seats. Ludlow stated that one 
hundred and twenty MPs survived Pride's clutches and entered Parliament upon the 6 th; this 
43 figure is supported by evidence in the journals of the House of Commons. Although three 
other purges took place, this resulted in the seclusion of no more than seventy MPs. 44 After 
these deductions, it is clear that Underdown assumed that approximately two hundred and 
eighty MPs turned up for parliamentary duty on the 6"'. The figure is higher than this because 
at least forty MPs were "frighted away" because of the large military presence in London. 45 
Therefore, we are looking at a figure of about three hundred MPs attempting to take their 
seats. This figure is substantially higher than any recorded attendance in the month before the 
purge. The average attendance in that month was one hundred and fifty-six. Although two 
hundred and thirty-eight MPs were in Parliament on the 4 th December '46 this still remains far 
lower than Underdown's figure cited above. It is most unlikely that there would have been 
such a dramatic increase within the space ofjust forty-eight hours. 
43 Cj vi, p. 93. Upon the 7 th December, there was one division in the House with 78 MPs 
votin, ý. A further 50 MPs had been secluded this day which makes 120 MPs attending upon 
the 6 fairly accurate. The Memoirs of Edmund Ludlow (ed. ) CR Firth, vol i, (Oxford 
1894) p. 211. 
44 See below. Seventy is the highest figure. 
45 Clement Walker, A Complete Histojy of Independency part ii, p. 46. Clarendon HistoKy iv, 
p. 515-14; Parliament Under the Power of the Sword, T. T. E 669 f. 13 (54), 7 th December 
1648. 
46 1 have not used the division of the 5 th as a guide. It was very late, and I imagine that a 
number of MPs had retired to bed. The average attendance is worked out from all the 
divisions in the five weeks before the purge Cj vi, p. 66-93. 
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Underdown also used both Prynne's list and the anonymous publication to maximise the 
number of secluded members. According to his list, William Jcphson and William Jesson 
were both secluded. The former appears in Prynne's publication as Colonel William Jephson. 
Prynne did not list Jesson. The anonymous publication listed a 'Jephson'. Underdown 
assumed that this referred to William Jesson; it appears more probably that this was a 
reference to William Jephson. Also, Arthur Owen appears in Prynne's list but Sir High Owen 
does not. The anonymous publication has a single 'Owen'. Underdown appears to have 
automatically believed that this was Sir Hugh Owen. 47 Finally, the evidence Underdown used 
to state that Nathaniel and Francis Bacon were secluded is debatable. Neither man appeared in 
the aforesaid lists. Underdown seems to have come to his conclusion upon the grounds that 
both men sought re-admission into the purged Parliament. This, however, is not an indication 
that they had been forcibly secluded. After the 22 nd February, all MPs who had not attended 
ý 48 Parliament since the 6h December had to provide "reasons for their absence'. This 
procedure was the same for the abstaining and secluded MPs. 
As stated above, there is a major problem with the available evidence. Apart from the forty- 
five imprisoned members, there are only twenty-two MPs who can definitely be identified as 
secluded. Upon the 7 th December, Sir Thomas Dacres, John Doddridge and Sir Edward 
Partheriche wrote to the Speaker, "signifying that coming to attend the House to do their 
duties, they were kept back by force. "49 Eight other MPs wrote a similar letter . 
50 A 
47 See below 
48 Quoted in Ludlow, Memoirs i, p. 223. Worden, The Rump, p. 61. 
49 Cj Vi, p. 94; Cary Memorials ii, p. 74-5; A Perfect Diumall of some Passages in Parliament 
T. T. E. 526 (40) p. 2254; Whitelock, Memorials ii p. 471. 
so C. J vi p. 94; The other MPs are Sir Martyn Lumley, Sir John Temple, George Booth, 
Thomas Waller, Thomas Middleton, Samuel Gardiner, Esay Thomas and Arthur Owen. 
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Presbyterian pamphlet provides information concerning the seclusion of Edward Boys, Sir 
John Hippisley, Mr Packer and John Ashe. 51 James Fiennes' seclusion was reported in the 
52 perfect Occurances of Evejy Day's Journal . 
Edward Wingate's seclusion was mentioned in 
Mcrcurius Elenticus. 53 It can be safely assumed that Arthur Annesley, Zouch Tate and Samuel 
Gott were secluded. They all signed a letter to James Cranford asking him to "License the 
Vindication of the Imprisoned and Secluded members. qi54 Robert Harley was briefly arrested 
55 
at the time of the purge and therefore denied entry. Finally, the MP for Coventry, John 
Barker, was secluded because the event provoked a local riot. 56 
If we add these twenty-two MPs to the forty-five imprisoned members there are only sixty- 
seven MPs who can, from reliable information be identified as secluded members of 
Parliament. For this reason, I believe that it is impossible to compile a definitive list. The 
errors in the anonymous publication make it too dubious to be regarded as an authentic guide. 
Prynne's list remains the most useful source, but the high number of MPs who feature in his 
list, and do not appear in the journals in the month before the purge, suggests that he may 
have mistaken a number of names. However, his total of one hundred and fifty secluded MPs 
51 The Second Part of the Narrative concerning the Armies Force and Violence uRon the 
Commons House and Members, T. T. E. 477 (19), 23 rd December 1648, p. 4 for the seclusion 
of Edward Boys and John Ashe; p. 7 for Sir John Hippisley and Mr Packer. 
52 Perfect Occurrances, T. T. E. 526 (35), Friday I" December - Friday 8 th December 1648, 
p. 755. 
53 Mercurius Elencticus, T. T. E. 476 (4), Tuesday 5h December - Tuesday 12'h December 
1648. 
54 H. M. C. R. part 11. Mss of his Grace the Duke of Portland vol iii, 13 th report, appendix ii, 
(1894) p. 166. 
55 Underdown, Pride's Purge , p. 179. 
56 Ibid. p. 175. 
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(this adds eight MPs mentioned above who do not figure in his list and all the imprisoned 
members) does not appear too high. On the 4 th December 1648 two hundred and thirty-seven 
MPs were in Parliament. If we assume that approximately the same number attempted to gain 
admission on the 6 th December, roughly eighty MPs were secluded on the first day of the 
purge. This figure is attained by acknowledging that one hundred and twenty MPs attended 
Parliament, (i. e. took their seats) with a further forty 'frighted away'. If we then add the fifty 
odd MPs who were secluded between the 7h and 20th December, we come to a figure close to 
one hundred and fifty. 57 This is slightly higher than Worden's figure of one hundred and ten 
but far lower than Underdown's total. My method remains very imperfect. John Evelyn wrote 
that there was "confusion everywhere', 58 at the time of the purges. This was of course, just a 
symptom of the confusion in Army circles about who exactly should be secluded. Moreover, 
the precise personnel was never really an issue, since the purpose of the purge was to produce 
a tractable Parliament that would countenance the execution of the King. Unfortunately this 
has meant that the names and numbers of secluded MPs remain rather elusive. 
The Presbyterian MPs' Response to the Purile. 
The impression created by the amount of published literature upon the reaction of the 
secluded members to the purge certainly suggests that there was a great deal of vocal hostility 
to the Army and the remaining members. The large number of declarations against the illegal 
nature of the Army's assault upon parliamentary politics would superficially suggest that the 
57 John Geree, Might Overcoming Right. A Cleer Answer to Mr. John Goodwin's Might and 
Right well met. 18 th January 1649, T. T. E. 538 (24), p. 28. (This was a letter written to Lady 
Fairfax and her mother Lady Vare. ) 
58 The Diajy of Sir John Evelyp, (ed) E. S. De Beer, 6 vols, , (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1955) Vol ii p. 545. 
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MPs were a united political party mounting a clearly defined political programme. 59 
N4orcover, if their writings were taken at face value, it would be assumed that they stood a 
very good chance of success. 60 The reality of the situation is very different. The vast majority 
of this literature came from the pen of William Prynne 61 so we are often looking at the 
reaction of an individual rather than a group of disaffected politicians. More importantly from 
the scraps of available evidence it is clear that Prynne's method of political attack was not 
shared by all the secluded members. 
William Prynne was not consistent in his writings and actions throughout this period. In the 
few weeks between the purge and regicide he appeared to assume four interrelated postures. 
First, he was the writer who described the plight that faced the honourable (and often ageing) 
imprisoned members. 62 Second, he was the articulate spokesperson for the Presbyterian cause, 
or to be more specific, the cause that favoured the Newport accord. Third, he was capable of 
embarrassing the new Government by not owning their authority. Finally, he was the abusive 
critic of the Army who claimed that the regicide was part of a Jesuit plot. 63 
59 Eg. The Parliament Under the Power of the Sword, T. T. E 669 f. 13,54,7 th December 1648; 
A True and Full Relation of the Armies Force and Violence Upon the House of Commons, 
T. T. E 476 (14), 13 th December 1648; The Second Part of the Narrative Conceming the 
Armies Force and Violence Upon the Commons House, T. T. E 477 (19), 23 rd December 1648. 
Vindication of the Imprisoned and Secluded Members cited above. A Solemn Protestation of 
the Imprisoned and Secluded Members, T. T. E 669 f. 13 (53), 12 th December 1648. A Public 
Declaration and Protestation of the Secluded Members of the House of Commons Against the 
IllejZal Proceedings of Some Confederate Members since their Forcible Exclusion T. T. 669 
f. 13 (88), 13 th February 1649. 
60 See for example A Solemn Protestation cited above. 
61 This appears to have been recognised by David Underdown, Pride's Purge p. 143, n. 2. 
62 A True and Full Relation, The Second Part of the Narrative and Parliament Under the 
Power of the Sword. They are all cited in full n. 59 above. 
63 A Vindication of the Imprisoned and Secluded Members was a coherent response to the 
revolution, and he embarrassed the regime in a pamphlet entitled, The Examination of 
William P! ynne, T. T. E 537 (30), 1 Oth January 1649. 
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Prynne provides detail of the conditions that the imprisoned members had to face during the 
few weeks that they were in custody. The accounts were used extensively by Professor 
Underdown and they provide excellent detail upon how the Army treated the members and 
the solidarity that existed amongst these poor members. As far as scrutiny is concerned we are 
almost compelled to accept them. There are no other accounts accept for the Royalist and 
Presbyterian literature that simply followed the version presented by Prynne. 64 The depiction 
of a brutal Anny goading the distinguished old gentleman is possible but they were directly 
answerable to Fairfax who went to great lengths to ensure that his soldiers behaved in a 
reasonable fashion. If this problem with evidence is insoluble one other claim of Prynne's can 
be disputed. His assertion that the imprisoned members were united in their desire to remain 
in custody until Parliament "was free" proved to be a very short-lived sentiment. As soon as 
prisoners were offered their paroles they were accepted and appear to have left London 
without making any fuss. 65 This is an indication that the imprisoned members were not as 
ideologically opposed to the purge as Prynne suggested. 
The most impressive defence of his cause can be found in a pamphlet entitled 'A Vindication 
of the Imprisoned and Secluded Members'. He may not have written this alone since a 
number of secluded members approached Crawford, a Presbyterian printer, to publish the 
document. 66 Prynne's pen can be identified as the 'Vindication' is similar in style and tone to 
64 Eg. Clement Walker, Independengy Part ii' p. 30-33. 
65 Underdown, Pride's Purge p. 167 and 195. 
66 HMCR vol iii, 14th report, Manuscript of his Grace the Duke of Portland, 16'h January 
1649, p. 166. The MPs were: Arthur Annesley, Edward Stephens, William Strode, William 
Prynne, Edward Harley, Thomas Gewen, Zouche Tate, John Crewe, John Bulkeley, Edward 
Leigh, Samuel Vaughen. 
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the speech that he gave in support of the Newport accord just a few days before the first 
purge. The 'Vindication' defends the stance adopted by the secluded members. It is difficult 
to know how much of the content reflects a genuine belief in their cause because it was 
written for public consumption. The document reminds the Anny of their former oaths and 
how the war had been fought to defend the person of the King. It attempts to counter the 
proposals outlined in the Agreement of the People by stating that Parliament, as it stood on 
the eve of the Newport negotiations, was the representative of the people through election. 
Prynne informed his readers that the Presbyterians had never wished to see any damage done 
to the Army. Prynne also warned about the dangers of allowing the religious toleration but 
there is no reference in this document supporting jure divino Presbyterianism. 67 
A Vindication of the Imprisoned and Secluded Members made some very interesting 
references to the Newport Treaty. Prynne admitted that it was not perfect and was still in need 
of refinement, adding that the MPs were committed to alteration. He also claimed that the 
Newport accord was the best opportunity available to establish control over the King. Prynne 
stated that they had achieved a great deal and asserted that the King would have to become 
accountable to Parliament and suffer restrictions to his power. The document warns that 
regicide would leave a bitter royal family capable of fonning an alliance with a popish power. 
The document concludes with a statement that they were satisfied with their position because 
the projected settlement that they advocated would have provided for a lasting peace. 
The 'Vindication' was published upon the 22 zid January just four days before the regicide and 
despite its attack upon the Army, it demonstrated no remorse for the part played by the 
Presbyterians in the demise of the King. Moreover, this account provides Charles with little 
67 A Vindication cited above. For the Agreement of the People, see Gardiner, Constitutional 
Documents of the Puritan Revolution, 1625-1660' (Oxford 1906), p. 359-371. 
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sympathy for his current position. This document essentially defends the Newport accord 
upon the grounds that it offered the best chance of peace. This was Prynne at his most 
rational but it does not charactcrisc his stance during the revolution. 
Prynne was capable of providing humour. David Underdown has identified examples of this 
quality - they will only be mentioned briefly here. Upon the 20th he turned up with a number 
of imprisoned members to see Fairfax. The General had taken to his bed so Ireton greeted the 
prisoners in his place. On seeing Prynne he ordered him away but Prynne refused and used 
the opportunity to sound his familiar tune by telling Ireton that the Army had subverted the 
laws etc. Ireton, who must have been familiar with Prynne's writings went bright red and left 
the room to calm down. The other occasion was in early January when Prynne was asked to 
come to the House of Commons to be questioned about one of his pamphlets. Prynne refused 
using the excuse that he was a prisoner of the Army and could not leave until he had the 
written authorisation from Fairfax. The unfortunate Fry who had been sent by the Commons 
returned without his illustrious prisoner. 68 
From the serious to the flippant and now to the vindictive. Prynne was always very sure of his 
own goodness, a common theme amongst some of the Presbyterians. 69 'A Brief Memento' 
published on the 5 th January 1649 was an unpleasant attack on the Rump and Army claiming 
that they were part of a Jesuit conspiracy designed to undermine the entire nation. Whereas 
68 Underdown, Pride's Purge p. 167-8; C. J vi p. II 1- 12; The Examination of William PjYnne 
T. T. E 537 (30), IOh January 1649. See also, British Museum the Egerton ManuscriPt, 2618, 
fol. 31 (letter from Prynne to Fairfax. ) 
69 This is the impression that I have gained from two accounts in particular: The DiaKy of the 
Reverend Ralph josselin, 1616-1683 (cd) Alan MacFarlane, New Series III, British Academy 
Records of Social and Economic History(1976). See also British Museum Sloane 
Manuscript, 3945, which is a remarkably flattering account of Christopher Love's life by his 
wife Mary. Unfortunately it tells us very little about his involvement in conspiracies. 
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the 'Vindication' was a reasoned response to the political developments this account could 
only inflame parliamentary opinion - this is exactly what it did. it is difficult to determine 
how seriously Prynne believed in this Jesuit conspiracy. 70 His biographer, William Lamont, 
was convinced that this was a genuinely held conviction. This is possibly true, but during this 
revolutionary period Prynne displayed a complex and fluctuating personality and his 
references to a popish plot were sporadic and certainly not the central theme of his writings 
during these months. 71 
For the purposes of this thesis four important conclusions can be drawn from this brief study. 
First, the most outspoken Presbyterian critic of the new regime failed to produce a consistent 
set of responses to the revolution apart from repeating the fact that he was an MP elected by 
his constituents who was prevented from doing his duty by an unelected Army. Second, this 
man was responsible for the majority of the literature that condemned the purge. It is 
interesting to note that the outspoken polemicist Clement Walker who always printed the 
responses of the secluded members, was very reliant upon the writings of Prynne which 
suggests that others were not as critical. 72 Third, his writings were, in part, designed to 
vindicate his own actions during the Civil War. The purge and the subsequent regicide 
infuriated him but from his writings he should not be regarded as a Royalist. The purge had 
turned him against the Army but he still believed in the stance that he had taken during the 
war. It appears likely, especially from the evidence in the 'Vindication', that he would have 
needed a great deal of persuasion to join the new Stuart cause. Finally Prynne's personal 
70 A Breife Memento to the present Unparliamenta! y Juncto ... T. T E. 537 (7), 4 
th January 
1649; C. J vi, p. II 1- 112. 
71 William Lamont, Marginal P! ynne (1963) p. 186. Also, William Lamont, Puritanism and 
Historical Controversy (1996) p. 15-25. 
72 Walker, A Histoly of Independena, Part ii p. 34-94. 
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crusade certainly declined after his release from custody. There is no evidence to suggest that 
he agreed to tone down his writings in exchange for liberty, but he, like many of his 
colleagues, appears to have gone into temporary retirement. 73 
Other Presbyterian MPs attacked the regime for its reliance upon the Army and the subversion 
of the fundamental laws as a result of the purging of Parliament. These accounts tended to 
come from men whom were imprisoned and likely to face prosecution rather than those in 
temporary custody. 74 They all conformed to the principle adopted by Prynne, of showing how 
the Army was attempting to alter the fundamental laws by preventing these MPs from going 
to the House to perform their duties etc. Thomas Smith recounted to his constituents about 
how he made a vociferous protest upon the day of the purge in a similar fashion to the method 
75 
adopted by Prynne - although he may have exaggerated the scale of his opposition. The 
reactions in the localities varied. As mentioned above John Barker's seclusion provoked a 
riot. But Sir Anthony Irby's constituents, whilst grateful for his services, welcomed the 
reformation and looked forward to the political developments. 76 
73 Ibid. As will be argued below, Walker appears to be running out of proclamations from 
Prynne and any other secluded members after the regicide. 
74 A Declaration of Waller, Massey, Clotworthy and Copley cited in Walker p. 40-4 1. A Short 
Declaration by Colonel Edward Massie T. T. E. 541 (7), 2 nd February 1649. The Kingdoms 
Weekly Intelligence T. T. E. 476 (39), Tuesday I 9'h December - Tuesday 19'h December 
164 8, p. 118 5. 
75 The Charge Against Mr. Thomas Smith Clarke Papers vol ii, p. 160. Contrast this with 
Cary Memorials ii p. 74-5 and CJ vi p. 94-5. 
76 Underdown, Pride's Purge p. 175. A Letter Written to the Honourable Member of the 
Commons, Sir Anthony Irby (from his constituents at Boston, thanking him for his services) 
T. T. E. 669 f. 13 (59), 20th December 1648. 
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Not all of the MPs adopted a confrontational posture. Some MPs merely wrote to the Speaker 
informing him of their seclusion without passing comment upon the actions of the Army. 
Dacres and Dodderidge merely informed Lenthall that they had been told by the Army that 
their "names were both on a list" and that they were not permitted to perform their duties. 77 
Most appear to have returned to their localities accepting that there was little they could do. 
The problems with evidence is more apparent here than in any other part of the thesis. It is 
obvious that these MPs objected to the purge but there is no evidence that they were willing to 
risk the wrath of the Anny by publicly attacking the purge and the subsequent regicide. There 
is evidence, however, that these men may not have been as committed to their cause as 
Prynne's writings suggest. As a symbol, the purging of Parliament is the illustration of how 
the Anny controlled the political nation. But this was not an Anny that concerned itself with 
the repression of opinions. On many occasions a pamphlet critical of the purge was followed 
by a response from a supporter of the Army making it plain that there was more to their cause 
than the sword. Prynne, Sedgwick and the Presbyterian divines were not punished for their 
writings and some of them were very critical of the purge and the regicide. The press 
remained relatively free as journalists pursued a variety of positions upon the revolution. The 
Presbyterians had the opportunity to vent their opposition but it appears that they chose not 
to. 78 
On the 20'h of January William Ashurst produced a pamphlet entitled 'Reasons Against The 
Agreement of the People'. Ashurst had survived the purging of Parliament but he left in 
77 See Cary Memorials ii and Cj cited in n. 75 above. 
78 For Sedgwick's pamphlets see below. For the Army's defence of their position see (eg): A 
Just Vindication of the Reputation of Mr White E. 538 (10) 13 th January 1649. A Vindication 
of the AMy T. T. E, 538 (29), 22 nd January 1649. An Answer of the Cities Representatives 
Set Forth by some Ministers of the Gospel T. T. E. 541 (23), 7 th February 1649. John Price, 
Clerico-ClassicumT. T. E. 554 (1), 1 gth February 1649. 
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protest soon after the 20th December. He was regarded by contemporaries as a leading 
Presbyterian, but the survival of this document demonstrates the lack of unity amongst the 
Presbytefians. 79 
He began by telling his readers that he and a group of colleagues were opposed to the 
Agreement of the People, and that he decided to write his reservations because he believed 
that it "was unchristian and unsafe to let so great dissatisfactions live privately. " He then 
outlined his view that subscription to the Agreement of the People would be detrimental to the 
kingdom. He suggested that if it were implemented the nation would be in perpetual strife as 
each new parliament would endeavour to make its own laws. He outlined the perennial 
warnings about the dangers of allowing religious liberty and how this would result in 
"anarchy and confusion" The paper defended the existing constitution upon the grounds that 
the implementation of the Agreement would result in more civil strife. Ashurst is presenting 
the case for peace after the period of civil conflict and he believed that this was best served by 
returning to familiar territory and for him this was a mixed monarchy. His attitude to Charles 
is rather ambiguous. In the pamphlet he stated that the proposals outlined in the Agreement 
would remove kings, "not only this one. " It is possible therefore that Ashurst may have 
accepted deposition provided that the institution of monarchy remained. The pamphlet still 
refers to Charles' party as the common enemy and one of his central arguments was based 
upon the notion that the projected settlement would divide the "cause. "80 
79 Worden, The Rump p. 24. Wood, Athanic Oxonienses, (3 vols 1692), vol ii p. 8 1. 
80 William Ashurst, Reasons Against Agreement with a Paper Entitled Foundations of 
Freedom; or, the Agreement of the People T. T. E 536 (4), 26h December 1648. 
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This is a very important piece of evidence concerning a Presbyterian MP who objected to the 
purging of Parliament. The events upon the 6h had infuriated him but he was still not willing 
to sever his connections with the parliamentary cause. Moreover, this document was far more 
concerned about the Agreement of the People than it was with the purging of Parliament and 
he showed little regard for the plight of the King. He only supported the retention of tithes 
because a suitable alternative had not been found - this was not a Presbyterian who bitterly 
resented the Anny's role in politics. For Ashurst and his friends it was not the purge but the 
Agreement that was the concern. Moreover, he still regarded himself as part of the 
parliamentary cause, and his reasoned and polite reservations meant that many in Parliament 
would listen to him. Ashurst's opponents believed that his opinions had the support of a 
number of secluded members. 81 
The two case studies cited above suggest that there is little evidence that a new united group 
emerged to put up resistance to the purge and regicide. In addition to the pamphlets written 
above there appears to have been one other'method of Presbyterian hostility to the new 
regime. Direct appeals to the Lord General himself. On the 3 oth December a secluded member 
wrote to Fairfax pleading with him to spare the King's life upon the grounds that he would 
not achieve divine forgiveness if he did not act. Colonel Harley also wrote to Fairfax a week 
before the regicide asking him to intervene to stop the trial of the King. In both these letters 
the authors made their affection towards Fairfax plain. This must have added to the burdens of 
the General who disapproved of the trial and faced considerable pressure from his wife and 
his friends to intervene. These two letters show the diversity of the Presbyterian MPs response 
81 For Ashurst Ibid. For the belief that the secluded and abstaining members united see the 
response to Ashurst's pamphlet entitled The State of the Kingdom Represented to the People 
T. T. E 539 (14), 25 th January 1649, p. I. 
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to the regicide; 82 Prynne focussed upon the assault on parliamentary liberties, Ashurst 
concerned himself with the projected settlement at Whitehall and these two MPs were 
concerned about the person of the King. 
The evidence produced here suggests that there was not a collective response to the purging 
of Parliament. After the regicide the Presbyterians were much quieter, and although they did 
produce one document that was Royalist in tone it is unlikely that it represented mainstream 
Presbyterianism. 'A Public Declaration and Protestation of the Secured and Secluded 
Members' followed the traditional line used by Prynne of attacking the purge upon the 
grounds that it was an assault uPon the liberties of Parliament, which were enshrined in 
documents such as Magna Carta, the Oaths of Allegiance and the Solemn League and 
Covenant. It then went on to attack the new regime promising that the Presbyterians in the 
land would join with their brethren in Scotland and restore Charles II as king. This document 
coincided with the publication of two other Presbyterian pamphlets. The first was 'A 
Declaration of the Peers ... ' purporting to represent the views of the entire aristocracy; this 
too promised to support the pretensions of Charles Stuart. The last pamphlet in this trio was 
entitled 'Six Propositions of Undoubted Verity', which followed the lines of Prynne's earlier 
interventions attacking the illegality of the purge but making no reference to siding with the 
King. 83 The perennial problem with regard to these public declarations remains. It is 
82 A Letter of Advice from a Secluded Member of the House of Commons to Lord Fairfax, 
signed E. S, T. T. E 536 (38), 3 Oth December 1648. It is likely that this was the MP for 
Tewkesbury, who was imprisoned at the purge. (See Underdown, Pride's Purge p. 386 for his 
political background. ) Colonel Edward Harley to Fairfax 23 rd Janua! y 1649, HMCR, The 
Manuscript of his Grace the Duke of Portland, 14 th report, 1894, p. 167-8. 
83 A Publike Declaration and Protestation of the secluded Members, 669 f. 13. (88), 13 th 
February 1649; A Declaration of the Peers of this Realme ..., T. T. 669 f. 13. (84), 8 
th 
February 1649; See also CSPD 1649-50, p. 1-4; Six Propositions of Undoubted Verity T. T E, 
541. (13), 5 th February 1649. 
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impossible to determine the number of people who supported these documents and who wrote 
them. From the evidence in his other writings it is unlikely that Prynne wrote the 'Public 
Declaration', because most of his other writings had not advocated resistance to the new 
regime by supporting Charles 11. 
The publication of these three documents effectively marked the end of the attacks upon 
Parliament by the secluded members. Clement Walker printed most of the declarations made 
by the Presbyterian MPs in the weeks after the purge. Most of the accounts cited above appear 
in his book A Cornl2lete Histo! y of IndependencY as he was keen to show the depth of the 
Presbyterian hostility. Although the book is one-sided, abusive and patently unreliable in 
detennining the activities of the MPs who took their seats, it does provide a vital clue about 
the activities of the Presbyterian MPs. The events between the purge and regicide marked the 
high point of the Presbyterian opposition to the revolution and most of the accounts were 
either printed in full or surnmarised by Walker. He also included a batch of articles which 
appeared in the middle of February, but after that date there was remarkably little detail of 
Presbyterian hostility. We can conclude, with a degree of confidence that the MPs apparently 
decided to end their public protestations. After February, Walker had to be content with 
making personal attacks against the grandees and highlighting the Leveller hostility to the 
new regime. 84 It is interesting to note that Nathaniel Fiennes, Thomas Lane, John Barker, 
George Booth, John Dodderidge, Samuel Gardiner, Thomas Middleton Sir Richard Onslow, 
Thomas Strode, Zouche Tate, Sir John Temple, Edward Vaughan; twelve of the MPs that we 
know for certain were secluded at the purge, were nominated as commissioners for the 
Assessment . There is no evidence that they voiced any objection. Moreover, at least ninety- 
nine of the secluded or abstaining members were nominated as commissioners with no 
84 Walker, Independengy, part ii p. 32-125 and p. 125-185. The forraer contains far more upon 
the public declarations of MPs. 
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recorded protest. The list of conunissioners was not entirely indiscriminate; the most vocal 
opponents, William Prynne and Clement Walker were not on the list - the two men who were 
trying to depict the existence of an enraged political party. 85 
The evidence presented here suggests that-the Presbyterian MPs were not united upon how to 
respond to the revolution. It has also suggested that this opposition was not particularly 
widespread and it complements the activities of the majority of the peers. There is, however, 
one generalisation that can be made. The English Presbyterian MPs were very different to 
their namesakes in Scotland. Professor Hutton noted that the Scottish Parliament declared for 
Charles II on the 5th February because the regicide had offended the two impulses of the 
covenanting movement The first was the religious due to the breach of the Solemn League 
and Covenant. The second was the patriotic because they had killed the King of the Scots 
without reference to that nation. This is undoubtedly the right order. The letters coming from 
Scotland complained about the breach of covenant and the dangers of "toleration" before 
referring to the affront to the person of the King. 86 The English Presbyterian MPs were 
primarily concerned about the liberties of Parliament and then they would move to a 
discussion of the dangers of toleration and the attack upon the King's person. They always 
began with the first but the order varied with the other two. As mentioned above, their 
principle concern about religion was the danger of toleration. It was mentioned earlier that 
few of the MPs before the revolution of 1648/9 were doctrinaire religious Presbyterians. It 
can be suggested that this remained the case after the revolution. 
85 These are taken from C. H Firth and R. S Rait (eds), The Acts and Ordinances of the 
Interregnum 1642-1660 3 vols, (1911), vol ii, p. 31-47. 
86 Ronald Hutton, Charles 11 (Oxford 1989) p. 37; Gardiner, Constitutional Documents 
p. 267-271; A Letter from the Commissioners of Scotland to William Lenthall T. T E. 539 
(10), P. 1-9. 
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In the conclusion to chapter three it was argued that many of the peers left politics because 
they did not have the will to risk another conflict in the name of Charles Stuart. The findings 
in this chapter suggest that this sentiment was shared by the Presbyterian MPs. Even the most 
outspoken found it difficult to demonstrate any real sorrow for the King, and despite the 
depths of their hostility to the purge their writings do not tend to show an inclination to 
support the Royalist cause. Historians have demonstrated the divisions that existed at the 
Royalist court in exile upon the issue of allegiance with their former Presbyterian foes. 87 
From the majority of the Presbyterian writings it is evident that they, in turn, had little 
sympathy for the Royalist cause. The opponents of the regicide remained deeply divided and 
this must have been some comfort to the new Government. 
The Presbyterian CleKgy 
This section will not attempt to provide a narrative of the activities of the Presbyterian clergy. 
David Underdown has provided a detailed and accurate account of their activities between the 
purge and the regicide and there is no need for any revision of his thesis, and Blair Worden 
has shown how this clerical opposition continued into the Rump. 88 It is clear from these two 
accounts that the clergy were the most vocal opponents of the new regime and that they did 
attempt to mobilise opinion against the regicide. This section will look at how they regarded 
the secluded members and what form their oPposition took. The findings are mainly taken 
from the clergy in London although I have drawn upon declarations from the localities. 
87 Ronald Hutton, Charles II p. 40-42. 
88 Underdown, Pride's Purge p. 146-7,152-3,161-4,174-8,194-5 Worden, The Rump p. 8 I- 
3,184,213,222-3,243-8. 
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The clergy, as we would expect, based their opposition to the regicide upon the grounds that it 
breached the Solemn League and Covenant. This was at the forefront of their aims and 
features in all of their protestations. But their response to the revolution shows that they were 
an extremely articulate group, who used their religious beliefs to launch an impressive 
defence of political and religious Presbyterianism. 
Between the purge and the regicide, the Presbyterian Divines in London produced three very 
detailed. documents that outlined their political and religious stance. The first was a letter to 
Fairfax that was deliberately published on the 18 th January. It claimed to be a defence of their 
decision not to engage in the Whitehall debates. They took eighteen pages to vindicate their 
position as seemingly implacable opponents of the revolution. It begins with an attack upon 
the Army for "seizing and imprisoning the King's person" when their brief had been to 
"defend his person. " The clergy also defended their stance throughout the Civil War 
reasserting the case that war had been fought to defend the person of the King from his evil 
councillors and settle the Protestant religion. But this official publication was not full of 
polemical attacks against the Army. As Professor Underdown has shown, this was the case in 
particular congregations but this document was more cautionary in tone. It advocated the 
retention of the King, but instead of outright condemnation, it offered an olive branch. it 
reminded the Army that they were "once honourable and precious in their eyes. " The 
document concludes with a plea to the Army to mend their ways so the Godly could unite. 89 
On the 24 th January another document was produced by the London clergy entitled 'An 
Apologetical Declaration. This outlined the same arguments cited above but placed even 
89 A Serious and Faithful Representation of the Judgements of the Ministers of Gospel T. T. E. 
538(25), 18 th January 1649. For examples of opposition see Worden and Underdown cited in 
n. 88 above. 
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more attention to the breaking of the Solemn League and Covenant. As the regicide 
approached this document was more forthright than the last, warning that their calling would 
never allow them to be silent. This was far more threatening carrying the tacit warning that 
they were willing to suffer persecution for their cause. However, it was similar to the letter to 
Fairfax in that it defended their participation in the Civil War and although it provided a 
stringent defence of Charles upon the grounds that his life had been guaranteed, it did not 
demonstrate too much concern for his person. 90 
The third document was entitled 'The Vindication of the Ministers of the Gospel' which was 
published just three days before the regicide. It was a fannidable, attack upon the Army and it 
categorically asserted that they would encourage their congregations to stand against the 
regicide upon the grounds that the act was contrary to the word of God. It was by far the most 
forceful document produced by the Assembly of Divines during this period. 91 
The three documents cited above demonstrate the strength of feeling generated by the 
revolution amongst the London clergy. It also portrays a degree of organisation behind the 
scenes, demonstrated by the cumulative radicalisation of the threats as the regicide dawned. It 
also shows how much pressure the Army and Parliament came under from this influential 
body of people and why the defenders of the Army would write pamphlets that attacked the 
clergy for meddling in politics. 92 This was the official face of the Westminster Divines but 
others members of the clergy were railing against the new regime, some of whom had been 
closely associated with political and religious radicalism. 
90 An Apolegetical Declaration 24 th January 1649, E. 539 (9) 
91 A Vindication of the Ministers of the Gospel T. T. E. 540 (11), 27h January 1649. 
92 John Drury, A Case of Conscience Resolved T. T. E 548 (29), p. 2-30. In this pamphlet Drury 
suggests that Presbyterians should be concerned with preaching for peace and unity, see 
especially p. 30. 
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One of the new brand of Presbyterians was William Sedgwick, although in one of his 
pamphlets he described himself as a Royalist. He produced a number of tracts that had one 
theme. He wanted to see the preservation of the King because he believed that this was the 
only means of preserving peace. But his attitude to the Army was not consistent. In a 
pamphlet produced upon the ll'h December he expressed outright contempt for their 
actions. 93 He accused them of confusing justice with malice suggesting that their arrears of 
pay was the guiding principle behind their actions. This was followed by another pamphlet 
produced on the 20'h. It was not so intemperate against the Army and he produced a series of 
recommendations for a settlement that would have preserved the King, but allowed for the 
introduced of an Act of Oblivion. 94 Three days later he appeared to have changed tact again 
admitting that he had been too harsh on the Army. He asserted that they had a right to demand 
reform and he accepted that God had revealed his anger for Charles. He accepted the Army's 
right to have intervened in politics in 1647 but now he politely pointed out that they had gone 
too far. He condemned a number of the Presbyterian MPs for being too lenient with the King 
seeing this as a wonderful opportunity for the Army to act as mediators between the factional 
95 
groups in Parliament. Sedgwick may have been trying a number of ploys to persuade the 
Army to deviate from their desire to. kill the King or he may not have been sure himself about 
what he believed in. Whatever the reason he was not providing any coherence to the 
Presbyterian cause. 
93 Sedgwick, Justice upon the Annie Remonstrance T. T. E. 475 (34), 1 ph December 1648, 
p. 31 where he claimed to be a Royalist. 
94 The Spiritual Madman T. T. E. 477 (9), 20th December 1648. 
95 




Other Presbyterians were willing to vent their hostility against the Army. Perhaps the most 
unequivocal was John Geree who sent an open letter to Lady Fairfax and her mother Lady 
Vere accusing the Army of being in league with the devil. He was full of support for the 
secluded members and made the rather amusing remark that the King had asked for the 
imprisonment of five members and was denied, whereas the Army had imprisoned forty and 
secluded over a hundred. 96 Such a hostile approach was not shared by all the Presbyterian 
ministers. John Gauden made it plain that he disliked the Army but he was still very fond of 
their persons. Yet, a pamphlet claiming to represent the views of many counties warned the 
Army and Parliament that all their actions were, from the first day of the purge, illegal. This 
pamphlet adopted a novel form of pressure by naming the MPs who were associated with the 
purge and warning them of their impending unpopularity if they proceeded to execute the 
King. 97 
The reaction of the Presbyterian clergy reveals a number of important issues about the nature 
of the English Revolution. First, it shows the nature of religious Presbyterianism at the time of 
the regicide. The Assembly of Divines did produce a coherent response to the events before 
the regicide. As mentioned above they based their philosophy upon an attachment to the 
Solemn League and Covenant which promised to preserve the King's life and establish 
national Presbyterianism which, in their view, was embodied in the Newport settlement. The 
purge had shattered that prospect and brought about the spectre of religious toleration. This 
96 Might Overcoming Right E. 538 (24), 181h January 1649, especially p. 24-8; See also, C. V 
Wedgwood, The Trial of Charles I (1964), p. 111. 
97 The Religious and Loyal Protestation of John Gauden. T. T. E. 538 (11), 5 th January 1649; 
For another example of a mild response see George Gillespie, A Useful Case of Conscience 
T. T. E. 539 (12), 25h January 1649; A Remonstrance and Declaration of Several Counties and 
Boroughs' T. T. E. 536 (23), 23d December 1648. 
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fear of toleration was at the heart of all the literature that appeared during the revolution. 
There were very few theoretical justifications of their own doctrine although they were at 
pains to point out that God was waiting in judgement to determine the true nature of man's 
deeds. This was a warning that they should not rely upon immediate providence as a symbol 
of God's intentions. Thomas Watson, in a sermon before the House of Commons, quoted 
psalm 50.21 that states that God watched evil deeds in silence and would later cast his 
judgement. 98 But the findings in this section suggest that there was even division amongst the 
clergy upon the manner in which they should respond to the revolution. This is another 
indication that Presbyterianism meant little more than an aversion to revolution. Although the 
clergy prayed heartily for the imprisoned members and identified the two causes, the clergy 
did not receive the support from the MPs that they so desperately needed. 99 
The clergy were the main opposition to the revolution. As David Underdown has shown they 
caused the Army Council a great deal of trouble which precipitated a warning upon the 22 nd 
December that further hostility would be greeted with a draconian response from the Anny. 100 
In contrast, the Royalists were cowed and although they printed a number of pamphlets they 
were not in a position to act. The lack of potency in their cause was demonstrated in one 
pamphlet that stated that a certain Major White advocated the regicide and his wagon 
promptly overturned killing the unfortunate man. This may have pleased a royalist audience 
but it shows that they were incapable of influencing any kind of policy in the weeks leading 
98 Thomas Watson, Gods Anatomy Upon Mans Heart, T. T. E. 536 (7), 27 th December 1648, 
especially p. 3-6. 
99 Underdown, Pride's Purge p. 163. 
loo lbid 
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up to the regicide. 101 The members of the clergy believed that they could influence policy and 
this explains why they continued their protests right up until the regicide. It should have 
become clear that these were hostile in tone and represented a direct challenge to the Army. 
This challenge did not end after the regicide. 
In the first week after the execution it was reported that castles were being secured in 
Lancashire. 102 The public were made aware that a union existed between the Royalist and the 
Presbyterian clergy in Manchester. A letter from Devon in the same week complained that the 
Presbyterian clergy were inciting their congregations to act against the new regime. 103 It was 
feared that the general level of poverty was providing the clergy with the opportunity to incite 
local inhabitants against Parliament and the Army. 104 The problem in Lancashire appears to 
have been the most serious area of discontent. Letters sent to London suggested that Ashton's 
forces, which should have been disbanded, were still in arms - they warned that he was 
capable of launching a counter revolution. ' 05 As a political force the Presbyterians continued 
to mount a campaign against the new regime. One pamphlet produced on the 2 nd of March 
101 The Visible Vengeance T. T. E. 476 (40), 19'h December 1649. It was rather surprising that 
a parliamentary pamphlet refuted the testimony, see A Just Vindication of the Reputation of 
Mr White T. T. E. 538 (10), 13 th January 1649. 
102 The Moderate Intelligence , T. T. E 541 (27), Thursday I" February - Thursday 8 
th 
February 1649. 
103 The Kingdomes Faithful and Impartial Scout, T. T. E. 542 (2), Friday 2 nd February - Friday 
9'h February 1649, p. 12. 
104 The Moderate Intelligence , T. T. E. 548 
(30), Thursday 20th March - Thursday 27 Ih March 
1649, p. 2006. 
105 The Impartial Intelligencer, E. 550 (18), Wednesday I lo'April - Wednesday I 8th April 
1649, p. 43. 
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attacked the Presbyterians for raising the prospect of another civil war. 106 In these 
circumstances we are left with the question as to why Parliament tolerated their hostility. 
One of the reasons for this has been explained by Blair Worden. The conservative nature of 
the MPs ensured that they would not wish to crush a cause, for which they had a great deal of 
sympathy. As mentioned in chapter one, his depiction of the conservative nature of the MPs 
does not require major revision. 107 But other factors demand consideration. 
Despite the depth of the Presbyterian opposition one factor remains fairly consistent. The 
clergy and the MPs did not regret the part that they had played in the Civil War. When 
Cromwell would later talk of the 'Union of the Godly', he would have had the Presbyterians 
in mind. It would not have been lost to the MPs that the transition from supporting the 
parliamentary cause in the 1640s to fighting for an untrustworthy Stuart would have been 
difficult for many Presbyterians. Considering that there was not a deep rooted attachment 
among the religious and lay Presbyterians, the prospect of appeasing, at least elements of this 
group, made good political sense. As I have mentioned on many occasions in this thesis, the 
background to all of the decisions taken by the Rump must be seen in the context of the grave 
dangers that faced the regime. 
Further encouragement would have come from some of the utterances made by the 
Presbyterians. As mentioned above, the 'Apologetical Declaration' still demonstrated a 
certain respect for the Anny. A petition from Banbury just three days before the regicide, 
106 A Gospel EWLinc T. T. E. 545 (29), 2 nd March, p. 1-22. 
107 Worden, The Rump, passim. 
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called for the retention of the King's person and the normal Presbyterian demands for the 
preservation of the true Protestant religion and an adherence to the Solemn League and 
Covenant. But before these demands were stipulated they made their loyalty and gratitude to 
the Anny patently clear. Moreover, their demands were not based solely upon religion. The 
principle objection to regicide was founded upon the fact that this would inflame foreign 
nations and provoke another war. 108 On the 7 th February, after consultation with the Assembly 
of Divines, the clergy in Lancashire produced their opinion of the regicide. As we would 
aspect it was very critical of the new Government, but it still advocated a Godly union under 
the Presbyterian mantle. 109 A Presbyterian pamphlet published on the 8h March entitled, 'The 
Essex Watchmen's Watchword', called for an end to any kind of religious toleration, and it 
was critical of the Parliament for deviating from its war aims. However, the document which 
had sixty two subscribers was principally concerned with the prospect of the implementation 
of the Agreement of the People. It is significant to note that the Royalists were still described 
as "malignants" and the objection to the Agreement was in part based upon a fear that it 
would allow papists and Royalists to hold office. ' 10 The same description of the Royalists was 
found in another long Presbyterian pamphlet which appeared on the 3rd April 1649. The 
pamphlet entitled, 'A Modest and Clear Vindication' was a response to Price's pamphlet, 
'Clerico-Classicum', which had launched a sustained attack upon the Presbyterians. As with 
the pamphlets cited above, it continued to identify the normal Presbyterian grievances but the 
author of this publication was not contemplating a Presbyterian counter revolution. "' 
108 The Humble Advice and Earnest Desires of Certain Well-affected Ministers of Banbu! y 
and Brackley, T. T. E. 540 (12), 27 th January 1649, especially p. 3 and 6. 
109 A Solemn Exhortation made and published to the Several Churches of Christ within the 
Province of Lancaster T. T. E. 542 (7), 7 th February 1649, especially p. 15. 
110 The Essex Watchmen's Watchword, T. T. E. 546 (11), 8h March, especially p. 6-10. 
111 A Modest and Clear Vindication, T. T. E. 549 (10), 3 Td April 1649. Also, T. Price, Clerico- 
Classicum, T. T. E. 544 (1). 
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Finally, a great deal of this Presbyterian opposition was based upon an attempt to prevent the 
implementation of the Agreement of the People. ' 12 Although some Presbyterians would 
become involved in conspiracy with the cause celebre, being the case of Christopher Love in 
165 1, the Presbyterians were not united in a desire to overthrow the Commonwealth. In the 
introduction to this thesis, it was stipulated that one of the aims was to identify Presbyterian 
petitions. Whilst this has been a futile exercise it is clear that many Presbyterians still 
influenced the direction of the Government's policy. Their heterogeneous character, coupled 
with an indication in certain quarters that they would acquiesce with the new regime, ensured 
that their views would be considered. It was not, therefore, inevitable that the MPs would 
have attempted to appease the Presbyterians. Had they all been intent upon making excessive 
attacks upon the new regime, they would have left Parliament with no choice but to destroy 
them. 
Conclusions. 
This study suggests that the divisions that existed in the 1640s between the two strands of 
Presbyterianism were not overcome as a result of the revolution. They did not join forces to 
form a group which felt that they were part of a disinherited minority. They were unable to 
launch a united campaign aimed at undermining the new regime. This contrasts quite starkly 
with the unity that was achieved in the Commons. Even the Presbyterian clergy adopted a 
variety of postures, and the divisions which existed among the MPs almost make the term 
more misleading than it is illuminating. As far as the apparent protestations of the secluded 
112 There are examples of this in most of the pamphlets cited in the text and in the notes 
above. The best examples are found in William Ashurst's pamphlet and in the Essex 
Watchman's Watchword, in n. I 10 above. 
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members were concerned, we should perhaps describe them as Trynneism' rather than 
Presbyterianism. As mentioned above, the term still retains its value since men such as 
Ashurst and Sedgwick were described as part of the Presbyterian movement. 
The very term Presbyterian is not misleading solely because of its religious connotations. The 
problem is compounded by the natural assumption to link the movement in England with the 
one in Scotland. The declarations from the Covenanter party in Scotland were far more 
vociferous in their desire to seek revenge for the breach of covenant. In England, such 
proclamations were the exception rather than the norm. 
In the first chapter of this thesis, it was suggested that Cromwell wanted to welcome all the 
sons revolution to support the post regicide settlement. The MPs also wanted to consolidate 
their position and the activities of some Presbyterians gave them cause to believe that there 
was at least some hope that they would support the new regime. They were willing to punish 
Presbyterians who disobeyed ordinances, illustrated by the arrest of Thomas Cawton for 
praying for the exiled King. 113 Yet, on the other hand, they retained the system of tithes and 
the Agreement of the People was cast aside. This was not only due to the conservatism of the 
MPs. It had as much to do with the circumstance of needing to send an army to Ireland allied 
to the respective responses of the Presbyterians and the Levellers. On the 2 nd April 1649 the 
Lord Mayor of London, Reynoldson, appeared before the House of Commons. This 
Presbyterian had. refused to proclaim the act abolishing kingship. When he was asked to 
explain his actions he responded with these words: 
"[his] conscience being charged as it was, with several oaths at and before the entering of his 
mayoralty he could not dispense with it in proclaiming that Act; and that he hath done it. " 
113 Worden, The Rump, p. 81-2 and 196. 
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The Commons refused to accept this excuse and they placed him in the tower for one month 
and fined him two thousand pounds, which was to be distributed to the poor in London. This 
demonstrates how seriously Parliament took the enforcement of their Ordinance, but this was 
mild in comparison to Lilburne. On the 29th March he published 'The Second Part of 
Englands New Chains Discovered. ' In this publication he accused the present Parliament of 
exceeding "in the nature and measure all the wickedness" of both the Royalist and 
Presbyterian parties put together. As mentioned above, the attack by Lilburne was described 
as a declaration of war against the Parliament and the Grandees. 1 14 This in many ways 
represents the different approaches of the Levellers and the Presbyterians. In such 
circumstances it can come as no surprise that the former were crushed and the latter were at 
least listened to. 
114 Cj vi, p. 177. For Lilburne see "The Second Part of Englands New Chains Discovered' in 




It will have become clear from both the text and the footnotes in the preceding chapters, that 
newspapers feature as a major source in this study of the English Revolution. There are both 
positive and negative reasons for this. On the positive side, as will be argued, newspapers do 
provide valuable evidence upon both the supporters and opponents of the new regime. 
Moreover, they are genuinely contemporary which contrasts with so much of the information 
upon the revolution' It was made clear in the second chapter of this thesis that the 
retrospective accounts of a conflict between the Army and the Parliament owed more to the 
events of April 1653 than they did to the Anny's interventions in 1648. On the negative side, 
as Professor Worden, and more recently Dr Kelsey found, historians have little option but to 
make use of newspapers due to the dearth of private correspondence and the limitations of the 
surviving diaries. 2 Considering that this thesis has found no new piece of evidence which 
dramatically illuminates the actions and motivation of the participants under scrutiny, it seems 
appropriate to make an assessment of these sources. For the purposes of this thesis there is a 
very compelling case to make such a study; in my chapter upon Cromwell, a number of pages 
were devoted to the questioning of Marchamount Nedham's account of Cromwell's attempts 
11 have followed the views outlined by Mark Kishlansky, The Rise of the New Model Arrny 
(Cambridge 1979), p. 1, of being very suspicious of evidence which was not strictly 
contemporary. 
2 Blair Worden, The Rump Parliament 1648-53 (Cambridge 1974), p. 398-404; Sean Kelsey 
Inventing a Republic (Manchester 1997) p. 11; J. S. A Adamson, 'The Peerage in Politics 1645- 
1649' (PhD thesis, Cambridge 1986) p. 257-279. Adamson is a good example of a historian 
who consulted a vast number of manuscripts until his final chapter which dealt with the 
period covered in this thesis. Blair Worden, A Voyce from the Watchtower (Camden Fourth 
Series 21, Part 5,1978), p. 55-80. Blair Worden, review Spalding, "The Diary of Bulstrode 
Whitelock" EHR (108), (1993) p. 122-34; Some of the diaries used include: Edmund Ludlow, 
Memoirs ed. C. H Firth, 2 vols (Oxford 1894). John Evelyn, Diafy (ed) E. S de Beer 6 vols, 
(Oxford 1955). Bulstrode Whitelock, Memorials of the English Affairs, 4 vols (Oxford 
1853). Clement Walker, The Complete Histoa of Independency (1661). Ralph Josselin., _The DiaKy of Ralph Josselin 1616-1683', (ed. ) Alan Macfarlane. British Academy, Records of 
Social and Economic History, new series, iii (1916). 
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to spare the King's life. 3 In an attempt to show that I have not blindly relied upon the 
prejudices of other journalists, this chapter will place the newspapers within the context of the 
respective political attitudes of all the main journalists. 
The second and equally important reason for writing this chapter is novelty. It is the first work 
upon the press which concentrates upon the revolution itself. There are a number of excellent 
studies upon the press but they tend to cover a wider period and they possess a different 
agenda to my work. 4 This chapter will attempt to deal with the attitude of the press to the 
political groups which have been considered in the previous chapters. In the process, this will 
lead to comments upon censorship, the political influences of the journalists, the amount of 
information available to the general public and how the newspapers support or refute general 
trends in political historiography. 
Gilbert Mabbott used his position as the Government's official censor to produce the most 
5 lively and politically adept newspaper. A copy of the Moderate was available every week 
during this revolutionary period, 6 and it is clear that Mabbott was a man of strong political 
3 See cbapter one above 
4 A. N. B Cotton, 'London Newsbooks in the Civil War. Their Political Attitudes and Sources 
of Information', (Oxford D. Phil 1971). MJ Seymour, 'Aspects of Pro-govenunent 
Propaganda during the Interregnum', (Cambridge PhD 1986). Joad Raymond, Making the 
News. An Anthology of Newsbooks of Revolutionary England 1641-1660, (Moreton-in- 
Marsh, 1993). J. Frank, The Beginning of the English Newspaper 1620-1660. 
(Cambridge. Mass 196 1). David Underdown, A Freeborn People. Politics and the Nation in 
Seventeenth Centu! y England , p. 90-1 11, (for his consideration of The Man in the Moon) Blair Worden, "Wit in a Roundhead, the Dilemma of Marcbamont Nedham" in S. D Amussen 
and M. A Kishlanksy (ed), Political Culture and Cultural Politics in Early Modem England. 
(Manchester 1995). 
5 CN Wedgwood, The Trial of Charles 1, (1968) p. 50. 
6 All of the newspapers cited are listed in the bibliography. I have attempted to place page 
references for all the newspapers that provided them. In some cases I have corrected the 
numbering. 
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conviction; he was also a professional journalist who attempted to influence political events 
by appealing to the Government and to a wider readership. 
As is well known, Mabbott's political views were closely associated with the so called 
Leveller party. However, in his coverage of the events between Pride's first purge and the 
regicide, he showed scant regard for the debates upon the Agreement of the People. 7 In one 
edition he complained that disputes over the reserve concerning religion ran the risk of 
eclipsing the more important issue of bringing the King to justice. 8 Instead of supporting a 
specific constitution, his editorials are stoked with divine justification for regicide, with a 
warning that divine sanction would be dispatched upon those who reneged upon their duty by 
failing to punish a murderous prince. 9 These were attempts to entice his readers to support 
regicide, and his overriding ambition to see Charles brought to justice dominated all his 
editorial comments. 10 
Mabbott did not just use his editorials leading up to regicide to persuade his readers that 
regicide was the most appropriate course of action. He also attempted to push Parliament into 
acting, warning that "procrastination is peril, and the mother of ensuing misery"" He 
balanced this criticism with praise when it became clear that Parliament was embarking upon 
7 The Moderate T. T. E. 477 (4), Tuesday 12 th December -Tuesday 19 th December 1648, 
p. 212. 
8 Ibid. He would change his stance after Lilburne's arrest. 
9 The Moderate T. T. E. 477 (4), Tuesday 12 th December -Tuesday 19 th December 1648, 
p. 101-2; The Moderate T. T. E. 536 (30), Tuesday 26th December - Tuesday 2 nd January 
1648/9, p. 225-6; The Moderate T. T. E. 538 (15), Tuesday 9th January - Tuesday 16 th January 1649, p. 249; The Moderate T. T. E. 539 (17), Tuesday 16 th January - Tuesday 23 rd January 
1649, p. 26 1; The Moderate T. T. E. 540 (20), Tuesday 23 rd January - Tuesday 30'h January, 
1649 p. 273. 
10 This is true in all of his newspapers between the purge and the regicide. Although he was a 
leveller, the desire to see justice against the King eclipsed his desire for the implementation of 
the Agreement and the abolition of the House of Lords. 
11 The Moderate T. T. E. 538 (15), Tuesday gth January - Tuesday 16 th January, 1649 p. 249. 
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the trial and ultimately, the execution of the King. 12 Throughout this period, Mabbott 
maintained pressure upon Parliament by printing a number of radical pamphlets which called 
for justice against the King. 13 
Mabbott was forced to widen his attack upon Charles I after the regicide when it was 
rumoured that the MPs were discussing the possibility of asking Charles 11 to take the 
throne. 14 In his paper covering the events between January 30'h and February 6h, Mabbott 
warned that the "infamy of tyranny is immortal" and he suggests that God "may visit the sins 
of the father upon the son". 15 As this coincides with these important constitutional debates, it 
can be assumed that Mabbott was attempting to exert a certain degree of pressure upon the 
policymakers at Westminster. In public at least, Mabbott shared the same limitations 
identified in a number of the MPs. He was convinced that Charles I had to die, but he was 
unsure about the nature of the constitution which should follow. It is interesting to note that 
this leading Leveller journalist was not totally convinced by the Agreement of the People. 16 
It would be entirely wrong to assume that Mabbott was an opportunist journalist who altered 
his editorials every time the political climate appeared to change. As a professional journalist 
he was capable of adaption, but he remained consistently opposed to the Presbyterians and the 
peers. Mabbott attacked the secluded members in all the editions between Pride's purge and 
12 The Moderate T. T. E. 539 (17), Tuesday 16 th January - Tuesday 23 rd January 1649, p. 261. 
13 To save space I have not cited all these in full. The full listings are found in the notes above 
and below. The Moderate E. 477 (4), p. 211-12. E. 536 (2), Tuesday 19'h December - Tuesday 
26 th December, p. 213. E. 539 (17), Tuesday 16 th January - Tuesday 23 rd January, p. 261-2, 
p-296. 
14 The Moderate T. T. E. 541 (15), Tuesday 30'h January - Tuesday 6 th February 1649 p. 285. 
15 Ibid. 
16 See above. Blair Worden The RumI2 Parliament (Cambridge 1974), p. 49-60. 
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the regicide, at one stage describing them as an "that proud flesh being an equal tryanny to 
monarchy "17 . After the regicide these attacks ended, a further indication that the majority of 
the secluded members retired from active politics. 18 His contempt for the clergy remained 
throughout this period. He warned of the connection between the Presbyterian clergy in 
England and the covenanter party in Scotland. 19 He also disliked the rigid nature of the 
Presbyterian church, which he rightly regarded as a threat to the principle of Liberty of 
Conscience . 
20 But most importantly, Mabbott regarded all Presbyterians as enemies because 
of their engagement with the Scots during the Second Civil War. This sole act should, in 
Mabbott's view, have excluded them from any role in the future constitution, reflecting the 
attitudes of the majority of the radicals both inside and outside Parliament. 21 This explains his 
profound annoyance with the decision to confirm the Presbyterian church settlement which 
resulted in the continuation of tithes. 22 It is also important to acknowledge that Mabbot was an 
avowed anti-Scot 23 and this made him implacably opposed to any form of Presbyterianism, 
especially in light of the alliance between the two forms of Presbyterianism during the Second 
Civil War. 
17 The Moderate E. 477 (4), Tuesday 12 th December - Tuesday I gth December 1648, p. 201. 
Quoted, The Moderate E. 536 (30), Tuesday 26 th December - Tuesday 2 nd January 1648/9 
p. 23 1. 
18 See chapter 4 above. 
19 The Moderate T. T. E. 548 (2 1), Tuesday 20th March - Tuesday 27 Ih March 1649 p. 374. 
20 The Moderate T. T. E. 546 (20), Tuesday 6h March - Tuesday 1P March 1649, p. 359. Also 
T. T. E. 550 (10), Tuesday P April - Tuesday I O'h April, p. 397. 
21 The Moderate T. T. E. 545 (11), Tuesday 20th February - Tuesday 27h February 1649 p. 32 1. 
22 The Moderate T. T. E. 550 (10), Tuesday 3 rd April - Tuesday I Oth April 1649, p. 398. 
23 The Moderate T. T. E. 544 (10), Tuesday 13 th February - Tuesday 20th February 1649, 
p. 309-10. 
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Mabbott made consistent attacks upon members of the House of Lords and the leading peers 
of the land. Even at the time when the Lords ratified nearly all of the revolutionary legislation 
sent to them by the lower chamber, Pembroke was described as the "old cobweb". 24 Although 
Mabbott claimed that, he was advised not to make detrimental remarks against the Lords, 25 
the temptation was too great. Between the purge and regicide Mabbott attempted to show that 
the Lords played a diminutive role. These attacks upon the Lords certainly derived from 
Mabbott's dislike of hereditary right, which extended to the King. 26 But his vociferous attacks 
in late February 1649 upon the Lords who were allowed to sit in the Council of State was 
more than just a case of antipathy towards people bom to privilege. Mabbott could not 
understand why the peers were allowed office in the Commonwealth when they had been 
identified with the Presbyterian party, and thus by implication with the Scots also. In 
Mabbott's view the peers played a part in the tumults of 1647: the decision to revoke the Vote 
27 
of No. Addrenes and the Newport negotiations of 1648. For Mabbott liberty and privilege 
should have only been bestowed upon those who had consistently displayed a desire for 
impartial justice against Charles 1. 
The leniency that the Commons displayed towards the Lords and the Presbyterians, coupled 
with the apparent failure of the regime to implement reform, provoked annoyance but not 
24 The Moderate T. T. E. 536 (2), Tuesday 1 gth December - Tuesday 26"' December 1649, 
p. 22 1. 
25 The Moderate T. T. E. 541 (15), Tuesday 30'h January - Tuesday 6 th February 1649, p. 294. 
26 The Moderate T. T. E. 545 (11), Tuesday 20'h February - Tuesday 27 th February 1649, 
p. 32 1. The Moderate T. T. E. 536 (2), Tuesday 19th December - Tuesday 26h December 1649, 
p. 213-4. 
27 The Moderate T. T. E. 545 (11), Tuesday 20th February - Tuesday 27 th February 1649, 
p. 32 1. 
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outright condemnation. 28 This changed with the publication of John Lilbourn's 'England's 
New Chains Discovered' . 
29 From the 28th of February onwards, Mabbott used his paper as a 
vehicle to make outspoken remarks against the new regime. This included: attacks upon the 
Council of State, 30 the failure to disestablish the Presbyterian church, 31 the moves against the 
leading Levellers, 32 the regimes failure to alleviate the plight of the poor 33 and the corrupt 
nature of the Government. 34 Mabbott became the greatest advocate of the leveller cause, and 
his papers were full of petitions on behalf of the Leveller leaders. 35 As it became clear that the 
Leveller cause was on the brink of collapse, Mabott resorted to Presbyterian language by 
suggesting that God was waiting to exact revenge against the new regime. In Mabbott's case 
it is clear that Lilburne was capable of inciting leveller based hostility. 36 
28 The Moderate T. T. E. 544 (10), Tuesday 13'h February - Tuesday 20'h February 1649, 
p. 312. 
29 England's New Chains Discovered, E. 545 (27) Monday 26 th February 1649. 
30 The Moderate T. T. E. 548 (21), Tuesday 20'h March - Tuesday 27 th March 1649, p. 373. He 
begins this editorial with the words 'Monarchy is retained. ' 
31 The Moderate T. T. E. 550 (10), Tuesday P April - Tuesday I Oth April 1649, p. 397. 
32 The Moderate T. T. E. 550 (28), Tuesday 1 Oth April -Tuesday 17 th April 1649, p. 409; The 
Moderate, T. T. E. 549 (12), Tuesday 27 th March -Tuesday 3rd April 1649, p. 3 85. In this 
account he does not mention Lilbume, but he talks about how MPs manipulated the law. 
33 The Moderate T. TE. 548 (2), Tuesdy 13 th March - Tuesday 20th March 1649, p. 361. The t Moderate T. T. E. 552 (20), Tuesday 24t April - Tuesday I" May 1649, p. 473. 
34 The Moderate T. T. E. 550 (10), Tuesday 3 rd April -Tuesday 10 th April 1649, p. 398. Sir 
Peter Temple received especial criticism in this edition. 
35 Although he had not supported the agreement wholesale, his paper certainly supported the 
leveller cause. Examples: The Moderate T. T. E. 546 (20), Tuesday 6 th March -Tuesday 13 th 
March, 1649 p. 349-6 1. The Moderate T. T, E. 550 (28), Tuesday I Oth April - Tuesday 17 th 
April 1649, p. 416-20. 
36 The Moderate T. T. E. 553 (15), Tuesday I" May - Tuesday 8 th May 1649, p. 478. 
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It is clear from the evidence produced thus far that Mabbott had a clearly defined political 
opinion. As mentioned above, he would use petitions to support his own political stance; he 
was also capable of reprehensible reporting, an example being his claim that Charles I had an 
37 illicit affair during his stay on the Isle of Wight. But Mabbott did provide his readers with 
news, even if this contradicted his own views. He printed Presbyterian literature which 
38 
attacked the purging of Parliament. He also reported upon the fact that the majority of the 
London Common Council refused to sign an oath of loyalty to the new regime 39. He never 
attempted to gloss over the fact that foreign nations objected to the regicide. 40 Even at the 
height of Parliament's moves against the Levellers, he was willing to print the regimes 
justification of their stance. 41 Moreover, despite all his opinionated remarks, he continued to 
provide his readers with an accurate account of parliamentary business, he also meticulously 
informed his readers about foreign affairs. 42 Although a man of conviction, Mabbott was 
dedicated to the cause of providing accurate news. This is illustrated best in his account of 
the King's trial where Charles' excellent performance was recorded accurately by one of his 
greatest critics. 43 
37 C. V Wedgwood, Trial, p. 50. This was not the nonn for Mabbott - contrast with the royalist 
sources. 
38 The Moderate T. T. E. 477 (4), Tuesday 12 th December - Tuesday I 9th December 1648, 
p. 205-6. Presbyterian hostility was reported throughout the period between the purge and 
regicide. 
39 The Moderate T. T. E. 536 (2), Tuesday 1 9th December - Tuesday 26h December 1648, 
p. 215-16. 
40 The Moderate T. T. E. 439 (17), Tuesday 16 th January -Tuesday 23rd January 1648, p. 27 1. 
41 The Moderate T. T. E. 549 (12), Tuesday 27 th March - Tuesday 3 rd April 1649, p. 387; The 
Moderate E. 550 (10). The Moderate E. 551 (20), Tuesday 17 th April - Tuesday 24th April 
1649, p. 431-33. 
42 This was true of every edition during the revolutionary period. 
43 1 am not as critical of Mabbott's reporting of this as Veronica Wedgwood appears to be, 
jnLal p. 126-6. My account is based upon: The Moderate T. T. E. 540 (20), Tuesday 23 rd 
January - Tuesday 3 Oth January, 1648 p. 275, p. 278. 
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John Dillingham's paper, The Moderate Intelligencer, also appeared throughout this period 44. 
The Editors views do not confonn with the conventional political groupings identified by both 
contemporaries and historians. 45 Dillingham was delighted to witness the seclusion of the 
Presbyterian MPs, vindicating the purge upon the grounds that it was essentially a 
Presbyterian tactic which had been used in 1647.46 But, he also objected to the principle of 
religious freedom believing that this could only result in confusion and strife. 47 His attitude 
towards the King was ambivalent; Veronica Wedgwood suggests that he "showed a cautious 
bias" in the King's favour. Her argument was endorsed by Blair Worden in his study of the 
48 Rump Parliament. To a certain extent this is correct. In his edition covering the events 
between Thursday 2l't December and Thursday the 28 Ih , Dillingham outlined both sides of the 
argument in the debate over the future of the King, without making his own opinions clear. 
His attitude was, however, expressed in his reporting of the events abroad. He showed support 
for monarchies and also included a condemnation of popular participation in politics. In the 
same edition he warned of opposition to moves against the King, and he supported a moderate 
petition from York . 
49 But this is the last editorial which contemplated a settlement with the 
44 The Paper is listed in the bibliography. Paging is very irregular, and in some cases, non- 
existent. 
45 See below and above for my observations upon the so-called Presbyterians. This was 
mentioned in the last chapter. 
46 The Moderate Intelligence , E. 476 (24), Thursday 7 
th December -Thursday 14 th December 
1648, p. 1777. From this point on in the notes all the sources cited will commence with the 
Thomason call mark of E. followed by the week of publication. 
47 The Moderate Intelligence , E. 477 (14) Thursday 14 
th December - Thursday 2 Is' 
December 1648, p. 1780. 
48 Blair Worden, The Rump Parliament, p. 403. CN Wedgwood, The Trial p. 49. 
49 The Moderate Intelligence , E. 536 (18), Thursday 2 Is'December - Thursday 28'h December 1648, p. 1802 (debate concerning the King. ) p. 1805 shows his support for 
monarchies. 
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King. When it became clear that Parliament was intent upon bringing the King to justice, 
Dillingham supported the regicide upon the grounds that the kingdom must be settled. For 
Dillingham the execution of the King afforded the greatest prospect of peace. 50 He accepted 
that relations between King and Parliament had deteriorated to such an extent that there was 
little prospect of a restoration of trust, thus making another conflict possible 5 1. He also blamed 
Charles for this situation. 52 
The theme of peace continues in his editorials after the regicide. He attacked the Presbyterians 
for creating opposition. 53 He warned his readers of the misery caused by war using the 
conflict in Gennany as his example of the appalling costs. 54 The plight of the poor (which had 
been caused by the war) dominated his editorial from the I" March until the 5 th April. 55 In 
these editions he called upon the Government to intervene and also he suggested to the gentry 
and middling sorts that they should provide more employment by displaying greater 
enterprise; he suggests that a new culture needed to be implemented which placed more 
emphasis upon new commodities. 56 
50 The Moderate Intelligence E. 537 (3), Thursday 28 th December - Thursday 4 th January 
1648, p. 1813. 
51 The Moderate Intelligence E. 538 (21), Thursday II th January - Thursday 18 th January 
1649, p. 1837. 
52 Ibid- The Moderate Intelligencer E. 539 (13) 1649, no pages at all in this edition. 
53 The Moderate Intelligence E. 545 (2), Thursday 15 th February - Thursday 22 nd February 
1649. 
54 lbid 
55 The Moderate Intelligence E. 546 (13), Thursday I't March - Thursday 8'h March 1649, 
p. 1921-22; The Moderate Intelligencer E. 546 (24) Thursday 8 th March - Thursday 15 th 
March 1649, p. 1933. The Moderate Intelligencer E. 548 (13) 1649 p. 1945. The Moderate 
Intelligencer E. 548 (30) Thursday I Oth March - Thursday 27 th March 1649, p. 1957. 
56 The Moderate Intelligence E. 546 (13), Thursday I't March - Thursday 8h March 1649, 
p. 192 1. 
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These interesting editorials come to an end in April, with the editor bowing to pressure as he 
acknowledged that many people did not approve of his comments. 57 From this point onwards 
he filled his paper with even more information from abroad, whilst he continued to report 
upon political events at Westminster and news from the localities. Dillingham made few 
personal observations upon political issues. He objected to Lilbume out of his fear that 
58 Leveller unrest would result in more civil strife. Dillingham never questioned the expedition 
to Ireland, and he was at pains to justify this stance. 59 Otherwise he took the job of printing 
news seriously and his papers are full of relevant political information. 
My findings do not support Blair Worden's suggestion that Dillingham had "scant sympathy 
for the purge and regicide"60 However, this argument does support Worden's view that 
Dillingham was not an official spokesman for the Government. 61 The Moderate Intelligencer 
acknowledged opposition to the regime. 62 Dillingham paid tribute to Lockyer's bravery and 
57 The Moderate Intelligence E. 549 (17), Thursday 29h March - Thursday 5'h April 1649, 
p. 1905. 
58 The Moderate Intelligence E. 546 (20) Thursday 8"' March - Thursday 15 th March 1649; 
The Moderate Intelligence E. 549 (17) Thursday March 29h - Thursday 5 th April th 
1649 
p. 1906; The Moderate Intelligencer E. 552 (4) Thursday 19'h April - Thursday 26 A ril 
1649, p. 2008; The Moderate Intelligencer E. 555 (2) Thursday 2 nd May - Thursday 
V 
May 
1649, p. 2025. In these last two editions he failed to print Lilbume's attacks. Contrast with 
Mabbott's, approach in The Moderate above. 
59 The Moderate Intelligence E. 552 (26), Thursday 26 th April - Thursday 2 nd May 1649, 
p-2015-16. 
60 Blair Worden, The Rum12 Parliament, p. 403. 
61 Ibid. Worden rightly points out his independence. 
62 The opposition to the regime was mentioned in every edition. There was not an attempt to 
present the view that there were no problems facing the new regime. 
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his views upon the poor would not have made pleasant reading for the Government. 63 
Dillingham was pursing his own, rather limited agenda which advocated an end to civil strife. 
The fact that this view coincided with the Government's appears to have been incidental. 
Henry Walker, the editor of Perfect Occurrences, included a short editorial with a Hebrew 
phrase conveniently translated into English. 64 His editions also included a phrase of the week, 
usually written by an MP, although on one occasion the honour was bestowed upon George 
Fleming, the Master of Ceremonies. 65 Throughout this period, Walker's editorials supported 
the Government. He welcomed the purge, and even before a High Court of Justice had been 
erected, he justified regicide upon the grounds of conquest. 66 At one stage he talked of "Gods 
reign on earth"67 and he regarded the introduction of the new Great Seal as the start of a 
glorious age . 
68 However, when it became clear that the Government was not going to extend 
the revolution far beyond the execution of the King, Walker praised them for being gracious. 
His blatant desire to support the existing Government, means that it is impossible to 
determine his political views. Unlike Mabbott, Walker made no attempt to exert pressure 
upon the politicians. In light of these remarks it would be easy to dismiss Walker as merely an 
apologist for the Government. In one important respect this is true. In all his editions between 
63 N. 55 above. He was especially critical of the Government in The Moderate Intelligencer E. 
548 (13), Thursday 15'h March - Thursday 22 nd March 1649, p. 1945. 
64 The paper is cited in the bibliography. 
65 MpS included: Miles Corbet, Perfect Occurrences E. 527 (28), Friday 23d February - 
Friday 2 nd March 1649, p. 857; Ireton, Perfect Occurrences E. 527 (35), Friday 91h March - 
Friday 16 th March 1649, p. 899; William Armyn, Perfect Occurrences E. 529 (7), Friday 30 1h 
March - Friday 6 th April 1649, p. 921. Nicholas Love, Perfect Occurrences E. 529 (15), Friday 
6 th April -Friday 13' April 1649, p. 937. 
66 Perfect Occurrences E. 526 (45), Friday 22 nd December - Friday 30th December 1649, 
p. 773. 
67 Perfect Occurrences E. 527 (3), Friday 29th December - Friday 5h January 1649, p. 78 1. 
68 Perfect Occurrences E. 527 (8), Friday 5 th January - Friday I Ith January 1649, p. 797. 
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December 1648 and May 1649, he never criticised the Government. His consistent attacks 
upon the Royalists, coupled with the neglect of news concerning Charles 11, points towards a 
professional propagandist. Moreover, Walker consistently cited or printed petitions which 
were supportive of the new regime. However, as with Mabbott and Dillingham, Walker took 
the printing of news seriously. He printed Presbyterian objections to the new regime; 69 he 
provided a full account of the King's trial expressing Charles' courage 70 ; he even presented 
Charles as a martyr before the trial began; and he printed examples of William Prynne 
embarrassing the Government by the latter's refusal to acknowledge Parliament as a lawful 
authority. 71 He included Scottish justifications for their proclamation of loyalty to Charles 
11 72 ; he acknowledged Lilburne's verbal and written denunciations of Parliamen t73 and he 
printed William Bray's outspoken attack against Fairfax. Walker did not attempt to deny both 
the unpopularity and the dangers facing the new regime - although these were not at the 
forefront of his reporting, there is little evidence of deliberate concealment. 
69 Perfect Occurrences E. 526 (40), 8 th December - 15th December 1648, p. 745-46; Perfect 
Occurrences E. 526 (42), Friday 15 th December - Friday 22 nd December 1648, p. 766, makes 
Presbyterian hostility clear; Perfect Occurrences E. 526 (45), Friday 22 nd December - Friday 
3 01h December 1648, p. 774, shows the difficulties the regime was having with the Common 
Council of London; Perfect Occurrences E. 527 (5), Friday 5 th January -Friday 12 th January 
1649, p. 789; Perfect Occurrences E. 527 (17), Friday 2 nd February - Friday 9th February 1649, 
p. 825, mentions the publication of A Vindication of the Ministers of the Gospel, for details of 
this pamphlet see Chapter 4 above; Perfect Occurrences E. 527 (21), Friday 9'h February - 
Friday 16 th February 1649, p. 839-40; Perfect Occurrences E. 527 (3 1), Friday 2 nd March - 
Friday 9h March 1649, p. 888,894, prints Presbyterian opposition, Thomas Cauton was 
arrested and Christopher Love was being questioned. 
70 Perfect Occurrences E. 527 (11), Friday I 9th January - Friday 26 th January 1649, p. 806-8; 
Perfect Occurrences E. 527 (14), Friday 26 th January - Friday 2 nd February 1649, p. 818-19. 
71 Perfect Occurrences E. 527 (5), Friday 5h January - Friday 12 th January 1649, p. 789. 
72 Perfect Occurrences E. 527 (2 1), Friday 9th February - Friday 16'h February 1649, p. 839- 
40. 
73 Perfect Occurrences E. 527 (28), Friday 23 rd February - Friday 2 nd March 1649, p. 865-66; 
Perfect Occurrences E. 527 (39), Friday 16 th March - Friday 23d March 1649, p. 913-14. 
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Although Walker's editorials were short, this was an improvement on Samuel Peck, whose 
paper A Perfect Diurnall did not include any editorial comment. " Moreover, he only made 
two direct political remarks, both of which were attacks upon the English and Scottish 
Presbyterians. 75 Despite this lack of editorial direction, it is patently clear that Peck was a 
supporter of the new regime. He appeared determined to show unity amongst the political 
leaders. This occasionally resulted in distortion such as his claim that no animosity existed 
during the debates over the Agreement of the People. 
76 He also glossed over the discussions 
77 
which arose during the debate concerning the future of the House of Lords. Moreover, he 
was less willing than his colleagues to acknowledge criticism of the new regime. 78 However, 
this paper should not be dismissed as a piece of propaganda. Peck did acknowledge the 
difficulties facing the regime and his attention to detail was most impressive. 79 His news was 
presented in a rather bland fashion, but A Perfect Diumall was a very infonnative and, by 
large, accurate newspaper. 
Three other newspapers, whose content and form closely resembled A Perfect Diurnall, 
require brief comment. A Perfect Summary of Exact Passages came out on the 29 th January. 
The first two editions provided a formidable justification of regicide, which was based more 
74 For the general location of these papers, see bibliography below. 
75 Perfect Diumall E. 527 (9), Monday 5h February - Monday 12 th February 1649, p. 2224; 
Perfect Diurnall, E. 572 (33), Monday 5th March - Monday 12 th March 1649, p. 2356. 
76 Perfect Diurnall E. 526 (43), Monday I 8th December - Monday 25 th December 1649, 
p. 207 1. 
77 Perfect Diumall E. 527 (18), Monday 5th February - Monday 12th February 1649, p. 2324. 
78 This can be seen in all the editions cited in the bibliography. Good examples can be found 
in Perfect Diurnall, E. 527 (16), Monday 29 th January - Monday 5'h February 1649, p. 2263; 
Perfect Diumall, E. 527 (25), Monday 19'h February - Monday 26th February 1649, p. 2238-9. 
79 Despite the lack of political comment the attention to detail is still most impressive. 
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upon the fashion in which Charles I had ruled, rather than an aversion to the principle of 
monarchy. 80 This would change from the 19"' of February onwards when the editor avoided 
personal remarks. Instead, the paper resorted to presenting factual and detailed accounts of 
parliamentary business. 81 The second paper was Daniel Border's The Kingdoms Faithful and 
Impartial Scout which came on to the market in March. 82 The paper provides useful detail 
upon Charles II's activities and excellent coverage of the trials of the leading Royalists were 
sustained throughout the proceedingS83 . Again, Border was reluctant to make his political 
perspective clear. Finally A Perfect Summary of Exact Passages appeared on the 10h April. 
The paper concerned itself with parliamentary business and in tenns of content it was not as 
useful as Peck's paper 84 . All three of these newspapers supported the Government, but as 
usual they provided a comprehensive account of parliamentary business. 
Although the last five newspapers supported the Government, their editorials did not suggest 
that this was their function. This is in stark contrast to a paper entitled A Modest Narrative of 
85 Intelligence which appeared on the 7h of April. The editor made it plain that he had been 
approached by "friends" of the Government to write a new paper. 86 Historians have tended to 
80 A Perfect SummaTy of Exact Passages, E. 527 (13), Monday 22 nd January - Monday 29'h 
January 1649, p. 1-2; A Perfect Summa of Exact Passages, E. 527 (20), Monday 5 th 
February - Monday 12 th February 1649, p. 17. 
81 This is clear in all the newspapers which follow. For ftill listing see bibliography below. 
82 For all the publications consulted in this thesis see the bibliography below. 
83 The Kingdomes Faithful Scout, E. 527 (27), Friday 23d February - Friday 2 nd March 1649, 
p. 38; The Kingdomes Faithful Scout, E. 527 (32), Friday 2 nd March - Friday 9 th March 1649, 
p. 41-2,46-8. 
84 See the listings in the bibliography below. 
85 See the bibliography below for a full listing of this newspaper. 
86 A Modest Narrative of Intelligence, E. 550 (5), Saturday I" April - Saturday 7h April 1649, 
p. 1, was the first paper. See the bibliography for a full listing. 
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neglect this paper, but it provides the clearest indication of the motives of the rumpers in the 
early years of the republic. 87 
The editorials provide a sustained attack upon the Leveller movement and a vindication of the 
Government's actions. The editor supported the moves against the leading Levellers because 
Lilburne and company were determined to divide the Army, and it was feared that this would 
frustrate the expedition to Ireland. 88 He attacked the Levellers for regarding all Scots as 
implacable opponents and he was also critical of the tendency to treat Royalists and 
Presbyterians as a homogenous group 89 ; this was a deliberate show of support for the Rump's 
attempts to isolate Royalists from Presbyterians. " The editor was also critical of the 
Leveller's attacks upon the new regime as they failed to provide a realistic alternative. This 
explains his depiction of the Levellers as "perpetual seekers" and "convinced trouble- 
makers. "91 Finally, the Editor justified the Rump's decision not to hold fresh elections upon 
the grounds that new elections would result in the return of people hostile to the new 
regime. 
92 
87 Blair Worden, The Rump Parliament, p. 403. J. Frank, The Beginnings of the English 
Newspaper, p. 190- 1. My thesis makes extensive use of this paper because, I believe it acts as 
the official Government mouthpiece. 
88 A Modest Narrative of Intelligence, E. 550 (5), Saturday I" April - Saturday 7 th April 1649, 
pl-2; A Modest Narrative of Intelligence, E. 550 (22), Saturday 7 th April - Saturday 14 th 
April 1649, p. 9; A Modest Narrative of Intelligence, E. 551 (9), Saturday 14 th April - Saturday 2 Pt April 1649, p. 9,17. A Modest Narrative of Intelligence, E. 552 (7), Saturday 
2l't April - Saturday 28th April 1649, p. 25. 
89 A Modest Narrative of Intelligence, E. 551 (9), Saturday 14'h April - Saturday 2l't April 
1649, p. 17. 
90 This is discussed in chapter 2 of my thesis. It was also a major theme in Blair Worden's 
work. 
91 A Modest Narrative of Intelligence, E. 550, Saturday 1" April - Saturday 7h April 1649, 
P. 9. 
92 A Modest Narrative of Intelligence, E. 555 (8), Saturday 5 th May - Saturday 12 Ih May 1649, p. 41. 
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A Modest Narrative of Intelligence was the only newspaper to justify the killing of Robert 
Lockyer and also point out that not everyone was impressed with the pomp and circumstance 
93 
which was on display at his funeral. Although the editor tended to refrain from personal 
attacks upon the Leveller leaders, the Diggers were dismissed as "would be peers" and 
drunkards. 94 Despite the fact this newspaper was, ostensibly, designed to act as the 
Government's mouthpiece, it still conformed to a recurring theme. First, the paper reported 
upon parliamentary legislation in a detailed fashion, without finding it necessary to praise the 
95 framers of the legislation. Second, despite his attacks upon Lilburne he did print petitions 
supporting the Leveller leader. 96 And finally, as we saw in Mabbott's newspaper, the editor 
did attempt to persuade the Government to act; in this newspaper encouragement was given to 
alleviate the plight of the poor and deal with the Army's arrears of pay. 97 
In contrast to a Modest Narrative of Intelligence, two other official newspapers, The Perfect 
Weekly Account and Kingdoms Weekly Intelligencer, 98 did not go to great lengths to support 
the new regime. The Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer, edited by Richard Collings showed a 
great deal of sympathy for the Presbyterian MPs secluded at Pride's purge and he wrote a 
93 A Modest Narrative of Intelligence, E. 553 (12), Saturday 30'h April - Saturday 5h May 
1649, p. 5-6. 
94 Ibid. p. 33. 
95 This editor supported the Government at the start of his paper but then dealt with the news 
without comment. This is true in all of the newspapers. For a full listing see the bibliography 
below. 
96 A Modest Narrative of Intelligence, E. 553 (12), Saturday 3 Oth April - Saturday 5 th May 
1649, p. 37-8. 
97 lbid p. 36. 
98 See the bibliography below for a full listing. 
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great tribute to the popularity of the King" in his edition which immediately followed the 
regicide; 
"This day it did not rain at all, yet it was a very wet day in several places in and about the City 
of London, by reason of the abundance of affliction that fell from many eyes for the death of 
the King. "loo 
His apparent support for the King and the Presbyterians appears to contradict the support he 
had for the Army. He was willing to publish their great achievements extending especial 
praise to Oliver Cromwell. 101 After the regicide he did report Royalist activity but in no 
greater detail than some of the other newspapers. In terms of editorial value, this paper offers 
little, apart from one remark he made suggesting that there was a possibility of an alliance 
between Levellers and Royalists. In his book, 'Literature and Revolution', Nigel Smith 
suggests that this projected alliance was strongly urged by Collings. This argument does 
require one important qualification: it was only mentioned on one occasion and was merely a 
reflection of one particular Royalist view. It was not mentioned again by Collings and can 
hardly be regarded as a policy that had the support of his paper. 102 
Daniel Border's The Perfect Weekly Account also showed a real admiration for Charles 1. 
This is shown in his report of Charles' final moments alive: 
99 The Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer, E. 476 (39) 1648, p. 1185-7. Although, he does not 
state his support for secluded members he does spend a great deal of time upon their 
declarations. The Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer, E. 541, Tuesday 30th January - Tuesday 
6 th February 1649, p. 124 1. 
100 Ibid. 
101 The Kingdomes Weekly Intelligence E. 476 (9), Tuesday 7 th December -Tuesday 15th 
December 1648 p. 1179. 
102 Nigel Smith, Literature and Revolution, 1640-60 (New Haven 1994) p. 64. 
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"no man have come with more confidence and appearance of resolution than he did. " After 
the regicide, apart from one occasion, when he asked Parliament to take more notice of the 
poor, he was not willing to comment upon political issues. He simply and accurately reported 
the news. Joseph Frank dismissed this paper as second rate. It is true that his paper did not 
contain as much news as some of the other papers, but Frank's view that Border was anxious 
not to attend the Government requires one qualification; he was also unwilling to praise the 
new regime preferring to provide an accurate account of events. 103 
Four other official newspapers have not yet been discussed. 'A Declaration collected out of 
the Journals of Both Houses' 104 went out of circulation in December. It produced two 
informative editions and his editorials demonstrated support for the Army and the remaining 
MPs. Another paper 'The Impartial Intelligencer' 105lived up to its name by simply printing 
news without comment apart from an occasional attack against the Leveller leaders. 106 The 
Anny's Modest Intelligencer appeared sporadically; it supported the regicide, but then 
advocated caution and unity. 107 Finally, Mercurius Brittanicus appeared in late April with the 
avowed intention of launching an attack upon the Royalist Mercurius Pragmaticus. 108 It was 
103 The Perfect Weekly Account, E. 546 (20), Wednesday 28 th February - Wednesday 7 1h 
March 1649, p. 409. For a full listing of these papers see Appendix D below. 
104 A Declaration Collected out of the Journals of Both Houses, E. 476 (17), Wednesday Oh 
December -Wednesday 13 th December 1648; A Declaration Collected out of the Journals of 
Both Houses, E. 477 (7), Wednesday 13 th December - Wednesday 20th December 1649. 
105 The Impartial Intelligence , E. 549 (15), Wednesday 28 
th March - Wednesday 4h April 
1649; The Impartial Intelligencer, E. 550 (18), Wednesday I Ith April -Wednesday 18t April 
1649. 
106 Ibid. This is clear in all the editorials. 
107 The An-nies Modest Intelligencer, E. 541 (16), Tuesday Yd January - Tuesday I Oth January 
1649. 
108 Ibid. Two editions appeared during this period: Mercurius Brittanicus, E. 552 (27), 
Tuesday 24 th April - Friday 24 th May 1649 and Mercurius Brittanicus, E. 555 (15), Tuesday 
8th May - Tuesday 15th May 1649. 
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scathing in its tone, but it provides an opportunity to consider the aforesaid Pragmaticus and 
the other Royalist newspapers. 
On the 13 th of February 1649, the editor of Mercurius Elencticus informed his readers that he 
was finding it extremely difficult to publish his paper. 109 He did, however, ensure readers that 
he would continue his work, but would be unable to guarantee the exact date of publication. 
This was not an isolated incident; a number of Royalist newspapers complained that the 'state 
blood hounds' were attempting to prevent Royalist publications. "OHowever, this did not 
prevent the production of numerous Royalist publications to go with the large corpus of 
parliamentary papers. "' Between the Oh of December and the 21't of May, nine separate 
Royalist titles were, at some stage, on sale; with a number of counterfeits in circulation, a 
minimum of fifty four Royalist editions were available for public consumption. 
Mercurius Pragmaticus accounts for twenty of these editions. From the 6h of December until 
the 26 th of January, the paper was edited by Marchamount Nedham. Following Nedham's 
temporary retirement from journalism it becomes difficult to determine the names of the 
journalists. Variations in style, coupled with complaints about counterfeits, suggest that a 
number of journalists wrote under the title. As with all the other Royalist newspapers, 
Pragmaticus exaggerated Royalist victories at sea, made vicious attacks against the purged 
, 09 Mercurius Elencticus, T. T. E. 542 (13), Tuesday 6 th February - Tuesday 13 th February 
1649. 
110 Mercurius Pragmaticus: E. 537 (20), E. 550 (13), E. 544 (17). Mercurius Elencticus: E. 
476 (4), p. 525, E. 542 (13). Mercurius Pragmaticus for King Charles: E. 551 (15), E. 552 
(15). The Man in the Moon: E. 550 (26). Mercurius Pragmaticus for King Charls: 556 (4). 
III 
I 
These are all cited in the bibliography. 
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Parliament and consistently maintained that a large pro-monarchical European Army was on 
the brink of launching a counter-revolution. 112 
Fourteen editions of Mercurius Elencticus appeared during this period. 113 The authentic 
version was edited by George Wharton, but a number of counterfeits were produced. 
Elencticus was the only Royalist newspaper which covered the execution of Charles 1. Along 
with Pragmaticus, it was the only title to appear in February 1649. 
On the 16 th of April a new and cheaper Royalist newspaper came on the market. Joseph 
Frank described the editor, John Crouch as the "smuttiest newsman produced by the puritan 
Revolution. " An analysis of Crouch's editorials supports this view; every edition contains 
invectives against the new regime and these observations were rarely supported by fact. As 
David Underdown points out "nobody could ever have read it for its news coverage". 114 
Mercurius Melancholicus produced two editions. Both of these appeared in the weeks 
between Pride's purge and the regicide. It is unclear who edited the paper but the journalist 
had little understanding of the political situation; the editor still believed that William Prynne 
was behind the moves against the King. ' 15 
112 All the titles are listed in the bibliography most are cited below. 
113 These are listed in Appendix D, listings of Mercurius Elencticus. 
114 David Underdown, A FreebomPeople, p. 95. 
115 Mercurius Melancholicus. E. 536 (27), Monday 25"' December 1648- Monday I" January 
1649; Mercurius Melancholicus, Monday I" January - Monday 8th January 1649, E. 537 (19). 
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Two editions of a paper entitled Mercurius Elencticus for King Charles appeared during this 
period. Both papers ran concurrently between April 30th and May 14'h. In his first editorial the 
journalist promised to be unfailingly objective: 
"So equal balanced, complete compact, so smoothly eminent, so truly exact". 116 
The image of objectivity was quickly destroyed as the editor launched a diatribe against 
anyone associated with the radical cause. The editor made little attempt to provide a credible 
political commentary. 
Another Royalist newspaper entitled Mercurius Philo-Monarchicus appeared twice. The 
editor claimed that he would provide information upon the exiled King. Instead he joined his 
colleagues in launching attacks against the new regime. 117 
On the 24 th April Nedham returned to write under the title Mercurius Pragmaticus for King 
Charles 11. He edited four newspapers in this period, all of which illustrated his aptitude for 
journalism. In early May 1649 Nedham. had to compete with a 'counterfeit' Pragmaticus. The 
paper can be identified by its failure to carry the 'e' in Charles. 118 Although Nedham bitterly 
resented this competition, the counterfeit was little different to any of the other existing 
Royalist newspapers. It attacked the new regime and had little understanding of the political 
situation. It appears that Royalist complaints about counterfeit editions reflected the 
journalists' annoyance about lost revenue, rather than the content of the fraudulent papers. 
116 Mercurius Elencticus for Kin Charles, E. 554 (5), Monday 30th April - Monday 7 th May, 
1649. 
117 Mercurius Philo Monarchicus, E. 550 (27), Tuesday I oth -Tuesday 17th April 1649, p. 1. 
118 Mercurius Pragmaticus, they can be found: E. 552 (15), 24 th April. E. 551 (15), 17 th April. 
E. 555 (13), 1" May. E. 556 (4), 15 th May. Mercurius Pragmaticus for King Charls, hey can 
be found: E. 554 (14), 8 th May, E. 554 (12), 1" May, E. 556 (5), 15 th May. 
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It is clear from the content of the Royalist newspapers that the editors had little interest in 
providing their readers with accurate information. This contrasts with the parliamentary 
papers which tended to focus upon factual detail as opposed to editorial comment. It is worth 
considering the aims of the Royalist editors. 
The most dominant theme was a desire to provide their readers with hope. The view of all the 
papers was neatly expressed by Mercurius Elencticus for King Charles, "shall my lines run, 
that each strain shall invite your contemplations, yet provide delight" 119The Royalist often 
created an image of an outraged Europe, who would unite and come to their rescue. 
Mercurius Pragmaticus informed readers that France, Denmark and Holland had pledged their 
support to Charles 11120 .A month later another edition under the same title claimed that 
Sweden and Austria had joined the coalition. 121 Other editions pursued this theme 122 but The 
Man in the Moon provided the most exaggerated account. Upon the 23d, Crouch told his 
readers that Charles could secure aid from every European state, but the young King had 
rejected the overtures because he did not wish to see strangers in the land. 123 Even Nedham 
included accounts suggesting that 5,000 Spanish troops were on the verge of launching an 
invasion for Charles 11.124 It is difficult to imagine how anyone would believe such accounts; 
it contrasts with the parliamentary papers which acknowledged Royalist triumphs. 
119 Mercurius Elencticus for King Charles, E. 554 (5), Monday 30 Ih April - Monday 7 Ih May. 
120 Mercurius Pragmaticus, E. 546 (4), Tuesday 27h February - Tuesday 5 
th March 1649. 
121 Mercurius Pragmaticus, E. 549 (13), Tuesday 27h March - Tuesday 4 th March 1649. 
122 Mercurius Elencticus, E. 554 (10), Tuesday 1" May - Tuesday 8 th May 1649, p. 16; 
Mercurius Elencticus, E. 555 (37), Monday 14 th May - Monday 21" May 1649, p. 32. 
123 The Man in the Moon, E. 551 (10), Monday 16 th April - Monday 23 rd April 1649, p. 12. 
124 Mercurius Pragmaticus for King Charles, E. 555 (13), Tuesday 8 th May -Tuesday 15th 
May 1649. See also, Mercurius Pragmaticus for King Charls, E. 554 (12), Tuesday I" May - 
Tuesday 8 th May 1649. 
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It is easier to understand the Royalists reports that the seas were dominated by Prince Rupert. 
The strength of the Royalist fleet was contrasted with the weakness of the parliamentary 
Navy. The disparity between the two was used as a device to persuade parliamentary seamen 
to desert the republican Navy. It was a propaganda play which had some chance of success 
because Parliament was finding it difficult to recruit seamen. 125 Moreover, the reports 
concerning success for Charles in securing support from Scotland and Ireland must have 
added to the concerns at Westminster, especially when the parliamentary press acknowledged 
the danger. 
The aim of the Royalist journalists was to paint a picture of a Government on the brink of 
collapse. They also devoted a great deal of attention to the problems facing the Government 
at home. Most of these focussed upon Leveller discontent, but any sign of opposition was 
also readily reported. These accounts ranged from the breakdown at local government in 
Exeter, 126 to pro-Royalist risings in Wales. 127 The press attempted to show that everyone in 
the country objected to the rule of the Rump and this extended from Levellers to 
Presbyterians. 
Although Royalist journalists found it convenient to use other groups to illustrate the new 
regimes unpopularity, journalists never forgot that they were writing a Royalist newspaper for 
Royalist readers. Journalists revealed their admiration for those men and women 128who had, 
from the first day of the conflict, supported the Royalist cause. In editorials, Royalist readers 
were reminded that they belonged to a glorious cause, and although facing adversity, should 
125 Mercurius Pragmaticus, E. 549 (13), Tuesday 27 th March - Tuesday 3rd April 1649. 
126 Mercurius Pragmaticus, E. 548 (22), Tuesday 20th March - Tuesday 28 th March 1649. 
127 Mercurius PraRmaticus cited n. 125 above. 
128 Mercurius Elencticus, E. 552 (14), Tuesday 24"' April - Tuesday I" May 1649. 
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seek comfort from the exclusive party which they belonged to. This is illustrated in two verses 
written by George Whorton: 
"Happy condition we live in, 
And yet we want no woe, 
But we have comforts lodged within, 
Which rebels ne're shall know 
We Cavaliers have secret joys 
Which Traitors never had, 
We have little wealth, yet jocund boys 
We live to laugh them old" 
129 
Any man who proved willing to make the final sacrifice for the Royalist cause received 
undiluted praise from Royalist journalists. This is illustrated by the reports upon the trial of 
Hamilton, Holland and Capel. 130 The press also made frequent references to Charles I who 
had, according to the Man in the Moon, provided himself to be the "most Christian anointed 
crowned, religious, just, pious, virtuous and wise Prince in the world". 131 All the references to 
Charles I illustrated how the late King had died for a glorious cause. 132 Journalists were eager 
to inform readers that the cause had not died with the King. Reports concerning Charles 11's 
129 Mercurius Elencticus, E. 477 (3 1) Tuesday I gth December - Tuesday 26 Ih December 1648. 
130 Eg: Mercurius Pragmaticus, E. 556 (18), Tuesday Oh March - Tuesday 13 
th March 1649. 
131 The Man in the Moon, E. 550 (26), Monday 16'h April 1649. 
132 Eg: Mercurius Pragmaticus, E. 540 (15), 24 th January -3 Oth January 1649; Mercurius 
Pragmaticus, E. 546 (18), Tuesday 6 th March - Tuesday 13 
th March 1649; Mercurius 
Pragmaticus for King Charles, E. 551 (15), Tuesday 8th May 1649. 
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health, coupled with the latter's detennination to re-gain his crown, were designed to provide 
'old loyal' Royalists with the feeling that their sorrow would be short-lived. 133 
Although journalists always remembered the old Royalists, their depiction of a society 
destroyed by a military tyranny was aimed at a wider readership. Between Pride's purge and 
the regicide, the four available newspapers 134 used dramatic imagery to warn readers about 
the kind of society which would follow the destruction of the monarchy. Mercurius 
Pragmaticus predicted the demise of law and religion. Nedharn also argued that the abolition 
of monarchy would result in chaos as every faction competed for supremacy. This, Nedham 
argued, would have ramifications throughout society as "no man of wealth and power would 
be secure from the malice of his inferior". 135 Appealing to a war-weary nation, Nedham 
contrasted a harmonious stake under a monarch with the prospect of a society without a King: 
"Instead of peaceable government under hereditary kings, the land will grown under the 
burden of successive tyrannies and be tormented with usurpation, upon usurpation and 
rebellion upon rebellion". 136 Mercurius Elencticus warned of anarchy and confusion. 137 The 
133 Eg: Mercurius Pragmaticus, E. 550 (32), Tuesday loth April - Tuesday 17 Ih April 1649; 
Mercurius Pragmaticus, E. 552 (12), Monday 23d April - Monday 30'h April 1649; Mercurius 
Elenticus, E. 552 (14), Tuesday 2l't April - Tuesday Is'May 1649; Mercurius Pragmaticus 
for King Charles, E. 551 (15), Tuesday 24th April - Tuesday Ist May. 
134 Mercurius Pragmaticus, can be found: E. 476 (2), E. 476 (35), E. 477 (30), E. 537 (20), E. 
538 (18), E. 540 (15); Mercurius Elencticus, can be found: E. 475 (22), E. 476 (4), E. 476 
(36), E. 477 (3 1), E. 536 (3 1); An edition of Merc. Elen in J. B Williams, A HistojY of the 
English Newspapers p. 200; Mercurius Melancholicus, can be found: E. 536 (27), E. 537 (19). 
Mercurius Imparticalis can be found: E. 476 (3). 
135 Mercurius Pragmaticus, E. 476 (2), Tuesday 5 th December - Tuesdi 12 th December; For t t similar arguments see: Mercurius Pragmaticus, E. 476 (35), Tuesday 5t December - Tuesday 
12 th December; Mercurius Pragmaticus, E. 538 (18) Tuesday 9h January - Tuesday 26 th 
January 1649 (Nedharn ran a double edition. ) 
136 Mercurius Pragmaticus, E. 476 (2), Tuesday 5 th December - Tuesday 12'h December 1648. 
137 Mercurius Elencticus, E. 475 (22), Wednesday 29th November - Wednesday 6 th December 
1648. 
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editor of Mercurius Imparticalis warned of the dangers facing "wives and children" in a 
society which had lost its traditional structures. 138 Mercurius Melancholicus attached 
particular significance to the dangers facing the church. 139 
This tactic of depicting a society which was being destroyed, continued after the purge. The 
papers were full of stories revealing the full horrors of military rule. Mercurius Pragniaticus 
told of an old man walking through the streets accompanied by his young children. The 
youngsters were slaughtered by a collection of soldiers because their father had revealed his 
preference for monarchy. 140 Royalists used other tactics, apart from violence, to show how 
society was being destroyed. The Man in the Moon focussed upon the "dire poverty and the 
tears of widows". 141 Mercurius Pragmaticus for King Charles used the regime's attack upon 
the Diggers as an example of a brutal conquest over "feeble souls and empty bellies. "142 
In the immediate aftermath of the regicide, Royalists attempted to show how everyone, from 
the top of the social ladder down to mere beggars had been adversely affected by the 
revolution. As the Army began to show signs of discontent, the newspapers adapted their 
stance. Instead of attacking the Army, journalists turned most of their attention to the 
members of the purged Parliament and the Grandees. 
138 Mercurius Imparticalis, E. 476 (3), Tuesday 5 th December- Tuesday 12 th December 1649, 
p. 8 
139 Mer'curius Melancholicus, T. T. E. 536 (27), Mercurius Pragmaticus, Monday 25 th 
December - Monday I" January, p. 1-3. 
140 Mercurius Pragmaticus, E. 540 (15), Tuesday 24 th January - Tuesday 30'h January 1649. 
14 1 The Man in the Moon, E. 551 (10), 16'h April - 23 rd April, p. 13; The Man in the Moon, 
E. 554 (4), 3 01h April - 7th May, p. 3; The Man in the Moon, E. 555 (21) p. 3; The Man in the 
Moon, E. 555 (33), 14'b -2 1" May, p. 53. 
142 Mercurius Pragmaticus for King Charles, E. 551 (15), Tuesday 17 th April - Tuesday 24 th 
April. 
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The information provided upon the Royalist press thus far has shown its attempts to 
undermine the Rump Parliament by producing wild accusations. The next section considers, 
not just their attitude to the MPs, but also the extent of their access to political information. 
The editions of Pragmaticus and Elencticus which reported upon the events between Pride's 
purge and the regicide provide the historian with some useful information. Nedham identified 
Sir Thomas Wroth, Sir Peter Wentworth and Edmund Prideaux as the most outspoken critics 
of the votes to continue the Newport negotiations. 143 Sir James Harrington, Sir Henry 
Mildmay, John Ven, Edmund Harvey, Francis Allen and John Blackhiston, Oliver Cromwell 
and Sir Gilbert Pickering were associated with the moves against the Presbyterians. 144 In total 
Nedham suggested that more than forty MPs played a leading role in the events leading up to 
regicide. Mercurius Elencticus also provides evidence showing that a number of MPs were 
involved in bringing the King to justice. 145 This is very useftil evidence for the historian, but it 
is the only occasion for which the Royalist newspapers can be used for a reconstruction of 
parliamentary history. 
Despite identifying a number of determined MPs, Elencticus, Pragmaticus and Melancholicus 
depicted a small and subservient Parliament reliant upon the Army. The image of a 
submissive Parliament was employed by all the Royalist newspapers. The polemical attacks 
which had been evident prior to the regicide increased. Mercurius Pragmaticus used 
143 Mercurius Pragmaticus, T. T. E. 476 (2), Tuesday 5 th December -Tuesday 12'h December 
1648. 
144 Mercurius Pragmaticus E. 476 (35), Tuesday 12'h December - Tuesday I gth December 
1648; Mercurius Elencticus, E. 475 (22), Wednesday 29th November - Wednesday 6 th 
December 1648; Mercurius Elencticus, E. 476 (4), Tuesday 5 th December -Tuesday 12 th 
December; Further examples in Mercurius Elencticus can be found: E. 476 (36), E. 477 (3 1), 
E. 536 (3 1). 
145 These can be found in Mercurius Elencticus: E. 475 (22), E. 476 (4), E. 476 (36), E. 477 
(3 1), E. 536 (3 1). 
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descriptions which included "King choppers", "cut throats" and "blood suckers" 146 Mercurius 
Elencticus spoke scathingly about the regicides at Westminster. 147 The Man in the Moon 
called the MPs the "new popes". 148 Mercurius Pragmaticus for King Charles simply referred 
to the members as "rebels". 149 Nedham's rival used the simple description "a foul house" 
15OMercurius Philo Monarchicus called them the "cauker-won-ns" of the body politic. 151 
It is clear (and it should also be added that the other parliamentary papers did not have access 
to political division at Westminster), that after the regicide, not a single Royalist journalist 
had access to the workings of Westminster. The editor of the Man in the Moon promised 
information upon the activities at Westminster, but his insights were limited to Henry 
Marten's sex life, Bradshaw's cowardice and the low social origins of the MPs 152 . The 
editions of Pragmaticus provide us with slightly more information citing the names of nine 
leaders of the Commonwealth. 153 Mercurius Elencticus refers to taxes being paid for Marten's 
whores. 
154 
146 Mercurius Pragmaticus, E. 544 (9), Tuesday 13 th February - Tuesday 20th February; 
Mercurius Pragmaticus, E. 546 (18), Tuesday 27h February - Tuesday 5 th March. 
147 Mercurius Elencticus, E. 542 (13), Tuesday 6 th February -Tuesday 13'h February. 
148 The Man in the Moon, E. 550 (26) , 
gth April - 16 th April 1649. 
149 Mercurius Pragmaticus for King Charles, E. 555 (13), Tuesday 8 th May - Tuesday 15 th 
May 1649. 
150 Mercurius Pragmaticus for King Charls, E. 555 (14), Tuesday 8 th May -Tuesday 15 th May 1649. 
151 Mercurius Philo Monarchicus, E. 555 (34), Monday 14 th May - Monday 2 I't May 1649. 
152 The Man in the Moon ' E. 551 (10), Monday 16'h April - Monday 23d April 1649, p. 10; The Man in the Moon, E. 555 (33), Monday 14th May - Monda St 
rd O'ý 
21 May 1649, p. 54; The 
Man in the Moon, E. 552 (8), Monday 23 April - Monday 3 April. 
153 Mercurius Pragmaticus, E. 544 (9), Tuesday 13 th February - Tuesday 20th February. 
154 Mercurius Elencticus, E. 552 (14), Tuesday 24 th April - Tuesday I't May. 
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The editors of the Royalist newspapers portrayed Parliament as a homogeneous body. It is 
interesting to note that they made no distinction between the Regicides and those MPs who 
returned to Westminster after the purge. 
As we would expect, the newspapers reported upon the demise of the Lords as another 
example of the illegal nature of the Commons rule. 155 It is interesting to note, however, that 
Royalist journalists neither praised nor forgave the Lords for their respective stands in the 
Civil War. Even the peers who had been outspoken opponents of the trial, did not receive 
praise from the journalists. Instead, newspapers condemned these peers as a collection of 
fools who had failed to act at the appropriate time. 156 The only two Lords to receive a great 
deal of attention, were Pembroke and Denbigh. These peers' decision to serve the new 
government resulted in widespread condemnation. 157 
Throughout this period every Royalist journalist attacked the Grandees for their role in the 
English Revolution. At the centre of these attacks stood the figure of Oliver Cromwell. 
Every editor enjoyed commenting upon the size of his nose, but it was not just his physical 
appearance which provoked comment and other disparaging remarks highlighting his 
155 Mercurius Pragmaticus, E. 548 (3), Tuesday 13 th March - Tuesday 20 'h March 1649; 
Mercurius Elencticus, E. 542 (13), Tuesday 6 th February - Tuesday 13 th February 1649; 
Mercurius PraRmaticus, E. 546 (18), Tuesday 6h March - Tuesday 13'h March 1649. 
156 Mercurius Elenticus, E. 542 (13), cited above n. 155. 
157 Mercurius Pragmaticus, E. 550 (13). Tuesday 3 rd April - Tuesday 10"' April; Mercurius 
Pragmaticus, E. 551 (19), Tuesday 17 th April - Tuesday 24h April; Mercurius Pragmaticus, E. 
544 (9), Tuesday 13 th Feburary - Tuesday 20th February; Mercurius Pragmaticus, E. 552 (16), 
Tuesday 24 Ih April - Tuesday I" May; Mercurius Elenticus, E. 554 (10) ' Tuesday I" May - Tuesday 8 th May, p. 15; The Man in the Moon, E. 551 (10), Monday 16 Ih April - Monday 23rd 
April, p. 10; The Man in the Moon, E. 555 (33), Monday 14'h May - Monday 2 1" May, p. 52. 
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"cruelty", 158 lack of originality"' 59, cc cowardice" 160and above all, his "ambition". 16 1 This is in 
complete contrast to the parliamentary newspapers which made very little reference to the 
future Lord Protector. 
Henry Ireton did not receive as much attention as Cromwell, but he was still regarded by 
Nedham as the driving force behind the revolution. 162 As we would expect, most newspapers 
revealed Ireton to be an ambitious, cowardly and corrupt man. 163 Fairfax was not immune 
from attack. Mercurius Elencticus blamed him for Pride's purge and refused to exonerate him 
for the regicide. 164 Editions of Pragmaticus berated Fairfax for his unscrupulous ambition. 165 
158 Mercurius Pragmaticus, E. 551 (19), Tuesday 17 th April - Tuesday 24 th April, Mercurius 
Elencticus, E. 552 (14), Tuesday 24h April - Tuesday I" May, p. 7. 
159 The Man in the Moon, E. 552 (8), 23rd April - 30'h April, p. 11; Mercurius Pragmaticus for 
King Charles, E. 552 (15), 24 th April - l't May, p. 11. 
160 The Man in the Moon, E. 554 (4), 3 01h April -7 th May, p. 26; The Man in the Moon, E. 552 
(8), 23d Aýril - 30 th April, p. 24; Mercurius Elencticus, E. 554 (10), Tuesday I" May - t Tuesday 8t May. 
161 Mercurius Pragmaticus, E. 540 (15), Tuesda y Mercurius Pragmaticus, E. 548 (22), 
Tuesday 20th March - Tuesday 27th March. 22 n January -3 oth JanuaM Mercurius 
Pragmaticus, E. 548 (3), Tuesday 13 th March - Tuesday 20th March; Mercurius Pragmaticus, 
E. 549 (13), Tuesday 27 th March - Tuesday 3rd April; Mercurius Pragmaticus, E. 550 (2), h Tuesday I O'h April - Tuesday 17th April; Mercurius Pragmaticus, E. 551 (19), Tuesday 17' 
April - Tuesday 24 th April; Mercurius Elencticus, E. 542 (13), Tuesday 6 th February - 
Tuesday 13 th February; Mercurius Elencticus, E. 545 (19), Wednesday 21" February - 
Wednesday 28'h February; Mercurius Elencticus, E. 552 (14), Tuesday 24 th April - Tuesday 
I" May, p. 5-6; The Man in the Moon, E. 554 (4), April 30'h - May 7 th; Mercurius Pragmaticus 
for King Charls, E. 554 (12), Tuesday I" May - Tuesday 8 th May, Me urius Pragmaticus for 
King Charles ' E. 555 
(13), Tuesday 8 th May -Tuesday 15 th May; Mercurius Elencticus for 
King Charles, E. 554 (5), Monday 30'h April - Monday 7 th May. 
162 Mercurius Pragmaticus for Kina Charles, E. 552 (15), Tuesday 24 th April -Tuesday I" 
May, p. 11. 
163 Most of these are found in n. 161 above. 
164 Mercurius Elencticus, E. 475 (22), Wednesday 29th November - Wednesday 6 th December, 
p. 518; Mercurius Elencticus, E. 545 (19), Wednesday 21" February - Wednesday 28 th 
February; Mercurius Elencticus, E. 552 (14), Tuesday 24 th Apri I -Tuesday I" May, p. 5. 
See Over for n. 165. 
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The Man in the Moon informed his readers that upon the day of the regicide, Fairfax kissed 
his wife "and told her that he thanked God he had that day a King without a head- " 166 A 
number of newspapers still believed that Fairfax was amongst the most important radicals in 
the land. But not all the papers agreed upon the amount of influence exerted by Fairfax. 
Mercurius Pragmaticus for King Charles believed that Ireton and Cromwell were the central 
forces behind the revolution; instead of viewing Fairfax as a prime author, the Lord General 
was depicted as a monkey. 
167 
As mentioned above, it appears likely that the Royalist press directed their editorials to a 
wider readership than just their royalist supporters. In the section above, we have seen how 
the press depicted a troubled society. In their editorials the press blamed the Grandees, Lords 
and Commons for their sufferings. However, journalists appreciated that the Royalists and 
neutrals could not, by themselves, destroy the new regime. The two groups who proved to be 
the most hostile opponents of the new regime were the Presbyterians and the Levellers - the 
two groups associated with causing the rebellion. To accept these groups as fellow-sufferers 
would leave the journalists open to the charge of betrayal, by a Royalist party who resented 
any concessions to their former foes. ' 68 On the other hand, journalists wished to debilitate the 
new regime. If the purged Parliament was to be destroyed by forces from within England, it 
would be achieved by either the Presbyterians or the Levellers. This section will analyse the 
manner in which the Royalist press treated their former enemies. 
165 Mercurius Pragmaticus, E. 540 (15), Tuesday 24th January - Tuesda 3 Oth January 1649. Iy 
Mercurius Pragmaticus, E. 548 (22), Tuesday 20'h March - Tuesday 27 March 1649. 
166 The Man in the Moon, E. 550 (26), April 16'h, p. 5. 
167 Mercurius Pragmaticus for King Charles, E. 555 (13), Tuesday 8 th May - Tuesday 15'h 
May, 1649. 
168 David Underdown, Royalist Conspiracy in England. (Yale 1960), p. 12. 
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Between Pride's purge and the regicide, Marchamount Nedham showed some sympathy for 
the Presbyterian MPs who were either imprisoned or secluded from Parliament as a result of 
the purge. For standing up to the Army, Nedham praised Sir Robert Harley and other secluded 
members, describing them as "bravely resolved" gentlemen. 169 Major General Massey and 
William Prynne were congratulated for writing against the Army. 170 Nedharn also appears to 
have supported the compromise agreed at Newport, considering the praise he gave Nathaniel 
Fiennes for speaking "honestly" in favour of the treaty. 17 1 From this evidence, it appears that 
Nedham acknowledged that the Royalist cause would be best served by disregarding former 
hostilities and accepting the Presbyterians as political friends. His view is illustrated in this 
quotation: 
"and because they now weep with the loyalists, though from a different cause, for companies 
sake, they shall be honoured with the names of fellows in affliction, though they never were 
in affection. " 172 
In contrast to Nedham's approach, George Wharton, the editor of Mercurius Elencticus, did 
not initially show too much concern or respect for the Presbyterian MPs. Instead of lamenting 
the imprisonment of some MPs Wharton remarked that "these members were the principle 
contrivers of our miseries. " Moreover Wharton suggested that the old crimes committed by 
the Presbyterians were coming back to haunt them. 173 By his next edition Wharton's approach 
altered. Although he began his paper by saying that the Presbyterian opposition was "raw and 
169 Mercurius Pragmaticus, E. 476 (2), Tuesday 5 th December -Tuesday 12 th December 1648. 
170 Ibid E. 537 (20), Tuesday 26h December - Tuesday gth January. 
171 Ibid. 
172 Mercurius Pragmaticus, E. 476 (2), Tuesday 5 th December -Tuesday 12 lh December. 
173 Mercurius Elencticus, E. 476 (4), Tuesday 5th December - Tuesday 12 th December 1648, 
p. 530. 
240 
inconsiderable", he did accept that if the Presbyterians distanced themselves from the new 
regime they would be able to "acquit themselves of all blame, contempt and infamy. 174 In his 
subsequent edition, Wharton described Prynne and Ashurst as "worthy members" because 
they wrote against the new regime. 175 Within a just matter of weeks Wharton had moved 
noticeably closer to Nedham's position. 
The other two newspapers which appeared between the purge and regicide gave hardly 
mention to the political Presbyterians. Mercurius Imparticalis made one reference to William 
Pyrnne, pointing out that he had a foul mouth. However, since Prynne was attacking the 
Army, the editor was content to report it. 176 Mercurius Melancholicus claimed that seven 
thousand Presbyterians from Lancashire were planning to launch a counter-revolution. Apart 
from this single and unreliable piece of information, the editor did not concern himself with 
the presbyterians., 77 After the regicide, the Royalist press ceased to report upon the activities 
of individual Presbyterians with the exception of the four MPs who remained in prison, 178 and 
reports concerning Sir Robert Harley's opposition to the Commonwealth's new coin. 179 
174 Mercurius Elencticus, T. T. E. 477 (3 1), Tuesday 191h December - Tuesday 26 Ih December 
p. 545. 
175 Mercurius Elencticus, E. 536 (3 1), Tuesday 26 th December - Tuesday 2 nd January, p. 550. 
176 Mercurius Imparticalis, T. T. E. 476 (3), Tuesday 5 th December -Tuesday 12 Ih December, 
p. 3. 
177 Mercurius Meloncholicus, E. 536 (27), Monday 25 th December - Monday I't January. 
178 Mercurius Pragmaticus, E. 550 (13ý, Tuesday 3 rd April - Tuesday I Oth April; Mercurius 
Pragmaticus, E. 551 (19), Tuesday 17t April - Tuesday 24 th April; The Man in the Moon, E. 
550(26), 16 th April, p. 7; Mercurius Pragmaticus for King Charles, T. T. E. 552 (15), Tuesday 
17 th April - Tuesday 24 th April, p. 12. 
179 Mercurius Pragmaticus for King Charles, E. 555 (13), Tuesday 8 th May - Tuesday 15 th 
May; Mercurius Pragmaticus for King Charls, E. 555 (14), Tuesday 8th May -Tuesday 15 th 
May. 
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Two editions of Royalist newspapers advocated a Presbyterian-Royalist alliance. An edition 
of Mercurius Pragmaticus appearing at the start of April suggested that this option should not 
be closed. 180 Nedham (whilst writing for Mercurius Pragmaticus for King Charles) praised the 
Presbyterians for their resolve and predicted that they would "resume true resolutions of 
English loyalty". 18 1 However, not all journalists favoured this approach. The editor of The 
Man in the Moon remained hostile to the Presbyterians for the role they played in the Civil 
War. In an edition of Pragmaticus, the editor claimed that not a single Royalist would mourn 
the death of Major-General Browne. The manner in which the Royalists should treat their 
former enemies was the central issue dividing the Royalist party during the Interreguum. 182 it 
quite clearly divided the press in England. 
It was, arguably not the lay Presbyterians who were the problem when it came to a possible 
alliance. Two editions of Mercurius Elencticus reveal a definite hostility to the Presbyterian 
clergy. The first appeared soon after the regicide: 
"This is not out of any affection they have to monarchy that they rise against their rebellious 
bretheren of the Army, but because they had not the honour to do it themselves. " 183 
Considering that the Presbyterians still demanded a rigid church settlement, coupled with the 
bad blood that existed because of the war, it was always unlikely that they would have 
cemented a formidable alliance. 
180 Mercurius Pragmaticus, E. 554 (17), Tuesday I" May - Tuesday 8 th May. 
181 Mercurius Pragmaticus for King Charles, T. T. E. 551 (15), Tuesday 17 th April - Tuesday 
24'h April. 
182 Ronald Hutton, Charles 11 (Oxford 1989), p. 40-4 1. 
183 Mercurius Elencticus, in J. B Williams, A Histo! y of English Journalism to the Foundation 
of the Gazette, v. 209. 
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In February 1649, Mercurius Pragmaticus and Mercurius Elencticus reported upon Scotland's 
hostility to the new regime. The editors enjoyed writing about this hostility, but this merely 
expediency rather than any notion of affection. 184 However, as soon as it became clear that the 
Scottish Government were imposing strict terms on the King, the press altered their approach. 
With the exception of Nedham, all the newspapers attacked the Scottish Government. 185 Once 
Montrose arrived, the press were quick to point out the success he enjoyed. 186 Marchamount 
Nedham was the only royalist journalist who refrained from attacking the ruling party in 
Scotland. He suggested that Scotland was crying out for Kirk and King. Having changed 
sides himself already, Nedharn was more willing than any other journalist to overlook the 
previous nine years. 
187 
The press' attitude towards the English Presbyterians and the ruling Kirk party in Scotland, 
highlights the press' reluctance to forgive their former enemies. With the Levellers, the 
question of forgiveness was even more burdensome, since the Agreement of the People had 
assumed the destruction of the monarchy. 188 In the weeks before the regicide, the available 
184 Mercurius Pragmaticus, E. 545 (15), Monday 20th February - Monday 27 th February; 
Mercurius Pragmaticus, E. 546 (1 ýý, Tuesday 27h February - Tuesday 5 th March; Mercurius 
Elencticus, E. 524 (13), Tuesday 6 February - Tuesday 13'h February. 
185 Mercurius Pragmaticus E. 551 (12), Tuesday 17'h April - Tuesday 24 th April, Mercurius 
PragmaticuS for King Charls, E. 554 (12), Tuesday 1" May - Tuesday 8 th May; Mercurius 
Elencticus for King Charles, E. 554 (5), Monday 30th April - Monday 7th May, Mercurius 
Philo-Monarchicus, T. T. E. 555 (34), Monday 14 th May - Monday 2 I't May. 
186 Mercurius Elencticus, E. 554 (10 Tuesday I't May - Tuesday 8th May 1649; Mercurius 
Elencticus, E. 555 (37), Monday 14t May - Monday 2 l't May 1649; Mercurius Elencticus for 
King Charles, E. 550 (10), Monday 7 th May - Mondayl4th May 1649; Mercurius Pragmaticus for King Charles, T. T. E. 555 (13), Tuesday 8 th May - Tuesday 15 th May; The Man in the Moon, E. 555 (33), Monday 14th May - Monday 2 I't May 1649, p. 56. 
187 See below. Mercurius Pragmaticus for King Charles, E. 552 (15), Tuesday 24 th April - Tuesday I't May 1649; Mercurius Pragmaticus for King Charles, E. 555 (13), Tuesday 8 th 
May -Tuesday 15 th May. 
188 Ian Gentles, The New Model Army, p. 286. 
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Royalist newspapers attacked the Leveller programmer. Mercurius Elencticus castigated any 
MPs associated with the Levellers. Wharton also warned his readers that the Agreement 
would only benefit "thieves and cheats". Finally, Wharton suggested that the implementation 
of the Agreement would result in the destruction of "religion, law and monarchy. "189 
Mercurius Pragmaticus described the Levellers as "made beasts with cursed principles". 190 
Nedharn viewed the Levellers as being central to the Revolution, implacably opposed to any 
kind of compromise. 191 Mercurius Melancholicus blamed the Levellers for causing the initial 
rebellion. 192 However, between Pride's purge and the regicide, the available Royalist 
newspapers made few references to Lilburne. It would be wrong to assume that this dearth of 
news suggests that Lilburne was opposed to the regicide. Upon the advice of Parliament, the 
Leveller leader had returned to his native Durham to secure E3,000 from the estates of 
Royalist delinquents. 193 
In an edition of Mercurius Pragmaticus, published upon the 20th February, the editor reported 
upon the purged Parliament's failure to implement the Agreement. 194 In the subsequent 
addition, the paper warned the Grandees that the Levellers were drawing up articles. 195 Apart 
from, these two references, no other comment concerning the Levellers was made. The 
189 Mercurius Elencticus, E. 536 (3 1), Tuesday 26 th December - Tuesday I" January, p. 55 1; 
Mercurius Elencticus, E. 546 (36), Tuesday 12 th December - Tuesday 19'h December, p. 534- 
5. 
190 Mercurius Pragmaticus, E. 476 (35), Tuesday 12 th December - Tuesday I gth December; 
Mercurius Pragmaticus, E. 477 (30), Tuesday 19'h December - Tuesday 26h December. 
191 See chapter I above. 
192 Mercurius Melancholicus cited above, E 536 (27), Monday 25 lh December -Monday I't 
January, p. 3. 
193 Ian Gentles, The New Model Ann , p. 304-5. 
194 Mercurius Pragmaticus, E. 544 (9), Tuesday 13 th February - Tuesday I gth February. 
195 Mercurius Pragmaticus, E. 545 (15), Tuesday 20'h February - Tuesday 27 th February. 
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situation dramatically altered with the publication of John Lilburne's, 'England's New Chains 
Discovered'. 196 From the 26 th February, the Levellers became the most important news, as 
journalists appreciated that Leveller hostility could cripple the new regime. 
All the Royalist newspapers recognised that Lilburne could kindle a fire throughout the 
kingdom, 197 which could divide the Army and possibly lead to a restoration. From February 
until May, all the Royalist journalists attempted to encourage the Leveller's to revolt. 198 
However, the majority of journalists could not resist making personal attacks upon John 
Lilburne and Leveller doctrine. Mercurius Pragmaticus still held the Levellers responsible for 
the death of the King. 199 Another Leveller, William Everard, was described as a man 
concerned with the liberties of the deer. 200 Mercurius Elencticus shared this aversion to 
Lilburne, a man who had been "eminently active in the ruin of the kingdom . 
20 1 The editor of 
the Man in the Moon failed to sympathise with Lilburne's imprisonment; instead of lamenting 
upon John's unfortunate condition, the editor suggested that he was receiving his just reward. 
202 The paper also reported upon Lilburne's ambition, going as far as claiming that John 
wished to be head of state. 203 Mercurius Elencticus for King Charles, commented upon the 
196 John Lilbume, England's New Chains Discovered in Alymer (ed) p. 142-8. 
197 E. g. Mercurius Pragmaticus, T. T. E. 546 (4), Tuesday 27 th February - Tuesday 5 th March; 
Mercurius Pragmaticus, T. T. E. 548 (3), Tuesday 13'h March - Tuesday 201h March. 
198 See examples in the notes listed below which provide specific references. 
199 Mercurius Pragmaticus, T. T. E. 546 (4), Tuesday 27 th February - Tuesday 5 th March; 
Mercurius Pragmaticus, E. 550 (32), Tuesday 10'h April - Tuesday 17 th April, Mercurius 
Pragmaticus, E. 551 (12), Tuesday 17ýh April - Tuesday 24 th April. 
200 Mercurius Pragmaticus, E. 546 (4), Tuesday 27h February - Tuesday 5 th March. 
201 Mercurius Pragmaticus, T. T. E. 550 (32), Tuesday I Oth April -Tuesday 17 th April. 
202 The Man in the Moon, T. T. E. 550 (26), 16'h April, p. 7; The Man in the Moon, E, 551 (10), 
16 th April - 23 rd April, p. 11. 
203 The Man in the Moon, T. T. E. 552 (8), Monday 23d April - Monday 30th April, p. 18; The 
Man in the Moon, E. 554 (4), Monday 3 Oth April - Monday 7 th May, p. 3 1. 
245 
extra-ordinary pomp at Lockyer's funeral for a man of "so obscure a condition". 204 Mercurius 
Philo Monarchicus believed that the Levellers were resolved to "level the House as low as the 
boys do the brothels at Shrovetide". 205 
The tendency to make personal attacks upon the Leveller leaders, and upon Leveller doctrine 
was not advocated by Marchamount Nedham. In his editorials, Nedham (when writing under 
Mercurius Pragmaticus for King Charles), praised Lilburne and his Leveller colleagues. In 
democratic language, Nedharn proclaimed that Lockyer "died a very martyr for the liberties of 
England" . 
206 
Despite the attacks made upon Lilburne, all the Royalist editorials encouraged the Levellers to 
continue and advance their campaign against the new regime. Accounts included praise for 
Leveller women who petitioned on behalf of John Lilburne. 207 For the ideologically 
committed, the newspaper pointed out the Grandess adversion to Leveller doctrine. 208 
Leveller readers were told that Lilburne faced execution and he was being kept in "inhumane 
and barbarous conditions". 209 For the solider concerned with financial matters, came the news 
that they would not receive a penny, 2 10 but most importantly the Royalist press argued for an 
204 Mercurius Elencticus for King Charles, T. T. E. 554 (5), Monday 30'h April - Monday 
7'h 
May. 
205 Mercurius Philo-Monarchicus, E. 555 (34), Monday 14'h May - Monday 21" May. 
206 Mercurius Pragmaticus for King Charles, T. T. E 551 (15), Tuesday 24 th April -Tuesday 1 
May, p. 14. 
207 Mercurius Pragmaticus, E. 550 (1 ýk Tuesday 3rd April - Tuesday I Oth April-, Mercurius 
Pragmaticus, E. 552 (16), Tuesday 34 April -Tuesday I" May. 
208 Mercurius Pragmaticus, E. 550 (13), Tuesday 3 rd April - Tuesday I Oth April, The Man in 
the Moon, E. 555 (33), 14 th May - 21" May, p. 55. 
209 Mercurius Pragmaticus, E. 546 (18) 1 Tuesday 6th March - Tuesday 13 
th March; Mercurius 
Elencticus, E. 555 (37), Monday 14 th May - Monday 2 l't May, p. 30. 
210 Mercurius Elencticus, E. 554 (10), Tuesday 0 May - Tuesday 2l't May, p. 30. 
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armed revolt. The foundation of their argument rested upon the simple, yet powerful 
suggestion that if the Levellers did not fight, they would be destroyed. 211 Even after Burford, 
the press continued to advocate military action. 
The attempts to persuade the Levellers to revolt, reveals a Royalist press writing for a wider 
readership. Upon occasions, journalists congratulated themselves and other newspapers for 
their part in persuading the Levellers to reVolt. 212 Whilst it is clear that journalists aimed to 
encourage the Levellers, there was not a total shift in editorial style. Despite all the 
encouragement which was extended to the Levellers, the personal attacks upon the Leveller 
leaders demonstrate that the press never regarded them as fellow-sufferers. Praise was only 
afforded to Levellers and Presbyterians because the Royalists themselves were not in a 
position to harm the new regime. In early May, it was reported that a group of Cavaliers had 
murdered Dr. Dorislaus. The widespread celebrations which greeted this one isolated incident, 
suggests that, had the Royalists caused problems, the papers would have focussed upon this, 
rather than reporting upon Leveller discontent* 213 However, the Royalists were crushed which 
left the journalists with little alternative but to focus upon other disaffected group, and yet 
essentially the press was encouraging the erosion of the radical cause. As one edition of 
Mercurius Pragmaticus highlighted, "not even the cavaliers can work better things with an 
anny, than this striving for priority amongst themselves. 214 
21 1 E. g. Mercurius Pragmaticus, E. 548 (22), Tuesday 20th March - Tuesday 27 th March. 
212 Mercurius Pragmaticus for King Charles, E. 555 (13). Tuesday 8 th May - Tuesday 15 th 
May 1649; Mercurius Pragmaticus, E. 552 (16), Tuesday 24 th April -Tuesday I" May, 1649; 
Mercurius Elencticus, E. 555 (9), Monday 7 th May - Monday 14 th May, p. 18. 
213 Mercurius Pragmaticus for King Charls, E. 555 (4), Tuesday 8 Ih Mg -Tuesday 15 th May, 
p. 30; Mercurius Pragmaticus for King Charles, E. 556 (4), Tuesday 15t May - Tuesday 22 nd 
May; Mercurius Elencticus, E. 555 (9), Monday 7 th May - Monday 14 th May, p. 23-4; 
Mercurius Philo-Monacrbicus, E. 555 (34), Monday 14 th May - Monday 21" May. 
214 Mercurius Pragmaticus, E. 548 (3), Tuesday 13 th March - Tuesday 
20th March. 
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The evidence produced upon the Royalist press suggests that the majority of journalists found 
it difficult to forget the part played by both the Presbyterians and the Levellers in the Civil 
War. Marchamount Nedham proved to be the exception. He was willing to support both 
Levellers and Presbyterians. He also proved adept in his use of Leveller language. Nedham's 
attacks upon the Council of State, mirrored Lilburne's views. His attempts to encourage the 
Leveller soldiers to ignore their senior officers could have been written by Lilburne himself. 
On the I't of May, Nedham told Leveller leaders that "they were not bom with saddles on 
their backs, to be ridden by their officers". 2 15 Nedham was far more flexible than the other 
Royalist journalists. In April 1649 he appreciated that the Levellers were capale of toppling 
the regime so he was willing to support them. It is hardly surprising that the new Government 
appreciated Nedham's ability; by the end of 1650 he had changed sides again and become the 
Commonwealth's leading spokesman. 216 
The English Press during the Revolution. 
In conclusion, it is worth considering the nature of the English press during the revolution and 
to comment upon the type of information available to the public. This conclusion will also 
deal with two other issues. First, it will mention the strengths and limitations of newspapers 
as a source for this period of history. Second, the conclusion will compare the observations 
215 Mercurius Pragmaticus for King Charles, E. 552 (15), Tuesday 24'h April -Tuesday I" 
May. See also Leveller tractsEngland's New Chains Discovered, Second Part of England, s 
New Chains and Picture of the Council of State, p. 156-245. 
216 See below for the Government's decision to employ Nedharn and above for his career as a 
Royalist. He was, of course, one of the great turncoats. 
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made by editors with the current historiography. Some of these issues have been raised 
earlier in the thesis. 
The information in this chapter has identified a major difference between the Royalist and the 
so-called official or licensed press. Superficially, this would come as no surprise, based upon 
the assumption that the official press were subjected to severe restraints. To an extent this is 
true, as there appears to have been a certain amount of self-censorship. However, the 
editorials in The Moderate, The Moderate Intelligencer and, to a lesser extent, the Kingdomes 
Weekly Intelligencer, show that the editors were not afraid to voice their concerns about the 
direction of the Government's policy. It is, perhaps a testimony to the freedom of the press 
that the official censor was also the most outspoken (with the exception of some, but not all 
the Royalist papers) critic of the new regime. This is made all the more remarkable when we 
consider that this was the first revolution that the country had had, and the new Government 
began to rule with arguably the narrowest base of support. 
Despite this apparent lack of censorship, the Government took the control of public opinion 
seriously. As Blair Worden argues, the readiness of politicians to employ and reemploy 
Nedham, shows the importance the Government attached to the press. 217 Nedham is rightly 
regarded as the great propagandist of the Civil War period. But the Rump took the initiative 
before they re-employed Nedham; the publication of the Modest Narrative of Intelligence was 
the first step towards the creation of a newspaper which would intelligently defend the 
Government's position. The need for such a paper demonstrates the Rump's vulnerability, 
but it also shows the importance of the press and the Rump's desire to avoid censorship. 
Although the laws were tightened in September 1649, M. J. Seymour suggests that they were 
217 Blair Worden, "Wit in a Roundhead" in S. D Amussen and M. A Kishlansky (eds), Political 
Culture and Cultural Politics in Early Modem England (Manchester 1995) (Essays presented 
to David Underdown) p. 301. 
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not enforced in a draconian fashion. 218 It is also evident that the public had access to a wide- 
variety of news, although it is difficult to determine how obtainable the clandestine 
newspapers were to the population living outside London. For the lower class person who 
clung to the traditional order, The Man in the Moon must have made excellent reading. For 
the poor soldier bitter about his arrears of pay, the publication of Mercurius Militaris would 
have been welcomed; this paper included bitter attacks against the Grandees and the proposed 
expedition to Ireland. 
The person interested in politics could turn to one of the licensed newspapers for a full 
account of events at Westminster' 2 19 But there is a more important consideration. If Professor 
Underdown is correct in his view that 70% of the Artisans in London were literate, it is clear 
that the English people had a large body of news and opinion to help them formulate a 
political belief Nigel Smith suggests that newspapers "were at the heart of Civil War and 
Interreguum politics; the pulse of the body politic. 220AIthough there is insufficient evidence 
to demonstrate the precise influence the newspaper had, it is clear that England was a very 
well-infonned nation and that the Government took the role of the press seriously. 
The Press also provides the historian with indepensable infonnation for a study of the English 
Revolution. 22 1 The desire of the editors to report upon a wide-variety of issues has resulted in 
an archive which covers a large cross-section of opinion. The press provides infonnation upon 
Presbyterian and Royalist opposition, radical demands for impartial justice and Leveller 
218 MJ Seymour, 'Pro Government Propaganda', p. 330-45. 
219 See above, A Perfect Diumall is the best example. 
220 Nigel Smith, Literature and Revolution in England 1640-1660, p. 69 
22 1 Blair Worden, The Rump Parliament p. 466. 
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opposition to the new regime. Some of this detail is of vital importance, especially upon the 
radical petitions and on the geographical location of Presbyterian opposition, since they are 
not found in other source's. But it is important to make one serious qualification. The editors 
failed to provide detailed information upon the political perspectives of the leading MPs and 
the press also failed to include details upon political divisions within Parliament. The editors 
would report upon conflict within the Commons, but they were reluctant (or did not know) to 
provide the names of the leading protagonists. There are two very good examples of this. 
From the information in the Journals of the House of Commons, using the method of 
identifying Tellers in motions 222 , we 
know that William Puretoy and Sydenham supported 
some kind of role for the Lords in the future constitution. 223 Using the same method we also 
know that Henry Marten and Lord Grey, along with forty two MPs, advocated abolition. 224 
Although the newspapers reported upon a protracted debate, 225 and upon occasions it is clear 
that divisions existed, 226 they failed to provide the names of the leading spokesmen. 227 The 
same scenario can be seen in the appointment of the first Council of State. The newspapers 
mentioned the debates, but we are not informed that Marten and Harrison's candidature were 
rejected and that there were disagreements upon whether the Earl of Salisbury should be 
admitted. Again, such information can only be found in the Journals of the House of 
228 Commons. The reluctance of journalists to comment upon parliamentary faction, questions 
222 This method was used in chapter 2 above to look at allegiances between regicides and 
conformists. 
223 C. J vi p. 134. 
224 lbid 
225 Perfect Occurences, E. 527 (17), Friday 2 nd February - Friday 9th February 1649; A 
Perfect Diumall, E. 527 (19), Monday 5 th February -Monday 12 th February 1649, p. 2321. 
226 The Moderate, E. 541 (15), Tuesday 3 Oth January - Tuesday 6 th February 1649, p. 294. 
227 This is true of all the newspapers. 
228 E. g. C. J vi p. 14 1. 
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Blair Worden's argument that specific newspapers represented the views of a particular group 
of MPS. 
119 
It is also clear that newspapers were reluctant to comment upon the political views of the MPs 
Only Royalist newspapers commented upon the MPs who dominated the House of 
Commons. 230 Unfortunately, the motivation of many prominent MPs during the revolution is 
not available and this provides the greatest difficulty to an historian of this period. The 
survival of a handful of manuscripts, explaining the motivation of several MPs is useful, but 
also frustrating because they only scratch the surface. 231 
However, the press does provide a clue to the position of the majority of MPs during the 
revolution. In my previous chapter upon the Commons, it was suggested that political 
divisions were not the norm, as Parliament decided to unite against the threefold threat of 
Royalism, Levellerism and Presbyterianism. Unity was achieved through a moderate 
programme of reform aimed at securing the acquaintance of those who had supported the 
parliamentary cause in the Civil War, but were disaffected with the course of the revolution. 
It has been argued in this chapter that the press was, by and large, free from governmental 
control. Moreover, it is clear that editors were willing to project their own political stance. It 
is, therefore, possible that the dearth of reports upon political divisions reflected the political 
situation, rather than illustrating the limited access journalists had to the corridors of power at 
Westminster. 
229 Blair Worden, The Rump Parliament p. 406. 
230 Mercurius Elencticus, E. 475 (22), Wednesday 29th November - Wednesday 6 th December 
1649. 
23 1 For useful manuscripts for parliamentary views see NLW Mss 11434B, A Vindication of 
the Army and Parliament, U. 
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In this respect, it is clear that information gleaned from the press can provide an insight into 
the secretive world of Westminster politics. It is worth considering how the detail found in the 
press is consistent with some of the current historiography; this conclusion will consider 
debates over the Agreement of the People, the role of the House of Lords and the influence of 
the clergy upon politics. 
The traditional view that the Grandees allowed the debates over the Agreement to take place 
whilst they got on with the important business of the King's trial is challenged in the works of 
Ian Gentles and Barbara Taft. 232 The latter view is supported by the detail found in the 
newspapers. There is no support for Lilburne's accusations (made quite a long time after the 
debates) of a sinister plot by the Grandees to deliberately thwart the Levellers. 233 In contrast, 
all of the newspapers showed that the debates were taken serioUSIY. 234 Moreover, upon two 
occasions it is clear that the editors were of the view that too much time and importance had 
been attached to the projected constitution. Gilbert Mabbott, the most famous Leveller 
jourrialist, demanded that less attention should be given to the Agreement as he encouraged 
235 
politicians (from both the Army and Parliament) to focus upon the King's trial. The editor 
of the Moderate Intelligencer displayed concern about the "strife and contention" which 
would follow if the proposals for liberty of conscience became part of the constitution. 236 
232 Ian Gentles, The New Model Army, p. 285-94. Barbara Taft, 'The Council of Officers 
Agreement of the People', HJ 28 (1985), p. 169-85. 
233 John Lilbume. The tract is, Legall Fundamentall Liberties, was critical of the Grandees, 
but I accept the case put forward by Barbara Taft in n. 232 above. 
234 A Perfect Diumall, E. 
h 
526 (4), p. 2557-2260. The Moderate, E. 477 (4), Tuesday 12 th 
December - Tuesday 19' December, p. 212. A Declaration of Both Houses, E. 477 (7), p. 19. 
235 The Moderate, E. 477 (4), Tuesday 12'h December - Tuesday I 9th December, p. 12. 
236 
See notes 49-58 above. 
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Considering that the newspapers were contemporary, coupled with Lilburne's propensity to 
make personal attacks when he did not get his way 237 , it is possible to conclude (taking 
account of Taft's and Gentles' research) that the debates upon the Agreement were not 
6cmerely a sop to the radicals to distract them while the Grandees got on with the more serious 
business of cutting off the King's head" . 
238 
In light of my chapter upon the House of Lords and the importance attached to John 
Adamson's work upon the upper chamber, it is worth considering the press' attitude towards 
the Lords and compare their accounts with the current historiography. 239 Unlike the 
unifon-nity which characterised the press treatment of the debates upon the Agreement of the 
People we find a mass of conflicting evidence. 
Between the first purge and the regicide, in keeping with their portrayal of a political system 
dominated by the Army, the two available Royalist newspapers depicted a small and 
subservient second chamber. 24() However, the criticism directed against the Lords suggests 
that the Royalist press believed that the peers still performed a function in the political 
241 process. Mercunus Pragmaticus reported upon a meeting held between the Lords and 
Fairfax. Nedharn stated that Pembroke, acting as the chief spokesman agreed to "renounce all 
titles and privileges" and do "anything which should be judged beneficial for the kingdom* 242 
237 This was argued in my chapter upon the Commons. 
238 Ian Gentles, The New Model Ann , p. 289. 
239 See chapter upon the Lords and Introduction. Sources are listed in full. 
240 Mercurius Pragmaticus, E. 476 (35), Tuesday 5h December - Tuesday 12'h December 
1648; Same title, E. 477 (30) and E. 538 (18); Mercurius Elencticus, E. 476 (4), Tuesday 5 th 
December -Tuesday 12 th December. 
241 
See listings in n. 240. 
242 Mercurius Pragmaticus, E. 477 (30), Tuesday I gth December -Tuesday 26 th December 
1648. 
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Although this account is not substantiated by any other source, it is important to note that 
Nedham accepted that the Lords still retained contact with the Army. The evidence from the 
Royalist press supports Dr. Adamson's view that there is "nothing about the actions of either 
army or commons in the month after the purge to suggest that they saw the Lord's as 
implacably opposed to bringing the King to justice. ', 243 Moreover, there is nothing to suggest 
from the Royalist press that in the month between the purge and the vote to proceed with a 
trial of the King, the Lords were not performing an essential legislative function. 
The ma ority of the 'official' newspapers reported upon the activities of the Lords, mainly i 
their concurrence to legislation sent to them from the Commons, without mentioning the 
diminutive size of the chamber. These papers do not make a point of mentioning the 
importance of the Lords, but it is clear that the Lords still performed a legislative function. 244 
By contrast The Moderate and a paper entitled A Declaration Collected Out of the Journals of 
Both Houses 245 regarded the Lords as a tiny and irrelevant chamber. 
From the information available from the press, it is possible to use evidence to support three 
very different arguments. C. V. Wedgwood and David Underdown's view that the Lords were, 
from Pride's purge onwards, a small and useless chamber, merely going through the motions 
is supported by the evidence in the Moderate. 246 Dr. Adamson's view that the Lords still 
performed an important role can be supported by the evidence found in the Royalist 
newspapers. Also the view expressed in my chapter which suggests that the Commons wanted 
243 Adamson, 'The Peerage in Politics, 1646-9', (Cambridge PhD thesis, 1986) p. 286. 
244 This is clear from all of the papers available apart from the two cited below. 
245 A Declaration Collected Out of the Journals of Both Houses, Wednesday 13"' December - 
20th December 1649; The Moderat-e T. T. E. 536 (2), Tuesday 19 th December - Tuesday 26 th 
December, p. 220. 
246 This is clear from all the editions of the Moderate cited in the notes above. 
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to retain the support of the Lords is evident in a number of newspapers. In this case, it is 
difficult to forrn conclusions using the press as a fonn of adjudicator. 
The evidence obtained from the press is valuable for three principle reasons. First, as an end 
itself it shows the nature of journalism during the English Revolution. Instead of a collection 
of bland 'goven-iment prescribed' newspapers, we find editors willing to promote a defined 
political line, but there is not evidence to suggest that all of them were in the pockets of their 
masters at Westminster. Second, a study of the press confirms Dr. Wordon's view that 
newspapers, along with the Journals of the House of Commons, are the most important source 
for a study of politics during the revolution. Finally, newspapers tell us a great deal about the 
kind of society the Rump was attempting to create. The first months of a new Government 
which combined legislative and executive responsibilities showed that it was not willing to 
curtail editorial independence to further its own political ends. This contributed to a press 
which took the business of reporting the news seriously and the survival of the newspapers, 
especially when we consider the lack of other sources is an invaluable source for a study of 
revolutionary politics. 
Blair Worden's book 'The Rump Parliament' was published in 1974. He concluded his 
section upon the press with these words: 
"I believe that on matters of information mid seventeenth-century newspapers were more 
,, 247 trustworthy than are their twentieth century counterparts. 
Given the current quality of our newspapers, Dr. Worden's remarks appear even more 
appropriate. 
247 
Worden, The Rump, p. 404. 
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Conclusion 
The conclusion to this thesis will endeavour to demonstrate the areas that I regard as being 
new and important. In the final pages I will attempt to place my findings within the wider 
context of the revolution itself. 
In terms of factual detail, this thesis has suggested that Pride's Purge was, to an extent, a 
misnomer. Although Colonel Pride stood at the entrance of Parliament's door upon the 6 th of 
December, he played no part in the planning of the purge. More importantly, the first purge 
failed to provide a sufficiently tractable Parliament and precipitated a series of other purges, 
which were not dominated by the notorious colonel. The findings in this thesis have also 
extended the motivation that governed this assault upon Parliament. The purging of 
Parliament was designed to bring the king, other leading royalists and the MPs who had been 
impeached in 1647 and/or invited the Scots to engage in the Second Civil War to justice. ' As 
for the other hundred or so MPs, they were either to be secluded or suspended from the 
House. 2 It was pointed out that the remaining MPs were satisfied with the restrictions placed 
upon their membership by the Army. 
The evidence presented in the first part of chapter four suggests that the purging of Parliament 
resulted in the seclusion of approximately one hundred and fifty MPs, a figure that is at 
variance with the totals of one hundred and eighty six and one hundred and ten found in the 
1 See chapter 2 above. I do not feel that historians have placed sufficient weight upon the 
importance of the Scots. See Below. 
2 See chapter 2 above. The Humble Proposals and Desires of His Excellency the Lord 
Fairfax. T. T. E. 475 (25) 7 th December 1648. 
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works of David Underdown and Blair Worden respectively. 3 In chapter three it is suggested 
that the purge also had a profound impact upon the membership of the Lords, not through 
outright force, but more due to the presence of the Army that "frightened away" many 
members. 4 
In the chapter upon the Press, it is argued that the evidence found in the official newspapers 
was not pre-ordained by their masters at Westminster. But the aim of this chapter is more than 
a desire to highlight the role of this important body of opinion. Any historian writing upon the 
politics of the Rump period is faced with a major shortage of evidence. This inevitably results 
in a reliance upon the corpus of tracts in the Thomason collection with special attention paid 
to the newspapers. A fine example of this can be found in John Adamson's doctoral thesis. 
His bibliography contains a vast number of manuscript sources but hardly any of these are 
cited in the final chapter of his thesis. 5 My chapter upon the Press is, to an extent, an apologia 
for the entire thesis. As the conclusion stated, I believe that the newspapers produced in this 
6 
revolutionary era are more reliable than the majority of the newspapers on sale today. I do 
believe that the factual content found in the official newspapers in the early years of the 
Rump period can be relied upon. 
3 See chapter 4 above, Tables i, ii, and iii below; Worden The Rump Parliament. (Cambridge 
1974) 
4 Clement Walker A Complete History of Independency (London 1660) Part ii, p. 30-3 1. 
5 J. S. A Adamson 'The Peerage in Politics', Cambridge PhD thesis 1986, p. 257-9. See his 
bibliography at the end of his thesis. 
6 Anthony Seldon Major. A Political Life (1997) p. 801-7. 
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This thesis makes the same contention stated by Dr Kelsey its immediate predecessor. 71 have 
not uncovered fresh evidence that has been locked away and never scrutinised. I do not, 
therefore, claim to have unearthed evidence that magically explains the actions and 
motivation of some of the figures considered in this thesis. This is especially true of the 
Presbyterian MPs. In my conclusion to this chapter, I suggest that the majority of these MPs 
simply retired from politics in the period 1649-53.1 can confidently make this assertion upon 
the grounds that they issued no tracts condemning their new masters. This said, and despite a 
trail through potential manuscripts, 8 I am unable to demonstrate their precise views upon the 
revolution and the early months of the Rump's existence. However, there is sufficient 
evidence to provide a new interpretation of certain important aspects of the English 
Revolution. 
This first chapter of this thesis portrayed Cromwell as one leader amongst many men 
involved in the English Revolution. Although there is still an element of mystery concerning 
his involvement in politics in December 1648, sufficient doubt has been cast upon the royalist 
sources to suggest that the alleged overtures to the King were one of three possibilities. First, 
they were an aberration upon the part of Cromwell, a sudden hesitation that did not amount to 
a serious alteration of policy. This can be defended upon the grounds that we know nothing 
about the precise terms apart from a vague mention of Charles assuming the position of a 
Doge of Venice. It is also possible that these tenns were discussed but never actually 
presented to the King. 9 Charles did not mention this mission at his trial which is a most 
7 Scan Kelsey Inventing a Republic (Manchester 1997) p. 1 1. 
8 Many of these are cited in the bibliography. The main sources tend to be royalist eg. 
Clarendon Mss, Carte Mss, the Nicholas Papers and the Egerton Mss. 
9 See Nedham to Nicholas. Bod. Library, Clarendon Mss. 34. fol 17; S. R. Gardiner, A Histo! Y 
of the English Civil War, vol iii, p. 556-7. 
259 
surprising omission considering that he made it plain from the onset that he would rather 
suffer death than accept limitations to his power and dignity. 10 Second, it is possible that 
Cromwell used this apparent overture to show moderates of his conciliatory stance and to 
contrast this with the unreasonable posture assumed by the King. Finally, it is possible that 
the so called Denbigh scheme was merely the product of Royalist wishful thinking 
encouraged by their leading protagonist Marchamount Nedham. It is difficult to support one 
view more than the other, but one inescapable conclusion must be drawn. The failure of any 
of the leading Royalists, (and this of course includes Charles) or the prominent 
Parliamentarians to mention the proposed compromise suggests that it was not taken too 
seriously. Whitelock was certainly not involved in the negotiations; had he been, or even 
heard about them they would have featured in his memoirs. ' 
Given the evidence presented in this thesis upon this mission, it should not be assumed that 
this was yet another example of Cromwell's dualist personality. My depiction of Cromwell as 
a more committed revolutionary is at one with the arguments found in the works of Ian 
Gentles and John Morrill, but I will now endeavour to show the significance of his views 
upon the Revolution itself and the early years of the Rump regime. 12 It will be suggested that 
the ideology Cromwell bequeathed to the new regime was consistent, prudent, largely 
unoriginal and based almost solely upon his religious anti-formalism. 
10 A Message Sent from Both Houses of Parliament to the King's Majesty in the Isle of 
Wight. T. T. E. 473 (41), 29th November 1649, p. 2. See Wedgwood Lrial passim; Charles 
Carlton, Charles I the Personal Monarch, 2 nd ed. (London and New York), p. 343-54. 
11 See the comments made by Whitelock in chapter 2 above. 
12 John Morrill and Philip Baker, 'Oliver Cromwell, the Regicide and the sons of Zeruiaah', 
paper given to the institute of Historical Research December 1999; -Gentles 
New Model 
Anny, p. 283-94. 
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Apart from Royalist sources, Cromwell is portrayed by contemporaries as a firm supporter of 
the purge, trial and regicide. This view is confirmed by his own writings and speeches upon 
the subjects. He naturally wanted to keep as many people as possible involved in politics and 
this explains his attitude towards the abstaining members of Parliament. But, this thesis 
suggests that he conceded very little. Although he was influential in allowing members of the 
Council of State to take the retrospective oath of approval this was sufficient for Cromwell at 
the time of grave political danger and consistent with his desire for a union of the Godly 
peoples. His attitude towards the House of Lords and the Levellers was again consistent. He 
supported the Lords because many of them had appeared to demonstrate support for the first 
stages of the revolution and he hoped that they would join the new regime in the post 
revolutionary era. This would remain an important principle that determined Cromwell's 
thinking until his death in 1658. His attack upon the Levellers was based upon an ideological 
aversion to some of their views which were apparent in the Putney debates and his only 
known intervention in the discussions at Whitehall. But his overriding concern was his desire 
to maintain unity of the Army -a view he demonstrated between September and December 
1648. Cromwell fearcd the Royalists and the destruction of the unity of the Army would have 
precipitated the return of the Royalists. ' 3 This said his attempt to marginalize the royalist 
cause is very different to portrayals of Cromwell as a man possessed with a fluctuating 
political temperament as he was tom between conflicting principles that created an 
ideological see-saw that had an important impact upon the early months of the 
Commonwealth. Instead he was the prudent politician who was willing to persuade moderates 
to return, but his principles did not allow him to make any concessions. It is important to note 
13 This was argued above. 
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that, during this revolutionary period, Cromwell did not initiate a single policy that 
compromised the revolution of 1648/9. 
Cromwell's attachment to the revolution placed him at the forefront of the parliamentary 
movement, and this, allied to his position in the Army made him one of the most important 
people in the land. However, this does not mean that he was the architect of the Rump 
regime. 14 The policies adopted in early years of the Rump regime must be regarded as a 
corporate rather than an individual enterprise. The findings in both chapters one and two 
revealed that Cromwell was one leader amongst many. The attempt to secure the return of the 
abstaining members and the loose interpretation of the test of dissent were made in 
Cromwell's absence. This was another example of his following rather than initiating policy 
which is consistent with his attitude towards the radicalism in the Army in the months before 
the purge. 15 
One other point upon Blair Worden's depiction of Cromwell as the architect of the new 
regime requires comment. The two major initiatives that demonstrated his conservatism were 
the attempts to retain the House of Lords and the confirmation of the Presbyterian church. 
Both these initiatives met with failure at a time when parliamentary unity and consensus were 
the norm. This is not evidence that Cromwell was not important, it merely reveals that he was 
not the dominating force in parliamentary politics. 
The findings of this thesis provide support for all the articles that make the case for the 
centrality of religion in Cromwell's character. 16 Professor Davis's view of Cromwell's anti- 
14 Blair Worden, The Rump Parliament, p. 19,179,191-3. 
15 This was the central theme of chapter 1. 
16 J. C. Davis, "Cromwell's Religion", in John Morrill (ed. ) Oliver Cromwell and the English 
Revolution (Longman 1990). p. 181-208; Blair Worden, "Toleration and the Cromwellian 
Protectorate" in W. J. Sheils (ed. ). Persecution and Toleration: Studies in Church Histoly xxi 
(Oxford 1984), p. 199-233; "Oliver Cromwell and the Sin of Achan" in D. Beales and G. Best 
(eds. ) Histo! y , Society and the Churches (Cambridge, 1985), p. 125-45 
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formalism upon the precise nature of church government explains why Cromwell was able to 
countenance the confirniation of the Presbyterian church provided that there was sufficient 
provision for a degree of liberty of conscience. 17 This thesis also supports the notion that 
Cromwell's decision to support the regicide was based upon his belief in the centrality of 
providentialism - this is certainly evident in his utterances upon the subject. 18 It is also clear 
that this would be the dominant principle that governed his politics for the rest of his life. It is 
also interesting to note that this belief in providence could lead to self-examination and 
humility. In the 1650s after a series of military defeats Cromwell was in a desperate state 
wondering whether he, and the nation, had deviated from God's wishes. It has also been 
convincingly argued that one of the reasons for Cromwell's refusal to accept the crown was 
based upon his belief that this would be tantamount to a rejection of God's providence. 19 
Although this thesis has not considered the sources upon which these accounts are based the 
general theme is certainly a logical one. This thesis has argued that Cromwell's justification 
for regicide was based upon providence revealed by Charles persistent failure in war; to move 
against this at a later date would have required an ideological shift that does not appear 
consistent with the findings in this thesis. 
17 J. C Davis, "Cromwell's Religion" in John Morrill (ed), Oliver Cromwell and the English 
Revolution, p. 181-208. 
18 This is the main theme in most of the recent work. The collection of essays cited in n. 17 is 
the best example. 
19 Peter Gaunt, Oliver Cromwell (Oxford 1997), p. 195-200. Blair Worden, "Oliver Cromwell 
and the Sin of Achan", p. 13 7-45. For an alternative view see Ronald Hutton, The British 
Republic p. 72-3 (1990), (reprinted 2000). Hutton provides a convincing case to support the 
view that Cromwell rejected the crown out of a fear of reprisal from the Army. This was 
certainly one of the considerations that governed Cromwell's decision, and above I suggest 
that personal factors did feature in Cromwell's thinking. However, the general feeling I have 
is that Cromwell feared God more than he feared Pride. Moreover, Peter Gaunt has shown 
that Cromwell "retained tight control over the army until his death", showing a willingness to 
move against the Army when he saw fit. Peter Gaunt, Oliver Cromwell (Oxford, 1997), 
p. 196-7. 
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The chapter upon Cromwell suggests that the origins of his revolutionary outlook to politics 
dates back to the start of the Second Civil War. The biographical importance of this rests with 
the fact that this view is not the orthodoxy. However, in terms of politics, the findings in the 
first chapter are even more significant. There is a danger of taking the dissolution as the 
starting point of the Rump regime and looking back to find evidence that explains this famous 
event. This thesis rejects the notion that there were any signs of this potential conflict in the 
early stages of the revolution. Instead, Cromwell's views were compatible with the majority 
of the MPs and as the following chapters suggest, there was not a substantial conflict of 
interest between the aims of the Parliamentarians and the mainstream views of the Anny. We 
should therefore reject the notion that the Rump was always destined to fail because a conflict 
with the Army was inevitable. 20 We should reject too the notion that Cromwell was always in 
the unenviable position of acting as mediator between the radical Army and the reactionary 
Commons. With Cromwell, the problems involved with interpretation are distorted further by 
the power and influence he enjoyed at a later date. 21 The purging of Parliament, the regicide, 
the formation and composition of the Council of State, the abolition of the House of Lords 
and monarchy stand as the great events in the English Revolution; Cromwell supported most 
of these but he did not initiate any of them. 
The findings of the second chapter demonstrate the level of commitment to the principle of 
regicide amongst the parliamentary MPs. This questions part of Dr Worden's argument that 
20 This, therefore, challenges the view presented by Blair Worden that portrays the Army as a 
radical force against a Parliament that always regarded itself as a temporary expedient. 
Worden, The Rump Parliament passim. 
21 This is almost an inevitable consequence of biography. The accounts of Cromwell's 
activities during the revolution quite obviously place Cromwell at the centre of events. 
Chapter 2 above attempts to demonstrate the importance of other less known regicides. 
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was at pains to demonstrate the moderation and conformity of the new regime. 22 Although the 
thesis fails to uncover any new private correspondence that provides an insight into the 
precise thoughts of the MPs, the tireless work performed by a vast number of MPs upon 
committees seems to suggest that they were more committed to the principle of regicide than 
the works of David Underdown, Blair Worden and to a lesser extent Veronnica Wedgwood 
allowed. 23 It is also suggested that the decision to allow the conformist MPs to enter the house 
was not necessarily an indication of the moderation of those that played a part in all of the 
major radical legislation that was Passed between the first purge and the regicide. Many of the 
non-regicides had played a part in politics after the purge with many of them involved in the 
legislation that destroyed the Newport accord, therefore making the possibility of regicide a 
reality. Thus the decision to allow many of these MPs to return was not a major compromise 
of policy. It is also suggested that the significance of signing the regicide document was not 
as important to contemporaries as it was to both the restoration politicians and historians. 
Even at the restoration, the principal targets were mainly, but not exclusively, the regicides. 
A. W. McIntosh has shown that sitting in the court upon the day of sentence, rather than 
signing the regicide document, was the key issue for the politicians of the restoration period. 
However, it was not just the regicides and those sitting on the day of judgement, that were 
considered for the ultimate punishment. The speaker Lenthall, St John and Whitelock were 
considered for punishment. Heselrige was only saved by the direct intervention of George 
22 Blair Worden, The Rump Parliament, p. 33-73. David Underdown, Pride's Purge was more 
willing to depict the regicides and early dissenters as revolutionaries but he does state that 
some of them (most famously Oliver Cromwell), were reluctant participants. see p. 5, p. 208- 
256. 
23 See n. 22 above. Veronica Wedgwood was more concerned with the spectacle at the time of 
the trial and therefore there is not a detailed discussion upon the motivation of the regicidcs 
during the trial of the King. She does, however, provide some very useful information upon 
the trial of the regicides, and her she portrays them as being more committed than is 
suggested in the works of Underdown and Worden. C. V. Wedgwood, The Trial of Charles 1, 
p. 216-24. 
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Monck and the unfortunate Sir Henry Vane was executed. Not all of the regicides were 
executed. Richard Ingoldsby survived by making the absurd claim that Cromwell forced his 
hand at the time of the signing. The signing of the document was not, therefore, the only 
prerequisite for punishment in the early 1660s, which appears to suggest that many of the 
politicians involved in the revolution, were regarded as a homogenous body. 24 
This case is strengthened by contemporary responses to the MPs that sat in the Rump. Both 
Royalist and Presbyterian writings made little distinction between those that signed and those 
that did not. The few divisions that did arise in Parliament were not demarcated by regicide 
and non-regicide. Moreover, the view that signing the regicide document marked the 
commitment of a revolutionary majority (upon the grounds that they would face the 
consequences if there was a Royalist restoration) was only sustained by Gilbert Mabbott who 
had no contact with Royalist thought. In marked contrast to this Royalist journalists were 
promising retribution against all the rumpers. 25 It was at the Declaration of Breda, after 
eleven years in exile, that Charles was willing to be conciliatory. In February 1649, when he 
believed that he would not have to make concessions to his former enemies, it is likely that 
any MY associated with the new regime would have been liable for punishment if the 
royalists had been victorious. 26 Considering that there was a genuine threat to the new regime, 
24 Ronald Hutton, The Restoration, A Political and Religious Histo! y of England and Wales 
(Oxford 1985), p. 132-4. Ronald Hutton, Charles 11 (Oxford 1989), p. 170-71. C. V. Wedgwood 
cited above (n. 23), p216-24. Margaret A. Judson The Political thoujzht of Sir Hena Vane 
(University of Pennsylvania 1969), makes little reference, rather surprisingly, of Vane's 
stance after the fall of Cromwell. A. W. McIntosh "The Number of English Regicides". 
History 67,1982, p. 197-200. 
25 The Moderate T. T. E. 544 (10), Tuesday 13th -Tuesday 20th February 1649 p. 312; The 
Moderate T. T. E. 545 (11), Tuesday 20th -Tuesday 27th February 1649 p. 32 1. 
26 See chapter 5 below. Some royalists would not even support the Presbyterians that wanted 
to join the royalists. Sir Edward Nicholas to Sir George Lane (April 8'h 1649), Carte Papers i 
p. 254. For a general attack upon all puritans see HMCR Earl of Westmoreland MSS 10 th 
Report (1906) p. 22. 
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those MPs that decided to join were willing to risk a great deal for the new regime. This 
shows more of a commitment to the revolution than the theory advanced by David 
Underdown, which claims that these conformists joined a revolutionary bandwagon. It also 
points to more of a belief in the revolution than Blair Worden's view, that many MPs took up 
their seats to moderate the revolution by keeping power in civilian hands. 27 
The chapter upon the MPs who sat in the Rump takes issue with both David Underdown and 
Blair Worden's view that there was a lack of commitment to the moves against the King. 
This, however, does not naturally lead to a support for some more recent interpretations that 
place great emphasis upon the republican beliefs of many of the MPs. Sean Kelsey has shown 
that once the Rump was established it was able to achieve an identity by creating a republican 
culture. Sarah Barber has shown how a small clique of republican MPs endeavoured to secure 
a degree of permanency for the new regime. In many respects both arguments have a great 
deal of validity. As time passed there was an attachment to the principle of a republic, but, 
amongst the MPs this usually came a long time after the regicide and the view was only 
shared by a small minority. Dr Kelsey's portrayal of the construction of an image is 
enlightening, but his book fails to deal with one important issue. Despite all of the later 
changes the events of 1648/9 essentially created a republic by accident. The findings in my 
chapter suggest that the majority of the participants in the political process, both inside and 
outside of Parliament, advocated regicide out of either an inherent distrust of Charles or a 
belief that Charles must die because of his failure to adhere to God's providence. 28 Deposition 
27 See above chapter 2. For debate over Underdown's findings see Worden The Rump, p. 5,9, 
16,41-2,48,50,53-5,63,97,123 - Worden's views upon the membership can be found p. I- 
73. 
28 This was stated in the text above. The Declaration of his Excellency, the Lord General 
Eairfax T. T. E. 474 (11) 1" December 1648; The Humble Desires of His Excellency the Lord 
Fairfax T. T. E. 475 (25), p. 1-7 (7 th December 1648). A New Remonstrance from the solde! y 
to His Excellency the Lord General Fairfax T. T. E. 476 (25) p. 1-3. An Ordinance (See Over) 
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was not an option because of the close relationship enjoyed by Charles and the other possible 
candidates. 29 The revolution started as being anti-Charles and it was only later that the case 
for republicanism was advanced. 
Sarah Barber's view that a few republican MPs supported the regicide because they wished to 
alter the entire constitution is plausible, but it must be remembered that this view was only 
shared by a small minority of MPs. The argument advanced in chapter three suggests that 
there were few doctrinaire republicans. If there had been a determination to fundamentally 
alter the existing structure, the Lords would not have been consulted in the aftennath of 
Pride's Purge. The assault upon the Lords came as a direct result of their decision not to 
proceed against the King. Although the Agreement of the People assumed the destruction of 
the Lords there is no evidence that the majority of the MPs shared this view. The majority of 
the MPs were not concerned with the future constitution in the weeks between the purge and 
the regicide. There were three issues that dominated proceedings between the first purge and 
the regicide. First, and most significantly, they had to deal with the King. Second, they 
wanted to punish the MPs associated with the engagement with the Scots. Finally, they 
of the Lords and Commons Assembled in Parliament for the choosing of Common- 
Councilmen. T. T. E. 476 (29) 18'11 December p. 1-2. A Pair of Cristal Spectacles ... by a 
member of the House of Commons T. T. E. 476 (30), 18'h December 1648, p. 1-8. A 
Declaration of the Officers Belonging to John Lambert T. T. E. 477 (10) December 29th 1648. 
A Vindication of the Army T. T. E. 538 (29) 22 nd January 1649. A Declaration of the 
Parliament of England T. T. E. 544 (17) 22 nd February. The Execution of the late King 
Justified and the Army and Parliament Vindicated T. T. E. 545 (7) February 26 th ! 649, passim, 
especially p. 1,25,58-59. Reasons to Resolve the Unresolved T. T. E. 545 (10) 26th February 
(1649) (Rob Robins) - this pamphlet begins with an assault on monarchy but it ends up being 
a very personal attack upon Charles p. 1-8. The Parliament Justified T. T. E. 545 (14) 27 th 
February 1649 p. 8. A Declaration of the Parliament T. T. E. 548 (12) p. 5,6,7-162 (17th March 
1649). A Vindication of the Army and Parliament (probably by Morgan Llwyd- National 
Library of Wales) Mss 11434B 
29 A Declaration from the Prince of Wales conceming the illegal proceedings of the 
Commons of England T. T. E. 542 (15), 13 th February. A True Relation of the King's Speech 
to the Lady Elizabeth and the Duke of Gloucester T. T. 669 f. 14 (9); BM Harl Mss 6988 f. 21 1; 
BM Egerton Mss 254 (1) f. 292. 
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wished to bolster the number of MPs attending the chamber upon the condition that this 
increase did not jeopardise the proceedings against the King. The desire for sweeping 
constitutional change was not shared by the majority and this explains why it took so long to 
officially establish the new regime. More importantly, the provision for entry into the 
Commons was based upon a retrospective acceptance that to negotiate with the King was an 
erroneous policy; it did not ask for a firm commitment to the principle of republicanism. 
Although this thesis has questioned a number of Dr Worden's arguments, upon one 
fundamental issue we agree. The decision to abolish monarchy and the House of Lords was, 
ostensibly, a reaction to a particular King rather than an aversion to the institution of 
Monarchy itself. 30 
Although this thesis supports the notion that many of the MPs were not doctrinaire 
republicans, they did prove adept at making a republican regime work. It should not be 
automatically assumed that their constitutional conservatism made them adverse to radical 
politics. Sir Henry Vane is perhaps the best example of a man who objected to the purge and 
the regicide but was generally regarded as one of the most radical MPs. 31 This thesis suggests 
that the rather low key response to the revolution was due to their own conservatism and 
events outside of Westminster, which pushed them towards moderation and conformity. The 
more positive attitude shown by some of the Presbyterians, which was in marked contrast to 
the position assumed by the Levellers, meant that a more conservative stance was taken in the 
weeks after the regicide than might otherwise have been taken 
30 Sarah Barber ReRicide and Republicanism: Politics and Ethics in the English Revolution 
1646-1659 (Edinburgh 1998), p. 147-165, sees a greater attachment to republicanism than 
Blair Worden does in The Rump Parliament, p. 33-60, esp. p50-5 1. My interpretation is far 
closer to Dr Worden's that it is to the one advanced by Dr Barber and Dr Kelsey's Inventing a 
Republic. 
31 See Ronald Hutton, The Restoration, p. 29-30. Violet A. Rowe, Sir Hen! y Vane the 
Younge (1970) A. Judson, The Political thought of Sir Hen! y Vane. Both of these last mini 
biographies provide an insight into the political thinking of Sir Henry Vane. 
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Blair Worden's argument, which demonstrated the conservative nature of the majority of the 
MPs has, in essence, been supported by these findings. The English Revolution was not 
extended in the months after the regicide because many of the MPs were not committed to the 
principle of radical refonn. For all of the recent accounts that have portrayed a deep rooted 
attachment to republican focus, they have not been able to eclipse the central argument 
advanced by Blair Worden and David Underdown - to sit in the Rump was not an indication 
of wholesale commitment to the new regime. This thesis provides the names of a number of 
MPs who had failed to demonstrate any indication of their support for the revolution. 32 
However, the thesis attempts to make one qualification to this argument. The MPs that sat in 
the Rump were willing to countenance new forms and ideas - demonstrated by their 
willingness to defend the regime when it faced intellectual assaults from its many opponents. 
It has been assumed in the past, that from its birth, the Rump was, in Professor Hutton's 
words, pushed in two powerfully opposed ideological directions. This thesis suggests that 
essentially the events outside of Westminster meant that the MPs had little option but to 
implement conservative policies. 33 
The chapter upon the Commons develops the theme initially taken by Blair Worden, that the 
threats facing the new regime meant that there would be little chance for a ma or reformation j 
of society. 34 The royalist threat was a real one. Although recent research has shown that 
Charles II's alliance with both the Irish and the Scots was based upon known links of mutual 
self interest, rather than a united ideological belief, for the MPs at Westminster, the prospects 
would still have been alarming. Moreover, there was a very real threat from abroad as Europe 
32 See chapter 2 above. 
33 See above. This was one of the main themes discussed in chapter 2. 
34 Blair Worden, The Rump Parliament, p. 163-9. 
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bad failed to embrace republicanism on a grand scale. This explains why the Council of State 
and Parliament spent the majority of their time building up the strength of the Navy and 
ensuring that a fully paid and equipped Army would be sent to Ireland. This was the 
immediate concern for politicians and this is another reason why reform was not the 
predominant concern at the start of the revolution. 
Second, and most importantly, this thesis suggests that there was not a gulf between the aims 
of the Army and Parliament. It is suggested that Parliament took a stand against the Levellers 
because of their onslaughts against the Anny. The only real sign of any conflict between the 
Army and Parliament was seen upon the day of Pride's Purge. After that date, although the 
Commons would seek clarification of certain issues, most notably the future membership of 
the Commons, the relationship is characterised by close co-operation and mutual self-interest. 
They also shared one principle belief that would last throughout the period covered by this 
thesis. 
Although some MPs had not been willing to support regicide, if a generalisation is to be 
made, both sides believed that Charles had to be judged for inviting the Scots to invade 
England and after the regicide they were united in their belief that the Stuarts should not 
return. The dislike of Charles and the justification for regicide based upon personal grounds 
was shared by both these groups. Historians have rightly portrayed the Anny as the central 
force in politics. During the revolution they were-primarily concerned with exacting justice 
upon the king and this was the motivation that governed the minds of the MPs. There was a 
lack of vision upon both sides. The Army wanted to get rid of Charles but had little idea about 
what should replace monarchy. This thesis suggests that for the majority in the Army there 
was little pressure placed upon the Commons to reform. Given the conservative nature of 
some MPs this would have come as a relief but it does not explain their conservatism and 
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moderation. These MPs knew who their political masters were and they would have had to 
respond - but were simply not asked to. 
This leads to another important issue raised in this thesis. Traditionally, the politics of this 
period has been characterised by notions of reforrn and reaction. Reform was demanded by 
the Army, and this was only accepted by the Commons when they really were compelled to 
do so. This may have been the case later on, but the politics during the revolution was based 
upon consensus between the two sides. It is, therefore, important to look at the latter period of 
the Rump Parliament to explain the conflict between Parliament and the Army. There is no 
evidence to suggest from the revolutionary era, that a potential clash was inevitable. It is, 
therefore, suggested that the future conflict between Cromwell and the Army against 
Parliament should be studied from a fresh perspective and it provides some tentative support 
for Sean Kelsey's argument that suggests that the army should be regarded as a 
heterogeneous body. This said, it was fairly united in this revolutionary era, due to their 
support for the moves against the King and their desire for the preservation of the 
Commonwealth. It can therefore be assumed that the differences emerged after the 
completion of the Third Civil War and this was an outcome of an increased amount of 
confidence within the Army caused by yet more success on the field of battle. 
To return to the reasons for the conservatism of the MPs, we need to focus upon the activities 
of the Levellers and the Presbyterians. It is suggested in chapter two that the MPs were 
willing to take the Agreement of the People seriously and although they were unlikely to have 
been implemented the projected settlement wholesale, the prospect of reform in response to 
the Leveller demands was very real. The revolution which established justifications of the 
new constitution upon the grounds that it was perfonned in the interests of the people was 
more akin to the philosophy of Levellerism than Presbyterianism. To understand the new 
regime's failure to implement reform we must consider the actions and apparent influence of 
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John Lilburne. His attacks upon both the Army and the new government ensured that his 
views would not be considered. As I mentioned in the second chapter, the MPs had 
demonstrated a degree of cordiality to Lilburne and had promised to debate the Agreement of 
the People at a later date. His attacks upon the regime virtually ensured that he could not be 
regarded as a participant in the political process. Lilburne raised the stakes even before the 
Rump had had an opportunity to consider any of his ideas. His self-styled maverick posture, 
which based politics upon personal attacks, coupled with his aim of inciting division and 
hostility in the Anny ensured that the new government were left with no option but to 
distance themselves from him; Lilburne's rhetoric precluded any chance of compromise. His 
complete inability to engage in realpolitik ensured that the reforms he apparently craved for 
would never be realised. Professor Hutton rightly stated that the left wing radicals who still 
meet at Burford to honour the memory of the Leveller idea should only attend "if they care 
passionately about the pay of the anned forces. Professor Hutton was, of course questioning 
the depth of support for Leveller ideas in the Army. "35 This thesis takes an even more cynical 
view of the contribution and motivation of the leaders of the Leveller cause. It suggests that 
Lilburne played a significant part in the first republican's regime adoption of conventional 
and conservative policies. 
In contrast to the Levellers, the Presbyterians were not as vocal in their opposition of the new 
regime and importantly they did not threaten the unity of the Army. The majority of the 
Presbyterian MPs refrained from making direct attacks against the regime, and with the 
exception of William Prynne, they showed little inclination to undermine the new regime. 
Even Prynne tended to abstain from making outspoken attacks after his release from custody 
in the middle of January 1649. The Presbyterian clergy were more vocal, but the findings in 
chapter four suggest that there was little possibility of an alliance with the Royalists. 
35 R. Hutton, The British Republic, p. 18. 
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Moreover, they were more inclined to attack the principle of liberty of conscience rather than 
the entire philosophy behind the new regime. As far as the Rump were concerned, the 
Presbyterians remained a disaffected minority group whose centre of gravity was closer to 
them than it was to the cause of the Stuarts under their new incumbent. 
It is difficult to determine whether the Presbyterians deliberately intended to influence 
politics by pursuing a more moderate path. Chapter four suggests that there is some evidence 
to support the notion that this was a conscious decision, but this conflicts with the argument 
that the Presbyterians never regarded themselves as a corporate entity. Despite this ambiguity, 
one factor is patently clear; the Presbyterian response to the revolution ensured that they 
would at least be recognised, whereas the Levellers effectively secluded themselves from 
influence. 
The chapter upon the House of Lords identifies two important aspects of the English 
Revolution: First, the findings suggest that the Lords were not as influential in the political 
process as Dr Adamson's thesis claims. Their power and influence depended upon their 
supporting the initiatives advanced in the lower chamber. This is important in itself because it 
places the impetus behind revolution back with the members of the so called lower house, but 
this should not detract from one key element of Dr Adamson's work; the abolition of the 
House of Lords was not an inevitable consequence of the purging of the lower chamber. This 
in turn leads to the second important finding of my research. The evidence presented in 
chapter three undermines recent accounts that see a depth of republican feeling amongst the 
members of the House of Commons and it firmly re-establishes the centrality of Charles I in 
the politics surrounding the revolution. 36 
36 See the works of S. Kelsey and S. Barber cited above. Also David Norbrook, Writing the 
English Republic: Poct! j, Rhetoric and Politics, 1627-1660 (Cambridge 1999). It appears to 
me that Norbrook's belief that many English writers were familiar with republicanism before 
the regicide may be correct, and this would appear to have helped the later (see over) 
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The chapter upon the Press reveals the nature of the English political system and the 
limitations of the available evidence. As I mentioned previously, a study of the Press is an 
end in itself-, this thesis has attempted to illustrate how the various editors regarded, and 
responded to the revolution. For the purposes of this conclusion, I wish to highlight two areas 
that were included in the chapter. First, it was suggested that the Press were not in the pockets 
of their Westminster masters and this was a principle that was applauded by some 
contemporaries. It also undermines some of the remarks made by John Lilburne, who was at 
pains to demonstrate that the Press enjoyed little freedom of action. 37With the exception of 
the 'Modest Narrative of Intelligence', few of the papers were published to support the new 
regime. In light of this interpretation we can use the evidence bequeathed by the seventeenth 
century journalists with confidence. These newspapers, allied to the diminutive number of 
parliamentary divisions recorded in the journals of the House of Commons, suggest that 
parliamentary politics during this revolutionary period was characterised by agreement and 
consensus, rather than distrust and division. Even the Royalist newspapers, who always had 
an eye for political division, regarded the Commons as a united body. The Second important 
issue raised in this chapter relates to the royalist Press. Whereas the parliamentary MPs stood 
united, this Press was divided upon how to respond to their former enemies - the Levellers 
and the Presbyterians and thus the divisions amongst royalist editors mirrored the divisions at 
the Royalist core. 38 
transition republicanism. However, the sources cited in this thesis suggest that, in the early 
years of the revolution, the justifications for a new government were principally based upon 
Charles' failings as a monarch. 
37 John Lilburne, England's New Chains Discovered in William Haller and Godfrey Davis 
(eds). The Leveller Tracts 1647-1653 (Columbia University Press) p. 16 1. 
38 These divisions were first established by David Underdown, Royalist Conspiracy in 
England (Yale 1960) pI- 10; Ronald Hutton, Charles Il p. 4 1. The latter pointed out that there 
were cross-currents between these groups, thus undermining the ideological distinctions 
between the two groups. 
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This then leads to another important issue raised by this thesis. For all the research 
undertaken upon the membership of the Rump Parliament and the divisions amongst the 
MpS39, the commoners who sat after the revolution were more united than any of their 
opponents. The Lords failed to establish a united front; some peers simply left Parliament, 
whereas others, such as Manchester only returned to reject the trial of the king. The differing 
ideologies are further revealed by the position adopted by the small group of peers led by the 
Earl of Denbigh. Although they did not support the trial, they certainly attempted to retain 
influence from a position of principled appeasement. The Presbyterian MPs were effectively 
represented by one or two men. The central theme of chapter four suggests that they cannot 
be regarded as a homogenous entity. A comparison between the writings of William Prynne 
and William Ashurst confirms this argument. 40 The Presbyterian clergy were more united but 
again they found it difficult to produce a consistent and coherent response to the revolution. 
Their opposition was confined to individual protests against the new regime. There were few 
collective documents produced to outline their reservations. It can be concluded that the term 
Presbyterian, whilst still retaining its value upon the grounds that it stems from contemporary 
usage, is, to an extent, a misnomer. Some Presbyterians would join the royalist side, others 
would retire from active politics altogether. With the exception of Christopher Love, few 
Presbyterians would make a stance based upon a distinct' ideology. 41 The Royalists, both in 
39 By far the most detailed research upon the factions is found in Blair Worden's The Rump 
Parliament passim. 
40 See above. Prynne, 'A Brief Memento to the Present Unparliamentary Juncto' T. T. E. 537 
(7), 4'h January 1649. William Ashurst, 'Reasons Against Agreement, with a paper entitled 
Foundations of Freedom', T. T. E. 536 (4), 26 th December 1648. 
41 Blair Worden, The Rump Parliament, p. 243-248. H. G. Denton, "The Presbyterian Plot of 
1651", Journal of the Presbyterian History Society, (1952). 1 mentioned in the text above that 
there was no evidence of conspiracy in the early months of the revolution. The article above 
suggests that conspiracy started in 1650. (B. Worden, The Rump Parliament p. 244 n. 3. ) 
Worden showed that a group of clergymen were hostile to the Commonwealth from(see over) 
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the Press and outside, failed to produce a united front, with some royalists being unable to 
overcome their resentment of their fon-ner enemies. Most Royalist writers, decided to detach 
themselves from political reality by limiting their protests to producing, quite literally, scores 
of tracts extolling the virtues of their dead sovereign. This helped create the myth of Charles I 
42 the martyr, but it did little to aid the possibility of a restoration of the monarchy. The 
Levellers, too, produced a political programme that lended itself to martyrdom rather than 
political influence. 
In marked contrast to these groups, the MPs at Westminster managed to unite despite their 
political differences. Some MPs were early dissenters from the 5 th of December vote, whilst 
others did not register their opposition to the said vote until February 1649. Differences also 
emerged over the role of the House of Lords and the membership of the Council of State. Yet, 
despite these differences, they managed to maintain a united front and sustain good relations 
with the Army. In terms of ideology, the men that sat in Parliament during this revolutionary 
era, were more committed than their opponents. 
I will conclude this thesis by re-emphasising two aspects of the English Revolution that have 
been mentioned for, but usually for a slightly earlier period. I wish to place the findings of 
this thesis within their British context and to re-establish Charles I as the principle figure in 
the start, (p. 81-2), but my findings suggest that it was only a small minority that advocated 
extreme measures. The problem with sources is very real here, not helped by Christopher 
Love's widow Mary. She wrote a brief history of her husband that demonstrated his godliness 
but it tells us little about his involvement in conspiracy. BM Sloane Mss. 3945. 
42 Some examples include: An Elegic on Charles 1, T. T. E. 553 (1). A Hand-Kirchife for . LoXall Mourriers, T. T. E. 541 (6), 30th January. A Coffin for King Charles, T. T. 669. f 14 (22), 
23'd April 1649. A Faithful sigh, on the universally-lamented Death of our most gracious 
sovereign Charles 1, T. T. E. 560 (4), 30th January 1649. The King's Last Farewell to the 
World, T. T. 669. f. 13. (77). 
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the revolution. This in turn, questions Jonathan Scott's recent attempt to place the revolution 
within a European context. 43 
The findings of both chapters one and two, demonstrate the importance of Charles' 
engagement with the Scots as being the prerequisites for both the purge and the regicide. It 
also acted as a grounds for the permanent seclusion of MPs whom were linked with the Scots. 
Although the connection cannot be totally proved, it is more than likely that future regicides 
were persuaded that Charles could not be trusted due to this engagement with the Scots. 44 if 
this is the case, then the events in Scotland had a dramatic bearing upon the course of the 
revolution and the future of the British Republic. The covenanters immediately proclaimed 
Charles 11 king upon the death of his father and began a series of negotiations with the young 
king that would culminate in the Third Civil War. This resulted in the emergence of Oliver 
Cromwell as the most significant figure in English politics and would lead to an enhanced 
feeling in the Army about their own omnipotence based upon their belief in the providence of 
God. Perhaps this self-confidence explains the future conflict between the Army and 
Parliament. This is certainly consistent with the evidence presented in chapter two, rejecting 
43 Jonathon Scott, England's Troubles (Cambridge 2000). This book shows that republican 
writers drew upon European examples to justify their actions (eg p. 3 11). However, at the time 
of the revolution they tended to focus upon Charles' failings. See n. 28 above. Also 
justifications were found through precedent in English History. See The People informed of 
their Oppressors and Oppressions, T. T. E. 536 (17), 28th December 1648. My historical 
method owes more to the writings of the revisionist historians. For example, Mark 
Kishlansky, The Rise of the New Model Ann , (Cambridge 1979 and "The Army and the Levellers: The Roads to Putney" (HJ. 22,4.1979. ) However, I have argued that there was a 
determination upon the part of the MPs to destroy the King and this owes more to the writings 
of the 1990s than it does to the 1970s. J. P Sommerville, Royalists and Patriots - Politics and 
Ideology in England 1603-40 , (2 
nd edition 1999). 1 tend, however, to suggest that the desire to 
kill the King was based upon a religious conviction and a deep sense of anger provoked by 
the Second Civil War. I do not, therefore, see a deep rooted conflict in English society about 
the nature of Government. This explains my rejection of the more recent accounts that argue 
for a strong attachment to a republican tradition held by a significant number of the political 
nation. 
44 See chapter I above and sources listed. See also, An Ordinance of the Lords and Commons 
Assembled in Parliament, T. T. E. 476 (29), 18'h December, p. 1-3. 
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the notion of an inevitable crisis. The conflict in Ireland would also have a profound effect 
upon the nature of the English Revolution. The unnatural alliance, provoked by Charles II, 
45 between O'Neil and Ormond in Ireland, ensured that policy in England would be dominated 
by preparations for war, rather than a concentration upon domestic reform. It also meant that 
Leveller demands for a substantial alteration of the constitution would be rejected as their 
actions threatened the unity of the Army. Although this thesis has been very critical of the 
posture assumed by Lilburne, had the conflict in Ireland never occurred, his ideas would not 
have been greeted with such a draconian response by Parliament. 
Finally, this thesis rejects the teleological approach of the Whig, Marxist and post-revisionist 
writings that point towards a deep rooted conflict within English society. 46 It also questions 
the view that there was any kind of highroad to republicanism. The revolution was about 
Charles I and no amount of historical revision should alter this incontrovertible fact. The 
justifications of the regicide in the immediate aftennath of the event concerned the actions of 
that particular king rather than a vindication of republican forms of government. This does, of 
course, beg one question: Why was Charles not replaced by another monarch? The answer is 
not, I believe, found in an attachment to republicanism. As Blair Worden rightly points out, at 
no stage during the interregnum did so called republicans define themselves with that term. 47 
Charles was not succeeded by another monarch because there was not a viable alternative. 
Both the young Prince Charles and the Duke of Gloucester were regarded as being too closely 
associated with the discredited king, and thus would have precipitated further concerns about 
45 Bodl. Library, Carte Mss. 23 fol. 534. 
46 See n. 43 above. S. Kelsey, Inventing a Republic. S. Barber, Regicide and Republicanism. 
47 Blair Worden, "On the Winning Side", Times Literary Supplement, 29th January 1999. 
279 
indemnity. 48 Charles I lost his head because of an attachment to a belief, shared by many MPs 
and the Army, in radical providentialism. This belief that the king must die was deemed as a 
necessity and transcended all consideration about the future constitution. Once this essential 
step had been taken, the invitation to another monarch was not a tenable alternative. It is 
important to appreciate that Charles' influence was not just evident in the amount of hatred he 
instilled in his opponents. The Presbyterians found it difficult to associate with the Stuart 
cause, which was a reflection of their attitude to the dead king rather than a distrust of his son. 
Although depicted as a glorious martyr, the legacy of Charles' life had a profound effect upon 
the political nation. His actions during his reign provoked naturally conservative men to take 
the once unimaginable step of executing one of God's anointed. For people who could not 
sanction such an act, Charles still retained an influence. For disaffected peers, political and 
religious Presbyterians, and members of the Press, to join his cause after his death, was either 
too unpalatable or simply not worth the risk. 




List of MPs categorised as secluded by Underdown: 
How their names appeared in the anonymous publication 
and in the Vindication of the Imprisoned and Secluded Members. 
Also dates the MPs appear to have attended Parliament in the month' before the Purge 
Underdown 
'Pride's Purge' 





Dates they appear in 
Journals in the 
Month before the 
Purge 
1. John Afford V/ v/ 
2. Mathew Allin Mathew Allen Mathew Allen 3,4 Nov; I Dee 
3. Arthur Annesley Mr Arthur Aneslee Arislow 2,4,6,8,11,14, '15,16, 
17,18,21,22,24 Nov; 1, 
2 Dec 
4. John Arundell Arundel - 
5. John Ashe John Ash 21,23,25 Nov; 1,4 Dec 
6. Ralph Assheton Ashton 
7. Sir Ralph Assheton Sir Ralph Ashton 5 Dec 
8. Sir Edward Ascough Sir Edward Askew Sir Edward Ascough 
9. Francis Bacon I Nov 
10. Nathaniel Bacon' 1,25 Nov 
11. John Barker 
12. Maurice Barrowe Maurice Barrow Maurice Beunow 
13. Edward Baynton Edward Bainton 
14. Anthony Bellingfield Anthony Beddingfield 
15. James Bellingham' 
16. Micheal Biddulph 
- 
Micheal Bicusse Micheal Biddolph 
17. Sir Robert Bindlosse Sir Robert Benlowes 
18. John Bond 
19. George Booth John Booth Colonel Booth 24,25 Nov; I Dec 
20. John Bowyer John Buller 
21. John Boys 1,3,17,25 Nov 
22. Sir Humphrey Briggs Humphrey BridSes 
23. Peter Brook Major Brook 1,27 Nov 
24. Sir Ambrose Brown 
25. Sir John Burgoyne Sir John Burgen 
26. John Button 
27. James Campbell James Kambell 
28. HeEa Campion 
29. Charles Lord Carr Lord Carr 
30. Charles Cecil 
(Viscount Cranbourne) 
Lord Cranbourne 5 Dec 
3 1. Robert Cecil Robert Cicill 
32. Thomas Ceeley Thomas Cleen 
33. Robert Chariton 
34. Sir Thomas Cheeke 
35. Francis Chettle Sir Fran Chettle 
36. Sir Henry Cholmley 
37. Samuel Clarke Sam Clarke 
38. Edward Lord Clinton Lord Clinton 
39. Sir john Corbet 
40. Elisha CDý! Ees Grimes 
4 1. Sir John Curzon Sir John Curzon Sir John Curzon 4,6,25 Nov 
42. Sir Thomas Dacres V, 22 Nov 
43. Thomas Dacres' 
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44. William Davies William Davie Col Davis 
Underdown Vindication Anonymous Dates in Journals 
45. John Doddridge V, Duddridge 1,3,4,22 Nov 
46. John Doyley John Deyley - 
47. Erasmus Earle Erasmus Erle 30 Nov 
48. William Edwards V/ 
49. Sir Charles Egerton V, 
50. John Elford 
51. William Ellis 13,18 Nov 
52. Robert Ellison 
53. Thomas Erle Thomas Earl 4,11 Nov 
54. George Evelyn George veling 
55. Sir John Evelyn Sir John Eveling 13 Nov 
56. James Fiennes James Fienes 4,13 Nov 
57. William Lord Fitz-William V - 
58. Sir Edmund Fowell Edward Vowell 
59. Edmnund Fowell Younger Vowell 17 Nov 
60. William Foxwist William Hoxwist V, 17 Nov 
61. Samuel Gardiner Gardiner 
62. Framlingharn Gaudey Francis Gowdy Gaudey - 
63. Thomas Gell Gell - 
64. John Glyn VO, 13 Nov 
65. George Gollop Gallop - 
66. Samuel Gott" 
67. Thomas Grove V, - 
68. Robert Harley6 4,21,25 Nov 
69. John Harris V 
70. Herbert Hay V/ 
71. James Herbert -w/ 4,10 Nov; 4 Dee 
72. John Herbert -w/ 
73. Philip Lord Herbert Philip Herbert 7 Nov 
74. Sir John Hippisley Sir John Ipsley 25 Nov 
75. Peregrine Hoby Peregrine Hobbye Perogine Hobby 
76. Thomas Hodges V/ 
77. Thomas Hodges 
78. John Holcroft 
79. Denzil Holles Denzil Hollis Denzil Hollis I Dec 
80. Francis Holles Francis Hollis Younger Hollis - 
81. George Homer George Homet George Honer 23 Nov 
82. Bennett Hoskins Hoskins - 
83. Henry Hungerford V, V1, - 
84. Robert Jenner Robert Genner 4 Dec 
85. Richard Jennings Richard Genings GenninRs - 
86. William Jephson William Jepson - 
87. William Jesson Jepson 17,22 Nov 
88. William Jones V, 25 Nov 
89. George Kekewich' - 
90. Sir Norton Natchbull Sir Norton Natchpole Sir Norton Knatchpoole - 
9 1. Walter Kyrle Walter Kile 
92. William Langton 25 Nov 
93. Sir John Leigh Sir John Lee - 
94. Lewis Lewis Lewis (younger) - 
95. Sir William Lister 
96. John Lloyd John Floyd John Floyd 
97. Henry Lucas V Lucas 
98. Capel Luckyn Capel Luckinge Cavell Lucken 
99. Sir Oliver Luke Oliver Luke 
100. Sir Martin Lumley V/ I Nov 
10 1. Sir Nicholas Martyn Sir Nicholas Martin Sir Nocholas Martin 
102. Sir John Maynard 1 1,2,25 Nov 
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103. John Maynard 15 Nov; 5 Dec 
Underdown Vindication Anonymous Dates in Journals 
104. Thomas Middleton Middleton (Sussex) 
105. Thomas Moore V 1,9,25 Nov 
106. Sir Poynings Moore %/ - 
107. Thomas More V, 
108. William Morgan 
109. George Montagu 
I 10. Sir Thomas Myddleton Sir Thomas Middleton Sir Thomas Middleton 
I 11. Thomas Myddleton -W/ Middleton 
112. Sir Robert Napier Sir Robert Napper 
113. John Nash 
114. Sir Robert Need**** V1, 
115. John Nelthorpe 25 Nov 
116. Anthony Nicoll Anthony Nichol 4,9,14,24 Nov 
117. Sir Duley North 21,22 Nov 
118. Sir Roger North 
119. Arthur Onslow Onslow Ounior) 
120. Arthur Owen 
12 1. Sir Hugh Owen Owen 
122. William Owfield 
123. Henry Oxinden Henry Oxenden Oxenden 
124. Robert Packer V/ Robert Parker 
125. Sir John Palgrove Sir John Pagrove %/ - 
126. Sir Philip Parker V" 
127. Sir Thomas Parker Sir John Parker 
128. Sir Robert Parkhursk v - 
129. Sir Edward Partheriche Sir Edward Partridge Sir Edward Partridge 17 Nov 
130. Henry Pe, t- ck V/ Peck 
13 1. John Pelham Pelham (younger) 
132. Sir Thomas BPelham %/ - 
133. Sir Francis Pile Sir Francis Pile 
134. Sir William Playters Sir William Platers 
135. Edward Poole V/ Sir Edward Poole 
136. SirNeville Poole %111 - 
137. Sir John Potts Sir John Pots 9,13 Nov 
138. Thomas Povey V1, 
139. Sir Richard Pryse Richard Price 
140. Charles Pyrn 
141. John Ratcliffe 
142. Hall Ravenscroft Ravencroft 
143. Charles Rich Charles Richards 6,7 Nov 
144. Hugh Rogers V/ 
145. John Rolle John Rolls 29 Nov 
146. Richard Rose John Rose - 
147. Thomas Sandys Thomas Sands Sands 25 Nov 
148. John Selden 13,15,16,17 Nov 
149. Sir John Seymour V/ - 
150. Robert Shapcote Shepcott 
15 1. George Skutt George Scut Scutt 
152. Simon Snow Snow 
153. John Spelman John Selman 
154. Sir Edward Spencer Sir John Spencer 
155. Sir William Spring Sir John Spring 
156. Herbert Springett Herbert Springham 
157. Henry Skupleton Younger Stapletor 17 Nov 
158. ZouchTake 4,13,29 Nov 
159. Sir John Temple 27 Nov 
160. Thomas Temple 
161. Samuel Terrick 
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162. Simon Thelwell Simon Thewell 
- Underdown Vindication Anonymous Dates in Jouý n-als 
163. Alexander Thistlethwaite Alex Thistlethwaite 
164. Edward Thomasr- 22 Nov? 
165. Esay Thomas 22 Nov? 
166. John Thomas Thomas of Devon 22 Nov? 
167. John Thynne Thomas Thinn Thomas Thyn 
168. Richard Tolson Tolson 
169. Nicholas Tretusis Tresusis 22 Nov 
170. Sir Thomas Trenchard Sir John Trenchard 
171. John Trevor Younger Trevor 9 Nov 
172. Sir Thomas Trevor v 4 Dec 
173. Sir Humphrey Turton Sir Humphrey Tuston Sir Humphrey Tuston 22 Nov 
174. Thomas Twisden Twisden 16 Nov 
175. Sir William Uvedale Sir William Udell 
176. Sir Henry Vane (Senior) Sir Henry Vane 2 Nov 
177. Samuel Vassall V Vassall 4,10 Nov 
178. John Waddon John Whadden 
179. Thomas Waller 1,16,17 Nov 
180. Richard Whitehead Whitehead 
181. Henry Wills 
182. Edward Wingate Wingate 
183. Richard Winwood Winwood 
184. William Wray William Ray 
185. Sir Richard Wynn , Sir Richard Win Sir Richard Wyn 
186. Sir Christopher Yelverton Sir Henry Yelverton 13,30 Nov 
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Notes to Table I 
in the right hand column I have listed the MPs identified by Underdown as secluded. Where a YI appears, it signifies 
that Underdown has made no alteration to the spelling or added or altered a Christian name. Where there is a difference 
I have reproduced the names as they appeared in either list. Column 3 includes the dates the MPs attended the House 
during the five weeks before the first purge. The method used includes MPs named to committees and/or were tellers in 
motions. The same method was used by Dr Wordcn to gauge attendance patterns during the "Rump Parliament", p. 392 
-394. 
2 Underdown's decision to categorise the Bacons is discussed in the text above 
31 am unable to explain why James Belingfield featured in Underdown's List. Bellingfield does not feature in either 
Prynne's list or the anonymous publication; Underdown produced no additional infon-nation explaining why he 
featured in his list. 
4 Thomas Dacres' seclusion is also a mystery. Both the anonymous publication and Prynne's List mention Sir Thomas 
Dacres but not Thomas Dacres. As with James Bellingfield above, Underdown provides no additional information. 
5 Samuel Gott's seclusion is mentioned in the text. 
6 For Robert Harley's seclusion in the text. 
7 Kekewich's seclusion is again not explained by Underdown. See Footnotes 3 and 4 above. 
8 The journals of the House of Commons only mention Mr Thomas. It could be anyone of these three. 
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MI's Imprisoned between 6 th December and 30th January' 
Table 2 
Imprisoned members 
identified in Underdown's 
'Pride's Purge' 
Anonymous Publication Dates appeared in Commons 
Journals 
1. John Birch' 4,9,13,16,21,22 Nov; 1,5 Dec 
2. Thomas Boughton Boughton - 
3. Richard Browne V/ 18 
4. John Bulkeley John Buckley 10,11,13 Nov; 1,2 Dec 
5. Francis Buller 
6. Sir John Clotworthy 1,4,9,10,15,18,22 Nov 
7. Lionel Copley 1,3,4,9,16,17,18,21,22,25, Nov 
8. John Crewe John Crew I Dec 
9. Sir Simond's D'Ewes Simon D'Ewes 
10. Francis Drake Drake 3,4,7,21 Nov 
11. Sir Walter Erle 1,4,6,9,16,17,21,23, Nov; 1,4, Dec 
12. Nathaniel Fiennes Nathaniel Fienes 18,21 Nov 
13. Francis Gerard 6,9,10,24 Nov 
14. Sir Gilbert Gerard Sir Gilbert Gerard 4,13,22 Nov 
15. Thomas Gewen Gewen 17,21,22 Nov 
16. Giles Green V, 4 Nov 
17. Sir Harbottle Grimston 13,17,21 Nov 
18. Edward Harley Col Harlow 4,21,25 Nov 
19. Sir Robert Harley Sir Robert Harlow 4,17,21,28 Nov 
20. Sir Anthony Irby 17,18,21 Nov 
21. Richard Knightley 14,17,20,27 Nov; 2 Dec 
22. Thomas Lane LANE 1,9,15,16 25 Nov 
23. Edward Leigh Colonel Leigh - 
24. Sir William Lewis V/ 1,2,3,4,13,16,21,25 Nov; 25 Dec 
25. Sir Martin Lisker 1,25 Nov 
26. Sir Samuel Luke V 7 Nov; 1,4 Dec- 
27. Sir William Lytton Sir William Litton - 
28. Edward Massey V 1,9,22 Nov 
29. Sir John Meyrick Sir iohn Merrick 
30. Sir Richard Onslow V/ 22,25 Nov 
3 1. Henry Pelham V/ 
32. William Priestley Priestly 1,17 Nov 
33. William Prynne William Prinne 10,13,15,17,21,22,25 Nov 
34. Sir Robert Pye V 24,25 Nov; 4 Dec 
35. Sir Benjamin Rudyard Sir Benjamin Ruddiard - 
36. Sir Thomas Soame V, 4 Nov 
37. Edward Stephens 22 ov 
38. William Strode 22,25 Nov 
39. John Swynten John Swinten 2,4,13,14,17,18,21 Nov; I Dec 
40. Charles Vaughan 3 25 Nov 
41. Edward Vaughan V/ 
42. Clernont Walker %/ 4,25 Nov 
43. Sir William Waller V1, 4 Nov 
44. Thomas Lord Wenman Lord Wenman I Dec 
45. William Wheeler Wheeler 4,9,14,17,21,25 Nov 
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Notes to Table 2 
As mentioned in the text no alteration is required to Underdown's list of imprisoned members. The politics behind 
their imprisonment will be discussed in my section upon the 'Presbyterians'. 
John Birch featured twice. 




MPs whom Underdown. categorised as Secluded 
Using the anonymous publication as his sole reference 
1. John Arundall 28. Edmund Fowell 55. Sir Francis Pile 
2. Ralph Assheton 29. John Glyn 56. Sir John Potts 
3. Edward Baynton 30. George Gollop 57. Sir Richard Pryse 
4. Anthony Bellingfield 3 1. James Herbert 58. John Ratcliffe 
5. Sir Robert Bindlosse 32. John Herbert 59. Hall Ravenscroft 
6. John Bond 33. Philip Herbert 60. Hug Rogers 
7. John Button 34. Sir John Hippisley 61. John Rolle 
8. Henry Campion 35. Thomas Hodges 62. Richard Rose 
9. Charles Lord Carr 36. Bennett Hoskins 63. John Seldon 
10. Charles Cecil 37. William Jesson 64. Robert Shapcote 
11. Robert Cecil 3 8. Walker Kyrle 65. Sir Edward Spencer 
12. Thomas Ceeley 39. William Langton 66. Herbert Springett 
13. Robert Charlton 40. Sir John Leigh 67. Henry Stapleton 
14. Sir Thomas Checke 41. Lewis Lewis 68. Zouch Tate 
15. Francis Chettel 42. Sir John Maynard 69. Alexander Thistlethwaite 
16. Sir Henry Cholomley 43. John Maynard 70. Esay Thomas 
17. Samuel Clarke 44. Thomas Middleton 71. Richard Tolson 
18. Elisha Crymes 45. Thomas Moore 72. Nicholas Tretusis 
19. John Doyley 46. Sir Poynings Moore 73. Sir Thomas Trenchard 
20. Erasmus Earle 47. Thomas More 74. John Trevor 
21. Sir Charles Egerton 48. William Morgan 75. Thomas Twisden 
22. John Elford 49. George Montagu 76. Sir William Uvedale 
23. Robert Ellison 50. Anthony Nicoll 77. Sir henry Vane (Senior) 
24. George Evelyn 5 1. Arthur Onslow 78. Richard Whitehead 
25. Sir John Evelyn 52. Sir Hugh Owen 79. Henry Wills 
26. James Fiennes 53. Sir Thomas Parker 80. William Wray 
27. Sir Edmund Fowell 54. Sir Robert Parkhurst 8 1. Sir Christopher Yelverton 
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Notes to Table 3 
1 If Underdown's List of MPs is consulted, p. 361 - 90, Underdown was unable to trace the political backgrounds of 
forty-eight of these MPs. 
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Table 4 Lords Attendance Vt November 1648- 2 nd January 16491 
Bold denotes attendance after the first purge. 
1. Berkeley (Nov) 2,3,4,6,7,9,11, (Dee), 2,4,28, (Jan), 2. 
2. Bruce (Nov) 2,6,9,10,15,20. 
3. Dacres (Nov) 3,13,14,16,20,22,23,24,25,27, (Dec), 1,2,4, (Jan), 2. 
4. Denbigh (Dec) 12,13,14,15,16,18,19,20,21,23,26,28,29, (Jan), 2. 
5. Grey (Nov) 1,2,6,7,14,16,17,20,27,30 (Dec), 13,14,18,28,29,2. * 
6. Hereford (Nov) 1,2,4,8,13,20, (Dec) I 
7. Howard (Nov). 1,2,3,4,6,8,9,11,13,14,15,16,17,18,20,21,22,23,25,27,30, Dec 1, 
2,4,6,7. 
8. Hunsden (Nov) 8,9,11,13,14,15,16,17,18,20,21,22,23,25,27, (Dee) 2,4,5,6, 
(Jan) 2. 
9. Kancie (Nov) 23. 
10. Kent (Nov) 1,2,6,7,14,17,20, (Dec) 13,19,23,26,28,29, (Jan) 2. 
11. La Warr (Nov) 1,2,3,9. 
12. Lincoln (Nov) 1,2,3,4,6,7,8,9,10,11,13,14,15,16,17,20,21,22,23,30, (Dec) 1,2, 
4,5. 
13. Manchester (Nov) 1,2,3,4,7,8,9,10,11,13,14,15,16,17,18,20,21,22,23,24,25, 
1q2 27,28,30,1,2,4,5 6,7, (Jan pI 
14. Maynard (Nov) 14,15,17,18,20,21,23,24,25,27,28,30, (Dec) 1,2,4,5, Ljan), 2. 
15. Middlesex (Nov) 8,10,11, (Dee) 1,2,4,5. 
16. Montagu (Nov) 1,2,4,7,8,9,10,15,16,17,18,20,21,22,23,24,25,27,28,3 0, (Dec) 
2,4,513. 
17. Mulgrave (Nov) 1,2,7,8,9,13,14,15,17,20,22,25,30, (Dec) 1,2,4.6,7,12,15,16, 
18,19,20,23,26,28, (Jan) 2. 
18. North (Nov) 1,2,6,8,9,10,11,14,15,18,20,22,24,30, (Dec) 1,2,5,7, (Jan), 2. 
19. Northumberland (Nov) 1,2,4, (Jan), 2. 
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20. Nottingham (Nov) 1,3,6,7,16,17,22,23,24,25,27, (Dec) 2,13,15,16,18 19,, 20,21, 
23,28. 
21. Pembroke (Nov) 30, (Dec) 2,4,5 6,7,12,13,14,15,16,18,19,20,21,23,26,28,29 
(Jan) 2. 
22. Rutland (Nov) 3,4,6,7,8,9,10,11,13,14,16,17,18,20,21,22,23,24,25,27,28,30, 
(Dee) 1,2,4,5 6,7, (Jan), 2. 
23. Salisbury (Nov) 9,10,13,14,15,16,17,18,20,22,23,24,25,27,28, (Dec), 12,16,28. 
24. Sarum (Nov) 3 0, (Dec) 1,2,4,5. 
25. Say and Sele (Nov) 10,11,13,14,15,21,22,27, (Dec) 1,2,7. 
26. Stamford (Nov) 1,2,3,4,7,20,21,22,23,24,25,27,28,30, (Dec) 1,2,4,5 6. 
27. Suffolk (Nov) 1,2,3,6,7,8,9,11,13,14,15,16,17,18,20,21,22,23,24,25,27,30, 
(Dec) 1,2,4,5. 
28. Wharton (Dec) 1,5,7. 
Notes to Table 
* Lord Grey does not feature in the list of lords attending on the 2 tid January in the Journals of the House of 
Lords but it is clear from that source that he introduced the Bill. See L. J p. 641. 
1. For an analysis of the attendance figures see the text above. The statistics for this table are taken from LJ 
p. 572-641. 
2. Manchester was Speaker all of the sessions he attended with the exception of 2 nd of January but he did 





The Carte Manuscripts. 23. 
Clarendon Manuscripts. 31,34,39,40. 
British Library. 
Additional Manuscripts: 
4,929. Sen-non Notes. 
5,015. Catalogue of Manuscripts for the British Museum. 
5,497. Ordinances of Parliament. 1642-1649. 
10,114. Memorandum. Book of J. Harrington MP. 
15,859-15,964. The Diary of Thomas Burton. 
15,903. Original Letters. 
18,979. The Fairfax Correspondence. 1625-1688. 
19,399. Royal and Noble Autographs. 
21,506. Algemon Sidney to the Earl of Leicester. Fol 55. 
22,620. Collections Relating to Norwich. 
24,861. Letters and Papers of Richard Mayor of Bursley. 1639-1689. vol ii. 
28,002.1648-165 1. Family of Oxendon Correspondence. Vol iv 
29,747. John Rushworth's Papers. 
35,332. Ordinance Office Deliveries for Land Service. 
42,586. Brockman Papers. vol i. 
44,848. Copies of State Papers. 
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Egerton: 
1,788. Secret Correspondence of Charles I with H. Firebrace. 
2,541. Nicholas Papers. f 389. 
2,618. Historical Letters and Papers. 1556-1753. 
2,65 1. Barrington Family Correspondence. 
2,648. The Barrington Papers. 
Harleian: 
454. The Diary of Sir Humphrey Midmay. 1633-165 1. 
3,783. Letters to William Sancrott. 
4,288. Remonstrance Concerning Church Government. 
4,808. Letters of Kings and Copies. 
6,988. Royal Letters and Warrants. 1625-1655. 
7,001. Original Letters of State, Warrants etc. 1633-1724. 
7,396. Sir Thomas Herbert Memoir of King Charles 1. 
Stowe: 
184. Historical Papers. 1628-165 1. 
354. Collections Relating to Parliament Henry III to George Ill. 
361. Speeches in Parliament. 1558-1695. 
Sloane: 
3,945. Life of Christopher Love by his Widow, Mary. 
Printed pamphlets from the Thomason Collection. 
A Catalogue of the Names of so many of those Commissioners as safe and sentenced the late 
King Charles to Death. 27. Jan 1649. E. 1017. (7) 
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A Coffin for King Charles: a Crowne for Cromwell: a Pit for the People. You may sing this to 
the tune of "Faine I would. " 23. April 1649.669. f. 14. (22) 
A Crowne, a Crime; or, The Monarch-Ma! Vr. (Verses. ) 13. Feb 1649.669. L 13. (87) 
A Declaration and Protestation of William Pfynne and Clement Walker, Members of the 
House of Commons, against the present proceedings of the Army and their faction now 
remaininiz in the said House. 19. Jan 1649 669. L 13. (72) 
A Declaration from the Northem Associated Counties declaring their Resolution touching the 
proceedings of the Parliament and Anny. (A Letter signed: Nehemiah Reinoldson, 
Doncastcr. ) (A List of the Names of the Councell of State for the Common-wealth of 
England. ) 14. Feb 1649. E. 544. (6) 
A Declaration from the Prince of Wales conceming the Illegal Proceedings of the Commons 
of England. 13. Feb 1649. E. 542. (15) 
A Declaration of Lord Fairfax conceming the Supply of Bedding required from London for 
the lodging of the Army in voyd houses to prevent the Quartering of the souldiers upon the 
inhabitants. Together with a draught of his Warrants for that puEpose. 7. Dec 1648. E. 475. 
(40) 
A Declaration of Parliament conceming the TKyall of the King. Also the Resolution of the 
Anny touching the person of the King. (Letters from Windsor. ) I. Jan 1649 E. 536. (36) 
A Declaration of the Commons aRainst a scandalous book entituled, The Second Part of 
Englands New Chains discovered, &c. 27. March 1649.669. L 14. (13) 
A Declaration of the Commons in Parliament expressing their Reasons for the Adnulling o 
these ensuing Votes (i. e the Ordinances of the 8"' and 30th June, 1648, abandoning the 
vroceedings against the eleven imneached Members, and of the 17 th Aug. orderine the 
negotiations for the Newport Trea! y. ) 15jan 1649 E. 538. (23) 
A Declaration of the House of Commons declaring that the People are under God the 
Originall of all just power: that the Commons in Parliament being chosen by and representing 
the people have the supream power: that whatsoever is enacted by the House of Commons 
hath the force of Law, although the consent of the King or House of Lords bee not had 
thereunto. 4. Jan 1649 E. 537. (18) 
A Declaration of the Parliament of England expressing the Grounds of their late Proceedings 
and of Setling the present Govemment in the way of a Free State. 22. March 1649. E. 548. 
f U2 
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A Declaration of the Peers of this Realme against the late Treasonable Proceedings of some 
Members of the Commons House. 8. Feb 1649.669. L 13. (84) 
A Declaration sent from Lord Hopton to the inhabitants of Comwell and the Counties 
adjacent conceming his Ingagement for their joynt assistance to settle Him in his Crowne. 
8. Feb 1649. E. 544. (3) 
A Faithftil Subject's Sigh, on the universally-lamented Death of our most gracious Soveraigne 
Charles 1. (In verse. ) 30. Jan 1649. E. 560. (4) 
A Gospel-Engine, or Streams of Love and Pity to prevent New Flames in England, being a 
petitiongy Letter to the London Ministers, Subscribers of the Representation. (Signed: Rapha 
Harford. ) 2. March 1649. E. 545. JL91 
A Great and bloudy Fight at Sea between five Men of War belonginiz to the Parliament and a 
Squadron of the Irish Fleet, etc. (Letters from Edinburjzh, 8 Feb. and from Bristol and 
Worcester, 9 Feb. ) 9. Feb 1649. E. 542. (6) 
A Hand-Kircbife for Loyall Moumers or a Cordiall for Drooping Spirits, Groaning for the 
bloody murther of our Gracious King. A Letter to a Friend. 30. Jan 1649. E. 541. (6) 
A Just Remonstrance of the Lord Mayor, Common-Councell-men and other Citizens of 
London against two later Ordinances, 18 and 20 Dee, 1648, of the Lords and Commons that 
now sit for the choosing of Common Councell Men and other Officers within the Cily. I. Jan 
1649 E. 536. (29) 
A Letter from the Commissioners of Scotland (William Kerr, Earl of Lothian, John Cherslev 
and William Gkendoniniz) residin at London to William Lenthall Speaker of the House of 
Commons, conceming the present Proceedings against Religion, the King and Govemment 6 
Jan. with their Protestation against taking awqy his Majesties Life, 22 Jan. 6. Jan 1649 E. 539. 
ful 
A Letter from the Lord Mayor and Common Councell of London, in answer to a Letter from 
the L. Genrall, and the Armies seizing great summes of money from Weavers Hall and 
Goldsmiths Hall. 8. Dec 1648. E. 475. (39) 
A Letter of Advice from a scheduled Member of the House of Commons to Lord Fairfax, to 
admonish him of the Kings danger, his own duty and the sad consequence of tyranny. 
(Signed: E. S. ) 30. Dec 1648 E. 536. (38) 
A Letter of Lord Fairfax to the Lord Major for the better preserving a right understanding 
between Ci! y and Army. With an order of His Excellency to Col. Dean to seize the publike 
Treasuries of Goldsmiths, Weavers and Haberdashers Hall to pay Quarters. 8. Dec 1648. E. 
475.02) 
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A Letter written to an Honorable member of the House of Commons, sir Anthony Irby (from 
his constituents at Boston, thanking him for his services. ) 20. Dec 1648 669. L 13. (59) 
A List of the Imprisoned and Secluded Members. 26. Dec 1648 669. L 13. (62) 
A List of the Names of the Judges of the High Court of Justice for tLyall of the King. I I. Jan 
1649 669. L 13. (68) 
A Manifestation from Lieutenant Col. John Lilbum, William Walmn, Thomas Prince and 
Richard Overton, now Prisoners in the Tower, and others commonly, though unjustly, styled 
Levellers. 14. April 1649. E. 550. (25) 
A Message from the Royall Prisoner at Windsor to the Kingdome of Scotland. (Letters from 
Windsor. ) 3. Jan 1649 E. 537. (1) 
A Modest Vindication of the late Vindication of the Ministers of London from the scandalous 
Aspersions of John Price in a Pamphlet entituled Clerico-Classicum. By a friend to a 
regulated Monarchy, a free Parliament, etc. 3. April 1649. E. 549. (10) 
A necessaly Testimony against Toleration and the present proceedings of Sectaries in 
England. From the Commissioners of the Kirk of Scotland. Also the return of the Estates of 
the Parliament of Scotland thereupon, manifesting that all the members have disclaimed the 
proceedings of the English Anny against His Majesjy. 18. Jan 1649 E. 541. (3) 
A New Declaration conccming the King from the Commons, and the Proclamation of the 
Lord Fairfax and the rest of the Commissioners appointed for tuall of the King conceming 
their sitting in Westminster Hall. Man 1649 E. 537. (28) 
A new Paire of Spectacles of the old fashion for the Scots Commissioners to helpe their Eye- 
sigbt when they are retumed to the Parliament at Edenburgh . to give account of their Protest 
against the demands of the Parliament of England. 5. March 1649. E. 546. (3) 
A New-years Gift presented by Lord Fairfax and the General-Councell of Officers in severall 
Propositions for equal distribution of Elections. An Equal Representation of the People, etc. 
Uan 1649 E. 536. (24) 
A New-yeers Gift for the Kings Majesty from his loyall Subjects residing in London; and a 
Declaration of the Kings speedy coming to London. I. Jan 1649 E. 536. (26) 
A Parallel between the Ministerial Ingenuity of the Forty-seven London Ministers and the 
foule miscarriages of the Army in their Declarations. With an Answer to the Letter from the 
Ministers of London. (In defence of the action of the General Council of the Army and of the 
Kings Trial. ) 26. Feb 1649. E. 545. (8) 
296 
A Petition presented by the inhabitants of NeyMort Pagnell to the Lord Generall faifax and the 
Generall Councell at White Hall, desirinjj the person of the King might be brought to a speedy 
justice. 26. Dec 1648 669. E 13. (61) 
A Proclamation by the Lord General. (Forbidding disorderly or uncivil behaviour on the part 
of the soldiers stationed in London. ) 12. Feb 1649.669. f. 13. (86) 
A Proclamation by the Lord Generall, conceming Free-Quarter. 20. Feb 1649.669. L 13. (911 
A Proclamation for Tlyall of the King. Proclaimed in Westminster Hall, at the Exchange and 
in Cheapside. With the Proceedings of the High Court of Justice against him. 8. Jan 1649 E. 
537. (34) 
A Proclamation of L. Fairfax requiring all Persons who have engaized for the King now in 
London, to depart the City within twenty-foure houres. With a Petition of the Officers and 
Souldiers in the Isle of Weight, Portsmouth and Hurst presented to his Excellency. Man 1649 
E. 537. (36) 
A Publike Declaration and Protestation of the secluded Members of the House of Commons, 
against the illegal proceedings of some few Confederate Members since their forcible 
Exclusion. 13. Feb 1649.669. f. 13. (88) 
A Remonstrance and Declaration of severall Counties, Cities and BurrouAs alzainst the 
Unfaithfulness and unwarrantable Proceedings of some of their Knights and Burgesses in 
Parliament. (In favour of the King and Presbylerianism. ) 23. Dec 1648 E. 536. (23) 
A sad and serious Discourse upon a terrible Letter sent by the Ministers of London, to the 
Lord General and his Councel of War. By W. Ca, a Member of the Army. 25. jan 1649. E. 
540. (3) 
A Serious Representation of the Judgements of Ministers within the Province of London. A 
Letter from them to the Generall and his Councell of War. (giving the reasons of their Refusal 
to meet with the Officers of the Anny "in their consultations about matters of Religion. " 
Signed by forty-seven London Ministers. 18. Jan 1649 E. 538. (25) 
A Short Declaration by Colonel Edward Massie, one of the Imprisoned Members of the 
House of Commons. Together with his Protestation aRainst the Illegal and Tyrannicall 
proceedings of the Anny. 19. Jan 1649 E. 451. (7) 
A Solemn Exhortation made to the Churches within this Province of Lancaster. By the 
Provincial Synod assembled at Preston. 7. Feb 1649. E. 542. (7) 
A Solemn Protestation of the imprisoned and secluded Members of the Commons against the 
violence of the Anny. I I. Dec 1648.669. E 13. (53) 
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A true Copy of the Articles Agreed upon for the Surrender of Pontedfract Castle (between 
Major General John Lambert and John Morris, Govemor of the Castle. ) Also Major General 
Lamberts Letter to the Speaker for the demolishing of the said Castle. 22. March 1649. E. 548. 
(25) 
A true Narrative of the Title, Govemment and Cause of the Death of the late Charles Stuart, 
King of England. 5. Feb 1649. E. 541. (14) 
A true Relation of His Majesties sad condition in Hurst Castle. (A letter from the Isle of 
Wiaht, sianed: George Vaughan. ) 6. Dec 1648. E. 475. (19) 
A true Relation of the King's Speech to the Lady Elizabeth and the Duke of Gloucester, the 
day before his Death. 29. Jan 1649.669. L 14. (9) 
A True Relation of the Officers and An-nies forcible seisiniz of divers eminent Members of the 
Commons House, 6 and 7 Dec. Also a Letter written by an Agent for the Army in Paris, 28 
Nov., to a Creature of the Anny, clearlv discovering that their late Remonstrance and 
Proceedings do drive on the Jesuits and Papists Designs. 6. Dec 1648. E. 476.914) 
A true Report of the great Costs and Charges of the five Hospitals in the Cijy of London 
(Christ's Hospital, St. Bartholomew's, St. Thomas's, Bridewell and Bedlam) in the 
maintenance of their great number of poore, this present yeare. 26. March 1649.669. f. 14. 
(11) 
A Vindication of the Imprisoned and Secluded Members of the House of Commons, 23jan 
1649. T. T. E. 539 (5). 
A Vindication of the Ministers of the Gospel in London, from the unjust Aspersions cast ul2on 
their former Actings for the Parliament, as if they had promoted the bringing of the King to 
Capitall punishment. (Signed by fifty-eight Ministers). 27. Jan 1649. E. 540. (11) 
A Warrant of Lord Fairfax to (Richard Lawrence) the Marshall Generall of the Anny to put in 
Execution the fonner Ordinances & Orders of Parliament conceming the regulating of 
printing scandalous Pamphlets. 9. Jan 1649 E. 538. (1) 
A Word to Mr. Wil. Pjynn Esg and two for the Parliament and Army. Presented to the 
consideration of the Readers of Mr. William PKynn's last Book. 6. Jan 1649 E. 537. (16) 
An abridgement of the late Remonstrance of the Army (signed by John Rushworth) 27 th 
December 1648 E. 536 (8) 
An Act for the Abolishing the Kingly Office in England, Ireland and the Dominions thereunto 
belonging. 17. March 1649.669. f. 14. (2) 
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An Act of the Commons for the Adjouming of part of the Term of HilaKy. 16. jan 1649 669. L 
13. (70) 
An Act prohibiting the Proclaiming of any person to be King of England or Ireland. 30. jan 
1649. E. 1062. (27) 
An Agreement of the Frew People of England. Tendered as a peace-offering to this distressed 
nation. Lieutenant Colonel John Lilbume, Naster William Walmn, Master Thomas Prince 
and Master Richard Overton, prisoners in the Tower of London. 1. May 1649. E. 571. (10) 
An Answer to the Cities Representation set forth by some Ministers of the Gospel of London 
conceminjz the Proceedings of the Anny. By a Prcsbyterian Patriot. 7. Feb 1649. E. 541. (23) 
An Apologetical Declaration of the Conscientious Presbyterians of London. 24. Jan 1649. E., 
539. (9) 
An Elegie on Charles 1.4. May 1649. E. 553. (1) 
An Ordinance of Parliament conceminiz the Election of Common-councell Men and other 
Officers in the cijy of London. (forbidding the election of any "That subscribed, promoted or 
abetted any engagement in the yeare 1648 relating to a personall Treajy with the King" 
20. Dec 1648 669. f. 13. (59) 
An Ordinance of the Commons of England in Parliament assembled (constituting the High 
Court for the Trial of Charles 1. ) with a LiSt of the Commissioners and Officers of the said 
Court by them elected. Man 1649 E. 536. (35) 
Articles exhibited against the King and the Charge of the AM drawn up by the General 
Councell of Officers, etc. (A letter from Windsor) 28. Dec 1648 E. 536. (21) 
Articles of Impeachment of High Treason exhibited by the Commons of England in a Free 
Parliament against Lieutenant General Oliver Cromwell, Commissa! Y-General Hen! Y Ireton, 
Sir Hardeesse Waller, Colonel Pride (and other Members of Parliament, officers of the Army, 
etc. A satire) 19. Dec 1648 E. 476. (37) 
Ashhurst, William: Reasons aRainst Aueement, with a paper intituled Foundations of 
Freedome, or, the Agreement of the People. 26. Dec 1648 E. 536. (4) 
Ball, Will of Barkham: The Power of Kings discussed: or an Examen of the Fundamentall 
Constitution of the Free-bome People of England: in answer to severall Tenants of Mr. David 
Jenkins. 30. Jan 1649. E. 540. (21) 
Bennet, Robert. Colonell: King Charles Triall justified. 9. May 1649. E. 554. (21) 
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BLay, William. Captain, for himself and the Officers and Souldiers that are for 
Rughteousnesse and Peace: To the Supreme Authorfty the Commons in Parliament; an 
Appeal in the Claim of Justice against the Lord Fairfax. 19. March 1649. E. 546. (30) 
Bray, William: To the Supreme Authorfty of the Nation, the Commons assembled in 
Parliament. A second appeale in behalf of the Soveraignjy of Justice over all Persons, against 
Thomas Lord Fairfax. ? standing committed by Order of the House for my first Appeal. 
2. April 1649. E. 549. (6) 
Brooks, Thomas: Gods Delight in the progresse of the Upright. A Sermon before the House of 
Commons at their monethly Fast. 26. Dec 1648 E. 536. (6) 
Burrell, Andrewes: A Cordiall for the Calenture and other diseases which distemper the 
Seamen. Or, a Declaration discovering how Englands Sea Honour mqy be regarded as in the 
raigne of Queen Elizabeth. 5. Jan 1649 E. 537. (10) 
Canne, John: The Snare is broken. Wherein is proved that the Nationall Covenant and Oath 
was unlawfully given and taken. Here also is vindicated the Parliaments later proceedings. 
I. May 1649. E. 552. (22) 
Cardeil, John: Gods Wisdom Justified and Man's Folly condemned. A sermon before the 
House of Commons. 3 I. Jan 1649. E. 540. (Z4A 
Cokayne, William: The Foundations of Freedomw Vindicated: or the Reasons of William 
Ashurst against the Paper stiled The Peoples Agreement examined and discussed. 7. Feb 1649. 
E. 541". 
-C251 
Collier, T: A Vindication of the Army-Remonstrance. Being a moderate answer to Mr. 
Sedgwicks book, intituled Justice upon the Anny-Remonstrance. 20. Dec 1648 E. 447. (6) 
Cook-, John: King Charles his Case-, or an Appeal to all Rational Men conceming his TIyal. 
(In favour of the Sentence of the High Court of Justice. ) 9. Feb 1649. E. 542. (3) 
Danvers, Henty: Certain Queries conceming Liberty of Conscience. Propounded to those 
Ministers of Leicestershire when they met to consult that Representation which they so 
privateky framed. 27. March 1649. E. 548. (20) 
Dell, William: The Way of true Peace and Unily amOng the Faithful. Pp 140.8. Feb 1649. E. 
542. (l) 
Dove, Christopher: A just Vindication of the Reputation of Mr. White, aldennan if Exon. In 
answer to a pamphlet cald the Visible Vengeance. 15. Jan 1649 E. 538. (10) 
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Duty, John. Minister of the Gospell: A case of Conscience resolved: conceming Ministers 
medling with State-matters in their Sermons and how far they are obliged by the Covenant to 
inteEpose in the affairs of Civil Govemment. 29. March 1649. E. 548. (29) 
Eleutherius Philodemius: The Armies Vindication-, wherein are proved: First, that there is a 
power residing in the People above Kings. Secondly, that Kings are subject to Law. In reply 
to ("Justice upon the Annie" and othcr pamphlets by) Mr. William Sedgwick. 
EnRlands Fortresse: exemplified in his Excellency the Lord Fairfax. Humbly presented by 
E. C. (Edward Calver). 20. Feb 1649. E. 544. (14) 
EnRlands Standard Advanced. A declaration from M. Will Thompson, and the oppressed 
people of this nation now under his conduct in Oxfordshife. 6. May 1649. E. 553. (2) 
Erbe! y, William: The Lord of Hosts, or, God guarding the Camp of Saints. 24. Dee 1648 E. 
477. (22) 
Eye Salve to anoint the Eyes of the Ministers of London that they may see their Error in 
opposing the Proceedings of the Parliament and Army in the due execution of Justice. By a 
Minister of the Gospel. 13. Feb 1649. E. 542. (16) 
Geree, John: Mijzht overcomina Rijzht. A Cleer Answer to Mr. John Goodwin's Might and 
Right well met. 18. Jan 1649 E. 538. (24) 
Goodwin, John: Right and Might well met. Or a briefe enquiKy into the Proceedings of the 
Army. Wherein the equity of the said proceedings are vindicated. 2. Jan 1649 E. 536. (28) 
Hartley, William: The Priests Patent cancelled, or the Lay-mans Answer to the Pricsts 
Objections. 13. Feb 1649. E. 542. (17) 
HayEood, William: A Sermon tending tO Peace. Preached before His Majesty at Nenort 
during the time of his late Treaty. Dec. 1648 E. 475. (3) 
Heads of the Charge against the King drawn up by the Generall Councell of the Annie, &c. 
24. Dec 1648 E. 477. (25) 
His Majesties Declaration conceming His coming from Windsor to White-Hall. Also the 
Qucens Message to Lord Fairfax. (Letters from Windsor 4 and 6 Jan and from Westminster 6 
Jan) 4. Jan 1649 E. 537. (13) 
His Majesties Declaration conceming his present restraint under the power of the sword. 
Likewise, the Proceedings of the Councell of Warre, Charge against'the King, and his 
MajestY to be tried at Windsor. (Letter from Windsor) 21. Dec 1648 E. 477. (28) 
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His Majesties Deelaration conceming the Charge of the Army (A letter signed: J. Willis, 
Windsor. ) I. Jan 1649 E. 536. (25) 
His Maiesties Declaration conceming the Proclamation of the Anny and HiS Resolution 
touching their bringing of Him to Tryall. (Letters from Copenhagen, 4 Jan, Halifay, 6 Jan and 
Windsor, 10 Jan) I O. Jan 1649 E. 537. (37) 
His Majesties last Proposals to the Officers of the Annie (said to be written and dictated by 
his Majesly. Letters from Windsor, etc. ) 27. Dec 1648 E. 536. (13) 
John Lilbum and divers other Citizens of London: Englands New Chairs discovered: or the 
serious apprehensions of a part of the People, in behalf of the Commonwealth: being 
presenters of the Large Petition of II Sept. 1648.26. Feb 1649. E. 545. (27) 
Kiffin, William: Walwins Wiles; or, The Manifestators Manifested, viz. John Lilbum, Will. 
Walwin, Richard Overton and Tho. Prince, discovering themselves to be Englands new 
Chains and Irelands back Friends. I O. May 1649. E. 554. (24) 
KinR Charls his Speech made upon the Scaffold at Whitehall-Gate immediately before his 
Execution. 30. Jan 1649. E. 540. tU7 
Leinsula, Francis: The Kingdoms Divisions anatomized, with a Vindication of the Armies 
Proccedin2s. I. March 1649. E. 545. (25) 
Liberty of Conscience asserted, or Persecution for Religion condemned. By a well-wisher to 
the Kingdomes good. 20. March 1649. E. 548. (4) 
Mr William P! ynn his Defence of Stage-Plays, or a Retractation of a fonner Book of his 
called Histrio-Mastix. (A satire) IO. Jan 1649 E. 537. (31) 
Mr. P! ynnes Demand of his Liberty to the Generall. With his Answer, and his Protestation 
thereupon. 26. Dec 1648 669. f. 13. (63) 
Mr. Pymnes Letter to the Generall, demanding what kind of Prisoner he is, and whose 
prisoner, with an appearance to his Action of false imprisonment which he resolves to 
prosecute. 3jan 1649 669. L 13. (65) 
Nethersole, Francis. Sir: The Self-condemned. Or a letter to Mr. Jo. Goodwin (in reply to 
"RiRht and Might well met. ") 8. Jan 1649 E. 538. (2) 
New-Babels Confusion. Or Severall Votes of the Commons against certain Papers entituled, 
the ARreement of the People for a firm Peace, etc. (Resolutions of the House of Commons, of 
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November and December, 1647. Collected and published by William PjYnne. ) 30. Jan 1649. 
E. 540. (19) 
No Papist nor Presbyterian; but the modest Desires and Prol2osalls of some well-affected and 
Free-bom People; offered to the Generall Councell of the Annie in order to the Agreement of 
the People. 2 I. Dec 1648 E. 477. (17) 
Not Guiltic plead for the Lords and others of the Kings Partie. (A defence of King Charles I. 1 
20. Feb 1649. E. 544. (12*) 
Owen, John: A Sermon preached to the House of Commons, on a day of Solemne 
Humiliation. With a discourse about Toleration. 3 I. Jan 1649. E. 540. (25) 
Poyer, John. Col. (now a Prisoner at Whitehall): Poyer's Vindication in answer to a lying 
Pamphlet (by John Elliot) intituled A Short Comment upon the Grounds of Poyer's taking up 
Arms in the second Difference, which are Monstrous Lies. 29. March 1649. E. 548. (31) 
Price, John: Clerico-Classicum, or The ClerRi-allarum tO a third War. BeinR an answer to A 
Serious Rel? resentation of the Judgements of Ministers of the Gospel of London. 19. Feb 1649. 
E. 544. (1) 
Plyn, William: Mr Pryn's last and finall Declaration to the Commons of England conceming 
the King, Parliament and Army; shewing that it is High Treason to compasse the deposition or 
death of King Charles. 5. Jan 1649 E. 537. (12) 
PEynn against Prinn. Or the Answer of William P! ynne, Utter Barrester. of Lincolnes Inne, to 
a Pamphlet lately published by William P! ynne, a Member of the House of Commons, 
intituled A Briefe Memento to the present. Unparliamentaiy Juncto. (A satire). 26. Jan 1649., 
E. 540. (fi) 
Pjynne, William: A Breife Memento to the present Unparliamenta! Y Junto touching their 
present Intentions to depose and execute Charles Steward, their lawful King. 4. Jan 1649 E. 
537. (7) 
Pymne, William: The Vindication of William Pymne from some scandalous papers newly 
published (i. e. "Mr. William P! ynn his Defence of Stage-Plays"). 10. Jan 1649 669. L 13. (67) 
Redinvstone, John: Plain English to the Parliament and An-ny. (A denunciation of King 
Charles 1) 12jan 1649 E. 438. (4) 
Richardson, Samuel: An Answer to the London Ministers Letter to his Excellency & his 
Counsel of War. Also an Answer to John Geree's Book entituled Might overcoming Right. 
27. Jan 1649. E. 540. (8) 
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Robins, Ro: A Whip for the Marshall's Court and their Officers. The Petition of Robert 
Robins to the House of Commons against the abuses practised in the Marshals Court. And a 
discovejy of the Jurisdiction and Priviledge of that Court. 7. Dec 1648. E. 475. (27) 
Salmon, Joseph: A Rout, a Rout; or some part of the Annies Quarters beaten up, by the D4Y 
of the Lord stealing upon them. I O. Feb 1649. E. 542. (5) 
(Scott), Thomas: A Pair of Cristal Spectacles with which Any Man may see plainly. 18. Dec 
1648. E. 546. (30) 
Sedgewick, William: A second view of the anny Remonstrance, or Justice done to the Annie. 
23. Dec 1648 E. 447. (20) 
Sedgewick, William: Mr. William Sedgwick's Letter to Lord Fairfax in prosecution of his 
Answer to the Remonstrations of the Anny. 28. Dec 1648 E. 536.910) 
Sedgewick, William: The Soiritual Madman; or, a Prophesie conceming the King, the 
Parliament, London, the Army. 20. Dec 1648 E. 477. (9) 
Sed2wick, William: Justice upon the Armies Remonstrance-, or, A rebuke of that evill spLrit 
which leads them in their counsels and actions. I I. Dec 1648. E. 475. (34) 
Six Propositions of undoubted verijy fitt to be considered by all loyall Subjects. 1. That this 
Parliament gathered out of the Mysticall Writings of Jacob Behmen. pp. 52.5. Feb 1649. E. 
541. (13) 
Six Serious Quacries conceming the Kings Triall by the new High Court of Justice. 9. Feb 
1649.669. L 13. (85) 
The Annies Remembrancer. Wherein they are presented with a Sight of their Sinnes and 
Dangers. By a Cordiall Friend to the Kingdomes welfare, Rr. 4. Jan 1649 E. 537. (6) 
The Articles and Charize of the An-nie aizainst fourscore of the Parliament men. With the 
Names and Number of those who were seized on by Col. Pride, 6 Dec. Likewise the further 
demands of Generall Councel. 8. Dec 1648. E. 475. (30) 
The Charge of the Army and Counsel of War against the King. With a brief Answer thereunto 
by some of the Loyall Party. 29. Dec 1648 E. 536. (20) 
The Cijy-Ministers unmasked, or the Hypocrisic of fifty-nine of the most eminent of the 
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Relation of the whole Expedition. (signed by Richard haddock, Vice Admirall, Robert 
Moulton, and twenly other Officers. Dated from the Downs. ) 23. Dec 1648 E. 536. (32) 
The Paper called the Agreement of the People taken into Consideration and the Lawfulness of 
Subscription resolved in the Negative by the Ministers of the Province of Lancaster. (Signed 
by fifty-four Lancashire Ministers. ) 6. March 1649. E. 546. (27) 
The Parliament justified in their late Proceedings against Charles Stuart. As also an Answer to 
the humble Advice of the Lecturers of Banbu! y and Brackley. By J. Fidoe, T. Jeanes, W. 
Shaw, Students in Trinity College in Cambridge. 27. Feb 1649. E. 545. (14) 
The Parliament under the Power of the Sword. (An account of 'Pride's Purge', on 6 Dec). 
6. Dec 1648.669. L 13. (52) 
The Parliament under the power of the sword. With a briefe Answer thereunto by some of the 
Anny. I I. Dec 1648. E. 476. (1) 
The People informed of their Oppressors and Oppressions. (A denunciation of Charles 1.1 
Unto which is added the sentence of Deposition against Richard Il and Edward II. 28. Dec 
1648 E. 536. (17) 
The Petition and Presentment of the Grand-Juries of the Counjy of York, for the demolishing 
of Pontefract and Midlam Castles and for taking of Free-guarter in that Counly. 19. March 
1649. E. 548. (26) 
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